Dear Readers,

This issue of the Review is devoted to an account of an in-house seminar, on the title below, held on 26 June at Peace Direct. It is written by Anne Rogers. We had a very rewarding day and we hope and trust you will find this an interesting read.

Designing peacebuilding interventions

This seminar – like last year’s on ‘Pacification or Peacebuilding’ – was for committee members only, designed to allow for a deeper analysis and discussion of members’ work than is generally possible in an open CCTS seminar. There were no pre-distributed papers; instead, three case studies of peacebuilding interventions in which committee members were involved were described and discussed. These presentations were given by Jonathan Cohen of Conciliation Resources (CR), Alan Pleydell of Quaker Peace and Social Witness (QPSW) and Marwan Darweish and Sarah Giles of Responding to Conflict (RTC).

The seminar was attended by 12 people and facilitated by Simon Fisher and Francesca Cerletti. The entire meeting took place in plenary, under the Chatham House rule. Each of the case study presentations was followed by a question and discussion session, and the seminar ended with a general discussion.

CR’s experiences in the Caucasus

In the first presentation, Jonathan Cohen, of Conciliation Resources, described his experience of working in the Caucasus, in particular in relation to the conflict over Abkhazia, and the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process. Jonathan has personally been active in this region since 1992, soon after the war began; CR’s work there commenced in 1998.

Jonathan admitted that when he began working in the Caucasus he knew little about the region and, with retrospect, the work in which he was initially involved was naïve and ill-founded. He reflected that ignorance was a common starting point when an organisation is new to a region, and stressed the importance of acting in an appropriately modest way.

The original design of CR’s peacebuilding project evolved in 1997-8, after the war had ended. The project was based on three assumptions:

The first was that the focus should be on helping people to identify and address for themselves the problems in their local society. It was recognised that the Abkhaz had borne the brunt of the war, and for nascent civic organisations there the priority would not, initially, be to enter into dialogue with Georgia. CR therefore focused on assisting some nascent Abkhaz NGOs to develop civil society capacities, encourage activism and enable marginalised groups to find a voice. To this end
they have provided training, support, strategic advice and funding for a range of activities, including civic education; language programmes; human rights development; youth groups; disabled groups; and local business development. From the outset a decision was taken not to work on civil society development issues in Georgia, given the plethora of other international organisations doing this. However, some projects specifically related to the conflict and peace process were initiated with Georgian NGOs and activists; in particular CR supported the evolution of a network of IDP organisations – seeking to empower the most marginalised group in Georgian society that had an important voice for the peace process.

The second assumption was that the war and the political animosity that followed had fuelled antagonism and negative stereotypes on both sides that had to be broken down. CR has therefore supported a number of media developments, including radio, print and TV projects, some within the communities, others that bridged the divide, including representatives from both sides (for example, some TV and radio programmes and the publication of a newspaper).

The third assumption was that it would be important for the people in both communities to begin to analyse what their options were, and to find ways of influencing their political leaders. By 2000 it was possible to establish a series of what has now been 19 direct Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue meetings within the framework of the Schlaining process, involving more than 120 officials, politicians and civil society actors, and to organise international study visits (for example to Northern Ireland) for these groups.

CR’s strategy has evolved over time in a way that Jonathan described as both constant and organic. It has been affected by CR’s understanding of the current political climate; their relationships with the Georgian and Abkhaz governments and their officials; their relationships with local partners; these partners’ evolving aspirations, and the changing objectives of donors, though it is hoped that CR has been able to influence these objectives.

The relationship with key stakeholders/partners

CR works at a number of different levels – both within the region and internationally.

At a local level they have very many (some might say too many) civil society partners. Maintaining these relationships is very demanding, requiring a continuing dialogue that assists people to be clear about their needs and how these might be addressed, while consistently ‘being there’ for people who are living in difficult and pressured circumstances, whose scope for action is oftentimes very limited. This requires long-term commitment.

At the political level CR maintains a dialogue with both Abkhaz and Georgian authorities, exploring their attitudes with them and challenging them to open up their thinking to alternative approaches. It can be difficult to proceed in a way that appears even-handed to both parties, when the Georgian authorities have often done much that needs to be challenged and the Abkhaz authorities have little room for manoeuvre.

At an international level CR maintains a relationship with the UN, and has regular meetings with the British and other European ambassadors and foreign ministry representatives. This is another benefit of the length of CR’s involvement in the region: they have a recognised expertise and this gives them opportunities to influence policy.

Key openings and turning points

In a sense there are always potential turning points after a conflict, because the politics are so raw and open, but it is often only possible to identify the key turning points after the event. What is important, therefore, is to be able to recognise moments when action might be possible and to grasp the opportunity. Jonathan described this as a mixture of planned opportunism and principled pragmatism.
For example, the impasse in inter-governmental negotiations means that there are currently very few if any direct discussions between the Georgian and Abkhaz governments. Notwithstanding this, CR has continued to explore opportunities for facilitating informal dialogue and after a long round of consultations it appears that a group of parliamentarians from the respective parties are open to the idea of a meeting. Such meetings are encouraged by CR in the hope that they influence higher-level discussions as and when they resume.

**Challenges**

It is a challenge to get close enough to a community to be able to support people ‘on the ground’, without losing the ability to raise difficult issues or being regarded as partisan.

Being a long-term actor in the region obviously has benefits in terms of the expertise that has been developed and the relationships that can be forged. On the other hand, it increases the likelihood of accusations of partisanship, as well as making it difficult to maintain a feeling of freshness in your approach to the work.

It can be particularly difficult to maintain the stance of not taking a position on the outcome of the conflict in this region, where the culture can be to regard neutrality as opposition.

The fact that CR is providing the funding can create an asymmetry in relationships with civil society partners. CR prefers to see itself as a partner rather than as a donor and in instances where it was involved in assisting in the running of small grant competitions CR tried to sidestep this problem as much as possible by passing responsibility to a local partner which took primary responsibility for selecting the projects that received financial support. In other contexts there is a great deal of local consultation about the dispersal of funds.

Finding funding for the ‘right’ work is often difficult. CR has been fortunate in being able to engage with the UK government and the EU to influence their approach and their willingness to fund work on the key issues.

Other issues not specific to this work or this region include the occasional problems of co-ordination between different peacebuilding organisations (some are easier to work with than others) and our failure as organisations to bring on a new generation of activists. This is exacerbated by the fact that for many young people the priority is to find work and there is rarely adequate funding for them to find posts in civil society organisations.

**What qualities are required?**

Jonathan identified seven qualities that he thought were necessary in peacebuilding work (and, in the interests of alliteration, did his best to make them all start with ‘p’). They were:

- **Patience**: the willingness to wait for the right moment to act;
- **Persistence**: the ability not to be disheartened by the many set-backs;
- **Political judgement**: to be at the same time idealistic (or you wouldn’t be in this work) and realistic (or you couldn’t do it at all);
- **Personability**: the ability to get on with people and create confidence (and in this region at least, a good liver!);
- **Prescriptiveness**: the ability to criticise, where necessary, and to push hard analysis;
- **Persuasiveness**: the ability to encourage people to consider alternative approaches and actions;
- **Authenticity**: the commitment to working with integrity and good faith, and the belief that this earns you the right to say difficult things.
Discussion

The first commentator noted that fifteen years have now passed since the end of the war, without a resolution. Jonathan responded that the passing of so much time is seen differently by different people. The Abkhaz are in general uncritical, grateful for the fact that they are somewhat less isolated now than they were. The Georgian government is becoming increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress, but at the same time not encouraging progress and allowing little room for negotiation. (One participant observed that unhelpful political action is a common factor in protracted peace negotiations.) It is getting harder to find donors – because the focus has inevitably shifted to new conflicts and worse political situations. (Jonathan saw this, at least in some sense, as no bad thing – since it ensures that a good case for funding has to be made.)

Participants were interested in the problems inherent in working with so many different groups, and in the dichotomy of simultaneously doing grassroots capacity building work and engaging with the political systems that have created or sustained the problems. Jonathan agreed that it could be difficult to maintain clear objectives at the different levels. Action in the moment is not infrequently intuitive rather than worked out, but is always underpinned by constant joint strategising. Jonathan believed that both the breadth of CR’s relationships and the number of different levels at which they worked were fundamental to their being taken seriously in the region. The community-level support gave local people the confidence that CR cared about their future, and made it easier for them to be challenging politically. One participant pointed out that the initial lack of capacity for negotiation on the part of the Abkhaz made it necessary to work in a different way with them and complemented Jonathan that CR had managed to sustain this when it must inevitably attract criticism. Jonathan replied that CR dealt with the asymmetry by focusing their work where it was most needed – mostly in Abkhazia, but also with IDP groups in Georgia.

One participant worried that if an organisation’s strategy is not worked out in collaboration with its partners, there is a danger of instrumentalising them. Although she was impressed with CR’s relationship with the people and organisations it works with, she wondered how possible it was to avoid this dilemma, particularly if one had many partners. Jonathan agreed that partners could be instrumentalised, but pointed out that so could CR! He was quite comfortable with this, as long as CR continued to be very open about what they were trying to do. CR’s political work makes some partners quite uncomfortable, but it doesn’t stop them doing it.

There are different approaches among the conflict transformation community in the degree to which they encourage the different parties in a conflict to develop a common strategy. Jonathan felt that too much focus on a single strategy could be more instrumentalising, and more frustrating, than a more flexible approach. He recognised that much in the Georgian and Abkhaz strategies had to be different because of their different aspirations, but this does not mean that there are not commonalities; one of CR’s roles is to provide the space to explore these.

QPSW’s work in the Balkans

In the second presentation, Alan Pleydell described the work of Quaker Peace and Social Witness in the Balkans. Alan, like Jonathan, has been personally involved in the work from the outset.

QPSW’s involvement in the region spans almost exactly the same time as CR’s in the Caucasus and, although the foundations for their work were inevitably rather different from CR’s, being governed by Quaker processes and principles, Alan felt there were many similarities with CR’s approach, and with Jonathan’s analysis of the key qualities needed in order to do this type of work.

Any work undertaken by the Society of Friends (Quakers) is set in a context of certain qualities and processes. The qualities Alan described were those of discernment, which many Quakers would see as guided by the Holy Spirit, and which is a necessary part of strategising, and faithfulness – sticking with people in hard times.
In general, the area of engagement is determined in Quaker committees. At the outset of the work in the 1990s, the prevailing inherited ‘model’ for overseas work was to have expatriate Quaker representatives in the selected region. The money to pay for the work, now as then, is mostly raised within the Quaker community (which, depending on the measure used, consists of between 16,000 and 35,000 people). Almost inevitably this means that work develops organically, through the slow development of relationships of trust with local actors and in response to changing circumstances, rather than mechanistically, in response to a worked out external analysis and prescription. QPSW’s work in the Balkans continues to fit this model, though in 2000-02 there was a managed transition to employing representatives who were local people embedded within their communities and already known and trusted for their peacebuilding work.

The Balkans Programme began in 1992 when the Quaker European Relations Committee, aware of the expansion of the Balkan war, wanted an increasing involvement from what was then called QPS (Quaker Peace and Service). At the same time, they recognised that QPS was fully committed in Russia and Northern Ireland. So the only work that could initially be afforded, in time and money, was done by Alan. It consisted of making contacts and building relationships of trust with people in the region, occasionally visiting, often together with a voluntary committee member, and recommending originally very small grants to assist their initiatives in the hope that the links fostered would become of use for more engaged peacebuilding and conflict transformation work later on. (During this period, a number of other Quakers were involved in the region, but not explicitly as representatives of the Society of Friends.)

By 1997 QPS’s involvements in Russia and Ireland were winding down, and more resources became available for work in the Balkans. After preliminary research, two representatives (both ex-pats) were hired in late 1998 to work in Sarajevo, with the objective of making stronger links in the region and supporting partners through capacity building training and continued small grant aid. They liaised with key local individuals who were engaged in a variety of peacebuilding and conflict transformation work. (In theory the relationships were formed with particular organisations; in practice, it was nearly always the individuals that mattered.) Who became key associates and partners was not determined by any pre-articulated focus on which specific sectors of the grassroots community would be particularly key to peacebuilding (whether young people, women’s groups, or income-generation schemes), but by an adherence to the Quaker tradition of supporting groups and their leaders whose activities could be seen to fall under the broad description of fostering peace. Similarly, the focus on Bosnia was not a strategic decision but a response to the dawning pragmatic recognition that they could not effectively function region-wide with only two people.

By the end of the 1990s many of the international organisations working in Bosnia had moved on to new conflict areas. QPS, in line with its principle of faithfulness and the sense that the real opportunities for sustained peacebuilding and reconciliation arose when the fighting had been over for some years, wished to remain in Bosnia and the wider region. Owing to internal financial constraints, however, it could not freely expand its budget or fundraise to fit an emerging broader regional need. Funding became available unexpectedly when a discussion of the Kosovo war at the summer 1999 Yearly Meeting of Quakers in Britain resulted in about £20,000 of relief money being raised almost immediately, when the head of fundraising ‘sent round some buckets’. At this time QPS had no programme in Kosovo and they felt a deep commitment to their work in Bosnia, which was already stretching them, they had no Albanian speakers, and many other organisations were already working there. However, in order to spend the new and unplanned money, they hired a temporary worker to advise on which relief groups within Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro should receive it. The contacts thus quickly made were not sustained but, in recognition of the importance of Kosovo to the regional picture, QPS did participate in the Balkan Peace Team, which was managed by a peace movement consortium, and contributed a volunteer.

In 2001 QPSW (as it now became) conducted a weekend consultation with its region-wide partners to consider what, if any, future work Quakers should undertake. The overwhelming response was that the Quaker approach, which consists essentially of using the Socratic method of drawing out and encouraging reflection, rather than coming with preconceived answers, was usefully different,
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in that it carried with it no agenda other than being ‘helpful for peace’. They were asked if they could work region-wide on ‘Dealing with the Past’, by assisting and engendering informal, non-governmental processes for truth and reconciliation. It was felt that the existing processes were either too politicised (because they were initiated by the state) or too remote from the people (because sponsored by urban intellectuals) to be able to do this work effectively.

The work has taken several years to get off the ground – affected not only by its small budget but also by the fact that it involved a change in focus for the organisation, and the appointment of new staff – but authentic truth and reconciliation work is now taking place, and growing. It has been a slow process, but the people and groups encouraged by QPSW are now starting to feel confident enough to work not only with the ‘victims’ of violence but also to begin work with its ‘perpetrators’ – recognising that the unprocessed violent tendencies that these ‘perpetrators’ had visited on society would continue to be recycled until they were directly addressed.

**Challenges**

Because of the way they are funded, Quakers cannot easily grow programmes to fit with the changing situation ‘on the ground’. For this reason they often engage in what Alan called ‘strategic tokenism’ – being selective as a way of responding to increasing demand without any increase in funding.

Funding pressures are increasing, and one recent effect is that QPSW is now under pressure to set up projects with a duration of no more than 5 years. This fits badly with the Quaker principle of faithfulness, as well as with a broader truth about the length of time it takes to bring about lasting change.

The newly-created truth and reconciliation team suffered initially from a great deal of internal conflict. Alan reflected that when you create a new team in an area of present or recent violence, you must expect the stresses of working in that environment to affect inter-personal relations. Such workers need extensive training in dealing with the external stresses that manifest themselves in their own relationships.

**Discussion**

In the ensuing discussion session it was generally agreed that it is necessary to wait until people are emotionally ready to deal with the past. This requires patience (a quality already identified by Jonathan). Alan commented that courage is also needed, especially if funders are pushing for action or only committing to short-term support.

In much of QPSW’s work in the Balkans, key local individuals have been far more important than the organisations for which they worked. Several participants recognised that this was also true in their work, and were concerned with the limitations that this might impose on their capacity to expand the work. Alan’s view was that the amount of growth that could be achieved inevitably depended on the individuals’ capacity to inspire and to establish co-operative lattices of relationships.

**RTC’s experience in the Middle East**

In the third presentation, Marwan Darweish and Sarah Giles described Responding To Conflict’s ongoing work in Israel and Palestine.

This work grew out of an initial feasibility study conducted by RTC for the British Council in East Jerusalem, primarily involving discussions with Palestinian civil society organisations, but later widening to include Israeli NGOs. During a preliminary 15-month pilot phase, RTC offered capacity building support, so that local actors could interact more coherently and strategically with each other and increase their impact on policymakers. This phase also included conflict analysis
and a series of ‘taster’ Conflict Transformation training sessions for Palestinian and Israeli civil society organisations.

Having obtained further funding, RTC has spent the last 3 years (2004-2007) working with a range of Israeli and Palestinian civil society organisations on a programme to build their capacity to ensure that the visions, aspirations and concerns of Israeli and Palestinian citizens for a just settlement of the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict impact effectively on political decision-shapers and on public discourse. The overarching objective is to contribute to a sustainable and just peace in the region, through good governance and nonviolent conflict resolution. The programme involves the delivery of conflict transformation training to partner organisations as well as working with them on developing and implementing action plans for transferring this learning into their organisations and wider communities.

The structure of the programme involves four field visits per year, each of 3 weeks’ duration. Each visit involves workshops and interim meetings to draw out the learning from the previous workshop and plan for the next one. As with the previous two presentations, RTC’s strategy was therefore evolutionary; no fixed path was defined at the start of the programme.

**Programme delivery**

The selection of partners proceeded differently in the two communities. In Palestine, partners were sought through PNGO, a network of more than 100 Palestinian NGOs. After an open recruitment process, 25 organisations were selected to form a strategy group. By contrast, Israel had no existing forum to cooperate with, and there was little desire to create one at that time. Initially, therefore, RTC worked bilaterally with a number of separate Israeli organisations: Shatil (Israel’s largest capacity-building organisation, which aims to strengthen Israeli civil society by promoting democracy, social justice and tolerance), New Profile (a feminist/anti-military group), Hakeshet (which promotes the rights of the Oriental Jews) and Mossawa (a group that advocates and campaigns for the rights of Palestinians living in Israel). RTC made it clear that this bilateral work was only for a limited period, and that it would be necessary to formulate some sort of common theme if the work was to continue, but this took some time to emerge. Interestingly, there was little curiosity from each side about RTC’s work with the other side, though both were aware that RTC was working in Palestine and Israel.

The preliminary 15-month study had revealed a Palestinian civil society that was fragmented and violent, with little capacity to effect change. The first year of the programme phase (starting September 2004) consisted primarily of conflict transformation (CT) training and organisational capacity building (including working with Israeli organisations to clarify their positioning with regard to the wider conflict). There was little evidence of applied learning until the second year, when a number of small initiatives began. These included: partners from the Medical Relief Committee transferring the training to their programme managers; agricultural workers in Gaza using CT techniques in dealing with potential conflicts over access to water and other agricultural resources following the withdrawal of Jewish settlers; women in the West Bank standing up to male dominated local councils; lawyers in the West Bank using CT in legal disputes, as a precursor to court involvement, and work to try and include CT in undergraduate legal training.

**Turning points**

With the Palestinians, there was a definite point, two years in, when partners had developed enough trust in RTC to accept that their ‘agenda’ was not simply ‘normalisation’.

In Israel, the turning point was when Shatil asked RTC to run two seminars for Directors of a number of Jewish and Palestinian social change organisations. More than half of these Directors expressed an interest in continuing to meet after the seminars. The current Strategy Group in Israel, the creation of which had initially been so difficult to motivate, grew out of these meetings.
Challenges

Funding has been a major challenge throughout the programme. The work has never been fully funded, and the 60-70% funding RTC does receive is provided by three donors. The UK GCPP offered substantial programme funding in early 2006 but withdrew its intention to continue funding in the summer when the war in Lebanon began and GPC had to divert the money to reconstruction work there. The three-year initial programme will end this year, and RTC is preparing for a second phase in which they will change their role from trainer to accompanier. RTC is encouraging local partners to fundraise as part of the transfer of ownership of the work.

Many of RTC’s civil society partners (Israeli as well as Palestinian) were initially suspicious that RTC had a hidden agenda to bring the two sides together for dialogue. This was never RTC’s agenda, despite the awareness that at some point in the future, civil society organisations from both sides will need to have a level of dialogue during the peace process.

The process of CT knowledge transfer by partners to a wider community proved much more challenging than RTC had envisaged. The process of building confidence to implement the learning in practical actions took longer than expected. It has been a struggle for RTC, based in Birmingham, to support this vital work from so far away, and RTC is trying to ensure a clearly defined role of accompaniment for the next phase in order to promote sustainability and long term change.

The war in Lebanon polarised society within Israel, and created great tensions within the mixed Jewish/Palestinian steering group; despite the risk of fragmentation and possible disintegration, however, the group has gained in strength and is now more able to clarify their joint vision and agenda.

Even before the recent violent takeover of Gaza by Hamas the mood of the area was one of isolation and despair. Now, things are even worse, and it can be hard to sustain optimism in a programme that at best is making only small grassroots improvements.

Discussion

The difficulty of getting partners to transfer learning and so multiply the effect of the programme, was the first focus of the ensuing discussion. Some participants had experienced this problem when working with relatively junior members of an organisation – because they lacked the authority to change attitudes within the wider organisation – but had more success when they dealt with senior managers or organisation directors. It was recognised, however, that training others was likely to be a challenge for organisations that had no training skills.

Marwan’s expressed feeling of despair was also taken up in general discussion. Participants who know the RTC programme commented on the progress that had been made – from initial hostility and resistance to the present day where 3-4 groups had developed local momentum and were doing constructive work together. The huge importance and value of sustaining hope and offering support in times of crisis was also re-iterated. Affecting the quality of coexistence at a very local level is part of this – described by one participant as the ‘daily peace’ as opposed to the ‘big peace’.

One participant acknowledged that, for him, civil society work alone was not enough. He felt that where people were dying there was a duty to try and engage with governments, too. He commended Jonathan’s success in establishing senior political links in the UK and UN, but thought such relationships were too rare, and that peacebuilding practitioners should try harder to engage at this level.

Others felt that governments generally knew exactly what was happening, but that ‘realpolitik’ over-rode this knowledge when policy was formulated. Some thought that the desk officers – whether in the UK or the USA – were generally very well informed, and tended to share much of the analysis and concerns of the peace workers. They felt that the difficulty was in getting through
to the politicians themselves, especially when they received so much of their briefing not through the civil servants but through ‘special advisors’. In these circumstances, all that one can do is to continue to respond with what Jonathan described as ‘consistent, coherent argumentation’.

Final session

In this final discussion session, participants commented that, although the approach taken in the three case studies was affected by the way that each organisation functioned, there were great similarities between them, including: their focus on individuals and relationships; their willingness to stand by local partners and offer support until they had the capacity to act, even (or perhaps especially) when this required very long-term commitment; their work in supporting local action and building the capacity to reflect; and the qualities that were identified as necessary to do the work effectively.

All of the speakers made a distinction between organic and mechanical development of strategy, and one participant would have liked to hear more about the implications of choosing a particular route to strategy development, whether by adopting an intuitive approach, by basing strategy more on the philosophical basis of one’s organisation, or by consciously formulating it with local partners. In reality the three case studies all used a combination of these approaches: if peacebuilding work is necessary, the local political situation is, almost by definition, volatile, and it will require intuition and experience to make the most of whatever is possible at any given moment; a peacebuilding organisation will inevitably have guiding principles which underpin all its work; and if that work is to be successful, it will involve collaborating with and listening to local partners.

It was suggested that a number of possible strategic trajectories could be taken:

i) focusing on the primacy of people and relationships (which was the approach taken by RTC and, to a large extent, by QPSW);
ii) focusing on politics and policy, either through direct influence or by supporting the actions of local partners;
iii) focusing on both people and politics, and dealing with the tensions that working at different levels inevitably created (which was CR’s approach in Georgia and Abkhazia).

Alan commented that QPSW’s role would always be to offer support until the local actors felt ready to act politically. In his experience, any attempt to impose political direction from the outside would be unwelcome.

There was some discussion about the legitimacy of international actors. Outsiders are most likely to have a dispassionate, non-entrenched viewpoint, but insiders clearly have more legitimacy, because of their first-hand knowledge and personal involvement. People who manage to straddle the two positions, either by dint of longevity in a region (like Jonathan) or because of their background (like Marwan) have the capacity to have most influence.

The efficacy and limitations of working with civil society were raised again, with one participant commenting that although civil society alone cannot make peace, peace cannot be made without it.

The choice of partners was also discussed. Is it better to develop relationships with a wide range of organisations, to select a small number of partners (and if so, how?) or to try and identify ‘winners’ – inspirational individuals who might really make a difference? Several participants saw great dangers in picking ‘winners’, fearing that a bad choice would be destructive and even a good choice might be divisive. One or two people admitted that their organisations had run into trouble by picking people who were objectively excellent (even when there had been intuitive reservations). Others acknowledged the danger, but thought that it was natural, and often productive, to look for ‘agents of change’ – who had the capacity to energise passive communities and create the capacity for movement.
A sobering closing comment was that conflict transformation organisations have yet to persuade others, even within the civil societies with which they work, that they have a key role in peacebuilding. As a group, they need to work harder to establish their credentials.

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Francesca Cerletti (Peace Direct)
Paul Clifford (independent and CCTS Treasurer)
Jonathan Cohen (CR)
Marwan Darweish (RTC)
Simon Fisher (RTC)
Diana Francis (independent and CCTS Chair)
Sarah Giles (RTC)
Caroline Hayman (Peace Direct)
Alan Pleydell (QPSW)
Andrew Rigby (Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies)
Anne Rogers (report writer)

**CCTS: Participating Organisations**
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- Quaker Peace & Social Witness, London
- Responding to Conflict, Birmingham
- Centre for Peace & Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University
- St Ethelburga’s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace, London
- International Alert, London
- Peace Direct
- Moldovan Initiative Committee of Management, Belfast
- Action for Conflict Transformation
- One World Trust

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