LOOKING FORWARD
CONNECTING FUTURES THINKING
MEDIATION AND RECONCILIATION
The Transformative Scenarios Process
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This supplement was written by Michelle Parlevliet, Consultant, associated with Conciliation Resources and Reos Partners. It provides an introduction to the Transformative Scenarios Process methodology and case studies of its application in conflict-affected contexts. It supplements the ‘Looking Forward’ Briefing Paper and Summary and Key Findings produced from the wider project in November 2022. The author thanks her co-authors of the Briefing Paper and Mille Bojer for their review of this text.

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1. THE TRANSFORMATIVE SCENARIOS PROCESS

Pioneered by Adam Kahane and Reos Partners,¹ the Transformative Scenarios Process (TSP) exemplifies a standardised approach to futures thinking which is modified for specific contexts. The method has been tried and tested in various conflict settings, is well-documented and seems to hold much potential to contribute to peace processes. This supplement therefore starts with a general introduction to TSP (section 1) before commenting on contributions and limitations of the approach in relation to mediation, reconciliation, and peace processes (section 2). To facilitate deeper understanding of TSPs in relation to peacebuilding, it then provides a comparative overview of similarities and differences (section 3). It concludes by setting out case examples from South Africa and Colombia which demonstrate this methodology, and provides brief introductions to some examples of other TSPs.²

WHAT IS IT?

TSP is a futures thinking approach whereby a group of diverse actors work together to develop a set of narratives about the future of a situation that they themselves are part of, which can then be used in a process of wider engagement to spark reflection, conversation, and action so as to influence the direction of the future as it unfolds.

The TSP approach originated from a scenarios process in South Africa in the early 1990s, which has become known as the 'Mont Fleur' process. It drew on experiences with scenario planning within Shell, the oil company, but was adjusted to suit the South African context and to support the transition from apartheid to multi-party democracy.³ Scenario work as practised by Shell at the time was usually expert-driven and meant to develop descriptions of possible future external environments to which the company, as a single actor, should be ready to react. In contrast, the Mont Fleur process brought together a cross-section of South African society — current and potential leaders from across the social, political, and economic spectrum — to jointly create a set of scenarios to help those involved shape the future of the country. The process involved the following innovations, which have become lasting and distinctive features of TSP:

• The use of scenarios not only as an adaptive tool to understand and adjust to the future but also as a proactive and transformative tool to influence the future;

• The careful convening of a very diverse group of actors who together comprised a ‘microcosm’ of society or a particular system; and

• The joint crafting of scenarios by people who are unlikely to like, trust or agree with one another.⁴

Since its emergence, the TSP approach has been used in various sectors, countries or situations around the world. These include contexts experiencing or affected by violent or protracted conflict (e.g. Ethiopia, Colombia, Guatemala, Thailand, Cyprus). They also include contexts not experiencing direct violence but where the issue at stake is contentious and social systems are polarised and stuck (e.g. equity in the United States health system;

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¹. Adam Kahane is a Director and Co-Founder of Reos Partners, an international social enterprise that ‘helps people move forward together on their most important and intractable issues’ [reospartners.com] in relation to economic inclusion; education; energy and climate; health and equity; peace, democracy and governance; and natural resources, land and food. In the late 1980s, he served as the head of the scenario department at oil company Shell, in which capacity he facilitated the ‘Mont Fleur’ process described in Example 1. Since that experience, Kahane and Reos Partners have facilitated numerous scenario processes focusing on different issues and in different contexts.

². While the TSP examples in this supplement are all derived from the experience of Reos Partners, the use of this approach is not exclusive to this organisation.

³. For more information on the context in South Africa at the time, see Example 1.

⁴. The explanation of TSP set out here draws on: Adam Kahane [2012] Transformative scenario planning: Working together to change the future, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers; Adam Kahane [2010] Learning from experience: the Mont Fleur Scenario Exercise blog post, 14 March; and Mille Bojer (2018) Transformative scenarios process: How stories of the future help to transform conflict in the present, Berlin: Berghof Foundation. Kahane coined the term ‘transformative scenario planning’ in 2012 to distinguish it from scenario approaches focused on adaptation. Over time, the approach has been referred to as ‘transformative scenario planning’ and ‘transformative scenarios process.’ The latter is used here given the dynamic nature of conflict contexts and to avoid an impression that situations and actions are linear and ‘planned;’ the uses of TSP are also wider than planning, although they can of course include it. The plural in the term [scenarios] reflects that the process always creates multiple stories of possible futures as there is never one possible future.
TSP SCENARIOS

Are not projections, predictions, preferences, options

Are stories of possible futures that are:

- **Relevant**: addressing current circumstances and concerns of stakeholders
- **Challenging**: making visible what is invisible, highlighting blind spots, and questioning current mindsets and narratives
- **Plausible**: evidence-based and believable as perceived by a highly diverse group of people, even if it stretches their imagination
- **Clear**: distinct, accessible and memorable – something that may be aided by the use of catchy, metaphoric titles.

Adjusted from Kahane 2012
Together, the set of scenarios provide ‘a map of future possibilities’ that helps participants to develop a deeper understanding of their current reality, makes them aware of risks, sheds light on opportunities, and surfaces subtle connections. This allows them to assess the scenarios’ strategic implications and to identify what they can do – individually and collectively, where applicable and feasible – to bring about a future they want to create. Subsequent wider sharing of the scenarios helps to fuel fresh public reflection and dialogue and inspire people to start acting for change.

In sum, TSP is a scenario approach to working with the future and harnessing the power of carefully and collectively created stories which reflect a complex reality and an evolving context. It is informed by a premise that the unpredictability of the future does not preclude people’s ability to influence it: the choices they make and actions they take can impact on how the world around them unfolds.

**WHAT DOES A TSP ENTAIL?**

A TSP is a logical, structured, yet creative process that involves several steps across three phases and mobilises the knowledge and experiences of those involved. The first phase focuses on convening and on what is referred to as ‘container-building.’ Convening means getting the right people into the room by establishing a scenario team from across the entire system. This ‘scenario team’ consists of all individuals who participate in the scenario development process, usually those who have acted as convenors and the individuals identified and brought together by the convenors to take part in the TSP.

Convening is preceded by considering which actor (or alliance of actors) has the legitimacy, authority and trustworthiness within the context to bring together a radically diverse group of about 25 to 40 people; it is important to conjure up sufficient ‘convening power’. Typically, convenors are actors from within the (conflict) setting. They are usually supported by impartial process facilitators from outside the context, who will guide TSP participants through the second and third phase. Such external facilitators may work in tandem with insider-facilitators.

‘Container-building’ means creating conditions that will help people to feel safe and to participate freely and creatively – something peacebuilders generally refer to as creating a safe space. This usually involves, amongst other things, in-depth, one-on-one dialogue interviews with all prospective members of the scenario team by the facilitators. These interviews help to establish rapport and gain insight into each person’s perspective, and a sense of the spectrum of views within the group. The convening process may not be finalised by the time dialogue interviews commence, so that additional perspectives can be drawn in to broaden the range of views in the group if need be.

**The second phase** focuses on scenario construction by observing what is happening and constructing stories about what could happen. It combines conventional scenario methodology with a process that is more qualitative and creative than expert-driven scenarios tend to be. Rather than relying on data-heavy modelling or projection activities, TSPs usually place more emphasis on ‘informed imagination’. They use interactive exercises that invite people to surface and examine deeply held values and beliefs and move them beyond the cognitive dimension into the realm of the social and emotional.

Participants’ cognition is activated by mapping core concerns and by identifying key certainties and uncertainties, as well as trends and external influences. The scenarios to be developed need to speak to people’s core concerns in order to be relevant; the concerns together form the strategic agenda underpinning the TSP.

External influences that are outside the stakeholders’ control, but greatly influence how the future of their concerns might unfold, are referred to as ‘driving forces’ in scenario planning. These may be technological, (geo)political, cultural, environmental or demographic. Considering these allows TSPs to use an ‘outside-in’ view and not solely rely on an ‘inside-out’ view, i.e. taking only into account those aspects that stakeholders can control. The group may also wish to draw on external expertise to increase their knowledge of the situation and the wider world environment or enhance technical details of the scenarios being developed.

5. A ‘system’ can be understood as an interconnected set of elements that is organised in such a way that it produces its own pattern of behaviour over time. It is more than the sum of its parts. Hence, the notion can refer to a community/society in conflict, but also to actors, networks, and organisations in a certain domain (e.g. food security; health sector). See Donnella Meadows (2008) Thinking in systems: a primer. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, p. 2.

6. See Boer Transformative scenarios process, for explanation of the physical, political and psychosocial dimensions of a container in the TSP context.


## Diagram 2: How to do TSP: 3 Key Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convening</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Action &amp; Dissemination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Clarity, scope and purpose  
• Align requisite resources  
• Map stakeholders  
• Establish conveying power  
• Convene a diverse team that represents a “microcosm of the system” | • 25-40 stakeholders  
• Map driving forces, key certainties and uncertainties  
• Generate and iterate scenario narratives  
• Write scenario text | • Identify strategic implications of scenarios  
• Identify individual and collective actions  
• Develop communication strategy  
• Disseminate the scenarios through multiple media and channels  
• Enable strategic dialogues among target audiences |

Reos Partners

Members of the scenario team are encouraged to move into the social and emotional domain in various ways, such as storytelling, paired dialogue walks, learning journeys, and journaling. At times, TSPs are combined with wider citizen consultations to inform scenario development in this second phase; their format differs depending on context.9

The third phase focuses on action and dissemination for impact, by discovering what can and must be done and acting to transform the system. The TSP’s most visible output – the set of scenarios – is an important tool here, but other, less tangible, outcomes are also key ingredients. These usually include a deeper understanding of the problematic situation, incorporating a wider array of perspectives; a new language for talking about the present and future; new or enhanced relationships among actors who before did not see eye to eye or worked at cross-purposes; greater capacities for working together; and, finally, an enhanced commitment to act – and act differently – on shared challenges. TSP has the potential to generate a new set of responses or options for action that are substantially different, both from a knowledge/understanding perspective and from a relationship perspective.

How far such outcomes resonate beyond the multi-stakeholder group comprising the scenario team largely depends on the extent to which they ‘own’ the scenarios and carry them into ‘myriad big and small strategic conversations about the future’10, disseminating their understandings, intentions, and relationships into the wider context. To facilitate this, it is often necessary to create follow-on processes that build on the scenarios. These are to help the stakeholders and others to turn lessons from the scenarios into action, generate broad public engagement and reflection, feed insights into national dialogues and/or influence policy contexts. From a TSP perspective, whether the imagined future[s] materialise in the end is not the yardstick for assessing the success of a scenario or set of scenarios, but whether and how they influence the strategies adopted and decisions people make in the context as it evolves.

A TSP may take between one and two years, though some are much shorter or last longer, depending on duration of convening and follow-up, contextual needs and conditions, availability of resources, etc.11 The scenario team usually comes together for two to four multi-day workshops over six to nine months, spending time constructing and editing the scenarios between workshops; the follow-up and wider engagement phase can vary widely in scope, modalities, and time span.

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9. This was for example the case in a scenario process imagining the future of Chile in 2030 discussed further below.

10. See Freeth and Drimie (2016) ‘Participatory scenario planning’.

11. At times, it may take years to get a TSP off the ground as was the case in Ethiopia.
**Diagram 3: Futures Thinking and Public Engagement**

**Convening**
- Establishing convening alliance
- Identifying prospective members of scenario team based on multiple criteria to ensure diversity
- Dialogue interviews with future members

**Futures Thinking Process**
- Stakeholders in a futures thinking process

**Scenario Construction**
- Workshops, research, writing, private engagement with key stakeholders

**Outreach & Dissemination**
- Public dialogue through various forums
- Strategic conversations
- Dissemination through print, broadcasting and social media

Result: clarity on who to bring together, where and how. Team established

Result: set of scenarios created

Modified Dinokeng model. Adjusted from Reos Partners by Parlevliet

This is a schematic overview of an example of a TSP, involving a period of convening, a scenarios approach (including joint analysis and creation), and outreach. In each phase there is a movement from ‘divergence’ to ‘convergence’ through ‘emergence.’ The divergent stage is characterised by free, open discussion, gathering diverse points of view, unpacking the problem, and generating alternatives; the convergent stage is goal-oriented and focused, and involves categorising ideas, evaluating alternatives, summarising key points and arriving at general conclusions. The transition between these is the ‘emergent’ stage (also known as the ‘groan zone’). Here people wade through the complexity generated in the divergent stage and start to integrate different ideas and needs, as their initial understandings are stretched to hold other points of view and new insights emerge. Once convergence has resulted in a certain outcome at the end of one phase, a new cycle starts. For example, once a set of scenarios has been created, outreach and dissemination generate new divergence as more stakeholders engage with them. Such wider dialogue and engagement can (as implied by the diagram) lead to convergence on what future to strive for or avoid, and what actions to take to that end, but this is not guaranteed.
2. CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF TSP

TSPs can be conducive to mediation, reconciliation and peace processes in various ways, but are no panacea. This section provides some discussion of contributions and limitations of the approach without being exhaustive.

HOW CAN A TSP BE HELPFUL TO MEDIATION, RECONCILIATION, AND PEACE PROCESSES?

While meant to affect the future and facilitate change from the outset, TSPs have not necessarily always been used or framed as a vehicle for peacebuilding, mediation and reconciliation. Yet, experiences to date suggest that they are relevant for peace processes and contexts affected by violent conflict. The scenario approach holds much potential to help a wide range of actors, including opponents, to work together, see the world from different points of view, and build empathy and relationships. Paradoxically, it does not seek to do so by forging agreement on the issues that divide them but by helping them to develop stories about one domain they have in common and are all uncertain about: the future of their context. Examples from different TSPs show that considering multiple possible futures can generate ‘actionable insights’ and a new range of responses on the basis of understandings and relationships generated through the process. The latter is especially the case if unlikely or new alliances are built through the process, expanding any one actor’s sphere of influence.

A TSP approach is hence an informal and indirect approach for a society in conflict that is different from, yet complementary to, negotiation; it is a Track 2 initiative that uses a specific methodology. Those participating are not expected to choose, concur on, or recommend a preferred scenario, vision, or solution; not even the strategic agenda needs to be based on consensus. Strictly speaking, ‘the process is only about telling stories, not about making commitments. This allows people to discuss almost anything, even taboo subjects, such as engaging with a proscribed armed group or de facto authority, embarking on a revolution, instigating strict gun control, legalising a banned substance, or prioritising restorative justice over retributive justice, etc. The prospect of merely exploring and co-creating a set of scenarios of what could happen in the future, entices people to join the process – and while participating, all are exposed to diverse perspectives and life experiences, face up to their own blind spots and flawed beliefs, experience cooperation despite divisions, and grow connections with others.

The absence of pressure to define a common vision, commit to resolving the problem(s) at hand, or agree on ‘the way forward’ or ‘the solution,’ is an important part of what makes TSP potent. This is facilitated by the fact that scenarios are always developed in a set. The knowledge that there will be multiple scenarios, not a single one, allows people with divergent interests, values, beliefs and visions to engage in informed debate without committing anyone to any particular policy position. The apparent technical nature of the process – following certain steps and emphasising facts and logic above values, positions, past and present grievances – may help too by making it seem a relatively non-threatening experience from which those participating stand to gain new knowledge and skills. Strong emotions – which are likely to surface during a TSP – are not immediately obvious; the process is not directly about them.

The use of narrative also arguably allows for considerable complexity to be conveyed and processed more effectively than traditional reports or presentations. The development of multiple narratives is also relevant here, as this can expand debate beyond the positions on which it has become stuck. For example, a TSP on ‘the drug problem in the Americas [2013-2025]’ provided ‘a refreshingly broad and open set of perspectives on a debate that [had] become narrowed and polarised between ‘drug warriors’ and ‘legalisers’, resulting in a report that ‘managed to open up a discussion that was as frank as it was unprecedented’ and eventually led to new agreements on hemispheric drug policy.

When used in a conflict context, a TSP may not necessarily focus primarily on ‘the conflict’; even so, it is bound to come up in the process. The Cyprus TSP has, for example, been focused on ‘possible futures of Cyprus’ so as to explore the future of the island beyond...

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13. Ibid, p. 3.
15. See Bojer Transformative scenarios process.
17. Quote from José Miguel Insulza (OAS Secretary General at the time) in Scenarios for the drug problem in the Americas.
consideration of what is usually referred to as ‘the Cyprus problem’, since the explicit and long-standing focus on peace and conflict – especially in the face of a stagnating peace process – tends to overshadow other challenges (related to, for example, climate change, migration, and the economy). The interviews (conducted in the first phase) help to ensure that the scenarios that are being developed illuminate the aspects of the future that stakeholders are most concerned and curious about.

“A TSP is a low-threshold, high-ceiling process. It is easy to step into. Once you’re there, lots of things can happen and are likely to happen – and are more likely to happen because they’re not demanded of you. Everybody is interested in the future and nobody has privileged information about it. In many TSP processes, people got bogged down in description of the present or the past, but not in the futures stories. The future is an uncontested space that people find interesting and pretty low risk.”

By lowering the bar for people to step into dialogue and collaboration, the TSP methodology can help seemingly intractable situations and dynamics to become ‘unstuck’ (see also the examples here and here). It may be particularly relevant to settings of considerable complexity, polarisation and disagreement, where trust is low, stakes high, and positions entrenched. Developing scenarios also encourages people to think in-depth through possible futures – which may result in some potential futures evaporating if they cannot withstand the rigorous scrutiny resulting from the requirement that the scenarios must be plausible. For example, the notion of a communist revolution in South Africa – then espoused by the political party Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) – was dismissed in the Mont Fleur process as a possible future on grounds of implausibility. The scenario team member who was PAC’s head of economics at the time, later explained to members of his party’s National Executive Committee, that he ‘[had] tried my best, comrades, but given the realities of the world today, I cannot see how we can tell a convincing story of how a successful revolution could take place within the next ten years. If any of you can tell such a story so that it carries conviction, I will try to have the team incorporate it [in the scenario set].’ Examination of maximalist and wishful visions can thus prompt actors to recalibrate their positions and strategies and make different choices.

A last helpful element noted here is the notion of ‘stretch collaboration’, which has been born inductively out of Reos Partners’ practical experience with TSP and other methods to work with diverse groups over several decades. This notion makes explicit that working together with diverse others – including outright adversaries – is possible by recognising, among other things, that it will involve embracing both conflict and collaboration, allowing for diversity and non-agreement in relation to beliefs and values, while still working together on common tasks and objectives. It also involves ‘experimenting the way forward’: trying things to make progress even as the road and the outcome are not clear, and reflecting on how that is working out, and ‘stepping into the game’: taking responsibility for one’s own role.

“The value of TSP work is not what it appears to be. It seems like it is all about the scenarios, the stories that are created. But actually, as [a prominent Guatemalan] said after the TSP process there, ‘the scenarios are our shells, a means to an end’ – like the shells that were traded between islands in the Western Pacific as a way of forging alliances [...]. Almost all stories about the impact of TSP are stories about what happened because people met, learned from each other and changed their way of relating; scenarios have been a means to build relationships.”

‘Collaboration’ in a TSP context is first about being in the same space at the same time; thereafter it is about jointly creating stories of possible futures. Engaging in this task expands people’s understanding and experience of working together across divides, which may well contribute to the process of making and building peace. The incrementalism embedded in this

18. The Cyprus scenarios [see cyprusfutures.org] resulting from the scenario team’s collective reflection pay attention to both the peace process and conflict dynamics, as well as to other challenges – thus reflecting the reality that it is hard to make progress on the latter without considering the former, and also manifesting the pattern that the former tends to.

19. Interview with futures thinking practitioner on 13/01/22.

20. Mosebyane Malatsi, head of economics of the Pan-Africanist Congress, as quoted in Kahane Transformative scenario planning, p. 11, see also p. 6.

21. Coined by Adam Kahane in (2017) Collaborating with the enemy. How to work with people you don’t agree with or like or trust. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. See also Adam Kahane (2018) How to collaborate when you don’t have consensus blog post on strategy+ business.com, 3 April; and Mille Bojer (2021) Collaborating with diverse others, why is it so difficult? blog post on medium.com, 26 April.

22. See for example Adam Kahane (2012) New stories can generate new realities The Systems Thinker. Building Shared Understanding 23(7): pp. 2–6, for examples from the Colombian TSP about direct adversaries engaging with one another and working together (e.g. secretary-general of far-left Communist Party and commander of far-right paramilitary forces) and Kahane Transformative scenario planning for examples from other TSP processes, including South Africa (e.g. interactions between a white Afrikaner executive of Chamber of Mines – entangled with the apartheid system’s economic and social control – and a high-level ANC economist).

23. Interview with TSP facilitator on 13/01/22.
approach, with its emphasis on navigating diversity and agreement, discord and connection, suits contexts affected by violent conflict and the reality that both political settlements resulting from mediation and long-term reconciliation will require ongoing negotiation.

The above indicates that the transformative scenarios process, while not directly geared towards resolving conflict, can be a useful component in building peace and working towards reconciliation. The examples provided in Sections 4 and 5 illustrate this further. For a comparative overview of the TSP approach and peacebuilding, see Table 1 in Section 3.

WHAT ARE LIMITATIONS OF TSP IN CONTRIBUTING TO MEDIATION, RECONCILIATION AND PEACE PROCESSES?

The scenarios, insights and relationships developed through a TSP can contribute to addressing a crisis, informing a process of national dialogue, and moving to agreement, but a TSP is not a ‘tool’ to resolve a crisis or agree on a concrete solution to a country’s problems. Nor does it constitute a formal mandated negotiation by individuals representing conflicting parties or specific other groups, such as victims or affected populations more generally. In addition, impact in the societal sphere is not a given unless those involved in the process and others decide to take action, and unless wider engagement is pursued through follow-up initiatives. Even then, with further action and public engagement, there is no guarantee that the core disputes of a conflict will be affected. A possible mitigating strategy is to accompany a TSP initiative with careful [informal, confidential] engagement with key stakeholders who are not involved in the process, but likely to affect the reception and uptake of the output. This can increase their understanding of the approach, plant ‘seeds’ for follow-up dialogue and, hopefully, reduce the risk of scenarios being misconstrued upon publication or team members being negatively framed when going public.

This reflects the reality that TSPs are subject to a range of challenges and limitations. Many of these pertain to futures thinking processes more generally; a more extensive summary is provided in Section 3.3 of the Briefing Paper, including some suggestions for mitigating strategies derived from practice. A few specific ones are worth mentioning here. First, TSPs are most likely to be feasible or effective if several stakeholders within the setting – preferably from diverse backgrounds – perceive conditions in their context as unacceptable and the status quo as unsustainable and recognise that they cannot make things move on their own. They may or may not be members of political or military elites, nor need they necessarily represent the ‘parties in conflict’. But if there is not a range of people who experience considerable discomfort with the status quo and a sense that ‘things could be different’ (and manage to connect to other stakeholders sharing such discomfort), a TSP is unlikely to get off the ground or run its full course.

Second, the power, quality and legitimacy of the process and the resulting scenarios depends on the composition of the group of individuals that take part. If the group is insufficiently diverse, the scenarios created are easily dismissed by others in or outside the context as representing a biased view and not credible as a means to generate dialogue and inform strategic decision-making. This would limit the scenarios’ reach and relevance for mediation and reconciliation.

Third, a full-fledged TSP takes considerable resources (in terms of time, money and energy) which may be hard to gather, especially when there are many other pressing demands. A complicating factor is the open-ended nature of this approach, which can make prospective donors reluctant to support a TSP in contexts where the international community is committed to a specific type of settlement – or keen to prevent a certain outcome. This was the case in Cyprus, for example, where a long-standing focus on a federal solution has been embedded in UN Security Council Resolutions. The fact that a Cyprus TSP would not a priori preclude consideration of other, highly contentious, futures that deviate from that vision [e.g. a two-state solution] made various prospective donors perceive the project as a risk. Such reluctance can lead to long delays before a process can really get underway, which may in turn affect its potential to impact on political developments in a context. Differently put, the lead time for a TSP to come to fruition may lag behind the timing for impact.

To mitigate funding constraints, the TSP approach can be adjusted to enable scenario construction within a relatively short timeframe and/or through online modalities. This may impact on the richness of the process, the outputs produced, and the degree of relationship-building facilitated but can still be valuable and result in useful scenarios that can inform public dialogue on choices and implications for the future.

24. See Bojer Transformative scenarios process pp. 4–5, and Kahane Transformative scenarios planning. These stakeholders may already be connected to one another but usually do not constitute a ‘group’ in any organised way prior to a TSP. In addition, relationships – if any – may only exist between some of them, not among all.
25. For example, see the most recent UN Security Council Resolution extending the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Resolution 2646 (28 July 2022), and, much earlier, Resolution 716 (1991), 11 October 1991.
26. Donors considering or supporting a TSP initiative are made aware that they will not have any influence on the contents of the scenarios and will only learn the substantive storylines after the scenarios have been finalised by the scenario team, at the time of going public.
27. This is, for example, the case if local actors seek to develop and launch scenarios in a context where important elections are due, with a view to facilitating public engagement on the scenarios to inform public discourse around the elections.
3. RELATING TSP TO PEACEBUILDING: COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

TABLE 1: COMPARING THE TRANSFORMATIVE SCENARIOS PROCESS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION-ORIENTED PEACEBUILDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIMILARITIES</th>
<th>TRANSFORMATIVE SCENARIOS PROCESS</th>
<th>PEACEBUILDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDERLYING PARADIGM</td>
<td>Both are informed by a paradigm emphasising systemic change, addressing root causes and drivers of change, and the importance of inclusion and participation. Much attention is paid to questions of who to bring together and how to design processes that allow people to engage meaningfully with one another</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT</td>
<td>Both explicitly recognise and work with the transformative potential of conflict, realising that conflict is part of change and need not be destructive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPOWERING</td>
<td>Both reflect a belief in human agency and ability to influence the future amid complexity and uncertainty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONSHIP-ORIENTED</td>
<td>Both involve and depend on relationship building for successful outcomes yet do not assume people have to like or trust one another to work together and make progress on addressing complex challenges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO IS AFFECTED</td>
<td>The most transformative impact is likely to be on those directly involved in a (TSP/ negotiation/ mediation/ reconciliation) process; additional outreach and dialogue are necessary to widen impact beyond them</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIFFERENCES</th>
<th>TRANSFORMATIVE SCENARIOS PROCESS</th>
<th>PEACEBUILDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TERM</td>
<td>Term referring to a specific methodology or approach to scenario planning in complex environments meant to help people involved influence the future</td>
<td>Umbrella term that refers to wide range of initiatives and efforts to address and transform destructive conflict and prevent future conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS</td>
<td>Joint development of a set of hypothetical stories of what might happen in the future ('scenarios') to generate and inform strategic conversations and public dialogue, no explicit focus on addressing conflict</td>
<td>Addressing the underlying causes of conflict and helping people to resolve their differences peacefully and to lay the foundations to prevent future violence by building relationships, capacities, and institutions to handle tensions without resorting to violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGREEMENT</td>
<td>Not geared towards facilitating agreement on a preferred scenario, vision, or solution; those participating are not expected to agree on these or other matters, only on a set of scenarios</td>
<td>Seeks to support parties in conflict to reach agreement on substantive issues that divide them and on political, economic, institutional, and other solutions and mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGOTIATION</td>
<td>Does not entail formal negotiation on contentious issues, but informal dialogue on key concerns, drivers of change and stories of possible futures</td>
<td>Usually entails a range of dialogue and negotiation processes, both formal and informal, to end violence, address causes of conflict and build positive peace, understood in both negative and positive terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMON GROUND</td>
<td>Builds common ground by focusing on a domain everyone in a context has in common and is uncertain about: the future of their context</td>
<td>Uncovers and takes advantage of common ground between parties in conflict by exploring the underlying needs and interests of those involved across divides</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### WHO IS INVOLVED

A group of 25-40 committed participants, who collectively, are representative of the whole society or system.* To reflect the diversity of the whole, they come from a range of backgrounds and hold different perspectives (sectoral, ideological, professional, geographical, cultural, etc.). Yet each person participates in their individual capacity, not as representative of a group or institution.

Wider engagement (of resource persons or members of the public) may occur during scenario construction and/or outreach and dissemination activities.

Different groups of actors depending on nature, focus and goal of process but deciding factor is generally their involvement in and/or being affected by the conflict. Approaches are either oriented towards key people or towards more people. The former involves those (groups of) people whose decisions and actions are critical to the conflict continuing. These key people are representatives who (are thought to) speak on behalf of a certain group, constituency, or institution.

*More people* approaches seek to engage increasing numbers of people in actions to promote peace, based on the idea that peace requires support and participation of the general population.

### WHAT FUTURE

Process explicitly steers those involved away from focusing on one future or on their desired future; instead explores multiple possible futures so that those involved have a better understanding of what could happen in order to influence it and bring about a better future.

Processes are implicitly geared towards building a better future as compared to violent conflict or oppression but may not entail explicit exploration of the future or what might happen in the future more broadly. Those involved are likely to have (separate) often competing images of the future they aspire to (which seldom consider concerns of other parties). Peacebuilding may contribute to parties in conflict developing a common vision of a future that is acceptable to all.

### PROCESS

Structured process that is adjusted to the context, but main steps are similar across contexts, involving convening, scenario construction, and dissemination and engagement. Process looks beyond immediate demands or urgent needs and considers both aspects that stakeholders can control and external influences beyond their control that impact on how the future might unfold.

Flexible, no single process, involving wide range of actions and initiatives by various actors at and across different levels of leadership in a society. Processes consider immediate demands as well as short- and long-term needs and interests of various actors involved in and affected by violent conflict, but may not involve consideration of wider external trends.

### INTENDED CHANGES

More systemic understanding of current reality, future possibilities, and strategic choices; better relationships among actors across a system; shifts in actions and intentions, taking account of the whole system; enhanced capacities to engage in systemic change and work with others; new language to talk about strategic choices.

Changes in: structures and systems (family, community, society) related to access, power, decisions; norms and values that guide behaviour; in individuals (emotional, cognitive), and direct interaction between people (manifested in communication, level of prejudice and trust). Changes at the personal, relational, cultural and at the socio-political level.

### DURATION

One to two years though some take longer or shorter, depending, amongst other things, on duration of convening and follow-up efforts.

Highly variable, but peacebuilding is generally understood to be a long-term process.

### CONCEPTS

System; system transformation; scenario; scenario team; emergence; stretch collaboration; strategic agenda; uncertainties; driving forces; co-creation; strategic choices; stakeholders; container

Latent/manifest conflict; conflict transformation; positive/negative peace; causes of conflict; connectors/dividers; conflict sensitivity; capacities for peace; peace infrastructure; positions/interests; Track 1/2/3; mediation; reconciliation; settlement

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*A ‘system’ can be understood as an interconnected set of elements that is organized in such a way that it produces its own pattern of behaviour over time and is more than the sum of its parts. The notion can refer to a community/society in conflict, but also to actors, networks, and organisations in a certain domain (e.g. food security, education, health sector). References: text on similarities and TSP draws on Bojer (2018); entries on peacebuilding are informed by text ‘what is peacebuilding’ on CR website and by Reflecting on Peace Practices Resource Manual [CDA, 2016] [distinction key people/more people approaches; intended changes]; and Lederach et al (2007) Reflective Peacebuilding [intended changes].

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4. EXAMPLES OF TRANSFORMATIVE SCENARIOS PROCESSES

EXAMPLE 1: THE MONT FLEUR SCENARIOS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Background/context
The Mont Fleur process took place in South Africa from 1991 to 1992 during a politically turbulent time. On 2 February 1990, President de Klerk of the governing National Party announced Mandela’s release from prison and the unbanning of political organisations seeking to end apartheid such as the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and South African Communist Party. By May 1990, the government and the ANC had committed themselves to a negotiation process and the state of emergency – in place since 1985 – was lifted. Political violence increased rapidly, however, threatening progress towards constitutional negotiations and longer-term stability, even as numerous multi-stakeholder gatherings were taking place on how to address issues of concern during and beyond the transition to democracy.

A request in mid-1991 to economist Pieter le Roux to organise a conference on South Africa’s economic future provided the spark for the Mont Fleur process. Keen to try a different approach, he opted for a scenario process and joined forces with political scientist Vincent Maphai. Their initial idea was to create a set of scenarios that would offer an alternative to the establishment-backed scenarios prepared through Anglo American. See the ‘Looking Forward’ Briefing Paper Example 17 for more on this process. They approached Shell’s scenario department to help with facilitating the process; Adam Kahane, the then head of the company’s social/political/economic/environmental scenario team, was engaged to provide it. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Swiss Development Agency funded the process, which revolved around the question: ‘what will South Africa be like in the year 2002?’ Its purpose was ‘not to present definitive truths, but to stimulate debate on how to shape the next ten years’.

Methods/process
Encouraged by Kahane to include some persons who could provide challenging, alternative perspectives on the South African situation, Le Roux and Maphai convened a very diverse team of 22 people, including politicians, academics, trade unionists, business people, community activists and others from across the ideological spectrum. Participants included individuals serving on the National Executive Committee of the ANC and the Economic Advisory Council of the President (of the white minority government), increasing the likelihood of insights and relationships gained through the process filtering through to the formal political negotiations. They met in three workshops of three days each between September 1991 and March 1992, with additional work taking place in between. After analysing the country’s social, political and economic crises, the team compiled 30 initial ‘stories’ about the possible course of events in the ten-year period considered. Some concurred with the official narratives of team members’ organisations; others were contrary to them. They included tales of revolution, economic growth through repression, right-wing revolts and free-market utopias.

Careful examination resulted in 21 stories being discarded, due to lack of internal consistency or plausibility, for example. The team then pared down the nine remaining stories to four, representing four possible outcomes to three key questions: Will the negotiations result in a settlement? Will the transition (from apartheid to multi-party democracy) be rapid and decisive? Will the new democratic government’s policies be sustainable? The team developed these four stories into a brief logical narrative. Each scenario conveyed a specific message to South African leaders and the public at large, conveying relatively abstract political and economic concepts through imaginative...


29. The initial name of the Mont Fleur project was ‘An Alternative Scenario Planning Exercise of the Left’ (Kahane Transformative scenarios planning, p. 4). Both Le Roux and Maphai worked at the [black, ANC-aligned] University of the Western Cape (UWC) at the time, respectively as director of the Institute for Social Development and head of the political science department. Mont Fleur is the name of the conference centre outside of Cape Town where the workshops took place.

30. For a list of those participating in the Mont Fleur process, and their positions at the time, see Le Roux et al. The Mont Fleur Scenarios, pp. 21–22.
names: that a non-negotiated resolution of the crisis would be unsustainable (Ostrich); that a weak coalition government unable to deliver was not going to last (Lame Duck); that implementing populist economic policies by a new government would be risky (Icarus); and that there was potential for a successful outcome (Flight of the Flamingos).

Outcome/Impact

The set of scenarios was the most visible result from the process. To facilitate dissemination, a 14-page report was published in two national newspapers, a 30-minute video was produced with cartoons and presentations by team members, as well as a summary booklet and pamphlets. Team members presented and discussed the scenarios with many different groups, including the national executive committees of the ANC and PAC; the National Party; government departments; financial institutions; major corporations; trade unions and civil society organisations. Other important results from Mont Fleur included the creation of informal networks and new understandings among influential people across the political spectrum, a shift in language and thought, and a broader awareness among diverse societal actors of choices to be made and possible implications thereof. The entire team strongly advocated making choices that would influence South Africa’s trajectory towards the Flamingos outcome; they viewed this as the optimal scenario, and broadly agreed on the conditions required for success.

Several analyses highlight the scenarios as having had a reconciling, nation-building role in the period to 2000s, and as underlining the need to keep National Party decision-makers focused on facing reality and to get parties at the constitutional negotiations to settle rapidly and decisively. They also point to the Mont Fleur process as having been influential in steering the ANC’s economic thinking away from macro-economic populism, rapid fiscal expansion, state appropriations and summary wealth redistribution towards fiscal discipline and conservative economic policies. The latter was the Flamingos-scenario economic position and arguably helped to ensure financial stability in the first decade following the transition. This reversal – dubbed ‘the Great U-Turn’ by prominent journalist Allister Sparks in his analysis of the South African transition – is particularly associated with Mont Fleur participant Trevor Manual, who was the ANC’s chief economist at the time of the process and became the country’s first black Minister of Finance. The process also probably contributed to significant shifts in the policies of the PAC, following presentation and discussion of the scenarios in the party’s National Executive Committee. This included the party’s decision to abandon the armed struggle and participate in the upcoming elections, both of which it had refused to consider until then.

Challenges/limitations

It is difficult to establish precisely to what extent ‘Mont Fleur’ contributed to the transition to democracy in South Africa aside from the (significant) shifts in policies outlined above. The process was separate from the negotiations between the government, ANC, and other political organisations. Yet several participants were very close to persons involved in the talks, so considerable influence is likely; the participation of senior political figures in the ANC, PAC, and senior business people with links to the white minority government will have helped in this regard. Also, some participants went on to prominent positions in the new government and were able to influence South Africa’s trajectory in the longer term. That said, the Mont Fleur process is nowadays seen in a more critical light in South Africa. Many view the ANC’s emphasis on market-led economics from 1996 onwards as having curtailed transformation of the economy and society in the long term. Deep inequalities and entrenched racism, which persist partly due to limited action to tackle social and economic patterns of exclusion, continue to threaten peace, reconciliation, human security and stability in South Africa.

31. See Kahane Transformative scenarios planning.
33. See Sparks Beyond the Miracle.
35. See Kahane Transformative scenarios planning, pp. 11–12, with quotes from Le Roux and participant Mosebyane Malatsi (economist in the PAC at the time) who together presented the scenarios to the PAC’s executive committee after the Mont Fleur process ended. Gordon (Limits and longevity, p. 11) writes that ‘it is widely agreed’ that the PAC underwent a similar shift in economic policy internally as the ANC did, following the participation of delegate Mosebyane Malatsi in the process.
**Diagram 4: The Mont Fleur Scenario Process**

**Team Members' Ideas**

- First Team Workshop: September 1991
  - Brainstorming: 30 initial ideas

- Second Team Workshop: November 1991
  - Research: 9 preliminary stories
  - Assessment

- Third Team Workshop: March 1992
  - Consultation
  - 4 Draft Scenarios
  - Refinement: 4 final scenarios

**Dissemination, debate, and use**

Source: Le Roux et al. (1996)
EXAMPLE 2: DESTINO COLOMBIA: A TRANSFORMATIVE SCENARIO PLANNING PROJECT IN COLOMBIA

Background/Context

The Destino Colombia project unfolded at a time of great division and conflict in Colombia, from 1996 to 1999. The country had been embroiled in violent conflict since the 1960s, with successive waves of confrontation between government, left-wing guerrilla and right-wing paramilitary forces that also involved criminal gangs and drug traffickers. Kidnappings, murders, forced displacement, disappearances, extortion, torture, and rape were prevalent, even as the country stood out in Latin America for its relatively stable constitutional system, sophisticated legal and institutional framework, vibrant civil society and dynamic business sector.

The project was initiated in 1995-1996 by businessman Manual José Carvajal and Juan Manuel Santos, a politician and former journalist. Having read about the Mont Fleur process, they thought something similar might be helpful to Colombians. They began by organising a large meeting to test the idea, involving high-level politicians and military officials, religious leaders, prominent business people, academics, and some guerrillas; Kahane was invited to present on the Mont Fleur experience. Based on the interest expressed, the project went ahead with a first phase of convening and scenario construction during 1996 and 1997, funded by the Colombian private sector. In 1998 and 1999, the focus shifted to publicising the scenarios, broadening the strategy conversation and building a shared national vision.

Methods/process

Santos realised that, as a politician, he was too partisan to be able to convene such a process and stepped back in favour of a broader, more neutral, organising committee of six. They were to assemble a group of people that reflected the whole conflicted society, legitimate players with plausible commitments to Colombia’s future who were not considered too criminal or corrupt by the convenors. They established a scenario team of 43 individuals, including guerrillas and paramilitaries, academics, activists, peasants, politicians, trade unionists, young people, journalists, military officers, and business people. Remarkably, the two illegal, armed, left-wing guerrilla groups – the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army) – also took part in the process, with four guerrillas participating by phone from prison, exile or the mountains.

The group met three times over four months (totalling ten days), to imagine which paths Colombia might follow over the next 16 years, and the consequences of each. They first listened to participants’ views and positions on the problems facing Colombia, then drew in knowledge from national and international experts to deepen their understanding of the country and its place in the world. Four scenarios emerged from their collective reflection as the most relevant, novel and substantial: ‘When the Sun Rises We’ll See’ (a warning of the chaos that would ensue if Colombians failed to act and just let things be); ‘A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush’ (a story of negotiated compromise between state and society, under continuing pressure from armed groups); ‘Forward March!’ (a story of Colombians electing a government that would impose order by crushing the guerrillas militarily); and ‘In Unity Lies Strength’ (a story of bottom-up change involving Colombians’ individual and collective mentality transforming toward respect for differences and cooperation).

Outcome/impact

The scenarios were distributed as an insert in major newspapers and magazines and through articles and editorials, radio shows, a video broadcast on national television, and large public meetings in all the region’s capitals. Participants also engaged in strategic conversations across government, business and community groups. In its report, the team explicitly stated that all participants agreed that the four scenarios were all possible, but that they ‘neither recommend nor express preference for any particular one. What we do agree on is that it is necessary for us Colombians […] to find the time and space to carry out an intense conversation, a serious analysis of the future of our country.’ They also highlighted that their agreements were ‘most valuable because they were arrived at by way of difference. It was the first time that a group of such dissimilar people had listened to each other, showing respect and tolerance in order to accept and give credit to the others’ ideas. This allowed us to acknowledge the possibility of reaching agreement without sacrificing our principles, and led us to conclude, in all humility, that enormous improvements and profound changes were needed to achieve the common good.’

37. Kahane Destino Colombia.
Indeed, while the Mont Fleur process had taken place in a context and at a time where countless multi-stakeholder forums were happening, the Destino Colombia workshops were ‘perhaps the only place where the full range of Colombian stakeholders met to discuss seriously and openly what was happening, might happen and should happen in their country’. This was a powerful feature of the project with a message for Colombian society at large. Yet the more systemic impact of Destino Colombia was unclear for a long time – and remains difficult to establish with any certainty. In 2006, a report suggested that the greatest impact of the project was in the personal realm, on those who participated in the process, and was less present in their professional lives and at broader public policy decisions and social processes. Yet in 2010, when Santos became president, he referred to the scenarios and the remarkable collaboration across divides, and highlighted the fourth scenario as the recurrent theme in policies of his new government – thus centralising the scenarios in his narrative of developments in his country. He also cited Destino Colombia upon being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016, noting that it was this process that had made him see that peace was possible and realisable through negotiations.

Challenges/limitations

- At the start, key challenges related to safety and fear. The guerrillas had been offered safe passage to the workshops by the government but thought this too risky – hence the decision to participate by phone. Meanwhile, many other participants were initially terrified of engaging with the guerrillas, and feared retribution for what they may say. After Kahane had raised this fear with the guerrillas, they promised not to kill anyone for anything said in the meetings.

- What also helped to mitigate safety concerns was the group’s decision to set ground rules to improve the quality of the conversation. For example, they agreed to be straightforward in expressing differences of opinion; to assume good faith of others; to be disciplined and punctual; to be willing to learn; to respect others’ right to speak; and to exercise tolerance and confidentiality.

- A later challenge entailed the results from the project being ignored by the government at the time, headed by then President Samper. Members of his administration had been excluded by the convenors from participating as his election campaign was thought to have been financed in part by drug traffickers (who had been excluded too). Carvajal later said he thought that this attempt to be ‘aseptic’ had been counterproductive, as the Colombian government did not engage with the scenario team’s work until after the end of Samper’s term.

- It is hard to substantiate the failure or success of Destino Colombia in definitive terms. Kahane’s writing reflects that the outcome and impact of the process may look different across different time frames as conditions in the context change. Assessments may also vary depending on the perspectives and positions – as happens with reconciliation too.

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38. Ibid, p. 4.
39. As referred to in Kahane New stories can generate new realities p. 4. See also transcript of conversation between Kahane and Santos on 19 October 2021, available here.
40. Bojer Transformative scenarios process, p. 15, referring to Litvinoff 2016.
41. Kahane New stories can generate new realities, p. 3.
42. Ibid.
43. Kahane writes: ‘In 2004 the project was pronounced dormant or dead; in 2007 I heard stories about the project’s continued influence; and in 2012 the president of Colombia announced that it had always been alive and was now the leitmotif of the policies of his new government. What I have learned from this experience and others is that you must try to do this as best as you can, but that its failure or success – like most things about the future – cannot be controlled or predicted or even known.’ [New stories can generate new realities, p. 2].
5. SOME OTHER TSP PROCESSES: BRIEF INTRODUCTIONS AND RESOURCES

**EXAMPLE 3: DESTINY ETHIOPIA**

The transformative scenarios process ‘Destiny Ethiopia’ was led by a core team of nine Ethiopian nationals from diverse walks of life, political perspectives, ethnic groups, faith and professional backgrounds. It was hosted by Forum of Federations, a Canada-based international organisation with several years’ experience in the country. After the idea for a scenario planning process initially came up in 2012, the process took some time to get off the ground. Convening started in 2017; in 2018, 50 individuals were invited to participate (from an initial ‘wish-list’ of over 250 persons, which was pared down through the application of multiple criteria), and in 2019 a series of scenario workshops took place over six months (May-December). The team behind the Destiny Ethiopia Initiative made considerable effort to obtain political buy-in for the process from the government, and was able to get support from members of the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, and some opposition parties. Ten academics and professionals served as resource persons during the workshops and helped to contextualise the process into the reality of Ethiopia.

The process resulted in 4 scenarios of how the future of Ethiopia could evolve from 2019 to 2040, with the key differentiator between the scenarios being the dominant responses to the complex economic, political, and social challenges faced by Ethiopia. These were respectively titled ‘dawn’ [a story of the steady building of institutions]; ‘divided house’ [a story in which separate and protective responses dominate]; ‘hegemony’ [a story of authoritarian control]; and ‘broken chair’ [a story in which caution prevails, limited by current capacity constraints]. A follow-up initiative, Multi-stakeholder Initiative for National Dialogue (MIND) was launched in August 2020 by eight organisations drawn from civil society, the government, and political parties. This has provided a platform for continuing dialogue between key stakeholders in Ethiopia after armed civil conflict broke out in November 2020.

**Resources:** the full scenario report; article by Wondwossen Sintayehu, one of the co-initiators of the Destiny Ethiopia process and its sequel MIND; article by Awol Kassim Allo, an academic involved in the process; blogpost by Manuela Restrepo, one of the facilitators; video of presentation by Adam Kahane of the four scenarios on Ethiopian television.

**EXAMPLE 4: CHILE TO 2030: FUTURE SCENARIOS**

The driving force behind the transformative scenarios process in Chile was a collaborative citizen advocacy platform called ‘Tenemos Que Hablar de Chile’ [We Need to Talk About Chile], launched by two prominent universities following a period of social and political unrest in 2019, to facilitate citizen participation and civic conversation about the future of Chile.

The TSP brought together over 300 people in person and online to inform the development of scenarios through a process combining multiple methodologies. Four workshops were held between October 2021 and January 2022, involving a diverse group of more than 40 people representing various perspectives and realities in Chile. To complement these, Tenemos Que Hablar de Chile conducted 100 one-hour dialogues, drawing in 255 social leaders, academics, politicians, business people, members from NGOs and foundations, and journalists. It also organised a mural painting workshop with girls, boys, and adolescents between 11 and 14 years of age. The resulting scenarios have been used, amongst other things, in the platform’s ongoing efforts to promote dialogue and engagement between people from all over Chile, and as a tool to inform the constitution-writing process by encouraging reflection on how the constitution could be resilient across these imagined futures.

**Resources:** project site with full scenario report [in Spanish]; site with summaries of the scenarios and two videos about the process [in English]; interview with Valentina Rosas [Tenemos Que Hablar de Chile deputy director] and Gerardo Marquez [Reos Partners project lead].
EXAMPLE 5: HOMELAND: SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFGHAN CIVIL SOCIETY

Over several months in 2022, a group of 30 Afghan civil society leaders engaged in a TSP focusing on the future of Afghan civil society, involving individual interviews, a five-day residential workshop, and several online sessions. The process created a space where various representatives of Afghan civil society and experts could come together and take stock of developments since August 2021 (when former President Ashraf Ghani fled Kabul and the Taliban took over power) and assess their implications. According to the scenarios team, ‘while there is broad agreement across most actors involved in Afghanistan on the need to sustain civil society, there has been a broader spectrum of conflicting views on which shape it should take, which functions it should serve, and what relationship, if any, it should have with the de facto authorities.’

The initiative was implemented by the Folke Bernadotte Academy in collaboration with Reos Partners and under the umbrella of the Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (EU APSM).

• Resources: full scenario report; site with English language summaries as well as the full scenario texts in Dari and Pashto.

44. Foreword, Homeland: Scenarios for the future of Afghan civil society, 2022, p. 3.
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