An International Review of Peace Initiatives

Accord

The Liberian Peace Process
1990-1996

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Cover Photo: Children walk through the damaged streets of downtown Monrovia, April 1996


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Acronyms

ACS American Colonisation Society
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
BDF Bong Defence Force
CDC Civil Disarmament Campaign
CEDE Centre for Democratic Empowerment
CR Conciliation Resources
ECOMOG ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
FOL Friends of Liberia
IA International Alert
ICAR Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
ICGL International Contact Group on Liberia
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFMC Inter-Faith Mediation Committee
IGL Interest Groups of Liberia
IGNU Interim Government of National Unity
IGO Inter-Governmental Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMTD Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
INK International Negotiations Network
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ITIP International Training Institute for Peace
JPC Justice and Peace Commission
LAW Liberian Alternative at Work for peace and democracy
LCC Liberian Council of Churches
LDF Lofa Defense Force
LIPCORE Liberian Initiative for Peace and Conflict Resolution
LNC Liberian National Conference
LFTG Liberian National Transitional Government
LPC Liberia Peace Council
LPP Liberian People’s Party
LWI Liberian Women’s Initiative
MOJA Movement for Justice in Africa
NDPL National Democratic Party of Liberia
RMCL National Muslim Council of Liberia
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPFL-CRC National Patriotic Front of Liberia – Central Revolutionary Council
NPRAG National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government
NVP National Volunteers Programme
OAU Organisation of African Unity
PWC People’s Redemption Council
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SELF Special Emergency Life Food Programme
SMC Standing Mediation Committee
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN
TWP True Whig Party
ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
ULIMO-J United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy - Johnson
ULIMO-K United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy - Kromah
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
WHO World Health Organisation
Preface

ACCORD - An International Review of Peace Initiatives emerges from a collaboration between Conciliation Resources, the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the International Peace Bureau (IPB), Geneva. Its primary aim is to inform and support agencies working in situations of violent conflict to increase opportunities for reconciliation and social justice. Among its intended beneficiaries are peace-building NGOs and IGOs, policy institutes, and all others with an interest in conflict transformation, from students and academics, to development and humanitarian workers, to religious organisations, diplomats, negotiators and journalists.

The working premise of ACCORD is that without accurate and accessible comparative information, there is a greater risk of repeating past mistakes in the design and implementation of peace interventions. To help, ACCORD intends to provide commentary, background information and critical analysis on specific interventions, along with the texts of the basic agreements which have marked their course. The theme of this pilot issue is Liberia, where the ongoing crisis is stark witness to the shortcomings of international peacemaking efforts. In the following pages, we aim to document the lengthy and fractious Liberian peace process, and to provide some insights into why thirteen individual peace accords have collapsed in half as many years.

The key Liberian agreements of the past five years are the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, the Cotonou Accord, the Akosombo Agreement, the Accra Clarification, and the Abuja Accord. The texts of these agreements form the core of this issue, and are presented in a format which facilitates close scrutiny. Arranged around this core are three articles which provide context and analysis on the accords and on the wider peace process. Max Ahmadu Sesay’s ‘Bringing Peace to Liberia’, presents a broad overview of the main issues related to the war and peace efforts. Dr. Charles Abiodun Alao, in his ‘Commentary on the Accords’, examines the strengths and weaknesses of specific agreements, while ‘Civic Initiatives in the Peace Process’, by Samuel Kofi Woods II, gives a first-hand account of the efforts of civic groups to help bring the war to an end. The issue concludes with a chronology and a short profile of key actors.

Readers with knowledge of other peace processes will draw their own conclusions as to the comparative lessons of Liberia’s. However, we would suggest that the Liberian experience has been especially shaped by three crucial factors - the economics of war, the erosion of civilian power and the incoherence of international peacekeeping.

The first concern is with economic forces. It is clear that the Liberian conflict has been fuelled by national and international economic processes that have sustained and profited perpetrators of violence at the expense of others. To the editors of ACCORD, it is apparent that successful peacemaking in Liberia will require the transformation of processes which
perpetuate and reward acts of violence, and the reconstitution of economies which peacefully provide for broad and equitable social development. Tools to accomplish this transformation could include innovative and effective approaches to arms and trade embargoes, income-generation programmes which provide present and potential fighters with meaningful alternative livelihoods, and reconstruction and development practices that challenge patronage systems now characterised by corruption and violence.

The second issue has to do with governance. The gradual erosion of civilian authority is a distinct theme in the evolution of Liberia's peace agreements. In attempts to include all groups with the capacity or the inclination to wreck the peace, the authority of the Liberian government has steadily been ceded to the more powerful armed factions. The destabilising effects of this have become clear. On the one hand, it has signalled that violence and criminality can be legitimised as a route to political power, fuelling the proliferation of armed factions and entrenching the broader culture of violence. On the other, it has created a highly volatile coalition government which has failed to rise above mutual suspicion and narrow factional interests to cooperate for the greater national good. The experience of Liberia suggests that, while it is essential to foster a broad sense of inclusion among those wielding coercive force, peace interventions must also protect and promote civilian society, and give it a genuine role in the emerging balance of power.

The third imperative for the Liberian peace process has to do with the coherence, vigor and consistency of international peace-making initiatives. While ECOWAS must be commended for the timeliness and persistence of its intervention in Liberia, it has broadly failed to fulfil its peace-making mandate. Especially in the early years, this is partly explained by a clash of interests and objectives among its member states. While the francophone countries of West Africa soon put their weight behind a diplomatic process which they thought might accommodate the aspirations of the NPFL, the anglophone states launched a military force which vacillated between impartial peace-keeping and 'peace enforcement' measures which expressly sought to contain the rebels and frustrate their aspirations.

Recent years have seen a substantial convergence in intra-ECOWAS agendas, largely explained by a common desire to control the mounting financial and political costs of continued entanglement. However, this convergence of interests and the presence of UNOMIL have failed to reverse either the inordinate delays and shortfalls in the deployment of observer forces, or their lack of co-ordination and professionalism. If international peace-making is to succeed, it must proceed in a more coherent and resolute manner than it has in Liberia. Furthermore, if regional initiatives like that of ECOWAS are to be sustained and consistently professional, the wider international community must provide far more substantial and timely support.

A supplement to the Abuja Accord, signed by the factions under the auspices of the ECOWAS 'Committee of nine', was released as this issue was going to press. The primary function of this supplement was to reaffirm the Abuja Accord and to reschedule the disarmament and election process derailed by the violence in Monrovia in April-May 1996. In a cosmetic attempt to dilute the overwhelming authority of armed faction leaders within
the Transitional Government, it also appointed Ruth Perry as chair of the ruling Council of State. Mrs Perry is the first individual with any political experience to hold this position since the diplomatic tilt towards accommodating the factions began in 1993.

One aspect of the new agreement which is potentially significant is the proposal for ECOWAS-wide sanctions on 'persons found guilty of acts capable of obstructing the peace plan'. These measures, announced in an ECOWAS communiqué attached to the revised accord, include travel and residence restrictions, the freezing of business assets, exclusion from participation in the Liberian election process and expulsion of violators’ families from West Africa. Through the communiqué, ECOWAS also expressed its willingness to request international visa restrictions on accord violators and to invoke an OAU resolution calling for the establishment of a Liberian war crimes tribunal.

While the revised accord has the potential to secure a final political settlement, considerable scepticism is still justified. The Transitional Government remains an unstable coalition which privileges some factions while marginalising others. It is also unclear whether ECOWAS and the international community have the capacity and the will to sufficiently strengthen ECOMOG and to impose the proposed sanctions if and when this proves necessary. The threats made to violators of ‘Abuja II’ are strong. Whether they are backed up with effective action over the difficult months ahead will determine whether Liberians can at last begin the arduous task of rebuilding their devastated nation.

One final point. It is important to recognise that the violence which erupted on the streets of Monrovia in April-May 1996 was as much an attack on Liberia’s nascent peace movement as it was a conflict between the armed factions. The burning of homes and displacement of outspoken civic leaders, the selective destruction of private media institutions and the massive looting of local and international humanitarian agencies have underlined the vulnerability of Liberia’s ‘civil society’. Reconciliation always entails pragmatic compromise and a degree of forgiveness for egregious wrongdoing. However, it also demands a special respect for those who have resisted the will to violence and have acted steadfastly in genuine good will to bring relief and healing. We would like to express solidarity with the civic associations and ordinary Liberian citizens who bore the brunt of the recent frenzy.

We would welcome feedback on this our pilot issue of ACCORD, as well as advice on the form and content of future issues. If you find this project in any way inspiring, we would also be grateful for letters of encouragement and support which we could use to raise funds for its continuation. Finally, on behalf of Conciliation Resources, we wish every success to the peacemaking efforts of our readership throughout the world!

Andy Carl and Jeremy Armon
Conciliation Resources
London
September 1996
Bringing Peace To Liberia

On Christmas Eve in 1989, a few hundred armed fighters calling themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attacked border posts around the village of Butuo in Nimba County, north-eastern Liberia. These attacks, which launched a campaign to oust the dictatorship of President Samuel Doe, effectively triggered a war that has brought the almost complete destruction of Africa's oldest republic.

Once war broke out, it quickly spread to other parts of the country due largely to the brutal counter-insurgency strategy of the national army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). By mid-1990, the NPFL, under Charles Taylor, had seized control of most of the country and had besieged the capital, Monrovia. The gruesome fighting in the city led to the massacre of civilians and attacks on foreign embassies which provoked an outcry from the international community. The most widely publicised cases were the attack by AFL soldiers on the United Nations compound on 30 May 1990, and their subsequent massacre of over 600 civilians at St. Peter's Lutheran Church on 30 July.

By September 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had sent in its Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to halt the carnage. However, the ceasefire signed in November broke down comprehensively in October 1992, when Taylor's fighters again attacked Monrovia and the peacekeeping force responded with heavy bombing raids. Events moved rapidly after this point, leading to the proliferation of armed factions, continued warfare, a string of national and international conferences and the signing of more peace agreements. By 1996, three successive interim governments had been installed with the help of the international community. Over
a dozen peace accords have been acceded to by the various parties to the conflict, but none have established a lasting cessation of hostilities. Elections scheduled for August 1996, like many before them, have been postponed for at least nine months.

Roots of the Conflict

Explanations for the outbreak of conflict in Liberia have mostly focused on the domestic socio-economic and political environment of the 1980s. The People’s Redemption Council (PRC), headed by the almost untutored Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe, seized power in a bloody coup d’etat in April 1980 and promised a complete revolution of Liberian society. Initially seeking advice from civilian politicians and academics, Doe quickly learnt the cunning, deceit and realpolitik that had been the hallmarks of Liberian politics for decades. Having done so, he disavowed his original ideals and set himself on an inexorable path of self-destruction.

The reign of Doe was characterized by sustained levels of political violence, dramatic economic decline precipitated by widespread corruption, a lack of progress in political reform, and purges of real and imagined enemies. During 1980-87, GNP declined at an estimated average rate of 2.1% per annum, while GNP per head declined by an annual average of 5.2% (Europa Africa Yearbook, 1996). By 1988, Liberia’s foreign debt stood at $1.4 billion and domestic debt at $507 million (Pereira-Lunghu, 1995). Capital flight and a weakened revenue position pushed the
government to unwittingly embark on the printing of 'flat money' to finance the fiscal deficit. Politically, the regime's brutality was demonstrated by the persistent haste with which those implicated in anti-government plots were eliminated. The tone was set early on, when 15 prominent politicians of the Tolbert government (1971-80) were publicly executed on a beach in Monrovia immediately following the coup.

Very soon, Doe came to trust no-one. Consequently, he adopted a policy of appointing members of his Krahn ethnic group to the top jobs in the bureaucracy, the public services, and the officer corps in the army and security forces. Though the poorly educated Krahn made up only four per cent of Liberia’s pre-war population, Doe’s policies dramatically increased their national profile and as late as 1995, at least eight out of 11 top positions in the AFL were Krahn (Nelson, 1984; Liebenow, 1987; Africa Watch, 1989; Sawyer, 1992). In 1985, rigged elections secured Doe the presidency at the head of a new ‘civilian’ government. In the aftermath of these elections, the President viciously suppressed an attempted military coup led by his former ally, Thomas Quiwonkpa. This action immediately raised alarm about a genocide against the Gio and Mano of Nimba County, home and power base of Quiwonkpa. Taylor, who was related by marriage to Quiwonkpa, benefitted from the alienation of the Nimba population as the Gio and Mano became willing recruits of the NPFL in 1990.

The primary confrontation at the start of the war was thus between the Krahn-dominated army, supported by the Mandingo who had helped prop up Doe’s regime, and a rebel force backed by the Gio and Mano. Within a short period, the war degenerated from a calculated conflict for control of the state to a horrendous slaughter waged along ethnic lines (Berkeley, 1992; Ruiz, 1992).

Liberia’s unresolved past

Looking beyond its immediate triggers, the Liberian conflict can be seen as the brutal culmination of the country’s ‘unresolved past’. The history of Liberia pre-1980 is literally the story of the arrival and success of freed North American slaves, resettled by the American Colonisation Society (ACS) along the present-day Monrovia coast in the mid 1900s. For almost a century and a half, these ‘Americo-Liberians’ dominated the political, social and economic life of Liberia, in alliance with Africans liberated from slave ships bound for the Americas (the ‘Congos’). They were able to achieve this through the institutions they created, such as the churches, judiciary, business associations, and other clubs and societies, notably the Grand Lodge of Freemasons. Their community was small in size, close-knit and culturally coherent, which was enhanced by intermarriages and by participation in the True Whig Party (TWP). The TWP, the Americo-Liberians’ ultimate source of wealth, status and employment, governed Liberia for over a century.

Under the rule of the settlers, indigenous Liberians were treated as second-class citizens. Although comprising over 95% of
the population, they were consistently excluded from the decision-making processes that affected their lives. This situation was improved to some extent during the rule of William Tubman (1947-71), in which the property rights qualifications which had disenfranchised the masses were removed (Clapham, 1976; 1978; Lowenkopf, 1976; Justice and Peace Commission, 1994). The government of William Tolbert (1971-80) continued to pursue integrationist policies, unifying the coastal settlements and indigenous hinterland, broadening participation in government and instituting an 'Open Door' policy that eventually brought a measure of development to the interior. These reforms were long overdue however and they soon gave vent to a deep well of resentment which erupted into full-scale violence in early 1980.

Thus while the civil war was sparked off by the excesses of the Doe regime, its roots run deep in Liberian history. The civil war can perhaps be seen as just one link in a long chain of events by which an exclusionary political establishment might one day be replaced with a more democratic order (Nelson, 1993). This, together with economic hardship, explains the popular euphoria that greeted both the 1980 coup and the NPFL invasion in 1989.

The Costs of War

The Liberian conflict is a striking example of contemporary warfare, involving the use of irregular armies and guerrilla tactics. Fighters use mostly light weapons, lack air cover and are bloodthirsty and unprofessional. Superstitious practices abound with masked fighters often clad in pyjamas, dressed as women and adorned with 'juju' (black magic) which is supposed to render them invisible, invincible or bullet-proof (Riley, 1993). There have been several large-scale massacres, allegations of cannibalism, cases of pregnant women disembowelled, and ethnocidal killings carried out by all parties (Ellis, 1995; Africa Watch, 1990; 1991). The rape and sexual abuse of women and girls has also been widespread.

Among the many flagrant human rights violations, abuse of children has been especially common. Various estimates put the total number of Liberian soldiers below the age of 15 at around 6,000, approximately 10 per cent of all fighters. It is further estimated that around 20 per cent of the militias are between the ages of 15 and 17 (Human Rights Watch, 1994). Child soldiers have engaged in various forms of imitative violence inculcated from routine exposure to brutality, reinforced by repeated showings of 'Rambo' and 'Kung Fu' videos, and further facilitated by the regular abuse of drugs (Richards, 1995). The World Health Organisation (WHO) reported in 1994 that nearly two thirds of high school students in Liberia had seen someone killed, tortured or raped and that 77 per cent had lost a close relative. Trauma on this scale leaves deep scars on a country's collective psyche. It is this high human cost of the war that many see as the greatest challenge for the healing process of the twenty-first century (Sesay, 1996b).

While the factions have exploited Liberia's natural resources throughout the war, the long-term decline of the formal economy has intensified rapidly, further undermining state revenues. This collapse of state and economy has both reflected and reinforced a comprehensive destruction of Liberian infrastructure. Basic amenities such as electricity, water supply and medical services have broken down and many Liberians have come to
depend on international relief for their subsistence. Because the official export sector has been dormant, foreign exchange has also become scarce, its availability depending crucially on expatriates such as ECOMOG, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and relief workers. The security situation has further affected transhipment activity, as insurance rates for ships docking in Monrovia have risen dramatically. Those ships that have managed to dock have often had to depart without cargo. In short, Monrovia’s traditional attraction as a ‘free port’ has been hit hard.

A final devastating impact of the war has been the massive displacement of Liberia’s population. In early 1995, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put the figures at over 850,000 refugees across West Africa (471,100 in Guinea, 360,000 in Cote d’Ivoire, 16,000 in Sierra Leone, 14,000 in Ghana and 4,200 in Nigeria), with over a million internally displaced and 150,000 dead. While these figures are very rough estimates, it is clear that the displaced represent a significant majority of Liberia’s 2.6 million pre-war population. Moreover, the process of displacement is continuous and ongoing, with the recent bloodshed in Monrovia providing fresh impetus (UNHCR, 1995; Ruiz, 1992).

Conflict Dynamics

Factional proliferation

As the Liberian conflict has progressed, the number of warring factions has grown from two to as many as eight. On occasion, factions have splintered due to internal tensions arising from a complex mix of strategic differences and personality clashes. Prince Yormie Johnson, for example, broke from the NPFL in 1990 due to profound personal differences with Taylor. The official position of his Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) was that the split had emerged from arguments over the ultimate goals of the rebel movement. Johnson’s propaganda slogan was the ‘gun that liberates should not rule’ (Johnson, 1991), a direct challenge to Taylor’s openly expressed presidential ambitions. Internal dissent within the NPFL resurfaced in 1994, when another breakaway group, the NPFL Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC), was formed. The leaders, mostly founders of the parent organisation, such as Tom Woewiyu, Sam Dokie and Lavell Supuwood, voiced concern over its lack of direction and vision, and about Taylor’s abandonment of his supposed ideals.

Part of the explanation for the proliferation of factions also lies in the ethnic divisions that characterise the conflict. Ethnic identification in Liberia has always been significant but in recent years, it has become increasingly so as faction leaders have manipulated it to aid recruitment and mobilisation. The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) was formed in Sierra Leone in 1991, comprising mostly Mandingo and Krahn refugees, many of whom had served in the AFL. Because of their national and

‘All of Liberia’s current ethnic feuds started at the top and spread downwards. To a great extent, all have been manufactured by people hungry for power, using violence as a means of political recruitment.’

- Stephen Ellis, Afrikastudiecentrum, Leiden, Netherlands, 1995
regional connections, ULIMO initially had the support of the AFL, the Sierra Leonean military government, and of key figures in the ECOMOG hierarchy. Its initial aims were to prevent Taylor from attaining power through the use of force and to protect the shared political interests of the Krahn, the Mandingo and their regional sponsors. By 1994 however, a split had occurred over the allocation of ULIMO posts in the Transitional Government. This led to the formation of a mostly Krahn wing led by Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J) and a predominantly Mandingo faction under the leadership of Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K).

Later in the war, other factions emerged to defend ethnic and local interests, though often at the behest of the larger armed groups. The Lofa Defence Force (LDF), was one such faction, formed with NPFL cooperation to resist ULIMO aggression in Lofa County. The Bong Defence Force (BDF) was another, which had links with ULIMO-K. However, the most powerful of these new factions was the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), which emerged in October 1993 and is led by Dr. George Boley. The LPC, formed with the collaboration of top-level AFL and ECOMOG personnel, served mainly to protect Krahn interests, as the Mandingos in ULIMO were unwilling ‘to spill blood to liberate Grand Gedeh (the county where most of the Krahn live)’ from NPFL control (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994).

The spoils

Pre-war Liberia was an unusually rentier state, with most of its income coming from maritime services and from foreign exploitation of rubber, agricultural, forestry and mineral resources. Through their control of most of the country in the early years of the war, the NPFL denied the official government in Monrovia access to most of this income apart from that derived from shipping. In doing so, they undermined what remained of the pre-war state and, in its place, built their ‘National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government’ (NPRAG).

This alternative administration followed the logic of both Doe and the America-Liberians, ‘privatising’ Liberia’s resources and remaining accountable to no one (Reno, 1995). According to allegations of corruption among civilian transitional leaders, the official wartime regimes in Monrovia were also not entirely averse to pursuing such a logic. The enduring ambition of most of the faction leaders is to succeed the transitional regimes into the presidential palace. Assuming peace is secured, such an ascendency would guarantee total command of Liberia’s resources and the amassing of wealth on a grand scale.

In the meantime however, faction leaders and their ‘strongmen’ have been engaged in an accumulation of personal wealth which itself forms a crucial dynamic of the conflict. There has been ruthless exploitation of Liberia’s forestry, mineral and other natural resources for the purposes of self-enrichment and for the financing and arming of private militias.

‘Greater Liberia’, the countryside beyond Monrovia controlled for a long time by the NPFL, was practically run as a business. Some of Taylor’s commercial links, especially in the early years of the war, were with the British and French firms involved in iron ore mining in the region. African Mining Consortium Ltd., a British firm, was reported to have paid him $10 million a month for permission to transport ore on an existing railroad.
French firms were also heavily involved in timber exports from the NPFL, largely through Côte d'Ivoire. In more recent years, smaller private firms have been willing to offer Taylor weapons, communications facilities and military training in return for access to timber that larger competitors were unwilling or unable to exploit. Diamonds illicitly mined in Sierra Leone, estimated at $100 million a year, have also found their way into the hands of various NPFL and ULIMO strongmen.

Even ECOMOG became involved in illicit business dealings after the capture of Buchanan from the NPFL in 1993. According to one source, ‘they have concentrated on stripping the country of fixed assets - railroad stock, mining equipment, public utilities - and selling them abroad’. The LPC, with the backing of some Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers, operates a rubber plantation firm that exported about 3,000 tons of rubber through Buchanan in 1994, netting an estimated $1.5 million (Reno, 1993; 1996). These are the resources that have helped fuel the war and have made disarmament difficult.

From 1990 to 1994, Liberia’s diamond exports averaged 300 million dollars annually. During the same period, timber exports averaged 53 million dollars a year, and rubber exports 27 million dollars a year. Iron ore exported from 1990 to 1993 averaged almost 41 million dollars. Even taking into account the inevitable smuggling of some of these commodities, especially diamonds, discounts for trafficking in illegal products, and bribes to officials ... the sums of money available to faction leaders are still substantial.’

- William Tweddell, US State Department official, report to the Africa Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives, June 1996

Regional machinations

Given the large flows of refugees, the competitive jockeying between West African regional powers and the fact that economic activity and ethnic identification frequently blur national boundaries, it was always spurious to view the Liberian war as a purely internal matter. Indeed, in its very earliest days, the NPFL was a multinational force, composed of exiled dissidents from across the region who threatened to export Taylor’s ‘revolution’ to neighbouring states once success had been achieved in Liberia. What also became public knowledge early on was that the NPFL had received support from Libya, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Libya had provided weapons, military training and oil, Burkina Faso had contributed men and training facilities, while Côte d’Ivoire was the major conduit for supplies and reinforcements.

In 1991, the war spilled into Sierra Leone where NPFL-backed rebels in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an anti-government insurrection. By this time, the swift manner in which the NPFL had over-run Liberia and the possibility of a domino effect had already helped spur a forceful regional intervention in the crisis. This intervention, spearheaded by ECOMOG, was largely the initiative of the nervous anglophone powers.

International Responses

Especially through the early months, the regional politics of the Liberian conflict helped shape the nature of external responses. For instance, Taylor’s Libyan connections significantly damaged his profile in Washington while his Ivorian links increased his standing with the
French. However, international responses must also be understood against the backdrop of the dramatic global events in and around 1989. The end of the Cold War occasioned a shift in the West’s strategic interests and with it, a decline of interest in sub-Saharan Africa. Marginalisation of Africa in the so-called ‘new world order’ meant that Liberia’s conflict can be said to have occurred at inauspicious times. The contemporaneous crisis in the Persian Gulf also helped determine that the external intervention which did occur was either too little or too late (Riley, 1993).

**United States’ response**

Due to its unique history, pre-war Liberia had long enjoyed the friendship and beneficence of the United States. Because of this history, the presence of a large US military and intelligence network in the country, and its close links with Israel, Liberia attracted substantial US aid between 1980 and 1988, amounting to around $500 million. By the outbreak of the war however, the special bond between the US and Liberia had weakened substantially. This was partly due to US exasperation at Doe’s authoritarianism, ineptitude and corruption, but mostly reflected the shifting strategic priorities of the incipient post-Cold War era. As the war erupted, it soon became clear that the US would not intervene to secure its former protegee. This came as both a surprise and an utter disappointment to most Liberians (Keppel, 1986).

There have been allegations of various forms of covert US involvement in the Liberian conflict. US Rangers, along with Israelis, are reported to have actively engaged with Taylor’s forces in the early stages of the war while later on, it has been suggested that the US shared military intelligence with the NPFL. However, both the Bush and Clinton administrations have officially taken the view that the conflict is largely an internal matter that requires an African solution. While individual statesmen, such as Jesse Jackson, Herman Cohen and former President Jimmy Carter have made sincere, if unsuccessful, attempts to mediate in the conflict, the most dramatic US response to date has been the rapid evacuation of its citizens and other expatriates from Monrovia. This occurred at the outbreak of war in the city in 1990, and again following the renewed fighting of April 1996.

While the US has remained highly wary of direct involvement, it has been of assistance in other respects. It has contributed an average US$10 million a year to ECOMOG, and has pledged an additional $30 million in 1996. It has also disbursed around US$440 million in relief aid, largely through the UN and international NGOs, and has pledged an additional US$75 million for post-war reconstruction (West Africa, 6/11/95). In the wake of the April 1996 debacle, the Clinton administration has come under increasing pressure from the US-based Friends of Liberia (FOL), from the Black Caucus and other lobby groups to adopt a more proactive policy on Liberia. This coincided with the setting up the US-led International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), involving a range of donor countries concerned with bringing peace to Liberia, and with a slight raising of the US profile in ECOWAS negotiations.

**Role of the United Nations**

The United Nations, which appeared to have regained potency after the end of the
Cold War, was constrained from embarking on direct intervention in Liberia largely due to the burgeoning demands of its existing peacekeeping operations. However, lack of resources does not fully account for the UN’s initial inaction. The fact is that for more than a year from the start of the fighting, African countries frustrated every attempt of the UN Security Council to meet and discuss the crisis. Cote d’Ivoire was particularly resistant to discussions, while Zaire and Ethiopia were also obstructive, reluctant to allow a precedent for intervention that in time might be applicable to them (Wippman, 1993).

The UN’s first significant intervention came three years into the conflict, when the Security Council passed Resolution 788 in November 1992 following the NPFL’s second major assault on Monrovia. This resolution supported the arms embargo imposed by ECOWAS on the warring factions and opened the way for what has since been a small but significant UN presence. During UN-assisted talks which culminated in the signing of the Cotonou Accord in July 1993, a technical team recommended the establishment of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Since its deployment in late 1993, UNOMIL’s mandate has been renewed several times, despite threats of withdrawal as late as 1996. Always headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), first Trevor Gordon-Somers and then Anthony Nyakyi, the principal objective of the mission has been to monitor and assist ECOMOG in the process of encampment, disarmament and demobilisation. While it was originally mandated to employ around 400 observers, UNOMIL was at full strength for just nine months during 1994. Since 43 of its number were detained and terrorised by NPFL fighters in September of that year, it has operated at around quarter strength. Deployment outside Monrovia has been partial and sporadic.

The Organisation of African Unity and Liberia

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was alarmed by the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Liberia in 1990, but lacked both the will and capacity to intervene (Aning, 1994). Therefore, like the UN, it ignored charges from within West Africa that the ECOMOG intervention lacked legality, arguing that the principle of non-interference enshrined in its charter does not excuse indifference to such magnitudes of disaster. In time, the OAU nominated an ‘Eminent Person’ for Liberia to help in the search for peace. This representative, the former Zimbabwean President Reverend Canaan Banana, has played a significant role in the diplomatic efforts from the Cotonou Accord onwards. He also facilitated troop contributions to ECOMOG from two non-ECOWAS countries, Uganda and Tanzania. However, troops from these countries pulled out of Liberia in the summer of 1995, after just 18 months service, due to international reluctance to sustain their costs. On the whole, the role of the OAU in the peace process has been marginal, symbolic and limited to support for ECOWAS and UN initiatives.

'Quite frankly, I think the issue of Liberia could have been taken care of a much longer time ago, if we had enjoyed a little bit more assistance from the UN as well as the western community.'

- Jerry Rawlings, President of Ghana, May 1996
Humanitarian responses

In the early months of the war, the security situation in Liberia largely prevented international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) from providing food and shelter to the displaced and starving. By late 1990 however, ECOMOG intervention had allowed for some international organisations, together with a sizeable number of Liberian NGOs, to engage in humanitarian relief assistance in Monrovia. By 1992, local and international NGOs had expanded beyond the capital and were operating in at least nine of Liberia’s 13 counties, most of which were under the control of the NPFL. By 1995, the number of operational INGOs had increased from four to 18, while the humanitarian efforts of the UN involved no less than nine separate agencies.

Following widespread looting and arson in April 1996, most aid workers withdrew from Liberia. Since then, foreign humanitarian agencies have operated a co-ordinated policy of performing only ‘limited, life-saving’ operations in protest at factional harassment.

Humanitarian activities have included the building of shelters and latrines, the digging of wells and the provision of food and clothing to indigent Liberians both within the country and in the region’s refugee settlements. Such activities have played a great role in protecting lives, stabilising explosive situations, giving succour to traumatised populations, and facilitating post-war reconstruction. However, they have also had a number of negative consequences. They have helped institutionalise dependency, caused notable ecological damage, and have sometimes provided resources and legitimacy to armed factions. Humanitarian agencies have also been criticised for engaging only in relief activity, rather than rehabilitation and development.

ECOMOG and Peacekeeping

As the international community failed to take rapid and meaningful steps to contain the carnage in Liberia, responsibility for direct intervention fell on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In May 1990, ECOWAS convened a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) which soon assumed the primary role in the peace process. By the end of August, the SMC had established and deployed ECOMOG and organised a national conference which duly elected the civilian Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by the academic-politician, Amos Sawyer.

Originally, ECOMOG was intended to monitor a ceasefire which had yet to be signed by the NPFL at the time of deployment. However, they soon adopted a peace enforcement posture after the execution of Doe in September 1990, repelling the NPFL and securing Monrovia for the IGNU accession. Although ECOWAS protocols on non-aggression and mutual defence seemed to provide the legal basis for ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, it was nonetheless an
unprecedented initiative. ECOMOG was the first example in the world of a ‘regional’ peacekeeping force sent in to oversee the resolution of an internal armed conflict.

Rationale for intervention

The arrival of ECOMOG in Liberia is partly explained by ECOWAS’ stated concern at the scale of the humanitarian disaster and the possibility of fighting spilling over Liberia’s borders diffusing weapons and instability throughout West Africa. However, regional political dynamics are also revealing in understanding the rationale behind the ECOMOG initiative.

The West African states that formed the original ECOMOG were all governed by leaders that came to power through military coups d’état, headed single-party governments, or demonstrated a tendency to hold on to power perpetually. They were President Dawda Jawara of The Gambia, Ghana’s Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, General Lansana Conte of Guinea, Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Major-General Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone. As a civilian-led movement, the NPFL had mobilised adequate human resources and military materiel to effectively topple a government. This aroused fears of a regional domino effect which spurred the ‘unholy alliance’ of reactionary rulers (Sesay, 1995) to resist the forces of change embodied in the NPFL. They did this forcefully, immediately collaborating with the AFL and the INPFL to prevent Taylor from taking Monrovia.

The initial deployment of ECOMOG also brought into focus the sharp rivalries between the region’s anglophone and francophone countries. President Tolbert (1971-80) had established strong links between the Liberian state and the francophone axis dominated by Cote d’Ivoire. By executing Tolbert and members of his family and inner circle, Doe broke these ties spectacularly, and subsequently forged a close alliance with Babangida’s Nigeria. With Ivorian and Burkinabe backing, the NPFL incursion threatened to shift the balance of power back in favour of the francophones. Considering this, ECOMOG can be seen partly as an Nigerian/anglophone attempt to defend its regional profile.

The SMC was certainly dominated by the anglophones and ECOMOG, opposed by Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, reflected this. From the outset, the force has been guided largely by the Nigerians, who have provided around 70% of its human, financial (estimated at $4 billion since 1990) and military resources. Togo and Mali, both members of the SMC, initially refused to send troops to Liberia, and the only francophone country involved at this stage was Guinea, which bore the brunt of Liberia’s refugee problem. Later in the conflict, Senegal, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda did deploy troops after successive internationally-sanctioned bids to dilute Nigerian dominance. However, only the Malians have maintained a sustained presence. The Senegalese quickly pulled out when six of their soldiers were killed by the NPFL.

Peacekeeping ‘success’

It is generally believed that the success of military peacekeeping relies on an attitude of impartiality, on trained and experienced multinational troops and on a commitment to use force only in self-defence. Also essential are adequate and reliable sources of finance, a clear and practicable mandate and the continued
support of the UN Security Council, the only body that can effectively authorize such an intervention. The consent of all, and an invitation from at least one of the warring parties is also desirable.

At the time of deployment, it is questionable whether ECOMOG conformed with any of these principles. Firstly, its peace-keeping mandate was clearly problematic in August 1990 when there was no comprehensive ceasefire to monitor. Second, it is unclear whether ECOMOG deployment was invited by any of the warring groups, although it is certain that the AFL and INPFL later welcomed the initiative. Third, intervention was undertaken despite some awareness of the huge financial outlays to be incurred by the participating countries and the hostile domestic reaction these were bound to provoke (Sesay, 1996a). Fourthly, ECOWAS lacked a standing force that was trained and experienced in peacekeeping and, unlike the UN, could not appeal to member states who did have such capacity. Fifth, although later resolutions did support ECOMOG, the initial deployment of the force had no Security Council approval. Moreover, in view of the composition of ECOMOG and the variety of regional and political interests at play, its ability to remain neutral was hotly debated from the outset. Immediately after its deployment, ECOMOG efforts to secure Monrovia involved collaboration with warring factions against the NPFL. Things came to a head in October 1992 when Nigerian Alpha jets strafed NPFL positions around the capital, and bombed the rebels out of Buchanan right back to their headquarters in Gbarnga. Reports from this time also confirm that ECOMOG supplied ULIMO with weapons, other forms of military materiel and financial resources in return for intelligence on the Liberian terrain and NPFL movements. Events such as these spurred US ex-President Jimmy Carter to remark in 1993 that ECOMOG had ceased to be neutral and had become a combatant in the conflict. Such comments quickly became a propaganda tool for Taylor who had been calling for a neutral UN force to replace ECOMOG. Taylor’s protestations were accommodated to some degree in the Cotonou Accord which provided for the expansion of ECOMOG and the establishment of UNOMIL in December 1993.

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<th>Country</th>
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<td>7,931</td>
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<td>Gambia</td>
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To its great credit, ECOMOG has generally managed to provide a semblance of order in Monrovia. At least until April 1996, the capital consistently accommodated a functioning ‘civil society’, including independent media, church and human rights groups. Moreover, as intra-ECOWAS agendas have converged, as the international community has been drawn into the peace process and as diplomacy has sought to accommodate the major factions, the force has assumed a broad authority which was absent at its deployment.

However, despite its considerable military and peace-keeping successes, ECOMOG’s professionalism and neutrality have consistently been questioned. The force also remains seriously under-resourced, notwithstanding substantial new pledges of international support.

The Diplomatic Peace Process

ECOMOG peacekeeping has been paralleled and complemented by a vigorous, if sporadic, diplomatic peace process. This process has involved peace talks in several capitals across the region, as well as in Europe. Within and outside Liberia, national conferences have also been convened by Liberian civilian leaders. It is these conferences, with the active support of ECOWAS, the UN, US and OAU, that have produced interim civilian leaders. These have included Dr. Amos Sawyer, head of IGNU from 1990 to 1994, Professor David Kpomakpor, chair of the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) between March 1994 to August 1995, and Professor Wilton Sankawulo, chair of the LNTG from September 1995 until August 1996. While variously involved in ECOWAS diplomacy, these provisional governments have not been able to exert significant autonomous political authority. The writ of IGNU scarcely extended beyond the outskirts of the capital and its basic security was determined largely by ECOMOG. On the other hand, the LNTG has not yet been able to function as an effective unified administration.

Early efforts

In May 1990, before fighting had reached Monrovia, peace efforts were being co-ordinated by the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC). In June, this committee convened week-long talks between Doe’s government and the NPFL at the US embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone. These early meetings founndered due to palpable intransigence on the part of the two main parties. Having reduced the writ of the government to the capital alone, a buoyant Taylor was poised to accept a political solution, but demanded as a pre-condition Doe’s unconditional resignation. Cocooned in the Executive Mansion, Doe for his part refused to step down. This standoff culminated in an NPFL boycott of the talks and an escalation of hostilities. In August 1990, the SMC adopted IFMC proposals as the ECOWAS peace plan and proceeded, without NPFL approval, to deploy ECOMOG and install IGNU.

While ECOMOG’s forceful intervention militarised the search for peace in Liberia,
the diplomatic option was never abandoned. With the support of the UN, OAU and the US, ECOWAS got the warring parties to sign a range of agreements as a prelude to conducting elections. The most significant of the earlier accords were the Bamako Ceasefire Agreement (November 1990), the Yamoussoukro I Accord (June 1991) and the Yamoussoukro IV Accord (October 1991). The first and the second of these brought the NPFL back to the negotiating table after periods of absence, while the third established comprehensive modalities for encampment, demobilisation and elections.

The collapse of these early accords is explained largely by the ambivalent commitment to a negotiated solution exhibited by all parties. While a signatory to all the accords, Taylor was not averse to employing the breathing space occasioned by peace negotiations to rearm and relaunch his military operations. Similarly the AFL, supported by elements within ECOMOG, collaborated in the formation of ULIMO in the belief that, together, they might defeat the NPFL militarily. It was only a series of factors, including the high cost of ECOMOG ‘peace enforcement’, Nigeria’s deteriorating domestic situation, the NPFL’s commercial and territorial losses, and the death of Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny, which united ECOWAS behind the diplomatic process and softened the confrontational approach of all parties.

*Fresh impetus*

The Yamoussoukro IV accord collapsed after the NPFL launched its second bid to capture Monrovia in October 1992. After this, the peace process lay dormant for several months before renewed ECOWAS and UN negotiations engineered the Cotonou Accord of July 1993.

The most comprehensive of all the Liberian accords, Cotonou formed the basis for subsequent agreements in Akosombo, Accra and Abuja. It provided for the expansion of ECOMOG, the formation of UNOMIL, and a range of mechanisms for observing and monitoring ceasefires. It also set out mechanisms for the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, stipulated procedures for conducting general elections and provided for the establishment of the LNTG and an executive Council of State involving representatives of the key factions. (Alao, 1994; Mackinlay and Alao, 1994). However, despite the installation of the first LNTG in March 1994, inter- and intra- factional disputes continued concerning the allocation of government posts. Moreover, despite significant deployment of peace-keepers outside Monrovia, new factions continued to emerge and existing ones continued to defend their territorial and commercial interests. Numerous ceasefire violations ensued, stalling and halting meaningful disarmament.

In August 1994 Ghana’s President, Jerry Rawlings, took over the ECOWAS chair. His determination to resolve the conflict gave fresh momentum to the peace process which by then was effectively stalled. He spoke of the growing costs and political unpopularity of the ECOMOG operation, warning the factions that unless they showed credible commitment to ending the conflict, ECOMAS troops would be withdrawn. Rawlings’ initiative soon produced the Akosombo Accord and the Accra Clarification, both of which reaffirmed and developed the principles of the Cotonou Accord, drawing the factions closer to the heart of the LNTG.
However, the signing of the Akosombo agreement coincided with the convening of the civilian Liberia National Conference (LNC) which made new proposals for disarmament and the demilitarisation of Liberian politics. The Akosombo and Accra agreements were rejected by the LNC, and by individual religious groups, human rights agencies and political parties. All these groups perceived the agreements as legitimising criminality and effectively partitioning the country between the armed factions. Nigeria was also suspicious of the new developments, perceiving a degree of Ghanaian/NPFL collaboration which was sideling them in the peace process. Regardless of their intended aims, the Akosombo and Accra Accords failed to halt the factional wrangling over government posts, nor did they significantly stem the violence in the provinces.

The Abuja Accord

With the help of international non-governmental organisations, Rawlings eventually secured a rapprochement between Taylor and the new Nigerian government of General Sani Abacha. This helped lay the groundwork for the signing of the Abuja Accord on 19 August 1995.

One significant departure from previous agreements was that the Abuja Accord brought the leaders of the major warring factions into government as members of the six-man Council of State which headed LNTG II. The council, installed on 1st September 1995, was chaired by Professor Wilton Sankawulo, an English literature lecturer from the University of Liberia. The equal vice-chairmen were the faction leaders Charles Taylor, Ahaji Kromah (ULIMO-K) and Dr. George Boley (LPC-Coalition), and two civilian representatives. The civilians were Oscar Quiah, representing the LNC, and Chief Tamba Tailor, an octogenerian traditional leader nominated by ULIMO-K and the NPFL. Another change from earlier agreements was that the Abuja Accord permitted the leaders of the warring factions to contest the presidential elections scheduled for August 1996. Its only condition on presidential candidates was that they resign their LNTG positions three months before standing.

The Abuja Accord raised great hopes in Liberia and its announcement led to wild excitement in the capital. This euphoria was heightened by Taylor’s announcement through various local and international media that he was returning from Nigeria to tell his fighters that they should lay down their arms. Taylor himself was greeted by jubilant crowds when, for the first time since the outbreak of the war, he entered Monrovia on 31 August 1995.

Like previous agreements, however, the Abuja Accord was flawed in its conception. Pundits in Monrovia expressed alarm that it permitted faction leaders to enter Monrovia with their militias and artillery intact. They also voiced reservations concerning the composition of the Council of State. On the one hand, there was widespread scepticism concerning the authority and political acumen of Sankawulo and Tamba Tailor, both of whom had been appointed under pressure from the NPFL. On the other, doubts were raised as to whether Boley could
In addition, major criticism was also levelled at the broad policy of assigning key executive positions to the various armed factions. This led to appointments to government positions and the public services based on factional and ethnic affiliation, a phenomenon which had fuelled the war in the first place. The local press and religious groups have especially argued that such appointments will serve only the narrow interests of the faction leaders, and not the purposes of national reconciliation.

In view of the weaknesses in the Abuja Accord, it is not surprising that fighting erupted, this time in the capital, in April 1996. In the months preceding the resumption of hostilities, the Council of State had been deeply divided by differences over interpretations of fundamental issues in the peace process. As feared, Sankawulo had proved broadly incapable of asserting his authority over his fellow council-men, creating the public impression that ‘there is more than one government’ in Monrovia (West Africa, 19/2/96).

In effect, the council had come to be dominated by the faction leaders, with Taylor and Kromah increasingly allied and the former gradually claiming de facto chairmanship. On 29 January 1996, Taylor celebrated his birthday with pomp, pageantry and long speeches. Those who attended eventually dispersed and began to talk of Taylor as ‘the leader’ (Africa Confidential, 16/2/96). He subsequently suggested changing the name of the LNTG by dropping the word ‘transitional’, made calls for ECOMOG to be brought under LNTG control, and canvassed support for these proposals from the diplomatic community. Prior to that, Taylor had cracked down on the independent press and on Krahn dissidents with the help of the NPFL-controlled police force.

**Liberia National Transitional Government**

**September 1995**

**Council of State:**

- Prof. Wilton Sankawulo: Chairman
- Dr. George Boley (LPC): Vice Chairman
- Charles Taylor (NPFL): Vice Chairman
- Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K): Vice-Chairman
- Oscar Quiah (LNC): Vice-Chairman
- Chief Tamba Tailor: Vice-Chairman

**Cabinet:**

- Momolu Sirleaf (NPFL), Foreign Affairs
- Lansana Kromah (ULIMO-K), Finance
- Francis Garlawolo (NPFL), Justice
- Varlee Keita (ULIMO-K), Public Works
- Losseni Kamara (ULIMO-K), Commerce and Industries
- Moses Bah (LPC), Education
- Dr. Roland Massaquoi (NPFL), Agriculture
- Victoria Refell (NPFL), Information
- Alfred Kollie (LPC), Post and Telecommunications
- Francois Massaquoi (LDF), Youth and Sports
- Jenkins Dunbar (NPFL), Lands, Mines and Energy
- Nanjohn Suah (NPFL), Internal Affairs
- Tom Woewiyu (CRC-NPFL), Labour
- Dr. Vamba Kanneh (ULIMO-K), Health
- Lt. Gen Hesekiah Bowen (AFL), Defence
- Monie R. Captan (LPC), Presidential Affairs
- Bai M. Gbala (LPC), Minister without portfolio
- Dr. Armah Youlo (LPC), Transport
- Francis M. Carbah (LDF), Planning & Economic Affairs
- Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J), Rural Development

adequately represent the combined interests of the LPC, ULIMO-J, NPFL-CRC and LDF, the so-called ‘coalition’ of factions which had emerged since the Cotonou accord. Considering the idea was to co-opt all leaders with the potential to wreck the peace, the exclusion of ULIMO-J commander Roosevelt Johnson was particularly puzzling.
Civic Peacemaking

A glaring omission in most analyses of the Liberian war is the role played by unarmed civic agencies in promoting and critiquing the peace process. The focus on factional, state and international actors has led to the marginalisation of these efforts which deserve a place in the history books.

The Inter-Faith Mediation Committee

Among civic groups, the most influential in the peace process has been the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC). This organisation, comprising prominent Christian and Muslim leaders, convened the first consultations between the representatives of Doe, Taylor and the AFL in June 1990. Two months later, their proposals were adopted and articulated as the original ECOWAS peace plan. Ever since this early involvement, the IFMC has been pivotal in bringing parties together, in organising conferences at home and abroad, and in helping to set agendas for these meetings. It was also represented in many of the peace negotiations across West Africa and has been a leading critic of the flaws in the accords. In March 1995 and February 1996, the IFMC led successful ‘sit-home’ strikes in protest at agreements they felt rewarded the leaders of warring factions. The second of these led to the formation of the Civic Disarmament Campaign (CDC) for which the Committee serves as an umbrella organisation for a broad range of civic

Non-governmental self-help organisations by Philippa Atkinson

The growth of self-help relief organisations has been one of the more positive phenomena to have emerged through the Liberian war. Specific self-help organisations include;

National Volunteer Programme (NVP)
Under this scheme, devised by local people and supported by UN agencies and international NGOs, over 1,500 former combatants became involved in activities from road clearing on the Monrovia-Gbarmaga highway, agricultural training and production, rubbish collection in Monrovia, education and vocational training. The majority of projects were small-scale, and implemented by local NGOs and government agencies. All of the projects were run through the provision of food-for-work, which provided an incentive for attendance. The scheme was discontinued partly due to the failure of the Cotonou Accord which it was supposed to support.

Special Emergency Life Food (SELF)
SELF was set up in Monrovia during the early part of the war with the express aim of taking responsibility within Liberia for the resolution of problems relating to the conflict. SELF devised a system of enumerating households and individuals that ensured that food aid could be delivered to the population of Monrovia as soon as it was available at the port. The SELF system of household, street and community level organisation was later extended beyond the delivery of food aid to include any type of development or reconstruction activity that could be fostered at a local level. Through its close contact with the World Food Programme (WFP), SELF has been able to get support in terms of food-for-work and management back-up for the implementation of projects including the rehabilitation of local schools, the cleaning of sewerage systems, and the building of latrines. The community welfare teams established through SELF follow careful guidelines for participation, decision-making and conflict resolution and have become one important channel for dealing with the traumas of the war and promoting local development. The WFP country director described SELF as 'the best local implementing partner we have ever worked with'.
actors. Some of the fundamental issues of interest to the IFMC remain the polarisation of Liberian society along ethnic lines, the intransigence of warring factions to disarm and the issues of justice and retribution in post-war Liberia. It continues to play a crucial role in both advocating peace and delivering social services.

Women’s organisations

Among the range of atrocities endured by the Liberian population, women have been the specific target for rape, sexual abuse and harassment. Together with children, they also constitute the bulk of refugees and are overall the greatest losers in the conflict. Women activists coordinated their responses to this suffering through a national organization, the Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI). The LWI has been instrumental in drawing local and international attention to the plight of women, in organising women’s responses to overseas relief, in channeling the views of women to national and international mediators and in representing women in local, national and international peace negotiations. In a lot of cases, women have assumed leadership roles demonstrating immense resilience, fortitude and wisdom. This could contribute to an irreversible change in the role and perception of women in Liberian society.

Interest Groups and NGOs

Interest groups and local NGOs have also made significant contributions to the search for peace. The association of Interest Groups of Liberia (IGL), headed by Dr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh, has played a key role in organising a range of professional bodies serving teachers, legal workers, drivers, traders and farmers whose combined efforts were crucial to the organisation of the two ‘sit-home’ strikes. In daily operations and through delegations at several major conferences, the IGL has identified the demilitarisation of Liberian society as key to conflict resolution and national reconciliation. It also provides an important model of grassroots democracy which will prove essential in post-war Liberia.

Two other prominent examples of local NGOs are Susukuu, a development agency also headed by Tipoteh, and the Special Emergency Life Food Programme (SELF). Although in existence well before the war, Susukuu has assumed an additional role complementing international efforts at disarmament. It does this by sponsoring ex-combatants for training in schools, colleges and technical institutes. SELF, for its part, is a local organisation concerned with relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. It was established in September 1990 to help ensure an orderly distribution of relief aid from abroad (see box). More recently, its major efforts have been geared towards the organisation and sensitization of local communities for effective participation in the post-war governance of Liberia.

Continued on page 75
Civic Initiatives in the Peace Process

Through the Abuja Accord of August 1995, international negotiators provided for the direct participation of armed faction leaders on the sovereign Council of State of the Liberian Transitional Government. They did so believing that this would provide security to all factions, accelerate disarmament and ensure free and fair elections within twelve months. Unarmed political and civic groups opposed this agreement from the outset, highlighting its tacit legitimation of violence and looting by men whose will to disarm was highly questionable and whose control of ragtag factional armies was sparse at best. They feared that the accommodation of the factions and the arrival of armed militias in Monrovia would endanger rather than enhance national reconciliation. On the 6th of April 1996, these fears were vindicated as forces loyal to various Transitional Government leaders engaged in some of the worst fighting witnessed in the capital in six and half years of war.

In 1990, civic proposals were adopted as the original ECOWAS peace plan.

The Abuja Accord was the culmination of a trend by which civic groups have gradually been marginalised within the Liberian peace process. This article endeavors to give voice to the civic constituency, to summarise its initiatives and to assess their impact on the peace process to date. Its prevailing message is that peace can only be assured by resisting trends towards militarisation and strengthening the role of civic groups in Liberian society.
Individual Liberians have faced the futile brutality of the war with a mix of courage and despair

Civic involvement in the Liberian peace process began in May 1990 when two major religious institutions, the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC) and the National Muslim Council of Liberia (NMCL), established the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC). Traditional African religions inform the dominant belief systems in Liberia, but Islam and Christianity wield significant moral authority largely through the services they offer in relief work, health and education. Most of Liberia’s bureaucrats and officials have benefitted from these services at one time or another and hence generally demonstrate respect for religious leaders.

In the face of international reluctance to address the unfolding conflict, the IFMC initiated the first major attempt to facilitate dialogue between the main warring factions of the time, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). After shuttling between the headquarters of the two factions, the Committee secured an agreement from both sides to send representatives to Freetown, Sierra Leone

"We assemble here today to say ‘enough is enough’. We will take our country back. It is complete insanity to let our country, already plundered and raped, continue in the path of utter destruction. We have assembled here to say NO to the warlords and want to publicly declare that we will do every reasonable thing within our powers to ensure that their desire to ruin our country will not be tolerated but in fact resisted and prevented."

- Ezekiel Pajibo, Africa Faith and Justice Network, Washington DC, April 1996
for comprehensive peace talks. These talks were held in the US Embassy in June 1990, but stuck on the issue of the status of President Doe. After a week of negotiation, the NPFL withdrew and announced the formation of an alternative government in the territories it had captured. As events deteriorated, with continuing carnage and a spiralling regional refugee crisis, the prospects for a purely diplomatic solution receded. It was at this juncture that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) assumed the lead role in the peace process. In doing so, they adopted the prescription of the IFMC, calling for an immediate ceasefire, a military force to monitor this ceasefire, and the establishment of an interim government headed by a neutral personality to lead Liberia to free and fair elections within the year.

The intervention of ECOWAS and the creation of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) diminished the extent and urgency of IFMC involvement in the peace process. Like other civic groups, the Committee was tempted to perceive regional intervention as an immediate panacea to the Liberian nightmare. This was ill-advised however, as the NPFL opposed the creation of ECOMOG, resolutely resisted its deployment, and refused to attend the national conference convened by ECOWAS to appoint the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).

This conference went ahead anyway in August 1990, and the IFMC was identified as the only neutral institution to preside over the deliberations. Since then, most gatherings of civil society, and some involving the warring factions, have also been overseen by the Committee. Included in these is the March 1991 All-Liberian National Conference which sought, in vain, to co-opt the NPFL within the civilian dominated IGNU. Throughout the period 1990-93, the IFMC continued consultations with ECOWAS leaders and with members of the growing number of Liberian factions. In doing so, they strove to remain ‘ideal mediators’ exercising ‘absolute neutrality’ in their dealings with all parties.

In July 1993, the landmark Cotonou Accord marked the genesis of the ‘power for guns’ policy by which international negotiators sought to accommodate the armed factions with offers of access to significant state power. During the final leg of the Cotonou negotiations, the IFMC contributed to the resolution of a major disagreement concerning the allocation between signatories of posts in the proposed Transitional Government. However, while helping to secure its passage, the Committee became increasingly troubled by the content of the agreement. This unease subsequently grew and by 1994, IFMC position statements expressed sharp disagreements with the direction of negotiations. The new position was largely influenced by the Catholic Prelate, Archbishop Michael K. Francis who articulated his conviction that ‘the truth is not neutral, it is a position’. While deeply interested in ensuring that peace return to Liberia, Francis was opposed to appeasement on legal, moral and religious grounds. He argued that the policy

By 1994, civic groups were deeply troubled by the direction of the peace process.
rewarded crime, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle of violence, and rendering genuine national reconciliation difficult, if not almost impossible.

By mid 1994, the NPFL had established itself as dominant among the factions represented in the Transitional Government. Attempting to exploit this position, it suggested, with a degree of support from elements in ULIMO, that the AFL be divested of its status as the lawful national army and replaced with a new military arrangement comprising fighters from all factions. In a further attempt to extend their power, the same faction leaders proposed traditional patriarch Chief Tamba Tailor as their consensus candidate to replace civilian politician David Kponkalpor as head of the Transitional Government. Asserting their principled new position, the IFMC publicly dissented from both these proposals. With regard to the military, they highlighted the unprofessional and ill-disciplined conduct of the factional militias, and urged that military reconstitution should be deferred until the establishment of an elected government. Attempted any sooner, they asserted, it would merely complicate and delay the process of disarmament.

Regarding Tailor, they argued that the traditional chief was simply too old to assert meaningful authority over the Transitional Government through the complex process of transition.

In 1994 and 1995, amid continued fighting in the rural areas, popular demonstrations at the slow pace of progress began to take place in Monrovia. One was organised by women’s groups demanding that the warring factions and the international community redouble their efforts to establish peace. Others took the form of violent attacks on the homes of individuals, including factional loyalists. Sensing the potential danger of these diverse actions and the need to develop a collective and achievable agenda, the IFMC convened a series of national consultations. These intended to bring various civic groups into a collective arrangement with a single agenda of ‘disarmament, peace, free and fair elections’. The emerging consortium comprised around fifty organisations, some national in character, including religious institutions, women’s organisations, students groups, workers, merchants, youth and professional bodies. It has since held regular discussions under the leadership of the IFMC.

In March 1995, this consortium staged a successful one day ‘stay home’ action. The objective of this was to signal to the factions and the international community that the majority of Liberians are peaceful, to pressurize militias to disarm, to galvanise civic institutions and to reduce the danger of legitimate protest finding expression through violence. On February 15 1996, six months after the Abuja Accord had drawn the leaders of the armed factions into government, a second such action was launched. This too was a resounding success which launched the ’Civic Disarmament Campaign’ (CDC). Chaired by the IFMC, the CDC seeks to mobilise the civic component of Liberia into a single initiative specifically to effect disarmament. Togba-nah Tipoteh, Chairman of the Interest Groups of Liberia (IGL), director of Susukku and a significant player within the CDC has said:

‘The Liberian people have a workable strategy for ending the war and moving towards a genuine peace. This strategy is support for ECOMOG to create a peaceful space in which ordinary Liberians interact with fighters to convince thousands of them to disarm; from disarmament to democratic elections to sustainable democracy.’
While a collective national agenda has become imperative, individual civic groups have also organised their own programmes to address the peace process and disarmament. The Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI) has conducted meetings, participated in demonstrations, and presented a range of position statements to ECOWAS and the factional leaders. Prominent LWI activists were also present to voice their concerns at the talks in December 1994 which culminated in the signing of the Accra Clarification.

For their part, Susukuu and the IGL have been involved in organising programmes to encourage fighters to disarm by providing academic and sometimes health care opportunities. Together, they launched a ‘school for guns’ programme to support former combatants. However, despite early promise, this project was seriously undermined by the recent renewal of hostilities.

In accounting for the ongoing war and delays in disarmament, civic organisations have often emphasised the commercialization of the Liberian war. They have highlighted how recent accords have addressed neither the direct benefits accruing from the illegal plunder of Liberia’s natural resources, nor the profits arising from illicit dealings between the factions and a range of international commercial interests. Worse, by securing the factions within the framework of the Transitional Government, the peace process has legitimised these acts of pillage and assisted their formal institutionalisation. Mrs. Mary Brownell, leader of the LWI, argues that: ‘disarmament will only be effective when Liberians themselves adopt a serious posture. There has been mere lip service to disarmament because of substantial material gains. We see the blatant destruction of property and the killing of innocent civilians yet we turn a blind eye and pretend that all is well.’

As the viewpoints and actions of civic groups have become more critical, they have experienced increasing antagonism from the armed factions, especially those most prominent in the Transitional Government who have most to lose. This is best demonstrated by the looting, harassment and death threats that forced all prominent civic leaders to flee Monrovia during the recent violence in the city. The forthright stance of these leaders has also undermined their mediatory role. This is demonstrated by the collapse, amid ‘government’ accusations of partiality, of IFMC attempts to mediate between Roosevelt Johnson and his enemies immediately prior to the renewal of hostilities. Despite all this however, the courageous stance of the IFMC and its

With the protection of ECOMOG, unarmed Liberians have influenced over 15,000 combatants to disarm without any massive people’s actions. So far, combatants who are tired of fighting have been laying down their guns like plums falling from a plum tree without any shaking of the tree. As most fighters are tired of fighting, and we want disarmament to move fast, all we have to do is to take massive action now for disarmament and combatants will lay down their guns fast just like plenty plums falling with the shaking of the plum tree. In reaching out to combatants to influence them to disarm, we must reach out with love and some concrete help to assist them to return to civil society and get a good chance to build a new and better life.’

- Susukuu, early 1996
allies has also raised the public profile of Liberian civil society and achieved increasing respect for its capacities.

In assessing the work of the IFMC, it is important to note that the continuous interaction of prominent Islamic and Christian leaders on the Committee forestalled the emergence of religious disharmony as a component of the civil war. While the peace process remained committed to defending a degree of civilian sovereignty, the IFMC also demonstrated the required neutrality and authority to ensure that negotiations were open, ordered and productive. The more recent strategic shift from ideal neutrality to the insistence on moral and religious standards has preserved a residue of respect for non-violence and the rule of law within decaying Liberian society.

The present impasse provides a fresh opportunity to strengthen civic groups

In the aftermath of the recent violence, it has become apparent that civil society must be better supported in its attempts to pressure for disarmament and national reconciliation. Now that the faction leaders have shown themselves unable to bury their differences and cooperate for the good of all Liberians, there is fresh potential for a heightened civic role in the peace process. However, the recent renewal of hostilities decimated the resources of civic groups and forced their leaders to flee the country. The question now is how far the international community will be willing and able to shift its peacemaking emphasis in order to rebuild and strengthen the role of non-violent, non-sectarian initiatives in the reconstitution of Liberia. ■
Due to the escalation of the Liberian civil war, and in the absence of a significant international response, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) set up a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in May 1990 to seek ways of bringing an end to the violence. Two months later, attempts by the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) to mediate between the warring factions began to lose impetus. In August, the SMC adopted IFMC proposals as the ECOWAS Peace Plan and assumed the lead role in peace efforts. Although failing to secure a ceasefire, it quickly assembled and deployed a military peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It also convened a national conference to elect a civilian-dominated Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), and set about securing Monrovia for the installation of this government. In all these moves, it met stern resistance from the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and from its backers within the francophone states of ECOWAS.

Since then, ECOWAS has orchestrated a series of diplomatic initiatives which have sought to establish the basis for peace in Liberia. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that these initiatives have repeatedly and tragically failed. They have not met the needs and interests of Liberia’s warring factions and their leaders, much less those of the civilian population. The following survey looks at the peace agreements marking the course of ECOWAS diplomacy, summarising their important clauses, their strengths and their major weaknesses. It is divided into three sections. The first considers the accords signed before the July 1993 Cotonou Accord, the second looks at the Cotonou Accord itself, while the third analyses the post Cotonou agreements. This grouping reflects the pivotal significance of the Cotonou Accord in the shifting political context of the peace efforts.
An exasperated Major-General Ishaya Bakut, commander of ECOMOG in 1991-92, at the height of confusion concerning both the means and ends of the peace process

**Pre-Cotonou Accords**

There were seven major ECOWAS-sponsored agreements signed before the Cotonou Accord. These were the Bamako Ceasefire of November 1990, the Banjul Joint Statement of December 1990, the February 1991 Lome Agreement, and the Yamoussoukro I-IV Accords of June-October 1991. The Bamako, Banjul, and Lome Agreements may be co-considered as the first stage of ECOWAS diplomacy, underwritten by Sir Dawda Jawara, President of The Gambia and Chairman of the SMC.

At the Bamako meeting, the NPFL, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), the three factions active at the time, committed themselves to the ECOWAS Peace Plan and to an immediate ceasefire. In Banjul, they pledged to organise a national conference which would reconstitute the IGNU with the inclusion of their own representatives within 60 days. The Lome Agreement built on the earlier accords and specified modalities for the implementation of the ceasefire. ECOMOG was given the prime role in disarming the three factions, who were to assemble in allotted camps. However, until the formation of the reconstituted interim government, it would carry out these duties in liaison with a Technical Committee comprising members of all the factions. ECOMOG was also to supervise the handing in of weapons, the registration of troops and the receiving of the sick, the wounded and the displaced. The NPFL only signed up to these agreements under intense military and
diplomatic pressure. Furthermore, in securing Monrovia in October 1990, ECOMOG had actively collaborated with AFL and INPFL forces to resist the NPFL advance. In the context of mutual suspicion resulting from these facts, hopes for disarmament seemed far-fetched and the accords soon floundered. They were effectively nullified when the NPFL realised it was being outmanoeuvred in the national conference of March 1991 and resorted to wrecking tactics. Refusing to recognise the authority of the conference, the NPFL leadership then set about consolidating its National Patriotic

Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), an alternative administration based in Gbarnga. The IGNU was reconstituted in Monrovia without NPFL participation.

The pre-Cotonou diplomatic process was revived in June 1991 with the signing of the Yamoussoukro I Accord. This agreement secured an apparent rapprochement between the NPFL and IGNU and built the impetus for the three further accords signed by these parties. Orchestrated by the late President Houphouet Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire, the Yamoussoukro agreements were under-written by a newly formed ECOWAS ‘Committee of Five’ which was effectively led by the Ivorians. They were further facilitated by the involvement of the Atlanta-based International Negotiations Network (INN) led by former US President Jimmy Carter.

The culmination of this new stage of diplomacy was the Yamoussoukro IV agreement signed in October 1991. While this accord reflected an appreciation of the conflict much improved on that of Lome, it still gave too central a role to ECOMOG. It was also over-optimistic about the timetable of encampment, disarmament and demobilisation, which it envisaged could be completed in 60 days.

This said, Yamoussoukro IV, like its predecessors, was compromised by a lack of factional commitment and by antagonism within ECOWAS. Although technically flawed to some degree, it failed more due to continued NPFL aggression and Nigerian fears of francophone-NPFL collaboration. These factors led elements within ECOMOG to provide covert support to the emerging United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) which cut its teeth opposing

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Banjul Communique
ECOWAS Peace Plan
7th August 1990

Signed by:
(formally accredited to by Wilmot Diggs (AFL), Charles Taylor (NPFL) and Noah Bordolo (INPFL) in Bamako on 28th November)

Witnessed by:
Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and a representative of the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC)

Key points:
* Called on the warring parties to observe an immediate ceasefire;
* Announced the establishment of ECOMOG to ‘keep peace’, ‘restore order’ and ‘ensure that the ceasefire is respected’;
* Called for a national conference of all Liberian political parties and other interest groups to establish a civilian-dominated interim government;
* Set up a special emergency fund for ECOWAS operations in Liberia;
* Elections to be held within twelve months.
Yamoussoukro IV Agreement
30 October 1991

Signed by:
Amos Sawyer (IGNU), Charles Taylor (NPFL)
Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire,
Guinea Bissau, Mali and Senegal, and
representatives of the Heads of State of Togo,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana and
Guinea

Key points:
*Provided for another ceasefire;
*Nominated a five member elections
commission and five member ad hoc supreme
court from the ranks of the NPFL and IGNU;
*Renewed and affirmed the mandate of
ECOMOG to supervise the agreement,
including the resettlement of the country’s
displaced;
*Stipulated that all warring parties must move
into designated camps where they would be
disarmed by ECOMOG troops;
*Provided for elections to be held within 6
months.

NPFL-backed insurrection in Sierra Leone. Especially after ULIMO-NPFL fighting had intensified in western Liberia, the NPFL refused to disarm to ECOMOG. The Yamoussoukro process was finally driven to its grave when the NPFL launched ‘Operation Octopus’, their ill-fated attempt to capture Monrovia in October 1992.

The Cotonou Accord

The Cotonou Accord is, without doubt, the most comprehensive accord signed on Liberia, and all the subsequent agreements merely clarify or amend it. Its 19 articles cover ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, the structure of transitional government, election modalities, repatriation of refugees and a general amnesty. It was facilitated by ECOWAS in collaboration with the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It was signed by IGNU, ULIMO, and the NPFL, whose military setbacks had forced their return to the negotiating table.

The Cotonou agreement marks a major watershed in ECOWAS diplomacy for a number of reasons. Firstly, it represents the end of the era in which factions signed accords merely as half-hearted or duplicitous responses to external pressure. With the Cotonou Accord, the peace process began to focus more specifically on the relationships and interests of the factions themselves, and hence acquired a much more ‘Liberian’ character. Secondly, it heralded a new stage in the peace process in which Liberian politics came to be dominated by the armed factions. For all intents and purposes, the civil state was ushered towards retirement at Cotonou as ECOWAS sought to institute a power-sharing regime which was genuinely inclusive of all armed interests. Thirdly, while previous agreements had made ECOMOG the sole executor of the peace process, the Cotonou Accord recast the role of the force in recognition of its questionable neutrality. It stipulated first that ECOMOG be expanded to include troops from outside West Africa, and second that it operate in close association with a United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIL). Taken together, these developments represent an unequivocal effort on the part of ECOWAS to allay the fears of the factions and to accommodate their aspirations within the peace process.

Continued on page 70
Accords of the Liberian Conflict

ECOWAS Peace Plan – Banjul Communiqué (7 August 1990)*

Bamako Ceasefire (28 November 1990)*

Banjul Joint Statement (21 December 1990)*

Lome Agreement (13 February 1991)*

Yamoussoukro I Accord (30 June 1991)*

Yamoussoukro II Accord (29 July 1991)*

Yamoussoukro III Accord (17 September 1991)*

Yamoussoukro IV Accord (30 October 1991)  
UN Security Council reference no. S/24815

Geneva Ceasefire (17 July 1993)*

Cotonou Accord (25 July 1993)  
UN Security Council reference no. S/26272

Akosombo Agreement (12 September 1994)  

Accra Clarification (21 December 1994)  
UN Security Council reference no. S/1995/7

Abuja Accord (19 August 1995)  

Supplement to the Abuja Accord (17 August 1996)

ECOWAS Protocols Pertinent to ECOMOG Deployment

Protocol on Non-Aggression (22 April 1978)

Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (29 May 1981)

Article 58, Revised ECOWAS Treaty (25 July 1993)

*Copies of texts not published on the following pages are available from:  
the United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, NY 10017, USA and  
the Department of Information, ECOWAS Secretariat, P.M.B. 12745, Lagos, Nigeria
Final Communiqué of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee of Five of the Economic Community of West African States on the Liberian crisis, held in Yamoussoukro on 29 and 30 October 1991

1. The Committee of Five of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Liberia held its fourth meeting in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, on 29 and 30 October 1991, under the chairmanship of H.E. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire. At the invitation of the Committee, apart from those who are members of the Committee of Five, the other members of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee participated in its deliberations together with Guinea and Sierra Leone.

2. Present at the meeting were the following Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives:

H.E. Captain Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, Head of Government of Burkina Faso;
H.B. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire;
H.E. General João Bernardo Vieira, President of the Council of State of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau;
H.E. Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, Chairman of the People's Redemption Transitional Committee, Head of State of the Republic of Mali;
H.E. Abdou Diouf, President of the Republic of Senegal;
The Honourable Kokou Joseph Koffigoh, Prime Minister of the Togolese Republic;
The Honourable Augustus Aikhomu, Vice-President, representing the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
The Honourable J. B. Dauda, Second Vice-President, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, representing the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone;
The Honourable Alhaji Omar Sey, Minister of External Affairs, representing the President of the Republic of the Gambia;
The Honourable Dr. Obed Asamoah, PNDC Secretary for Foreign Affairs, representing the Head of State of the Republic of Ghana;
The Honourable Facine Toure, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, representing the Head of State of the Republic of Guinea.

3. Also present at the invitation of the Committee were:

H.E. Dr. Amos C. Sawyer, President of the Interim Government of Liberia;
Mr. Charles Taylor, Head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL);
Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity;
Mrs. Dayle E. Spencer, representative of the International Negotiations Network (INN).

Outcome of Deliberations

Developments since the Committee’s last meeting

4. The Committee reviewed developments relating to the Liberian crisis since its last meeting in Yamoussoukro on 16 and 17 September 1991. The Committee noted with appreciation that since that meeting, the Republic of Senegal, in keeping with its promise to contribute troops to ECOMOG, had started deploying its troops to Liberia to join ECOMOG. It also noted with pleasure the fact that the parties, in consonance with the agreement reached in Yamoussoukro during the last meeting of the Committee of Five, had nominated a five-member Elections Commission for the organisation and supervision of the elections to be held in Liberia, and a five-member ad hoc Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes that may arise from the electoral process, as provided for by the Liberian Constitution. The Committee urged the parties concerned to take all necessary action to ensure that the Interim Elections Commission begins its work without any further delay.

ECOMOG

5. Recalling its earlier appeal to other ECOWAS member States to contribute contingents to ECOMOG, the Committee welcomed with appreciation the announcement by Guinea-Bissau of its readiness to contribute troops to ECOMOG in order to enhance its capacity to discharge its peace-keeping role in Liberia.

Timetable for encampment and disarmament

6. Recalling the earlier Yamoussoukro Accord of the parties to implement, under ECOMOG supervision, the encampment of their troops in designated locations and their disarmament, and the mandate given to ECOMOG, in liaison with the parties concerned, to work out the practical modalities for the implementation of that Accord, the Meeting considered and agreed a programme of implementation of these important elements of the cease-fire, which is annexed hereto (see enclosure below). This programme envisages the implementation within 60 days of all the modalities for the establishment of the necessary conditions of peace and security on the ground in order to reinforce the confidence of the parties as well as create a proper atmosphere conducive to the holding of free, fair and democratic elections in Liberia not later than six months from the date of this Meeting. The Committee therefore renewed its mandate to

ACCORD PAGE 39
ECOMOG to ensure that the programme is smoothly and speedily implemented, in order to make it possible for democratic elections to be held in Liberia within the stipulated period. To this end, it appealed to all the parties concerned to continue to repose trust and confidence in ECOMOG and to cooperate fully with ECOMOG, the Interim Elections Commission, the INN and all other international observers who may wish to observe and monitor the electoral process.

Visits to Guinea and Sierra Leone

7. The Meeting received the report of the delegation of the Foreign Ministers of Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria, headed by Senegal, which was requested to visit Guinea and Sierra Leone after the end of the Committee’s last meeting. It welcomed the participation of Guinea and Sierra Leone at the meeting and particularly noted with appreciation, the declaration of these countries to continue to cooperate with the Committee in order to achieve the successful implementation of the ECOWAS peace plan and to facilitate the restoration of normalcy in the border areas of Sierra Leone and Liberia. The Committee agreed on the necessity that all hostile foreign forces be withdrawn immediately from the territory of Sierra Leone and that a buffer zone be created with similar dispatch on the Liberian side of the border, to be monitored by ECOMOG.

Vote of Thanks

8. The Committee expressed its appreciation and gratitude to H.E. Felix Houphouet Boigny, President of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, and to the Government and people of Cote d’Ivoire for the warm reception and hospitality accorded to all delegations and for the excellent facilities made available to ensure the success of the Meeting.

Done at Yamoussoukro this 30th day of October 1991.

His Excellency Captain Blaise COMPAORE
President of Burkina Faso

His Excellency Felix HOUPOUJET-BOIGNY
President of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire

His Excellency General João Bernardo VIEIRA
President of the Council of State of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

His Excellency Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani
TOURE, Head of State of Mali

His Excellency Abdou DIOP
President of the Republic of Senegal

The Honourable Kokou Joseph KOFFIGOH
Prime Minister of the Togolese Republic

The Honourable Augustus AIKOMU
Vice-President, Federal Republic of Nigeria

The Honourable J. B. DAUDA
Second Vice-President, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Sierra Leone

The Honourable Alhaji Omar SEY
Minister of External Affairs, The Gambia

The Honourable Dr. Obed ASAMOAH PNDC
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ghana

The Honourable Facinc TOURE
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Republic of Guinea

His Excellency Dr. Amos C. SAWYER
President of the Interim Government, Liberia

Mr. Charles TAYLOR
Head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Enclosure

Programme of Implementation

**ECOMOG mission**
Cover the whole of Liberia.

Supervise the encampment and disarmament of all warring factions.

**Preliminary accepted conditions**

ECOMOG shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the territory of Liberia.

All warring factions will willingly abandon their fighting positions and move into designated camps.

During the Period of encampment and disarmament, eminent persons of the INN will visit Liberia in order to reinforce the confidence of the parties.

All parties concerned will recognise the absolute neutrality of ECOMOG and demonstrate their trust and confidence in it.

Some weapons inadvertently lost would therefore need to be located and recovered.

There would be some obstacles and possible minefields that would need to be neutralised.

All entry points into Liberia will be monitored by ECOMOG troops.

**Tasks**

Eliminate external threat to allow the encampment and disarmament programme to be smoothly and effectively carried out.

Monitoring of all possible avenues of approach into Liberia by patrols and static guards.

Search, in conjunction with administrative authorities, to recover hidden or lost weapons.

Strategic installations will need static guards.

Security will be provided to all VIPs and where freedom of movement is established such security will not be necessary for local dignitaries.

It is clear that trust and confidence from all the parties to the conflict underpin the operations of ECOMOG which, in the light of the Yamoussoukro meetings, should now take us into the next phase. It is therefore recommended that this next phase commence on 15 November 1991, which shall be known as “D” Day.

It is envisaged that the ECOMOG military programme can be completed within 60 days as follows:
**D-Day**

Issue Orders

**D-Day + 7**
Confirmatory reconnaissance completed of all encampment areas and forward patrol bases.

Border guards in place including buffer zones along Sierra Leone/Liberia border.

Roadblocks and checkpoints removed in collaboration with administrative authorities.

Reception centres for encampment opened.

ECOMOG patrols commence.

NPFL encampment and documentation.

Receiving, crating and storage of weapons at designated points completed.

Resettlement programme commences.

Robertsfield International Airport reactivated.

Consolidation of border areas in collaboration with the administrative authorities.

Appropriate light Air Detachments deployed in Liberia (including helicopters).

Routine patrols continue.

Permanent presence and supervision of all airports and seaports.

International flights into Robertsfield commence.

No movement of heavy weapons belonging to ECOMOG where not necessary.

**D Day + 60**


The operation itself will be conducted at small unit and subunit levels but there is an overriding need to keep border security forces for as long as necessary. Command and control will be exercised at Force Headquarters.
Cotonou Accord

This Agreement is made this Twenty-Fifth day of July One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety-Three

Between the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU) of the first part and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) of the second part AND the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) of the third part.

Part I Military Issues

Section A, Article 1

Declaration

1. The Parties to this Agreement hereby agree and declare a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities - to become effective at the date and time and on the conditions stipulated in Article 2 and Section C below.

2. The Parties further declare that all parties or groups within and without the perimeter of Liberia shall refrain from act(s) or activity(ies) that may violate or facilitate the violation of the ceasefire.

Article 2

Effective Date

The Parties also agree that the ceasefire stated hereinabove and the cessation of hostilities shall take effect seven days from the date of signing of this Agreement, commencing at 12 midnight.

Section B, Article 3

Supervisory and Monitoring Authority

1. The ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission shall supervise and monitor the implementation of this Agreement. The Parties hereby expressly recognize the neutrality and authority of the ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission in respect of the foregoing. Accordingly, the ECOMOG and UN Observers shall enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout Liberia.

2. By ‘ECOMOG Peace-keeping Force’ is meant an expanded ECOMOG which includes the forces of ECOWAS Member States and African troops from outside the West African region.

3. The Parties agree further that in order to monitor and ensure against any violation of the
ceasefire between the period of the effective date of the ceasefire and the arrival of the ECOMOG and full contingent of the UN Observer Mission. A Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee is hereby established which shall have the authority to monitor, investigate and report all ceasefire violations. The Committee shall comprise an equal number of representatives from each of the parties hereto, ECOMOG and an advance team of the UN Observer Mission. Each group of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee shall be Chaired by the UN Observer in the group. It shall freely travel throughout the country. This Committee shall automatically be dissolved and deemed to be dissolved upon the arrival and deployment of the ECOMOG and the full Contingent of the UN Observer Mission.

Section C, Article 4

Terms and Conditions

The Parties hereby state further that they have agreed to the ceasefire stipulated above on the following terms and conditions:

1. Prohibitions Upon the Parties:

The parties agree not to:

a) import any weapons and war-like materials by any means into Liberia;

b) use the period of the ceasefire to engage in any military build-up

whether in manpower or armaments; or

c) engage in any other activity that would violate or result in the violation of the ceasefire.

2. Adherence to Stipulations on Military Embargo

The Parties recognize and accept that the military embargo imposed on and upon all warring parties by ECOWAS and the United Nations Security Council shall remain in full force and effect.

3. Creation of Buffer Zones

The ECOMOG shall create buffer zones or otherwise seal the borders, whichever is militarily feasible, of Liberia- Guinea, Liberia-Sierra Leone and Liberia- Cote d'Ivoire to prevent cross-border attacks, infiltration or importation of arms. There shall be deployed UN Observers in all of such zones to monitor, verify and report on any and all of the foregoing and the implementation thereof.

4. Monitoring and Supervision of Entry Points

All points of entry including, sea ports, airfields and roads shall be monitored and supervised by the ECOMOG. There shall be deployed UN Observers to monitor, verify and report on the implementation of the foregoing activities.
5. Position of Warring Parties at Declaration of Ceasefire

The warring parties shall remain and maintain their positions held as at the effective date of this ceasefire, until the commencement of encampment.

Section D, Article 5

Acts of Violation

1. The Parties hereto hereby agree to honour every and all provisions of this Agreement, and stipulate that any party committing any acts of violations shall be held liable for such violations.

2. The following acts shall constitute violation of the ceasefire:
   (a) importation of arms and ammunition, incendiary devices and other war-related items;
   (b) changing or improvement of existing positions or fortification or alteration of existing positions;
   (c) attack (whether with conventional or unconventional weapons) against the position of any warring faction by another, or firing at an individual of a warring faction established to have been carried out at the instance of the authority of the warring party to which he/she belongs;
   (d) the systematic use of conventional or unconventional weapons (i.e. knives, cutlasses, bows and arrows, etc);
   (e) recruitment and training of combatants and/or groups of persons after the effective date of this Agreement;
   (f) any proven use of communication devices, facilities or propaganda designed to incite or having the effect of inciting hostilities between any of the warring parties;
   (g) planting of mines and incendiary devices subsequent to the effective date of the ceasefire;
   (h) refusal to disclose the existence of or places where such devices or mines have been planted; and deliberate failure to co-operate or furnish maps (where available) where such devices have been planted;
   (i) obstruction of the implementation of any of the provisions of the Agreement by any party or its authorized agent;
   (j) harassments or attacks upon the ECOMOG, the UN Observer Mission or the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee.

Section E, Article 6

Disarmament

Disarmament being the ultimate objective of the ceasefire, the Parties hereto agree and express their intent and willingness to disarm to and under the supervision of the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the UN Observer Mission. In conformity therewith, the parties agree that:
1. All weapons and warlike materials collected shall be stored by the ECOMOG in armouries designated by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN Observers.

2. All weapons and warlike materials in the possession of the parties shall be given to the ECOMOG, monitored by UN Observers, upon appropriate recording and inventory, and placed in designated armouries.

3. Said armouries shall be secured by the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN Observers, upon proper documentation or inventory of all weapons and warlike materials received.

4. Each of the warring factions shall ensure that its combatants report all weapons and warlike materials to the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN Observers, upon proper inventory. Such weapons and warlike materials, upon inventory, shall be taken to the designated armouries by ECOMOG, under the monitoring and verification of UN Observers.

5. All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials shall also report and surrender same to the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN Observers. Such weapons and warlike materials shall be returned to the owners after due registration, licensing and certification by the governing authority after the elections.

6. The ECOMOG shall have the authority to disarm any combatant or non-combatant in possession of weapons and warlike materials. The UN Observers shall monitor all such activities.

7. For the sole purpose of maintaining the ceasefire, the ECOMOG shall conduct any search to recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by the UN Observers.

Section F, Article 7

Encampment

1. Purpose

(a) The Parties agree and fully commit themselves to the encampment of their combatants in encampment centers established by the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN Observers, the purpose of which shall be, in addition to the disarmament and demobilisation, to serve as a transit point for the further education, training and rehabilitation of said combatants; and

(b) Consistent with the above, the parties agree to submit to the ECOMOG and the UN Observers, a complete listing of their combatants and weapons and warlike materials and their locations to the nearest encampment centers.
2. Commencement of Encampment

The Parties agree that encampment shall commence immediately upon the deployment of the ECOMOG and UN Observer Mission. Copies of the schedule of encampment shall be furnished to all the parties hereto.

3. Identification and Security of Encampment Sites

In consultation with the Parties, the ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission shall identify locations for encampment. Security of encampment sites shall be provided by the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN Observers.

Section G, Article 8

Peace Enforcement Powers

1. It is also agreed upon that the ECOMOG shall have the right to self-defence where it has been physically attacked by any warring faction hereto.

2. There shall be established, upon deployment of the ECOMOG and the full contingent of the UN Observer Mission, a Violation Committee consisting of one person from each of the parties hereto and the ECOMOG and UN Observer Mission, chaired by a member of the UN Observer Mission.

3. All violations of the ceasefire shall be reported to the UN Observer Mission/Observers who shall, immediately upon receipt of the information of violation, commence an investigation and make findings thereof. In the event the violations can be cured by the UN Observers, they shall pursue such a course. However, should such a course not be possible, the UN Observers shall submit their findings to the Violation Committee. The Violation Committee shall invite the violating party(ies) for the purpose of having such party(ies) take corrective measures to cure the violations within such time frame as may be stipulated by the Committee. Should the violating party not take the required corrective measures, the ECOMOG shall be informed thereof and shall thereupon resort to the use of its peace enforcement powers against the violator.

Section H, Article 9

Demobilization

1. The Parties hereby agree that any warring faction or factions that may have non-Liberian fighters or mercenaries shall repatriate such persons, or when found, upon evidence, shall be expelled by the Government of the Republic of Liberia.

2. Further, the parties hereby call upon the United Nations, other international organisations and
countries, to programme and finance the process of demobilisation, retraining, rehabilitation and re-absorption of all former combatants to normal social and community life.

3. It is agreed by the Parties hereto that each party shall immediately commence a community information or educational programme, explaining to the public by means of communication devices or any form of media, the essence and purpose of ceasefire, encampment, disarmament and demobilisation. Such programme shall include other social institutions.

Section I, Article 10

Prisoners of War

The Parties hereby agree that upon signing of this Agreement all prisoners of war and detainees shall be immediately released to the Red Cross authority in an area where such prisoners or detainees are detained, for onward transmission to encampment sites or the authority of the prisoner of war or detainee. Common criminals are not covered by this provision.

Section I, Article 11

Submission By Parties To Authority Of Transitional Government

Consistent with the provisions of paragraph (5) of Article 14 of this Agreement, all Parties agree to submit themselves to the authority of the Transitional Government.

Section K, Article 12

Schedule of Implementation

Schedules of implementation of this Agreement, including a schedule for disarmament, encampment and demobilisation of combatants, shall be drawn by the ECOMOG and the UN Observers. This schedule of implementation shall be given to each of the warring parties prior to implementation. The parties undertake that they will create no obstacles to the full implementation of any of the foregoing activities.

Part II Political Issues

Section A, Article 13

Review and Reaffirmation of the Yamoussoukro Accords

The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm that the Yamoussoukro Accords provide the best framework for peace in Liberia, noting the links between the ECOWAS Peace Plan and the Yamoussoukro Accords.

Section B, Article 14

Structure of Government

1. The Parties observe that Liberia is a unitary state and as such
agree to form a single transitional
government, styled THE LIBERIA
NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT. The authority of
the transitional government shall
extend throughout the territorial
limits of the Republic of Liberia.

2. The mandate of the transitional
government is to provide essential
government services during the
transitional period and to also hold
and supervise general and
presidential elections in
accordance with the ECOWAS
Peace Plan. The Transitional
Legislature Assembly or the
Council of State shall have power
to enact or cause to be enacted
any rule(s), regulation(s) or laws or
take any action(s) which may
facilitate the holding of free and
fair democratic elections.

3. Formal installation of the
Council of State shall take place in
Monrovia, the Capital City of the
Republic of Liberia, and the
Council of State shall also be
permanently headquarted there.

4. The Parties further agree that
the aforesaid transitional
government shall be selected in
accordance with the below listed
provisions and installed in
approximately thirty (30) days of
the date of signature of this
Agreement, concomitant with the
commencement of the
disarmament process. Upon the
installation of the transitional
government, both IGNU and
NPRAG shall cease to exist and
shall be deemed dissolved.

5. The Parties further agree that
the transitional government shall
operate as closely as practicable
under the Constitution and laws of
Liberia.

6. The Parties further agree,
warrant and promise that from the
date of signature of this
Agreement, no loans shall be
negotiated or contracted in the
name of or on behalf of the
Liberian Government except to
ensure the carrying out of the
operations and activities of
governmental and other public
services. All financial transactions
entered into by the Transitional
Government shall be formally
submitted to the Transitional
Legislative Assembly for
ratification.

7. The Parties also agree that the
transitional government shall have
three branches: Legislative,
Executive, and Judiciary.

Executive

i) The Parties further agree that
during the transitional period, the
executive powers of the Republic
shall be vested in a five (5) member
Council of State which is hereby
established. Each of the Parties
shall appoint one (1) member to
the Council, whilst the remaining
two shall be selected in accordance
with the following procedure:

Each of the Parties shall nominate
three (3) eminent Liberians who
together shall select two (2) of their
number to be additional members of the Council.

ii) Each Party shall submit the name of its appointee to the Council and also the names of its three (3) nominees in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph to the office of the current Chairman of ECOWAS within a period of 7 (seven) days from the date of signature of this Agreement. Copies of the list of these names shall also be forwarded to each of the Parties.

iii) The Parties shall, not later than 3 (three) days from submission of the aforesaid names, jointly and mutually determine the time and venue for the selection of the two (2) additional members of the Council. This entire selection process shall not exceed 10 (ten) days after the determination of the time and place of the meeting. If at the appointed place and time, any of the nominees fail to appear, the nominating party shall forfeit its right to renominate any other person(s), and the selection process shall proceed.

iv) Proof of the selection of the two additional Council members shall be made by a written statement signed by all the nominees (excluding the two nominees selected) who participated in the selection process confirming same. The statement shall be forwarded to the current Chairman of ECOWAS with copy to each of the Parties.

v) The Council shall select from amongst its members a Chairman and two (2) Vice-Chairmen.

vi) The Council shall conduct and be responsible for the day-to-day operation of government. All decisions shall be made by consensus of all the members.

vii) The Council shall also devise and implement appropriate procedural rules in respect of its operation.

viii) The Parties shall, in consultation with each other, determine the allocation of cabinet posts.

**Judiciary**

8. The Parties further agree that for purposes of continuity, there shall be no change in the existing structure of the Supreme Court. ULIMO shall have the right to nominate the fifth member of the Court to fill the vacancy which currently exists. The nominee by ULIMO to the Supreme Court shall meet the established criteria and successfully undergo a screening by his or her peers in the Court.

**Legislature**

9. The Parties agree that the Transitional Legislative Assembly shall be a unicameral body composed of thirty five (35) members. Both IGNU and NPFL shall each be entitled to thirteen (13) members, and ULIMO, nine (9) members. The Parties agree that ULIMO shall have the right to nominate the Speaker from one of its members in the Assembly.
Section C, Article 15

Elections Modalities

1. The Parties agree that in order to enhance the inclusive nature of the transitional government, ULIMO shall have the right to nominate two members to the Elections Commission, thus expanding the existing Elections Commission to seven members. For the purpose of continuity the present structure shall remain the same.

2. Supreme Court: The Supreme Court shall adjudicate all matters arising out of the elections during the transition, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the country;

3. Voters Registration: Voters Registration shall commence as soon as possible having due regard for the need to expedite repatriation;

4. Observers and Monitors: The transitional government and the Elections Commission will work out the modalities for the participation of Observers and Monitors in the electoral process.

5. Financing: Financing will be sought from the national and international communities.

6. The Parties agree that the elections to be conducted shall conform to the several United Nations and internationally accepted codes of conduct and the Elections Commission shall, accordingly be guided thereby.

Section D, Article 16

Tenure and Mandate of the Transitional Government

1) The transitional government shall be installed approximately one month after the signing of this Agreement, concomitant with the commencement of the disarmament process.

2) The transitional government shall have a life span of approximately six (6) months commencing from the date of its installation.

3) General and presidential elections shall take place approximately seven (7) months from the signature of this Agreement.

4) Holders of positions of leadership within the Transitional Government (i.e. Members of the Council of State, Supreme Court Justices, Members of the Elections Commission, Cabinet Ministers, Members of the Transitional Legislative Assembly, Managing Directors or Heads of Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies) shall be ineligible to contest the election provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.

Section E, Article 17

Humanitarian Assistance

The Parties agree that every effort should be made to deliver humanitarian assistance to all Liberians, particularly children, who
are malnourished and suffering from related diseases. Convoys of humanitarian assistance should travel to all areas of Liberia through the most direct routes, under inspection to ensure compliance with the sanctions and embargo provisions of this Agreement.

Section F, Article 18

Repatriation of Refugees

1. The Parties hereby commit themselves to immediately and permanently bring to an end any further external or internal displacement of Liberians and to create the conditions that will allow all refugees and displaced persons to, respectively, voluntarily repatriate and return to Liberia to their places of origin or habitual residence under conditions of safety and dignity.

2. The Parties further call upon Liberian refugees and displaced persons to return to Liberia and to their places of origin or habitual residence and declare that they shall not be jeopardized in any ethnic, political, religious, regional or geographical considerations.

3. The Parties also call upon the relevant organizations of the United Nations system, particularly the UNHCR and UNDP, other inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, to implement programmes for the voluntary repatriation, return and reintegration of the Liberian refugees and internally displaced persons.

4. The Parties proclaim that they shall, jointly or individually, cooperate in all necessary ways with themselves and with the above-mentioned organizations in order to facilitate the repatriation, return and reintegration of the refugees and displaced persons. Amongst others, they agree to:

a) establish all necessary mechanisms or arrangements, such as joint repatriation committees, which would facilitate contacts, communications and work with the relevant organizations for purposes of implementing the repatriation, return and reintegration operation and to enable effective decision-making and implementation of the relevant activities;

b) facilitate access by UNHCR and other organizations to the refugees and displaced persons who have returned so as to deliver the necessary humanitarian assistance and programmes and monitor their situation;

c) guarantee and provide security to UNHCR and the other relevant organizations, their staff, vehicles, equipment and resources necessary to carry out their work;

d) provide all other necessary facilities and support that will be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the return, voluntary repatriation and
reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.

Section G, Article 19

General Amnesty

The Parties hereby agree that upon the execution of this Agreement there shall be a general amnesty granted to all persons and parties involved in the Liberian civil conflict in the course of actual military engagements. Accordingly, acts committed by the parties or by their forces while in actual combat or on authority of any of the parties in the course of actual combat are hereby granted amnesty. Similarly, the Parties agree that business transactions legally carried out by any of the Parties hereto with private business institutions in accordance with the laws of Liberia shall in like manner be covered by the amnesty herein granted.

Done at Cotonou, Republic of Benin, in Seven Original Copies This Twenty-Fifth Day of July 1993

Amos Claudius SAWYER
President of the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia for and on behalf of the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU)

Enoch DOGOLEA
Vice-President of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia for and on behalf of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL/NPRAG)

Major-General Alhaji G. V. KROMAH
Leader of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy for and on behalf of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

Witnessed By:

His Excellency Nicephore Dieudonné SOGLO, President of the Republic of Benin and Current Chairman of ECOWAS

Dr. James O. C. JONAH
Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations for and on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Rev. Professor Canaan BANANA Eminent Person for Liberia for and on behalf of the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity
Akosombo Agreement

This Agreement, which supplements and amends the Cotonou Accord, is made and entered into on this Twelfth day of September One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety-Four by and between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) represented by and through its leader Charles G. Taylor (hereinafter referred to as the party of the first part), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) represented by and through its leader Lt. Gen. Alhaji G. V. Kromah, (hereinafter referred to as the party of the second part), and the Armed Forces of Liberia represented by and through its Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. J. Hezekiah Bowen (hereinafter referred to as the party of the third part), hereby witnesseth:

Preamble

NPFL, ULIMO and AFL reaffirm their acceptance of the Cotonou Accord as the framework for peace in Liberia. However, having realized the slow pace in the full implementation of the Cotonou Accord, resulting from the failure of disarmament and the inability of the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG) to achieve the objective of its mandate within a six-month period as set forth under Section B, Article 14 (2) of the said Cotonou Accord: and

Having noted with grave concern the protracted human suffering and the undue hardships to which the people of Liberia (inside and outside the country) have been overly subjected as a result of the senseless Liberian civil crisis: and

Having realised the urgent need to bring this ugly civil crisis to an immediate and lasting end:

Do hereby agree to the following:

Part I Military Issues

Section A, Article 1

Declaration

Count 1 is amended to read as follows:

The parties to this agreement hereby agree and declare a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities effective as of the signing of this amendment.

Section B, Article 3

Supervisory and Monitoring Authority

Count 1 is amended to read: That the LNTG, ECOMOG and UNOMIL in collaboration shall supervise and monitor the implementation of this Agreement.
The parties hereby expressly recognize the neutrality and authority of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in respect of the foregoing.

Accordingly, the LNTG shall ensure that ECOMOG and UNOMIL shall enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout Liberia.

Section C, Article 4

Terms And Conditions

Count 4 is amended to read: The LNTG, in collaboration with ECOMOG and UNOMIL, shall ensure that all points of entry including sea ports, airfields and roads shall be monitored and supervised.

Count 5 is amended to read: The warring parties shall undertake to disengage and move to designated assembly points within the time frame in the schedule to be attached to this document.

Count 6: That the LNTG shall enter into a Status of Forces Agreement with ECOWAS within 30 days from the signing of this Agreement.

Count 7: That the existing Status of Mission Agreement already executed with United Nations (UNOMIL) is herein incorporated by reference and is applicable.

Section D, Article 5

Acts of Violation

Count 2 is amended to read: The following acts shall constitute violations of the Agreement:

Sub-Section (b): Any change or improvement of existing positions aimed at acquiring territory.

Sub-Section (c): Any deliberate discharge (whether with conventional or unconventional weapons) against the position of any warring party by another, or firing at any individual or property or any seizure or abduction of individuals and properties.

Sub-Section (f): While the right to communication shall not be abridged, any proven use of communication devices, facilities or propaganda designed to incite or having the effect of inciting hostilities between any of the warring parties.

Sub-Section (h): Obstruction of the implementation of any of the provisions of the Agreement by any party and/or individual.

Sub-Section (i): Harassments, intimidations, or attacks upon any official of the LNTG, relief organisations, ECOMOG, UNOMIL, Ceasefire Violations Committee as well as individuals.

Sub-Section (j): Obstruction of the activities or the LNTG, ECOMOG, UNOMIL and the Ceasefire Violation Committee.
Sub-Section (k): The facilitation or creation of new or splinter armed groups. To this end, any individual or group or individuals suspected of creating or assisting to create any new armed or splinter group or facilitating existing splinter group(s) (directly or indirectly) shall:

1. Not be recognized under the Cotonou Agreement.

2. Shall be disarmed and disbanded by ECOMOG in collaboration with LNTG verified by UNOMIL.

3. Thereafter be prosecuted under the laws of Liberia.

Section E, Article 6
Disarmament

The introductory paragraph is hereby amended to read: the ultimate objective of disarmament under the Cotonou Agreement being primarily to create a conducive security environment for absolute peace in order to have free and fair elections in the country, NPFL, ULIMO and AFL, hereby agree to disarm to ECOMOG with the cooperation of the LNTG and monitored and verified by UNOMIL in accordance with the schedule to be attached to this Agreement. The parties further mandate the LNTG to begin the formation of appropriate national security structures to facilitate the disarmament process. Accordingly appropriate measures shall be undertaken to enable the AFL to assume its character as a national army. Until such measures are completed the AFL like all other parties and warring groups shall be completely disarmed in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement. In order to ensure a secure environment for the proper functioning of the unified government in Monrovia the LNTG in collaboration with ECOMOG shall ensure that no group or individuals bear arms in the perimeter or the Capital. However, the personnel security of the leaders of the warring parties shall be reflected in the Status of Forces Agreement.

Count 4 is amended to read: Each of the warring parties shall ensure that its combatants report all weapons and warlike materials to ECOMOG which would be inventoried by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by LNTG and UNOMIL. Upon proper inventory, such weapons and warlike materials, shall be taken by ECOMOG to the designated armouries, monitored and verified by UNOMIL and LNTG.

Count 5 is amended to read: All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials shall also report and surrender same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by LNTG and UNOMIL. Such weapons and warlike materials shall be returned to the owners after due registration, licensing and certification by the governing authority after elections.
Count 7 is amended to read: For the sole purpose of maintaining the ceasefire, ECOMOG shall conduct any search to recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by UNOMIL and LNTG.

Section F, Article 7

Encampment

Count 1 is amended to read: The parties agree and fully commit themselves to the encampment of their combatants, and maintenance of command and control in encampment centres, established by ECOMOG, UNOMIL and LNTG in collaboration with the parties. The encampment centres shall, in addition to disarmament and demobilisation, serve as transit points for the further education, training and rehabilitation of said combatants.

Section G, Article 8

Peace Enforcement Powers

The following amendments are hereby made to wit:

1. That in the event any party, new armed group or splinter group and/or individuals refuse to desist from acts in violation of the Agreement, the LNTG in collaboration with ECOMOG shall have the power to use the necessary force available to compel compliance.

2. All violations of the ceasefire shall be reported to UNOMIL who shall, on immediate receipt of the information or violation, commence an investigation and make findings thereof. In the event the violation can be cured by the party, UNOMIL shall submit their findings to the Ceasefire Violation Committee. The Violation Committee shall invite the violating party(ies) for the purpose of having such party(ies) take corrective measures to cure violations within such time frame as may be stipulated by the Committee. Should the violating party not take the required corrective measures, and the use of peace enforcement powers are recommended against the violator - the LNTG in collaboration with ECOMOG shall thereupon take the necessary action.

Section H, Article 9

Demobilization

Count 2 is amended to read: Further, the parties hereby call upon the LNTG, UN, OAU, ECOWAS and other international organisations and countries, to design a programme which recognizes the peculiarities of the parties and finances the process of demobilisation, retraining, rehabilitation and reintegration of all former combatants to normal social and community life.

Count 3 is amended to read: It is agreed that the LNTG, in
collaboration with the parties shall immediately commence a community information or educational programme, explaining to the public by means of communication devices or any form of media, the essence and purpose of ceasefire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization. Such programme shall include other social institutions.

Count 4: Internal security arrangements including police, customs and immigration will be put in place immediately. Planning for restructuring and training of the AFL will be the responsibility of the LNTG, with the assistance of ECOWAS, United Nations and friendly governments.

Section K, Article 12

Schedule of Implementation

This article is amended to read: The attached schedule of implementation to be attached to this Agreement, including disarmament, encampment and demobilization of combatants, preparation of a Status of Forces Agreement, restructuring of AFL and dissolution of the parties drawn up by ECOMOG and UNOMIL in collaboration with the Parties, shall be given to each of the Parties prior to implementation. The Parties undertake that they will create no obstacles to the full implementation of any of the foregoing activities.

Part II Political Issues

Section B, Article 14

Count 7 is hereby amended to read thus:

Executive

(i) The Parties further agree that during the transitional period leading up to inauguration of an elected government, the executive powers of the Republic shall be vested in a five member Council of State which is hereby established. Each of the Parties (AFL, NPFL and ULIMO) shall appoint one member to the Council and the remaining two, representing unarmed Liberians, shall be chosen from among prominent Liberians, one appointed by the Liberian National Conference recently convened in Monrovia and the other by NPFL and ULIMO. The designation of Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen shall be determined through a process of elections to be carried out within 7 days of the signing of this Agreement. The new Council of State will be inducted under the auspices of the Chairman of ECOWAS or his representative within 14 days of the signing of this Agreement.

(ii) The Council of State shall conduct and be responsible for the day to day operations of government. All decisions shall be made on the basis of a simple majority.
(iii) The Council shall also devise and implement appropriate rules of procedure in respect of its operations, to be signed by all members on the occasion of their induction into office.

(iv) The parties hereby agree that the allocation of Ministries, Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies as agreed by the Parties in Cotonou, Benin on November 3-5 1993 shall be maintained, taking into account existing factions in respect of existing vacancies. All boards of Public Corporations shall be constituted in accordance with the Acts creating said Corporations.

(v) In the case where the executive post is allocated to one party, the two deputy posts shall be allocated to the two other parties. In the case where there are more than two deputy posts in a given Ministry, Public Corporation or Autonomous Agency, the Council of State, shall appoint qualified Liberian citizens to occupy the third and or remaining deputy posts.

(vi) The Council of State shall also exercise its executive prerogative powers to appoint qualified citizens in all other subordinate presidential appointed posts in government as may be provided by law in consultation with the parties.

(vii) Each of the parties shall have the right to review the status of its appointees in the LNTG through the Council of State and any change in appointment by the Council of State, should follow as closely as possible the constitutional procedures. Once appointments have been made to the Council of State changes can only be effected for cause and then consistent with existing laws.

Count 9 is amended to read:

Legislative

(i) That the parties agree that the Transitional Legislative Assembly shall be a unicameral body composed of 48 members. The TLA is expanded by 13 eminent citizens selected through the Ministry of Internal Affairs from each of the 13 counties, and appointed by the Council of State.

(ii) The parties further agree that the TLA shall give consideration to providing appropriate benefits for the heads of warring parties.

Article 16

Count 2 is hereby amended to read:

That the transitional government shall have a life span of approximately 16 months commencing from the date of installation of the five member Council of State.

Count 3 is hereby amended to read:

That General and Presidential Elections shall take place on October 10, 1995, and the newly elected Government shall be installed on the first Monday of 1996.
Section H, Article 20

The Parties agree that all provisions of the Cotonou Agreement not amended here are herein incorporated by reference and the same are hereby applicable and remain in full force and effect except for the below listed provisions:

(1) Part 1, Section A Art. 2
(2) Part 1, Section B Art. 3, Count 3
(3) Section D Art. 5 (d)
(4) Part II Section A Art. 13
(5) Part 2, Section B Art. 14,4,6,7 i,ii,iii,iv

Done at Akosombo, Republic of Ghana This 12 Day of September 1994

Charles G. TAYLOR
Leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

Lt. Gen. Alhaji G. KROMAH
National Chairman of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

Lt. Gen. J. Hezekiah BOWEN
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)

Witnessed By

His Excellency Ht. Jerry John RAWLINGS
President of the Republic of Ghana and current Chairman of ECOWAS

Ambassador Trevor GORDON-SOMERS
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Liberia
Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement and Accra Clarification

This Acceptance and Accession undertaking made and entered into this Twenty-First day of December One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety-Four by the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), represented by Mr. Francois Massaquoi; the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), represented by Dr. G.E. Saigbe Boley, Sr; the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL), represented by J. Thomas Woewiyu; ULIMO represented by Major General Roosevelt Johnson, the Liberia National Conference (LNC), represented by Counsellor J.D. Bayogar Junius, all of them hereinafter collectively referred to as the non-signatories to the Akosombo Agreement, hereby:

Witnesseth:

Whereas an agreement, referred to as the 'Akosombo Agreement' was made and entered into on the Twelfth day of September, by and between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO), in an effort to establish a ceasefire, facilitate disarmament, encampment, demobilization, and to pave the way for a free and fair election; and

Whereas, the non-signatories to the Akosombo Agreement did not participate in the discussions leading to the Akosombo Agreement; and

Whereas, a need arose for further discussions between the Signatories to Akosombo for clarification and expansion of the provisions therein with the view of facilitating the acceptance and the implementation of the Agreement, which said discussions the non-signatories fully participated; and

Whereas, after intense discussions and negotiations between the parties to the Akosombo Agreement and the non-signatories thereto, the non-signatories have agreed to accept the terms and conditions of the Akosombo Agreement with the clarifications thereto as set forth and contained in the Agreement on the clarification of the said Akosombo Agreement.

Now therefore the non-signatories to the Akosombo Agreement, in consideration of their participation in the discussions on the clarifications of the Akosombo Agreement, and in further consideration of the political arrangements agreed upon and accepted by them, agree as follows to wit:

1. That the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and the Central
Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL), in their individual capacities; the LNC, and ULIMO agree to accept and to accede to, and by this document hereby accept, and accede to the Akosombo agreement and the agreement on clarification of the aforesaid Akosombo agreement.

2. That the non-signatories commit themselves individually and collectively to the terms and conditions of the Akosombo agreement and the Agreement on Clarification of the said Agreement, and undertake to fully implement and discharge all the tasks and the responsibilities, and to abide by all the terms and conditions as set forth and contained under the said Akosombo agreement, and the Agreement on clarification of the said Akosombo agreement, as if they were signatories thereto and/or specifically named therein.

In witness thereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and affixed their signatures this Twenty-First day of December, One Thousand One Hundred and Ninety-Four in the City of Accra, Republic of Ghana:

ULIMO, Represented by and through its Chairman Major General Roosevelt JOHNSON

Lofa Defense Force (LDF) Represented by and through its Leader Francois MASSAQUI

Liberia Peace Council (LPC) Represented by and through its Chairman Dr. G. E. SAIGBE BOLEY, Sr.

The Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL) Represented by and through its Chairman Juonette Thomas WOEWIYU

Liberia National Conference (LNC) Represented by and through its Chairman Counsellor J. D. BAYOGAR JUNIUS

Attested To:

His Excellency Flt. Lt. Jerry John RAWLINGS
President of the Republic of Ghana and current Chairman of ECOWAS

Accra Clarification

Agreement on the Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement

This Agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo Agreement made this Twenty-First day of December One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety-Four is intended to clarify and expand pertinent provisions of the said Akosombo Agreement.

Part I Military Issues

Section A, Article 1

Ceasefire

The Parties to this Agreement hereby declare a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities effective as of 23.59 hours on the 28th day of December 1994.
Section C, Article 4

Terms and Conditions (Safe Havens and Buffer Zones)

Consistent with Section C Article 4 count 5 of the Akosombo Agreement, the parties agree to facilitate the establishment of Safe Havens and Buffer Zones throughout Liberia in accordance with a plan to be drawn up by the LNTG in collaboration with UNOMIL and ECOMOG in consultation with the parties. In this connection, the deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, the establishment of Buffer Zones, Safe Havens and other measures necessary to restore normalcy throughout the territory of Liberia, shall be undertaken in accordance with the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements.

In keeping with Section C Article 4 count 6, the LNTG shall enter into a Status of Forces Agreement with ECOWAS within seven (7) days as of the seating of the Council of State established under this Agreement.

Section H, Article 9

Demobilization

Consistent with Section H Article 9 count 4 of the Akosombo Agreement it is agreed by the parties that in the reorganization of the Armed Forces of Liberia, the Police, Immigration and other Security Agencies, the combatants and non-combatants who satisfy conditions for recruitment shall be considered for inclusion. In this connection, the Council of State established under the Akosombo Agreement clarified by this agreement shall establish appropriate committees which will be charged with determining the criteria for recruitment, taking advantage of the relevant expertise of ECOMOG and UNOMIL.

Section K, Article 12

Schedule of Implementation

The parties hereby agree to abide by the schedule of implementation hereto attached and incorporated herein by reference.

Part II Political Issues

Section A

Executive

Consistent with Part II Section A (i), of the Akosombo Agreement the provision for the function and structure of the Five-Member Council of State provided for in the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements are hereby reconfirmed.

The procedure for the appointment of the relevant officials of government as enshrined in the Akosombo Agreement is hereby reaffirmed. Such officials shall be appointed based on merit.

The parties agree that a five-member Council of State shall be established.
The first four members of the new council of state shall be appointed as follows:

NPFL ......................... 1
ULIMO ......................... 1
AFL/COALITION .......... 1
LNC ......................... 1

The fifth member of the council of state shall be a traditional chief selected by the NPFL and ULIMO in the person of Honourable Tamba Tailor in accordance with Part II section A (i) of the Akosombo Agreement and agreed by the parties.

Consistent with Part II Section A (i) of the Akosombo Agreement, induction of the Council of State shall take place in the City of Monrovia under the auspices of the Chairman of ECOWAS or his designee within fourteen (14) days as of the ceasefire date.

Section H, Article 20

Consistent with Section H Article 20 of the Akosombo Agreement, the parties reaffirm the acceptance of the ECOWAS Peace Plan including the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as the best framework for peace in Liberia.

All Provisions of the Akosombo Agreement not herein clarified remain in full force and effect.

Done at Accra, Republic of Ghana, this 21st Day of December 1994

Charles G. TAYLOR, Leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Lt. Alhaji G. V. KROMAH, National Chairman of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)
Lt. J. Hezekiah BOWEN, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)

Attested To:

His Excellency Flt. Lt. Jerry John RAWLINGS, President of the Republic of Ghana and current Chairman of ECOWAS
Abuja Accord

Part I Military Issues

Section A, Article 1

Ceasefire

The Parties to this Agreement hereby declare a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities effective at 12 o’clock midnight August 26th, 1995.

Section K, Article 12

Schedule of Implementation

The Parties hereby agree to abide by the schedule of implementation attached to the Agreement on the Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement with such modifications in terms of dates as are required by virtue of the delay in the implementation of the said Agreement.

Part II Political Issues

Section A

Executive

i) The Parties agree that during the transitional period leading to the inauguration of an elected government, the executive powers of the Republic of Liberia shall be vested in a six-member Council of State to be composed as follows:

a) NPFL - Mr. Charles Ghankay Taylor
b) ULIMO - LTG. Alhaji G. V. Kromah
c) Coalition - Dr. George E. S. Boley, Sr.
d) LNC - Oscar Jaryee Quiah
e) Chief Tamba Tailor
f) Mr. Wilton Sankawulo

ii) The Chairman of the Council shall be Mr. Wilton Sankawulo. All other members of the Council shall be Vice-Chairmen of equal status. In case of permanent incapacitation a new Chairman shall be appointed within the ECOWAS framework.

iii) The Parties hereby agree that the allocation of Ministries, Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies agreed by the Parties in Cotonou, Benin on November 3-5,
1993 shall be maintained. The Parties however, agree that the allocations for the erstwhile IGNU shall revert to LPC/COALITION. LTG Hezekiah Bowen, Francois Massaquoi, Thomas Woewiyyu, Laveli Supuwood and Samuel Dokie shall be given ministerial or other senior Government positions.

ULIMO-J shall occupy the following positions:

**Ministries**

1. Minister of State for Presidential Affairs
2. Minister of Transport
3. Minister of Rural Development
4. Minister of State without Portfolio

**Public Corporations/ Autonomous Agencies**

1. National Bank
2. Corporate Development Agencies (CDA)
3. Agricultural Industrial Training Board (AILIB)
4. Forestry Development Authority (FDA)

**Deputy Ministers**

1. Ministry of Post and Telecommunications
2. Ministry of Justice
3. Ministry of Education
4. Ministry of Information

**Deputy Managing Directors/ Deputy Directors General**

1. Nicol-National Insurance Corporation of Liberia
2. National Housing Authority (NHA)

3. Liberia Water and Sewage Corporation (LWSC)
4. National Housing and Savings Bank (NHSB)
5. Fire Service
6. General Auditing (GA)
7. Institute of Public Administration (IPA)
8. National Food Assistance Agency

**Section C, Article 15**

**Elections Modalities**

1. The operations of the Elections Commission shall be monitored by ECOWAS, OAU and the UN.

**Section D, Article 16**

**Tenure and Mandate of the Transitional Government**

1. The Transitional Government hereby established shall be installed within 14 days after the signing of this Agreement.

2. The Transitional Government shall have a life span of approximately twelve (12) months commencing from the date of its installation.

3. Holders of positions within the Transitional Government as defined by the Cotonou Accord who wish to contest the election provided for under the Schedule of Implementation shall vacate office three months before the date of elections. They shall be replaced by their nominees or by persons
nominated by the parties represented in the Council of State.

4. The Chairman of the Council of State shall be ineligible to contest the first Presidential and Parliamentary elections to be held pursuant to this Agreement.

Section G, Article 8

Peace Enforcement Powers

1. Enforcement of violations of ceasefire shall be in accordance with the terms of the Cotonou Accord.

All provisions of the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as clarified by the Accra Agreement not herein amended shall remain in full force and effect.

Done at Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, This 19th Day of August 1995

Charles Ghankay TAYLOR
Leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

Lt. Alhaji G. V. KROMAH
National Chairman of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

Dr. G. E. SAIGBE Boley Sr.
Leader of the Liberia Council (LPC)

Lt. J. Hezekiah BOWEN
Armed Forces of Liberia

Major-General Roosevelt JOHNSON
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-J)

Francois MASSAQUOI
Lofa Defence Force (LDF)

Jucontee Thomas WOEWIYU
National Patriotic Front of Liberia Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC)

Chea CHEAPOO
Liberia National Conference (LNC)

Witnessed By:

Dr. Obed ASAMOAH
For and on behalf of His Excellency Fit-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, President of the Republic of Ghana and Chairman of ECOWAS

Chief Tom IKIMI
For and on behalf of His Excellency General Sani Abacha, Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces

His Excellency President Canaan BANANA
OAU Eminent Person in Liberia

His Excellency Anthony B. NYAKYI
UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Liberia
Supplement to the Abuja Accord

Whereas the Abuja Accord has been endorsed by the OAU and the United Nations as the best framework for peace in Liberia, and

Whereas the ECOWAS Authority has reaffirmed the Abuja Accord as the only viable means to its determination to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Liberian civil war and has reiterated its determination to fully implement the said agreement, and

Desiring to effect a change in the leadership of the Council of State in order to enable it to perform more efficiently and creditably,

Pursuant to Section K, Article 12 and Section D, Article 16 of the Abuja Accord, the Schedule of Implementation should have been implemented within the twelve-month lifespan of the Liberia National Transitional Government, and

Whereas the parties agreed to abide by the schedule of implementation attached to the Abuja Accord, with such modifications in terms of dates are required by virtue of any delay in the implementation of said agreement, and

Whereas the Abuja Accord needs to be revised in line with the issues raised above,

Now therefore the parties hereby agree:

1. Part II titled 'Political Issues', Section A, paragraph (ii) is hereby amended and shall read as follows:

(ii) The Chairman of the Council shall be Mrs. Ruth Perry. All other members shall be Vice-Chairmen of equal status. In case of permanent incapacitation a new Chairman shall be appointed within the ECOWAS framework.

2. To abide by the revised Schedule of Implementation attached hereto.

3. To extend the life of the transitional government in accordance with the revised Schedule of Implementation.

Done at Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, This 17th Day of August 1996

Charles Ghankay TAYLOR
Leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

Ltg. Alhaji G. V. KROMAH
National Chairman of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

Dr. G. E. SAIGBE BOLEY Sr.
Leader of the Liberia Council (LPC)

Ltg. J. Hezekiah BOWEN
Armed Forces of Liberia

Major-General Roosevelt JOHNSON
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-I)
Francois MASSAQUOI
Lofa Defence Force (LDF)

Juonete Thomas WOEWiyU
National Patriotic Front of Liberia Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC)

Chea CHEAPOO
Liberia National Conference (LNC)

Witnessed By:

Chief Tom Ikimi
for and on behalf of General Sani Abacha,
Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces

Capt (Rtd) Kojo Tsikata
Member of the Council of State
for and on behalf of Flt-Lt Jerry John Rawlings, President of the Republic of Ghana

President Canaan Banana
OAU Eminent Person in Liberia

Anthony B Nyakyi
UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Liberia
Commentary on the Accords
Continued from page 36

Cotonou Accord
25 July 1993

Signed by:
Amos Sawyer (IGNU), Enoch Dogolea (NPFL),
and Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO)

Witnessed by:
Nicephore Soglo (President of Benin and
Chairman of ECOWAS), James Jonah (on behalf
of the UN Secretary General), and Rev. Canaan
Banana (OAU Eminent Person for Liberia)

Key points:
*Ceasefire to take effect from 1 August 1993,
with specified process of encampment,
disarmament and demobilisation;
*Created the Liberia National Transitional
Government (LNTG) to replace IGNU,
dominated by a five person council of state
and a cabinet, both appointed by the
signatories;
*Provided for a six month period of
transitional rule culminating in multi-party
elections, supervised by a reconstituted
electoral commission;
*Stipulated that no member of the transitional
government can stand for office in national
elections, and that council of state decisions
must be reached by consensus;
*Provided for a national judiciary and a single
transitional legislature, merging the Monrovia
parliament with the NPRAG in Gbargna;
*Expanded ECOMOG to include troops from
outside the region;
*Provided for a United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to assist ECOMOG
in the implementation of encampment,
disarmament and demobilisation;
*Created a joint ceasefire monitoring unit
made up of UNOMIL, ECOMOG and
representatives of the three signatories.

By March 1994, the Cotonou Accord
appeared to be showing a degree of
promise. The Council of State, the
legislative assembly and the supreme
court of the LNTG were all installed, and
symbolic encampment and demobilisation
had commenced. However, the logistics of
implementation had already begun to lay
bare the deficiencies of the accord.

The peace formula adopted at Cotonou
('disarmament - resettlement - election')
did not have an impressive record, having
failed woefully in Angola and Cambodia.
Only in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1980 had
the approach been successful. This was
due partly to the willingness and capacity
of regional powers to secure compliance
from their clients, and partly because
forces receiving the incoming Patriotic
Front combatants had all arrived at their
designated bases according to schedule.
These success criteria did not hold for
Liberia. On the one hand, Burkina Faso,
Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria would or could
not wield the requisite influence over the
NPFL and ULIMO. On the other, delays in
the deployment of UNOMIL and the new
battalions of ECOMOG derailed the
timetable for the implementation of the
accord. Many felt that these delays
exposed the timetable as wildly unrealistic.
They certainly allowed plenty of time for
the emergence of new factions, including
the AFL-sponsored Liberia Peace Council
(LPC), and for a renewal of hostilities
between the NPFL and its various
enemies.

The process of implementation also
highlighted a number of other major flaws
in the Cotonou settlement. The first of
these was that it made no provision for
resolving disputes arising out of appointments to the executive of the transitional government. Such disputes stalled the establishment of the LNTG, which had been the pre-requisite for disarmament, and continued to plague the efficacy of the administration for months after its installation. They were also a primary cause of destabilising splits in both ULIMO and the NPFL. Another major shortcoming was that the Cotonou Accord failed to clarify the position and the role of the Council of State. It was unclear on whether the members nominated by the various parties would represent their own factional interests or whether, upon assuming office, they would be independent decision makers serving the needs of all Liberians. This is significant as the leaders of the warring factions had strong vested interests, particularly economic ones, in maintaining instability. Finally, considering the sheer magnitude of the task of resettlement and reconstruction, the Cotonou Accord also placed unrealistic expectations on the deeply divided LNTG. By mid-1994, it was clear that the Cotonou Accord was inoperative.

Post-Cotonou Accords

Between the collapse of the Cotonou Accord and the outbreak of renewed fighting in April 1996, there were three new agreements signed on Liberia: The Akosombo Accord in September 1994, the Accra Clarification of December 1994, and the August 1995 Abuja Accord. All of these agreements were secured under the resolute auspices of incoming ECOWAS Chairman and Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, with degrees of support from other ECOWAS figures, notably in Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. The UN, the OAU, and a range of international NGOs also lent their support at various times. Although each set out to amend and strengthen the Cotonou Accord, the post-Cotonou

**Akosombo Agreement**
(supplement to the Cotonou Accord)
12 September 1994

Signed by:
Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO), Hezekiah Bowen (AFL)

Witnessed by:
Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings (President of Ghana and Chairman of ECOWAS), Trevor Gordon-Somers (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia)

Key points:
* Strengthened the role of the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in supervising and monitoring the implementation of the Cotonou agreement;
* Provided for the reformation of the AFL who, together with police, immigration and customs officials are to form an ‘appropriate national security structure’ to include members of ULIMO, AFL and the NPFL;
* Empowered the newly constituted AFL to collaborate with ECOMOG/UNOMIL in overseeing disarmament and demobilisation;
* Stipulated that no group or individual is to bear arms in the perimeter of the capital, but for the personal protection of faction leaders;
* All council of state decisions to be reached by a simple majority;
* Expanded the Transitional Legislative Assembly by adding one ‘civilian’ representatives from each of the 13 counties, appointed by the council of state;
* LNTG to have a ‘life span’ of some 16 months. A power balancing arrangement was formed whereby ministries under the executive control of one party have two deputy posts allocated to other parties.
agreements still failed to address the underlying issues and interests propelling the war.

The principal objective of the Akosombo Accord was to grant the LNTG and the armed factions who dominated it a more central role in the management of Liberian state affairs. To this end, it amended the Cotonou Accord in a number of ways. First, it placed the responsibility of overseeing the peace agreement not only on ECOMOG and UNOMIL, but also on the ‘security forces’ of the LNTG. Second, it ceded effective control of the Council of State to the more powerful factions, removing the requirement for consensus decision-making and instituting the authority of a simple majority. Thirdly, it also permitted factions to review the status of their appointees at all levels of the administration at any time.

The Akosombo Accord ran into major problems over appointments and nominations to the LNTG. Strong resistance was registered by some ECOWAS members, notably the Nigerians, and by a range of Liberian political parties and civilian interest groups. A major concern was that the agreement disproportionately favoured the NPFL and ULIMO-K who by this time controlled most key executive portfolios and were jointly pressing for the aged Chief Tamba Tailor to be appointed Chairman of the Council of State. The increasingly central role assigned to armed factions within the LNTG also led to groups aligning and realigning themselves in a violent scramble for position. This in turn produced significant breakdowns of command within individual factions, notably ULIMO.

Compared with the three signatories of Akosombo, no less than eight groups signed the Accra Clarification. However, while this agreement brought new groups into the peace process, along with those who had been left out of earlier accords, it did little, if anything, to advance the search for a solution. After signing the Accra Clarification, the parties failed to reach an agreement on the composition and chairmanship of the Council of State, with the AFL and ‘coalition’ forces particularly struggling to determine their joint nominee. Crucially, while factions

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**Accra Clarification**
(of the Akosombo Accord)
21st December 1994

**Signed by:**
Francois Massaquoi (LDF), George Boley (LPC),
Thomas Woewiyu (NPFL-CRC), Roosevelt
Johnson (ULIMO-J), Bayogar Junius (LNC),
Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-
K), and Hezekiah Bowen (AFL)

**Witnessed by:**
Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings (President of Ghana and
chair of ECOWAS)

**Key points:**
* Included an agreement drawing in non-
signatories to the Akosombo and Cotonou
Accords (ULIMO-J, LPC, LDF, NPFL-CRC and
LNC);
* Re-specified composition of council of state;
one member to be drawn from NPFL, one from
ULIMO-K, and one to represent jointly the AFL
and the new armed signatories;
* Provided for two civilian council members;
Chief Tamba Tailor, plus a Liberian National
Conference (LNC) appointee;
* Set up procedure for facilitating the
establishment of safe havens and buffer zones;
* Stipulated that the council of state be inducted
within 14 days of a 28 December ceasefire;
* Empowered council of state to determine
criteria for recruitment into new security forces.
and political leaders haggled, the implementation of other aspects of the agreements remained stalled. Perhaps most significantly, Accra attempted to

\textbf{Abuja Accord}

(supplements the Cotonou and Akosombo Accords, as clarified in Accra)

19 August 1995

\textbf{Signed by:}
Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K), George Boley (LPC), Hezekiah Bowen (AFL), Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-J), Francois Massaquoi (LDF), Thomas Woewiyu (NPFL-CRC), and Chea Cheapoo (LNC)

\textbf{Witnessed by:}
Dr. Obed Assamoah (representing President Rawlings), Chief Tom Ikimi (representing President General Sani Abacha of Nigeria), Rev. Canaan Banana (OAU Eminent Person in Liberia), Anthony Nyaki (Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia)

\textbf{Key points:}
* Extended the council of state to six members, appointing a third civilian, Mr. Wilton Sankawulo, as chairman;
* Named LPC’s George Boley as ‘Coalition’ representative on the council;
* Reasserted the allocation of ministries, public corporations and autonomous agencies agreed after the Cotonou Accord, confirming that GNU posts would be ceded to LPC/Coalition members;
* Partially accommodated ULIMO-J without giving them representation on the council of state;
* Office holders in the LNTG permitted to contest future elections;
* Ceasefire in force from 26 August with installation of council of state soon after;
* Council of state to have a life-span of approximately twelve months.

co-opt the civilian Liberian National Congress without heeding its concerns on the militarisation of the peace process.

The Abuja Accord managed to bring the leaders of all warring factions into the transitional government, which was installed with due ceremony in September 1995. As such, it represents in many ways the fulfillment of the aspirations of the post-Cotonou peace process. It did not however bring peace to Liberia. Discontent continued to fester within groups and individuals who believed themselves sidelined in the settlement. Fractions continued to guard their territorial and commercial resources jealously, with ongoing violence between NPFL and LPC and between various sub-groupings of ULIMO. The lack of security and international support continued to impede the full deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL. As elements of NPFL and ULIMO-K sought to consolidate and extend their power within the framework of the LNTG, tensions intensified. Increasing numbers of factional fighters entered Monrovia, ostensibly to ensure the security of their leaders. On April 6th 1996, police forces, backed up by NPFL and ULIMO-K fighters, moved to arrest ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson on charges of murder. This led to an eruption of violence between NPFL/ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J/AFL/LPC which was the worst seen in Monrovia since before the Cotonou Agreement.

\textbf{Conclusion}

A couple of general points can be made concerning the shortfalls of the Liberian accords. Firstly, all have failed to address the vested interests profiting from the anarchic status quo. This might have been achieved through the institution of
effective mechanisms for establishing and monitoring embargoes on illicit trade. Secondly, in seeking to accommodate the demands of armed groups rather than shoring up civic and political institutions, the accords have all been vulnerable to the emergence of new and proxy factions. Such factions have typically not been signatories to existing agreements and as such have not been under obligation to respect them.

In addition to these general points, some specific failings can be highlighted concerning the two discernible phases of the peace process. In the pre-Cotonou phase, it is clear that all aspects of the process were severely undermined by the ambiguous nature of ECOWAS intervention. If the aim of early initiatives was to protect a civilian state from the illegitimate accession of the NPFL, then the rapid deployment of ECOMOG and the resolute defence of the IGNU is understandable. Less so are the attempts to pressure the rebels into a peace process whose aims they clearly held in contempt. On the other hand, if the idea was to minimise instability by seeking a neutral compromise with the NPFL, then the stern confrontations and partisan collaborations of ECOMOG make little sense. What is clear is that pre-Cotonou, ECOWAS itself was riven by uncertainty and by competing interests working at crossed purposes. Under these circumstances, the early accords were probably doomed to prolong Liberia’s suffering. Enduring peace was certainly not served by the churning out of agreements to which the sponsors, never mind the protagonists, were clearly ambivalent.

If the early accords were void of much meaning, post-Cotonou initiatives were more misguided. A major flaw in all of them was that, while increasingly ceding power to the factions in the executive arm of the transitional government, none of them established mechanisms for resolving the inevitable disputes over the interpretation of provisions. Another destructive element in the post-Cotonou efforts was the way in which faction leaders were permitted to extend their political power without acceding to the military pre-conditions specified in the accords. In protecting their accumulated interests, all factions were hugely reluctant to proceed with disarmament, a phenomenon abetted by a lack of international censure of faction leaders and the inordinate delays and shortfalls in the deployment of military observers.

While a thorough, binding and well-resourced settlement is yet to be reached in Liberia, the resurgence of warfare in April 1996 seems to have created a watershed in the peace process. In order to facilitate elections and secure a more just and peaceful political dispensation, Liberians and their international partners must seize the moment. However, if they are to successfully transform organised violence in Liberia into constructive, unarmed political conflict, they require the vision and the courage to engage with the evolution of the peace process thus far and to learn from its manifold shortcomings.
Bringing Peace to Liberia

Continued from page 26

Complexities in the Peace Process

Taylor’s ambition

The difficulties encountered in the Liberian peace process emerge from the complex interplay of a plethora of factors. Some analyses (Sesay, 1996b) focus on the pivotal position of Charles Taylor. For a long time, Taylor’s signing of ceasefire agreements and accords did not indicate a serious commitment to a political solution. His involvement in negotiations was generally secured only under intense military or diplomatic pressure and his adherence to peace agreements was conditional on their not obstructing his presidential aspirations. Taylor’s refusal to recognise the GNU frustrated the earliest peace efforts of 1990-91. It was also his decision to launch ‘Operation Octopus’, which brought about the collapse of the Yamoussoukro process and his all-out military confrontation with ECOMOG.

Official appeasement

On the other hand, despite two episodes of vigorous anti-NPFL ‘peace enforcement’, ECOWAS has repeatedly appeased and accommodated the warring factions. With an interest in ending the war quickly, it has particularly acceded to NPFL demands, providing for the expansion of ECOMOG, the involvement of UNOMIL and the replacement of GNU with a transitional government increasingly dominated by the more powerful factions.

Members of the LNTG Council of State at their inauguration in September 1995 (l to r: Oscar Quiah (LNC), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K), Wilton Sankawulo, Charles Taylor (NPFL), and George Boley (LPC))
Although all these concessions seem to have removed major obstacles to progress, they have not brought an end to the war in Liberia. This is due partly to failures of implementation. ECOMOG continues to be an under-staffed, under-resourced, Nigerian-dominated force, while UNOMIL has been severely under-strength for almost two years. However, and perhaps more importantly, bringing faction leaders into government has been fraught with difficulties. From the outset, the LNTG has been riven by violent squabbling within and between factions concerning the allocation of key posts in the Council of State, the cabinet and the parastatals.

‘New’ factions

The proliferation of warring factions has obstructed peace for at least three inter-related reasons. First, it has led to a wide diffusion of arms across the country and to an increase in the total number of combatants which has immensely complicated the process of disarmament. Second, it has compounded the commercial dimension of the war as Liberia’s natural wealth has been carved up and contested by increasing numbers of covetous warlords and strongmen. Third, the proliferation of warring factions has complicated diplomatic negotiations as agreements have had to be inclusive of and acceptable to an increasing number of interests. The Yamoussoukro, Cotonou, and Akosombo accords all collapsed largely because new groups were either left out or refused to attend peace talks.

‘The thieves dilemma’

Violations of the Abuja accord in December 1995 and April 1996 can be traced ultimately to the marginalisation of Roosevelt Johnson and ULIMO-J within the LNTG. Johnson’s appointment as Minister of Rural Development and the faction’s control of a number of minor ministries, public corporations and state enterprises was regarded within ULIMO-J as wildly inadequate. Trouble began in December when ECOMOG troops were deployed to disarm ULIMO-J fighters around rich diamond mining sites in Bomi and Lofa Counties. In response, fighters loyal to Johnson went on the rampage around the city of Tubmanburg, killing and capturing several ECOMOG soldiers and civilians, and destroying property in the process (Africa Confidential, 16/2/96; The Economist, 20/1/96; West Africa, 22/1/96).

These troubles culminated in the intense fighting of April 1996, after a LNTG commission of inquiry into the December disturbances found Johnson guilty of wanting to derail the peace process. This led to Johnson’s dismissal as leader of ULIMO-J and his consequent suspension by the Council of State from his cabinet post.

What we have in Liberia today is a classic case of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, or shall we say ‘thieves dilemma’. All armed groups are keenly aware that none has operated under any formal system of rules that is based on trust, honesty, principles, and respect for law and order. Indeed each leader has so much blood on his hands that none believes the others are capable of using power for the common good. Each is therefore likely to opt for the gun in the ‘rational’ belief that a first strike would give advantages or in the rather ‘irrational’ consolation that it is better to deny the prize to the enemy even if everybody dies in the process.’

- Yusuf Bangura, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva, April 1996
Following intra-factional skirmishes outside his home, a police force backed by NPFL and ULIMO-K fighters was despatched by the Council of State to arrest Johnson on charges of murder. In response, ULIMO-J supporters rioted, provoking the worst fighting and looting in Monrovia since 1992. Significantly, Johnson loyalists were joined in resistance to the NPFL and ULIMO-K by their Krahn kinsmen in both the AFL and LPC.

The divided consensus

Regional politics has added a further dimension to the complexities of the peace process. For instance, progress was obstructed in 1991 when the Yamoussoukro agreements were interpreted in a number of anglophone states as an attempt by the late Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny to steal the peace-making spotlight from ECOMOG. These talks were generally welcomed by the NPFL, but snubbed by others, especially the Nigerians and some of their officers in ECOMOG. The role of intra-ECOWAS antagonism is undermining the earlier accords is explored in more detail above.

Since the institution of the ‘Committee of nine’ in October 1992, intra-ECOWAS agendas have harmonised substantially. However, regional power politics remained a factor even after Jerry Rawlings became ECOWAS Chairman in 1994. In a swift and rather surprising move, Rawlings developed some kind of friendship with Taylor, with whom he and senior Ghanaian officials held closed talks in various locations around West Africa. Although these talks injected fresh momentum into the peace process, there were reports of Nigerian unease. If successful, the Akosombo and Accra accords would have added to Rawlings’ stature as an international statesman and served as an indictment of Nigerian diplomacy. Aware of the crucial need to obtain broad support for any peace deal in Liberia, Rawlings changed tack and sought conciliation with the Nigerians. He eventually helped Taylor mend fences with the Abacha regime, paving the way for the signing of the Abuja Accord. The Taylor/Abacha rapprochement also secured a measure of continuity in the peace process when the chairmanship of ECOWAS transferred to Nigeria in August 1996.

Obstacles to disarmament

Possibly the thorniest issue for peace efforts in Liberia has been the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation of the estimated 60,000 combatants. The fearfully slow progress on disarmament is explained by a combination of factors. Firstly, mutual suspicion among faction leaders has not only destroyed agreements, but has also made unilateral disarmament impossible. Faction leaders have executed, or threatened to execute, war-weary fighters who have disarmed without permission, leading to deep scepticism concerning their professed commitment to peace. Despite years of trying, peace groups have not yet been able to construct effective inter-factional confidence-building measures.

Secondly, several years of fighting have created a gun culture that has become a source of livelihood for thousands of young men. In response to this, adequate economic resources are needed to create sustainable non-violent livelihoods which are attractive to fighters. The government in Monrovia, cut off from access to timber, minerals, rubber and iron ore, is ill-placed
financially to fund such a programme. Susukkuu has been useful in trying to solicit funds from the public and overseas for this purpose, but has not come near to what is required for comprehensive disarmament to occur.

Despite US contributions averaging US$10 million a year (and renewed pledges of an additional $30 million), there are also problems regarding ECOMOG funding for disarmament. A donor conference on Liberia held in New York in October 1995 pledged just over US$100 million towards disarmament, reconstruction and democratisation. However, for comprehensive disarmament to have taken place ECOMOG needed strengthening from 7,000 to 12,000 troops, an increase which alone required US$133 million. Furthermore, for effective monitoring of the nine designated safe havens and the 12 assembly points, UNOMIL also needed enlarging by 42 observers, requiring a further US$62 million (West Africa, 6/11/95). These estimates make the current pledges look grossly inadequate.

Prospects for the demilitarisation of Liberian politics were further worsened by Taylor’s words and actions in early 1996. By this time, he had recruited over 800 fighters to the armed, NPFL-controlled national police force, a move widely interpreted as a measure to circumvent the requirement to disarm. Arguing that total disarmament in his circumstances is unknown in world history, Taylor has even suggested that disarmament should take place after elections. However, in the wake of the April fighting, he has backtracked from this hardline stance, committing to immediate, if partial, disarmament in response to censure from civic groups, other faction leaders, ECOWAS and the broader international community.

Lessons of War and Peace in Liberia

The Liberian civil war, like those in Angola, Sudan, Somalia and Burundi, has shown that people are prepared to go on fighting until they completely dissipate themselves, are defeated militarily, or perceive the possibility of furthering their interests by other means. As a result of this, peace accords like Liberia’s often become just another means of pillage for those involved, while excluded players seek to ensure that nothing meaningful comes of negotiations. We are yet to see whether those who accepted the political framework and principles of the Abuja Accord will eventually accept its authority, but the recent violence in Monrovia is clearly a cause for pessimism.

In the meantime, the nature of the war, the unprecedented military intervention it has provoked and the tardy nature of the peace process offer much food for thought both for the international community and for Liberians themselves.

Lessons for peace-makers

There are a number of lessons to be drawn from the nature and consequences of the
regional intervention. While ECOWAS
governments have been remarkably
persistent with their initiative, their
efforts, notably ECOMOG peacekeeping,
have not always been as professional as
they could have been. This is partly due to
insufficient and inadequate resources. In
addition however, efforts have also been
frustrated when the interests of individual
countries have been allowed to over-ride
their common purpose of returning peace
to Liberia. For an enterprise of this nature
to accomplish more in the future, it
requires greater regional co-operation, and
more professional, better resourced and
experienced forces.

Much could also be learnt of the positive
role indigenous civic organisations can
play in times of crisis.
In the case of Liberia,
religious groups,
academics, women’s
organisations, the
media, interest groups
and other local NGOs
managed to maintain a
semblance of ordered
civil society amidst the
chaos. Their input also
strengthened the peace
efforts of international
actors, while providing a conduit for
constructive criticism. The main lesson
here is that indigenous NGOs should be
encouraged and assisted to improve their
organisation, finances, and political
standing to exert a greater positive
influence on peace initiatives.

Lessons for Liberians
For Liberians, the horrifying spectacle of a
wrecked nation and the thought of the
challenges to be faced in the next century,
have provoked an intense debate on the
need to mould a new Liberia. This process
of national reconstruction will entail
eliminating the deadly weapons currently
diffused throughout the country,
rethinking the basis of political practice
over the last century and a half,
revamping old institutions including the
state, and creating new and more viable
ones. To be effective, however, any
revolution of Liberian society has to be
built on a thorough transformation of
social attitudes. There is an urgent need to
shed off the sycophancy and self-delusions
that have infected the average Liberian
psyche (Enoanyi, 1990).

As an excellent starting point, most
Liberians are beginning to see that
increased self-reliance is required to
reduce the consequences of
disappointment at the hands of trusted
friends and traditional
benefactors. The
manner in which
faction leaders and
politicians have
manipulated ethnic
identities, traditional
loyalties, and youth
and rural resentments
has also helped to
make Liberians more
wary of demagogues, of
people who mobilise
popular feelings and prejudices for their
own selfish ends. To consolidate these
lessons, sincere efforts have already been
initiated by local organisations to increase
awareness of the destructive effects of
‘tribalism’ and to start addressing the need
for a transparent, competitive and
inclusive political system headed by a
competent, caring, dedicated and truly
national leadership (Dixon, 1992; Moniba,
1992). Ultimately, the future of Africa’s
oldest republic lies in the hands of the
traumatised survivors of this vicious war
and of their supporters in the
international community.

The annual budget
of UNOMIL is
equivalent to the
cost of five days UN
peace-keeping in the
former Yugoslavia
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West Africa Magazine


**AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PEACE INITIATIVES**
Key Actors

Warring Factions

**Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)**

The Armed Forces of Liberia actively entered Liberian politics in the military coup of 1980. Under Samuel Doe, the army was ethnicised through a recruitment policy which favoured the Krahn, Doe's own ethnic group. The AFL remained loyal to Doe until his death but has since been led by General Hezekiah Bowen, now defence secretary in the transitional government. Estimated to have about 9,000 troops, many of its members have joined or collaborated with ULIMO and LPC. Confining to barracks after the Bamako ceasefire, the AFL was re-activated to repel the NPFL offensive of late 1992. Although the official national army through most of the conflict, the professionalism of the AFL has been highly questionable and it has generally been treated as another warring faction. The Akosombo Agreement made provisions to reconstitute the AFL with combatants from other armed groups. It has been responsible for many of the worst massacres of the war, for widespread human rights abuses and systematic looting.

**Liberia Peace Council (LPC)**

Estimated to have 4,650 combatants, the LPC emerged in the wake of the 1993 Cotonou Accord, partly as a proxy force for the AFL. It has since made substantial gains from the NPFL in south eastern Liberia, vying for control of commercial operations in timber and rubber. A predominantly Krahn organization, it draws supporters from ULIMO and the AFL, but also from other ethnic groups who have suffered under NPFL occupation. The LPC is led by Dr. George Boley, and is implicated in widespread murder, torture and looting and in efforts to terrorise and depopulate rural areas held by the NPFL.

**Independent National Partiotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)**

A breakaway NPFL faction led by Prince Yormie Johnson, initially estimated at less than 500 troops. In the early stages of the war, the INPFL was a significant force, controlling a number of strategic points within Monrovia and facilitating the deployment of ECOMOG. It was the INPFL which captured and murdered President Samuel Doe in September 1990. The faction disintegrated in the wake of internal wrangling over its level of cooperation with the interim government, ECOMOG and the NPFL. Through 1991, its role in the conflict substantially declined and the faction formally disbanded in late 1992. Johnson is presently residing in Lagos, Nigeria.

**Lofa Defence Force (LDF)**

A local group that crossed the northern border from Guinea to attack armed positions, mostly of ULIMO-K, in early 1994. Led by Francois Massaquoi, now Minister of Youth and Sports in the transitional government. The LDF is estimated to have 750 combatants, mainly
drawn from within Lofa County. Strong allegations of links with the NPFL.

National Patriotic Force of Liberia (NPFL)

Led by Charles Taylor, the NPFL sparked off the war, taking up arms against the Doe regime in December 1989. Most fighters were originally drawn from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups of Northern Liberia who were persecuted under the Doe regime. Has enjoyed the active backing of Libya, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, especially in the early years of the war. Grew with popular support from an initial force numbering in the low hundreds to a large irregular army which occupied around 80 per cent of the country in less than a year. Thwarted by the arrival of ECOMOG, the NPFL did not capture Monrovia, but set up an alternative national administration (National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government - NPRAG) based in Gbarnga. Sponsored RUF subversion against the military government in Sierra Leone, partly as a strategy to gain control of local trade in diamonds. In late 1992, the NPFL launched ‘Operation Octopus’ which was repulsed by combined ECOMOG, AFL and ULIMO forces. The NPFL has since lost a lot of its territory to other factions, but remains dominant in the east and centre of the country. Controls the Police, the Ministry of Justice and other key ministries in the present transitional government. Large numbers of NPFL fighters have been inducted into the ‘official’ security forces which engaged with Krahn factions in Monrovia in April 1996. The NPFL is estimated to have around 25,000 combatants and has orchestrated a wide range of human rights abuses including massacres, torture, kidnapping and a number of political assassinations.

In recent years, the NPFL has become the most ethnically heterogeneous of the factions, although many of its leaders are Americo-Liberian.

National Patriotic Front of Liberia - Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC)

Breakaway group which emerged in mid-1994. Prominent in the faction are former key NPFL figures Sam Dokie and Tom Woewiyu. The latter was Defence Chief in Taylor’s Gbarnga ‘government’. Both men cited strategic and ideological differences as the cause of their defection. Woewiyu is now Labour Minister in the transitional government. The NPFL-CRC have engaged with the NPFL around Gbarnga and in the north of Liberia.

United Liberation Movement(s) of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMOs K and J)

Originally led by Raleigh Seekie, ULIMO was formed in June 1991 by former AFL fighters and other supporters of the late President Doe who had taken refuge in Guinea and Sierra Leone. From the outset, it has had substantive connections with ECOMOG personnel. After fighting alongside the Sierra Leonean army against RUF insurgency, ULIMO forces entered western Liberia in September 1991. Scored significant gains over the NPFL, notably around the diamond mining areas of Lofa and Bomi Counties. Riven from the outset by internal divisions, ULIMO effectively broke into two competing wings in 1994. ULIMO-J, is a Krahn faction led by General Roosevelt Johnson, while ULIMO-K, is more Moslem/Mandingo-based, under Alhaji Kromah. ULIMO-K is relatively united under Kromah who has forged for it a strong presence in the
transitional government, linked to his increasing collaboration with Taylor. In contrast, ULIMO-J has been sidelined in and by the emerging authorities and remains fractious. It was discontent within ULIMO-J, largely articulated by Johnson and his supporters, which precipitated the worst violence of late 1995-96. ULIMO-J has around 8,000 combatants and ULIMO-K around 12,000. Members of both factions have committed a catalogue of atrocities, including the burning of villages, widespread murder, rape, mutilation, and looting.

Liberian Political Figures

George Boley

Leader of the Liberian Peace Council, Boley is a member of the Krahn ethnic group. He was a junior minister in the administration of President William Tolbert (1971–80), but was briefly jailed for his associations with opposition groups. Released on the morning of the 1980 coup, he rose to become Minister of Presidential Affairs and Minister of Education under President Doe. After Doe’s murder in September 1990, Boley went into exile in the US, but returned in 1993 to take over the leadership of the LPC. Member of the Council of State in the present transitional government.

Samuel Doe

Former Master Sergeant in the Liberian Army. A largely uneducated Krahn, Doe led a military coup against the Americo-Liberian government in 1980 at the age of 28. Executed President William Tolbert and most of the key figures in his administration. Repressed opposition within and outside his People’s Redemption Council (PRC) government. Won rigged elections in 1985 and installed the ‘civilian’ administration of his National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL). Continued purges of political opponents, centralising control of the state and the army among the Krahn. Viciously put down an alleged coup by former ally Thomas Quwonkpa in late 1985, and subsequently persecuted his main supporters among the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. Doe’s fate was effectively sealed when US aid dried up in 1989. Abducted while under ECOMOG protection in September 1990, and subsequently tortured to death by INPFL leaders.

Roosevelt Johnson

Former teacher and leader of ULIMO-J who broke with other ULIMO leaders to seek a greater stake in the transitional government for himself and supporters among his fellow ethnic Krahn. Fighters loyal to Johnson triggered the
first major violation of the Abuja Accord in December 1995, resisting ECOMOG deployment around the diamond mines near Tubmanburg. Dismissed from the ULIMO-J leadership in early 1996 and subsequently suspended from his post as Minister of Rural Development in the transitional government. Engaged in clashes with ULIMO-J rivals which led to charges of murder being brought against him by his enemies in the Council of State. Attempts to arrest Johnson sparked the violence of April/May 1996 which severely undermined the Abuja Accord.

David Kpomakpor

Chairman of the Council of State of the transitional government between March 1994 and September 1995. Lawyer and academic from Bomi County. A prominent member of the Liberian Bar Association and lecturer at the University of Liberia with little political background or constituency. Appointed as one of two IGNU representatives on the Council of State and elected Chairman as a compromise candidate acceptable to ULIMO and the NPFL.

Alhaji Kromah

Chairman of ULIMO-K, Kromah is a Moslem of the Mandingo ethnic group and a member of the Council of State of the present transitional government. Special Assistant to the Vice President during the Tolbert era, he rose to become managing director of the Liberian Broadcasting System and Minister of Information under Doe. Went into exile in June 1990 following the NPFL rebellion and spent much of the war in Conakry, Guinea. Since the emergence of ULIMO, his power base has been in the north-west of the country, in and around Lofa County. While harbouring in the past a deep personal animosity for Charles Taylor, the two leaders have been increasingly linked in Council of State manoeuvrings.

Ruth Perry

A senator between 1986-1990 during the rule of President Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL). Previously worked for fourteen years for the Chase Manhattan Bank in Monrovia. The widow of a prominent Liberian lawyer and mother of seven children, Mrs Perry is from Grand Cape Mount County in the west of Liberia. She has been active in the Liberian Women's Initiative (LWI) and was appointed to the chair of the Council of State of the transitional government in August 1996.

Oscar Quiah

Representative of the civilian Liberia National Conference (LNC) on the Council of State of the present transitional government. He comes from Sine County in the south-east and belongs to the Sarpo ethnic group. Involved in opposition politics in the Tolbert era and temporarily jailed for his activities in 1979. He was appointed Minister of the Interior following the coup of 1980 and later became managing director of the Liberia Telecommunications Corporation. Also jailed by Doe after being implicated in an alleged coup, but was soon released for
lack of evidence. At the height of the civil war in 1992, he fled Monrovia for his homeland, returning to the capital in 1994 after the LPC won back Sinoe County from the NPFL. The only civilian-elected member of the Council of State.

**Wilton Sankawulo**

From Bong County in central Liberia, Sankawulo taught English literature at the University of Liberia. He is the author of a number of novels and essays and is famous for his short stories inspired by national folklore. Like many other ‘progressive’ academics and politicians, he was involved in the early years of the Doe administration, serving briefly as Director of the Cabinet. Has taught, written text books and run radio programmes with the Catholic Education Secretariat. His Chairmanship of the Council of State in the transitional government was agreed during the secretive negotiations which led to the Abuja Accord. He is reported to have heard of his appointment on the radio in Monrovia. Sankawulo's lack of political background hampered his ability to exert effective authority within the Council of State.

**Amos Sawyer**

Formerly Chair of the Department of Political Science and Dean of the College of Social Science and Humanities at the University of Liberia. Also Constitutional Commission Chair in the early years of the Doe administration. Left Liberia after being implicated in a coup attempt and, while in the US, lobbied the government to halt aid to Doe's regime. Appointed by an ECOWAS-sponsored national conference to be head of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) in August 1990. Officially Head of State from November of that year until the dissolution of IGNU in 1994. Founding member of the pan-Africanist Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), and of its off-shoot the Liberia People's Party (LPP), which together dominated the IGNU. Formed and trained a small militia ('The Black Berets') as his elite presidential force. Allegations of corruption tainted his personal reputation and that of IGNU. Sawyer is also a founding member of Susukuu, and of the Centre for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE), a peace and conflict think-tank, based in Monrovia.

**Chief Tamba Tailor**

A member of the Kissi ethnic group from Lofa country in north-west Liberia. A great landowner and perhaps the oldest paramount chief in the country. He is well known for having a number of wives and some 60 children, and also for his generosity. Appointed to the current Council of State by consensus of the armed factions, especially the NPFL and ULIMO-K.

**Charles Taylor**

Leader of the NPFL, Taylor was born in 1948 of an American father and Liberian mother. Educated in the US, he became prominent in the Liberian student’s movement and
returned to Liberia shortly before the 1980 coup. Ingratitated himself with the new administration partly through family links with Doe's then close ally, Thomas Quiwonkpa. Assumed the position of General Services Administration Director, which gave him control of lucrative government procurement activities. He was dismissed from the civil service in 1984 on embezzlement charges and fled to the US. After arrest under an extradition treaty, Taylor escaped from a high security prison in Massachusetts and travelled to Accra, Ghana via Mexico, Spain and France. Organising with other opponents of Doe, he established links at the highest levels of government in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Libya. He later moved to Burkina Faso and secured residence and Libyan military training for a number of Liberian exiles, most of whom had fled from the repression in Nimba County following Quiwonkpa's 1985 coup attempt. Taylor led the invasion into Liberia in December 1989 which precipitated the civil war. He is presently the most powerful member of the Council of State. Taylor is a man of boundless ambition and ruthless determination. His personal quest for power in Liberia has been a major dynamic of the war ever since.

**Togba-Nah Tipoteh**

Chairman of the Interest Groups of Liberia, Director General of Susukku and one-time advisor to the US government's anti-poverty programme. Tipoteh rose to national prominence in the 1970s struggle for social change in Liberia, when he was dismissed by the Tolbert regime, first as Director of the Budget, and then as Chair of the Department of Economics at the University of Liberia. At the time of the 1980 coup, he was Chair of the African Group of Governors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Tipoteh briefly served as Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs under Doe, but was forced to resign after being implicated in a 1981 coup attempt. Currently he is a member of the UN International Advisory Board on Structural Adjustment in Africa and is involved in disarmament efforts through initiatives such as the school-for-guns program. He is also President of the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) and Chair of the Liberian People's Party (LPP), which dominated the interim administrations between 1990 and 1995.

**International Intervenors**

**Benin**

Nicophore Soglo, President of Benin and then-Chairman of ECOWAS was a witness signatory to the Cotonou accord, and was subsequently involved in organising consultations on the allocation of posts in the new transitional government. Earlier, in October 1992, Soglo and his representatives were instrumental in launching the 'Committee of nine' which initiated a harmonisation of ECOWAS policy on Liberia.

**Cote d'Ivoire**

Origin of NPFL's launch into Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire has since been a major conduit for Taylor's arms and supplies, and a staging post for his commercial operations. It has also been the site of persistent border clashes and refugee settlements. The late President Houphouet-Boigny's son-in-law Aldophus Tolbert, son of Liberian President William Tolbert (1971-80), was killed with his father in the 1980 coup led
by Samuel Doe. In the early stages of the war, Houphouet-Boigny’s government, like that of his other son-in-law, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, actively supported the NPFL invasion. It also obstructed discussion of the Liberian crisis in the UN Security Council. Initially opposed to the deployment of ECOMOG, the Ivorians and most of their francophone allies have still not contributed troops to the force. Instead, they became increasingly associated with the ECOWAS diplomatic process. As a leading force in the ECOWAS ‘Committee of Five’ formed in June 1991, Houphouet-Boigny secured the four Yamoussoukro Accords which reconciled the NPFL and interim government authorities and set out modalities for a ceasefire, disarmament and elections. Ivorian diplomatic input receded sharply after the NPFL attack on Monrovia in October 1992 effectively scuppered the Yamoussoukro process. Nonetheless, it is believed to have played a role in facilitating the discussions between Taylor and Nigeria’s President Abacha which led to the signing of the Abuja Accord in August 1995. Houphouet-Boigny died in December 1993.

**ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)**

Regional military force in Liberia fluctuating between 4-15,000 troops and mandated variously for both peace-keeping and ‘peace enforcement’ activities. Despite its substantial successes, ECOMOG forces have been persistently dogged by allegations of partiality, looting and commercial adventurism. Created in August 1990 by the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Reflecting the Committee, ECOMOG was (and remains) dominated by anglophone West Africans, with Nigeria contributing the bulk of finance, personnel and materials. The US has met around 10% of expenses, footing the bill for the deployment of Senegalese, Ugandan and Tanzanian troops. In October 1990, together with elements of the AFL and INPFL, ECOMOG launched an armed offensive against the NPFL to secure Monrovia for the accession of the civilian interim government. Its success created a semblance of order in the capital which allowed political, civic and humanitarian organisations to pursue their operations. ECOMOG forces were deployed outside Monrovia to supervise the implementation of the various peace accords of 1991, but were withdrawn to Monrovia after six Senegalese soldiers were captured and executed by the NPFL. In October 1992, ECOMOG switched back to a peace enforcement strategy, launching an all-out offensive to repel a major NPFL advance on Monrovia. They also provided support to AFL and ULIMO fighters, who made large inroads into NPFL territory and severely undercut the commercial underpinnings of its unofficial regime. Since 1993, the force has resumed a predominantly peace-keeping role, sporadically deploying outside Monrovia to oversee the fitful implementation of the Cotonou Accord and its antecedents. Nigeria’s dominance of ECOMOG was partly reduced after Cotonou, but has re-emerged since the shrinkage of UNOMIL and the departure of Ugandan and Tanzanian troops deployed during 1994-95. Due to a lack of international assistance, the added responsibilities recently ceded to the transitional administration, and the escalating costs to its contributing governments, the profile of ECOMOG has fallen slightly in recent months. The force did not intervene to halt the violence in April 1996.
France

Details on the French role in the Liberian war remain elusive. France appears however to have played a significant part in facilitating discussions leading to the Yamoussoukro Accords in 1991. It is also believed to have had a role in discussions leading to the Abuja Accord four years later which ensured that Taylor could not be marginalised in the peace process. There is evidence of significant links between the NPFL and French commercial interests, including those of Christophe Mitterrand, son of the late French President. France remains active in defence of its profile throughout Africa, and is thought to have been suspicious of Nigerian regional hegemony.

The Gambia

As Chair of ECOWAS and of its Standing Mediation Committee, President Dawda Jawara of The Gambia was a driving force in the early stages of the peace process between May 1990 and March 1991. During this period, a comprehensive ceasefire was established, modalities were expressed for the encampment and disarmament of combatants and two national conferences were convened to constitute a civilian-led interim government. These efforts floundered due to disagreements on the role of the NPFL in the interim government and on the perceived partiality of ECOMOG. Jawara was deposed by the Gambian military in July 1994. Allegations remain linking this coup to discontent among soldiers in The Gambia’s ECOMOG contingent.

Ghana

President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana acceded to the Chairmanship of ECOWAS during an impasse in the peace process in mid-1994. Seizing the diplomatic initiative, he quickly established links with Taylor and facilitated the signing of the Akosombo Agreement and the Accra Clarification. These agreements brought all armed factions into the peace process and provided for their increased role in the transitional government. In 1995, he continued to co-ordinate ECOWAS diplomatic initiatives, orchestrating a rapprochement between Taylor and the Nigerians. This produced the Abuja Accord which brought armed faction leaders into government for the first time. Ghana is presently playing host to General Roosevelt Johnson, the Krahn faction leader whose disputed status was the trigger for renewed violence in Monrovia in April-May 1996. It has also contributed around ten per cent of ECOMOG troops, the second largest contingent after Nigeria.

Nigeria

Under President Ibrahim Babangida, the Nigerian government was a close ally of Samuel Doe. It was instrumental in setting up ECOMOG and has been the leading supporter of the force, contributing substantially more money and troops than the other participants combined. The Nigerian strategy in Liberia in the early stages of the war appears to have been to contain the NPFL and to put a damper on Taylor’s obvious presidential ambitions. Since the accession of General Sani Abacha, Nigeria is seen as less partisan and relations have gradually improved with the NPFL. Abacha’s representative Chief Tom Ikimi was among the signed witnesses of the Abuja Accord. President Abacha himself became chair of ECOWAS in August 1996 and is assuming a prominent role in continuing regional initiatives. He was instrumental in the August 1996
ECOWAS summit which set out a revised timetable for the implementation of the Abuja Accord, together with a list of sanctions to be imposed on violating factions. Commentators now speculate that the Abacha regime is keen to allay the high financial and political costs of ECOMOG, but is wary of recalling thousands of military personnel into its fraught domestic milieu. The ideal scenario is for a large increase in international assistance which would resolve ECOMOG’s financial crisis, while rescuing what could be packaged as a bold and noble foreign policy initiative.

**Organisation of African Unity (OAU)**

The OAU has exercised low-key participation in ECOWAS diplomatic initiatives. Its Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, was a witness to the original ECOWAS Peace Plan in 1990. Its Eminent Person for Liberia, the Reverend Canaan Banana, was involved in negotiations leading to the Cotonou and Abuja Accords, and acted as witness to both these agreements. The OAU has also assisted co-ordination between the UN and ECOWAS. The regional response to the Liberian crisis facilitated the recent loosening of the OAU’s cardinal principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. In 1993, a ‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’ was approved at the OAU Summit in Cairo. Since then, the organisation has despatched peacekeepers to Rwanda and expressed support for a proposed East African military presence in Burundi. An OAU resolution tabled in July 1996 called for the imposition of severe sanctions on Liberian faction leaders, and supported calls to consider setting up a war crimes tribunal to deal with human rights violations arising from the conflict.

**United Nations**

In the early stages of the war, the UN Security Council commended ECOWAS peace initiatives and urged the factions to respect accords. In response to renewed hostilities in late 1992, it imposed an arms embargo on all combatants except ECOMOG. At the same time, Trevor Gordon-Somers was despatched to Liberia as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG). Following discussions between Gordon-Somers and local and regional leaders, the Security Council reiterated its support for ECOMOG, but called for a revival of the peace process, offering increased UN involvement. Working closely with the OAU, UN personnel were instrumental in convening peace talks between the factions in Geneva. These talks led to the signing of the Cotonou Accord, by far the most thorough and well-drafted of all the Liberian agreements. The United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia (UNOMIL) was established in September 1993 to oversee the implementation procedures of the Cotonou Accord and to ensure the neutrality of ECOMOG operations. Its mandate was re-specified in November 1995. Under this re-specification, UNOMIL was empowered to monitor and verify compliance with the ceasefire, the arms embargo, and the encampment, disarmament and demobilisation of armed factions, to assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian activities, to observe and verify elections, and to report on any violations of humanitarian law. There have been consistent reports of poor communication between UNOMIL and ECOMOG who have occasionally accused the mission of high-handedness. UNOMIL was originally authorised to employ 368 military observers. It reached full strength four months after formation and was deployed throughout the country, but severely cut back its operations after 43 of its personnel were detained and terrorised by
NPFL fighters in September 1994. Around this time, Gordon-Somers also played a role in facilitating the signing of the Akosombo Agreement which ceded a greater role in the transitional government to the armed factions. Soon after, Anthony Nyakyi became SRSG, and subsequently participated in the signing of the Abuja Accord. Originally established for a seven month stay, UNOMIL’s mandate has now been renewed eight times. However, its 80-90 strong observer force is seen by many as a token presence, reflecting the general indifference of the international community to the Liberian crisis. From the beginning of the conflict, a range of UN agencies have provided humanitarian assistance to Liberia.

**United States**

Considering strong historical ties between the two countries, US input to help end the Liberian crisis has been markedly scarce. US officials have intermittently played a role in facilitating negotiations, but involvement has been low-key and circumspect. The US has provided a measure of backing to ECOMOG, notably underwriting the deployment of Senegalese and East African troops in 1991-93 and 1994-95 respectively. More recent pledges of support have as yet failed to materialise, pending improvements in the professionalism of ECOMOG. The arms-length relationship between the US and ECOWAS peace efforts is largely a function of shifting strategic priorities in the wake of the Cold War, but strained relations between the Clinton administration and the military regime in Nigeria are also a factor. In recent months, the National Black Caucus and a range of Liberian interest groups have lobbied the US government for larger-scale intervention. Partly in response to this, the Clinton administration helped set up the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), a body bringing together representatives of a range of donor governments concerned with promoting peace in Liberia. A special envoy of the President has also travelled to West Africa to meet with Rawlings and other ECOWAS dignitaries, but few envisage a substantial shift in US policy. The US has channelled large quantities of emergency relief to Liberia through the UN and various NGOs, and has twice evacuated westerners from Monrovia, in 1990 and 1996.

**Non-Governmental Peace-Makers**

**National**

**Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC)**

The IFMC brings together the National Muslim Council and the Liberian Council of Churches in a joint movement for peace and justice in Liberia. In June 1990, before ECOWAS intervention, the IFMC had already established its mediation efforts, convening week-long talks between the factions in the US Embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone. After these talks broke down, IFMC proposals were adopted as the first ECOWAS Peace Plan. The Committee subsequently chaired the national conferences of August 1990 and March 1991 which determined the composition of the initial interim government. It has also engaged in shuttle diplomacy throughout West Africa and held observer status at many ECOWAS meetings. As the armed factions have been drawn into government, the IFMC has expressed growing unease with ECOWAS diplomacy. In response, it has concentrated its efforts on co-ordinating pressure for disarmament, galvanising
civic institutions, and organising non-violent protests at the militarisation of Liberian society. These culminated in the ‘stay-home’ strikes of 1995-96 and the formation of a Civic Disarmament Campaign (CDC) to co-ordinate the struggle for demilitarisation. IFMC attempts to mediate the stand-off between Roosevelt Johnson and elements of the transitional government in March-April 1996 led to accusations of impartiality from the latter. Fighters believed to be loyal to Taylor and Kromah hounded IFMC leaders out of Monrovia soon after. Though undermined by these developments, the Committee remains active in lobbying ECOWAS and co-ordinating civic peace and relief initiatives.

**Interest Groups of Liberia (IGL)**

Led by Dr. Togba-Nah Tipoteh, the IGL is a consortium of more than 25 national organisations. It emerged from the All-Liberia Conferences of 1990-91. Concerned with bringing about a peaceful end to the conflict, the IGL have adopted a Declaration of Peace and Progress in Liberia and have engaged in signature campaigns and peace marches. It also planned wide-scale strikes in protest at the perceived diplomatic capitulation to armed faction leaders.

**Justice and Peace Commission (JPC)**

The JPC is the human rights and peace-initiating component of the Catholic Church in Liberia. Founded in November 1991, it has been involved in human rights monitoring, reporting, documentation and training, and in legal aid programs. Its reporting has been vital for information on the abuses and violations of human rights in Liberia, but has often been attacked by faction leaders. The JPC has been involved with the IFMC in a series of negotiations regarding the peace process.

**Liberia National Conference (LNC)**

This association of political parties, religious bodies and prominent Liberians first convened in late 1994 to deliberate on the many aspects of the peace process. Like the roughly coterminous Akosombo Agreement, the Conference reaffirmed the Cotonou Accord and called for a more central role in its implementation for the transitional government. Where it differed from the mainstream peace process was in recommending the retention of the existing, civilian-dominated Council of State. This proposal was rejected. The LNC is represented in the present Council of State by Oscar Quiah.

**Liberian Alternative at Work for Peace and Democracy (LAW)**

A group of prominent Liberian civilians temporarily located in Freetown, Sierra Leone in the immediate aftermath of the renewal of hostilities in April 1996. Led by Mrs. Mary Brownell, its position statement calls for the repudiation of the armed factions and the present transitional government, and the convening of a Sovereign National Conference to establish a civilian-led provisional administration. It also calls for the revival of ECOMOG’s peace enforcement mandate, for the expansion of ECOMOG to include African forces from outside the region, and for resolute steps to enforce the UN arms embargo and to bring war criminals to justice. To underwrite these moves, it urges substantial and resolute support from the international community, led by the US.
Liberian Initiative for Peace and Conflict Resolution (LIPCORE)

LIPCORE was established in 1994 under the auspices of the US-based Consortium for Peace-Building in Liberia. It is a group of Liberians from many different ethnic and political backgrounds who have banded together to work for peace. They have held two workshops, one in Akosombo, Ghana (April 1994) and one in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire (February 1995). The purpose of these workshops was to provide an opportunity for informal, unofficial dialogue between members of the various parties, organisations and movements in the Liberian conflict. Participants were encouraged to consider the sources and history of societal, political, and economic problems encountered by Liberians, and to begin to assess strategies for overcoming these problems.

Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI)

The LWI is a non-partisan movement of women founded in January 1994 under the leadership of Mrs. Mary Brownell. Through meetings with various leaders and numerous public statements, it has sought to impact on the peace process, particularly focusing on the need for disarmament. LWI representatives were present at the talks which led to the Accra Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement in December 1994. It has also formulated a plan for enhancing the provision of incentives for disarmament, but complains that neither the UN nor ECOWAS appears to have studied their plan or considered incorporating it into their own programmes of action. The LWI has co-sponsored a range of civic peace initiatives with the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee.

Susukuu

Development NGO formed in 1971 to pursue projects in a range of fields including community development, employment promotion and legal assistance. During the war, Susukuu has focused on stimulating the flow of international assistance to Liberia, advocacy for refugees and displaced persons, reconstruction of social infrastructure, and rehabilitation of former combatants through training, counselling and education.

International

Consortium for Peace-Building in Liberia

Initiated in 1993 by the Conflict Resolution Programme of the Carter Center in Atlanta. Involves a range of NGOs based in the US, including the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), and the Friends of Liberia (FOL). Has carried out needs assessments, identified Liberians interested in peace-building, and convened conflict resolution training programs to develop their skills.

Friends of Liberia (FOL)

Established as a group of former Peace Corps volunteers who have served in Liberia. Have been prominent in recent efforts within the US to lobby for resolute and appropriate international involvement in the Liberian peace process.
International Alert (IA) / International Training Institute for Peace (ITIP)

IA in London and ITIP in Lagos facilitated discussions between the NPFL and the Government of Nigeria which led indirectly to the Abuja Accord of 1995. They also drafted seemingly influential proposals which recommended state representation for all armed factions controlling one or more Liberian counties, the assignment of peace enforcement powers to ECOMOG and UNOMIL to maintain the territorial status quo in lieu of elections, and the establishment of proportional electoral procedures to guarantee that all parties could secure a significant stake in post-conflict governance.

to provide logistical support for the then-scheduled 1992 elections. Due to the failure of various accords, the centre has subsequently been involved in conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives. On one level, Jimmy Carter himself has taken an active role in communicating with parties to overcome diplomatic logjams. He was involved with President Rawlings and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in facilitating the Akosombo Agreement in September 1994. On another level, the centre has assisted LIPCORE and other NGOs in conflict resolution seminars for faction deputies. It has also created a grant structure to support small pro-peace projects and has disbursed over forty grants since 1993.

International Negotiations Network (INN)

An organisation headed by former US President Jimmy Carter. Became involved in Liberia in 1991 to assist in the Yamoussoukro negotiations between the NPFL and the interim government. Established the Carter Centre in Monrovia
Chronology of Events

1989  Nine year rule of President Samuel Doe under increasing strain after severe economic mismanagement and a cutoff of US aid narrow and weaken his personal patronage systems. Brutal repression further alienates the general population, especially northerners of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. NPFL invades.

December
A few hundred National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) fighters, mainly Gio and Mano, launch an incursion from Cote d’Ivoire into Nimba County, northern Liberia. Led by Charles Taylor, the NPFL aim to overthrow President Samuel Doe. They are broadly supported in this by Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, both of whose leaders nurse family feuds with Doe.

1990  Bloody civil war escalates. Civic groups cede lead role in peace process to ECOWAS. ECOMOG, a regional peace-keeping force dominated by Nigeria, secures Monrovia and prevents early victory of NPFL. Civilian interim government installed and ceasefire established, but little evidence of commitment from main faction leaders.

January–June
After ruthless counter-insurgency measures by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), vicious, inter-ethnic war breaks out. NPFL extends de facto control to most of the country, apart from the capital, Monrovia. Appalling human rights abuses on all sides. UN agencies evacuate Liberia. ECOWAS heads of state in Banjul, The Gambia establish a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to monitor developments. Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) initiates peace talks in the US Embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

July

August
SMC adopts IFMC prescriptions as the first ECOWAS Peace Plan. Creates a regional peace-keeping force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Headed by a Ghanaian General, ECOMOG comprises some 4,000 troops, mostly Nigerian, but also from Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Togo and Guinea. Substantial resistance to ECOMOG deployment from Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. The SMC also convenes a national conference of Liberian political and civic groups to help resolve the crisis. NPFL refuses to attend. In their absence, Dr. Amos Sawyer, leader of the Liberian People’s Party (LPP), is elected head of an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). IGNU to exercise sovereignty over Liberia, with ECOMOG protection.
September
ECOMOG engages NPFL in Monrovia and prevents it from seizing power. Foreign nationals and diplomatic staff evacuated by US naval force. Around one third of Liberian population are refugees in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone, with many more internally displaced.

President Doe abducted, tortured and killed by INPFL leadership en route to ECOWAS headquarters in Monrovia. Nigerians assume command of ECOMOG. Ivorian and Burkinabe backers of the NPFL more receptive to a diplomatic solution. Further efforts by US State Department to involve Taylor in a negotiated settlement.

October
ECOMOG establishes control over Monrovia, with some support from AFL and INPFL fighters. The latter factions agree to observe a ceasefire.

November
Bamako Ceasefire signed between AFL, INPFL and NPFL following a extraordinary session of ECOWAS heads of states. IGNU formally installed. UN estimates 150,000 dead and 500,000 displaced in war. UN agencies return to Monrovia.

December
Banjul Agreement between the AFL, INPFL and the NPFL to convene a national conference in 60 days to reconstitute and consolidate IGNU with representatives from all factions.

1991  Effective partition of Liberia. War spills over into Sierra Leone. Emergence of ULIMO. Cote d'Ivoire assumes leadership of ECOWAS diplomatic process, with ambiguous support from Nigeria. Reluctant NPFL pressured into series of tenuous peace accords.

January
UN Security Council backs ceasefire. NPFL establishing their National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) in Gbarnga.

February
Signing of Lome agreement which specifies the modalities for ECOMOG monitoring of ceasefire implementation. Disarmament deferred until after reconstitution of IGNU.

March
All-Liberia National Conference fails to take the peace process forward, as Taylor's presidential plans are thwarted and NPFL resorts to wrecking tactics. INPFL leadership irrevocably split over degree of collaboration with IGNU, ECOMOG and NPFL. First raids into diamond-rich border areas of Sierra Leone by NPFL-backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Refugee flows from Sierra Leone into Liberia and Guinea.

April-September
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) formed in Guinea and Sierra Leone by ex-AFL fighters and Krahn and Mandingo supporters of the late President Doe. ULIMO forces enter western Liberia from Sierra Leone to attack NPFL.

Reconciliation in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire between Sawyer and Taylor, brokered by President Houphouet-Boigny, with the involvement of the International Negotiations Network (INN) of former US President Jimmy Carter. ECOWAS 'Committee of Five' established, comprising heads of state of Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Togo. Committee to steer diplomatic negotiations together with the INN. First three Yamoussoukro agreements signed.
October-December
Increasingly isolated NPFL pressured into signing of Yamoussoukro IV accord, providing for the disarmament and encampment of factions, for the handover of all territory to ECOMOG control, and for elections to be conducted under ECOWAS supervision. ULIMO not party to the Yamoussoukro process and hence not bound by its provisions. NPFL wary of disarming to ECOMOG, especially amid persistent rumours of ECOMOG-ULIMO alignment. ECOMOG supplemented with Senegalese troops.

calling for neutral UN peace-keeping force. Internally divided and inconsistent in its approach to Taylor, ECOWAS invites the UN to verify and monitor the proposed election process.

August-September
ULIMO/NPFL fighting escalates. ULIMO seizes diamond mining centre of Tubmanburg. ECOMOG officers support ULIMO with arms, intelligence and uniforms.

October
200,000 internally displaced in Monrovia having fled from renewed fighting and NPFL harassment in the interior. NPFL finally disbands. Their patience waning, Cote d'Ivoire steers ECOWAS to renew threats of economic sanctions on NPFL areas. ‘Committee of nine’ instituted to coordinate ECOWAS policy, comprising representatives of key states, both anglo- and francophone.

‘Operation Octopus’, an all-out assault on Monrovia, launched by the NPFL from the facilities of the Firestone rubber plantation near Harbel. ECOMOG abandons its peace-keeping stance for greater combatant role. Re-arms AFL and, openly allied with ULIMO, commences heavy bombing of NPFL-held areas. Former US President Jimmy Carter comments publicly on ECOMOG partiality.

January-April
Deployment of ECOMOG outside Monrovia. ULIMO gains in western Liberia. Sierra Leonean government toppled by under-paid and disgruntled army officers, but RUF insurgency continues.

May
In sporadic fighting, six Senegalese soldiers captured and executed by NPFL. ECOMOG forces withdrawn to Monrovia. UN Security Council launches appeal to factions to respect the Yamoussoukro Accord.

June-July
Amid continued ceasefire violations and NPFL arms purchases, ECOWAS gives Charles Taylor a 30-day ultimatum to disarm fighters and apply Yamoussoukro Accord or else face economic sanctions. NPFL refuses to disarm to ECOMOG,
1993

Forceful ECOMOG offensive severely weakens NPFL without crushing it. Diplomatic process moves ahead with signing of landmark Cotonou Accord, which allows representatives of armed factions to join transitional government. Emergence of LPC.

January-March

Arms flows continue despite UN embargo. ECOMOG troops increased to 15,000, but Senegalese withdraw. ECOMOG, AFL and ULIMO achieve strategic military gains, including the port of Buchanan, the supply point of Kakata on the Monrovia-Gbarnga road, the Robertsfield Airport, and the Firestone rubber plantation at Harbel. NPFL’s military and commercial interests severely undermined. First reports of substantial corruption and commercial adventurism by ECOMOG personnel. Security Council reiterates backing for ECOMOG and offers increased UN support to ailing peace process.

April-May

ECOMOG finally imposes economic sanctions on NPFL-held areas. Reportedly strafes cross-border convoy of relief agency, Medicins Sans Frontieres.

June

600 civilians, mainly displaced Liberians, killed in an armed attack on the Firestone plantation near Harbel. A panel of inquiry appointed by the UN Secretary General attributes the attack to units of the AFL. Nigerian elections held and annulled.

July

At the invitation of the UN, the Beninois Chairman of ECOWAS and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), all the warring parties invited to Geneva for peace talks. Geneva Ceasefire signed between the NPFL, ULIMO and IGNU.

Cotonou Accord formally signed between the same parties. This accord re-schedules disarmament and encampment, and provides for a tripartite Liberia National transitional government (LNTG). LNTG to replace IGNU once disarmament commences, headed by a five-man Council of State to be appointed from the signatory organisations and from lists of ‘prominent Liberians’ drawn up by them. Council of state to operate by consensus and to determine the allocation of posts in the cabinet, in public corporations and autonomous government agencies. LNTG leaders ineligible to contest future presidential elections. Implementation of the Accord to be supervised and monitored by ECOMOG, with support of newly-formed United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia (UNOMIL). Nigerian dominance of ECOMOG to be reduced.

August

President Babangida of Nigeria resigns.

September

The mis-named Liberia Peace Council (LPC) emerges with support of AFL and engages the NPFL around rubber and timber exporting zones in south-eastern Liberia. Refugee flows to Cote d’Ivoire. UNOMIL established, the first UN peacekeeping operation undertaken in co-operation with a regional organization. ECOMOG has primary responsibility for ensuring implementation of Cotonou Accord, but UNOMIL authorized to monitor and verify the ceasefire, the arms embargo, and the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) protests at UN support for embargo on NPFL-held areas.

October

Governments of Egypt, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe announce troop
contribution to ECOMOG. Egypt and Zimbabwe later fail to meet their commitments due to financial constraints.

November
General Sani Abacha assumes Nigerian presidency. ECOWAS calls a consultative meeting of Cotonou signatories to determine allocation of LNTG posts.

December
President Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire dies. Emergence of NPFL-sponsored Lofa Defence Force (LDF) in Western Liberia. Two weeks of negotiations fail to decide the allocation of four remaining cabinet portfolios, or a date for the start of encampment, disarmament and demobilisation.

March-April
LNTG Council of State installed with IGNU's David Kpomakpor as chair. Transitional legislative assembly sworn in. Supreme Court opens for 1994 term. ECOMOG and UNOMIL troops commence deployment to monitor the disarmament process. Deployment stalled around Tubmanburg, where ULIMO fighters riot over LNTG composition, in border areas, where hostilities continue amid the proliferation of armed groups, and in the southeast, where skirmishes persist between NPFL and LPC fighters.

May
After internecine fighting around Tubmanburg, ULIMO effectively splits into Mandingo and Krahn factions. These are termed ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J, after their respective leaders, Alhaji Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson.

June-August
All factions experiencing command and control problems. ECOMOG not fully deployed and UNOMIL withdrawn from western region for security reasons. Informal talks between Taylor and incoming ECOWAS chair Jerry Rawlings.

Liberia National Conference (LNC) of civilian groups meets to deliberate on the peace process. Supports the Cotonou Accord but urges the maintenance of a strong civilian presence in the LNTG. Gambian government unseated by a military coup precipitated by pay disputes within its ECOMOG contingent.

1994
Cotonou Accord eventually unravels, due to factional squabbles over composition of transitional government, the continued emergence of new armed groups, and the limited resources of peace-keepers. ECOWAS diplomatic process renewed under Ghanaian leadership, further accommodating the armed factions (especially NPFL) and increasing the militarisation of Liberian politics. ULIMO splits.

January
UNOMIL reaches full strength. Arrival of East African ECOMOG battalions. Frequent ceasefire violations.

February
Signatories of the Cotonou Accord meet in Monrovia. Disarmament to begin on March 7th, after the installment of the LNTG. General elections scheduled for September 7th.
council-man, with two civilians to be appointed, one by the LNC, and one jointly by the NPFL and ULIMO-K. Council decisions to be made on the basis of a simple majority. LNTG to collaborate with ECOMOG and UNOMIL in supervising and monitoring implementation of the accord. LNTG also empowered to begin the formation of national security structures and to build AFL as a national army with fighters from all factions. The bearing of arms in the capital is prohibited, although faction leaders are allowed to provide for their own personal security.

While Taylor is abroad, fighting is reported at NPFL headquarters. Gbarnga subsequently attacked by anti-NPFL forces, led by ULIMO-K. Fresh refugee influx into Guinea. NPFL fighters detain and terrorise UNOMIL and NGO personnel in north and east of country. UNOMIL evacuated to Monrovia and drastically reduced in size. Split in NPFL, leading to formation of NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (CRC) under Tom Woewiyu and Sam Dokie, key members of NPFL command structure. Attempted coup against the LNTG, led by disaffected AFL General Charles Julu, is crushed by ECOMOG.

**October-November**

Elements of the LNTG, civilian political groups, churches and human rights agencies vigorously protest at the increasing militarisation of Liberian politics. Anthony Nyakyi becomes the new UN SRSG to Liberia.

**December**

Accra Clarification signed by all factions, old and new, including both wings of ULIMO. Council of state to include representatives of the NPFL, ULIMO-K, and the LNC, together with paramount Chief Tamba Taylor (nominated by NPFL and ULIMO-K) and a joint representative of the AFL and the new signatories. Amid growing evidence of NPFL/ULIMO-K collaboration, deep divisions persist within the AFL and the ‘coalition’ of LPC, ULIMO-J, LDF and NPFL-CRC. Nigeria wary of perceived NPFL ascendancy, but largely preoccupied with domestic problems.

**1995**

**Regional accommodation of NPFL continues with rapprochement between Taylor and Nigerian President Abacha.** Discontent and divisions spread among powerful Krahn factions. Abuja Accord draws all armed groups into transitional government, with Taylor and Kromah assuming prominent role.

**January-July**

ECOWAS Heads of State attend mini-summit on the formation of the Council of State. All warring factions accept a proposal to expand the number of council nominees from five to six in order that the AFL and the ‘coalition’ forces can be represented separately.

US State Department condemns ECOMOG for systematic and large-scale looting and, along with the UN, cuts funding. Also encourages informal talks between Taylor and Nigerian President Abacha. These talks are sponsored by Rawlings and international NGOs.

Purges of ‘disloyal’ lieutenants within NPFL. Fractions continue sporadic warfare whilst jockeying for position within LNTG. Civilian LNTG leaders perceived as increasingly irrelevant.
August
Taylor's first trip to Nigeria. Signing of the Abuja Accord, which supplements all previous agreements. The accord establishes a new six-member Council of State, headed by writer Wilton Sankawulo. Taylor, Kromah and LPC's George Boley are appointed vice-chairmen of equal status, along with the LNC politician Oscar Quiah and Tamba Tailor. All members can contest proposed elections, provided they resign their post three months in advance. Only one council seat is allocated to the AFL/Coalition, but ULIMO-J is granted control of three ministries and a range of public corporations.

To fulfil its widened responsibilities, ECOMOG plans to increase its strength to 12,000, and to integrate Ivorian and Burkinabe troops as part of this expansion. Ugandan and Tanzanian troops withdraw from ECOMOG.

September
Faction leaders enter Monrovia with armed 'protection'. New LNTG Council of State installed.

October
Several ceasefire violations reported. Internal tensions in all factions, notably ULIMO-J, on distribution of LNTG posts. ECOWAS receives renewed pledges of financial assistance from the international community.

November
UN Security Council provides for the expansion of the UNOMIL mandate, authorizing the deployment of additional troops to investigate all ceasefire violations, support humanitarian assistance activities, investigate and report human rights violations, and observe and verify the proposed election process. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali visits Monrovia to meet with the Council of State, after a summit in Ghana with Jerry Rawlings.

December
Violence erupts in Tubmanburg between ECOMOG and elements of ULIMO-J loyal to Roosevelt Johnson over disarmament and control of diamond mines. ECOMOG personnel killed, kidnapped and wounded and military hardware seized. NPFL and ULIMO-K forces join in the fighting.

1996
Alliances within the transitional government move to suppress dissent and squeeze opposition. Under-resourced ECOMOG unable (and unwilling) to prevent serious escalation of hostilities. Heavy fighting in Monrovia leaves hundreds dead, severely undermining the credibility of the transitional government and the Abuja Accord.

January-February
Persistent lack of resources stalls deployment of ECOMOG/UNOMIL. Sporadic fighting continues within ULIMO, between ULIMO-J and ECOMOG, and between LPC and NPFL. All factions reluctant to proceed with disarmament. Evidence of NPFL-inspired crack-down on independent press.

March
Taylor calls for ECOMOG forces to be placed under the control of the Council of State. The council adopts protocols by which the LNTG is to be termed the 'Government of Liberia', and the Council of State 'the collective presidency'. Taylor and Kromah begin referring to their fighters as 'government forces'. LNTG commission of inquiry into December violence in
Tubmanburg finds against ULIMO-J. ULIMO-J high command removes Johnson as overall leader, but he maintains allegiance of many fighters. Johnson suspended by Council of State from ministerial post in LNTG.

April
In the absence of Boley, the Council of State despatches police-militia to arrest Johnson on murder charges. Heavy fighting breaks out between 'government' forces and predominantly Krahn factions. The latter, comprising LPC, AFL and ULIMO-J fighters loosely allied under Johnson, base themselves in the Barclay Training Centre, taking with them and later releasing 600 'human shields'. Violence and intensive looting by all factions leads to estimated 1,500 fatalities and US evacuation of over 2,000 aid workers and foreign nationals. Johnson flown to Accra, Ghana. Independent press offices ransacked and burnt out, allegedly by the NPFL. Thousands of civilians find refuge in US Embassy compound. US convenes the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), an inter-governmental committee of donor countries concerned with overseeing and augmenting ECOWAS peace efforts.

May-July
Militias eventually withdraw from central Monrovia after Council of State orders 'government forces' to surrender their positions to ECOMOG. All factions believed to have retained contingency arms and personnel within the city limits. 'Congo Defence Force' emerges and engages with ULIMO-J north-east of Monrovia. Cross-border raids by NPFL and ULIMO-K fighters into Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea. ECOMOG remains seriously under-resourced, despite renewed pledges of US support. Thirteen international NGOs resolve to pursue only limited, life-saving operations until security can be assured. Angry protests from Liberian civil groups demand that faction leaders be called to account for the renewed violence.

August
Contributors

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Andy Carl is Co-Director of Conciliation Resources (CR). The primary focus of his fieldwork is in providing support to the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum in Fiji. He has also been engaged in developing ACCORD and in project work in Russia and Somaliland. Between 1990-94, he was Programme Director with International Alert (IA) in London.

His main responsibilities included establishing organisational capacity for programmes in the former Soviet Union, Africa, South Asia and Latin America. His project responsibilities were in Liberia/Nigeria, Iraqi-Kurdistan, South Africa, The Philippines, Europe, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. He holds an M.Phil from Trinity College, Dublin and a BA from the University of California at Berkeley.

Max Ahmadu Sesay holds a first class honours degree in modern history from Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone (1989), and a doctorate in international relations from the University of Southampton, UK (1993). He taught at the universities of Sierra Leone and Southampton in 1989/90 and 1992/93 respectively. In February 1994, he joined Staffordshire University as a research associate. He is currently a research fellow and lecturer at the same institution. His research interests include war, development and regional security in Africa. He is author of several scholarly articles on Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Samuel Kofi Woods, II is national director of the Justice and Peace Commission established in Monrovia in November 1991 by the Catholic Church of Liberia. He is recipient of the 1994 Reebok human rights award and is currently nominated for the Roger Baldwin medal of liberty, an award instituted by the Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights. He was evacuated from Liberia on April 20th 1996 with assistance from numerous international organisations. He has since been prominent in initiating campaigns for the restoration of peace in Liberia.
Conciliation Resources

An International Service for Conflict Prevention and Resolution

Conciliation Resources (CR) seeks to provide support, advice and training to local people struggling to address social conflicts which have led or which threaten to lead to widespread violence.

Activities

Project support services are provided through multi-disciplinary teams working with local partners in collaboration with the London office. Commitments are made for the medium to long term. Specific activities include:

- Collaborative design and implementation of conflict transformation strategies;
- Support for the organization of seminars, workshops and other fora aimed at clarifying issues in a particular conflict, building confidence and capacities, and generating a range of political, economic and social options for peaceful settlement;
- Research and organizational support for specific third-party mediation efforts.

Advisory and capacity-building services involve experienced and independent practitioners from a variety of backgrounds in professional consultancy services to local, national and international organizations and individuals.

Public education and training initiatives linked to specific conflicts are carried out in collaboration with other specialized organizations and individuals in the humanitarian, conflict resolution and development fields. These include:

- Conflict resolution training and production of educational and training materials;
- Media and other training programmes;
- Publications.

Current programme areas

In addition to producing ACCORD - An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Conciliation Resources is currently providing project support to the Women’s Movement for Peace, the National Association of Journalists, and the National Catholic Development Office/Caritas in Sierra Leone. It is also partnered with the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) in Fiji, is supporting the work of the Peace Committee of Somaliland and has provided training for the Gambia Press Union. CR also undertakes short-term consultancies. Recent consultancies have been undertaken for UNESCO, CARE UK, Oxfam-UK, CEDRIDE-Ghana, the Kiev Centre for Political Studies and Confictology and the Moscow Institute for Humanities and Political Studies.

Co-Directors & Council

David Lord (Co-Director); Andy Carl (Co-Director); Guus Meijer (Chair); Cristina Sganga; Martin Henwood (Treasurer); Theodosia Sowa; Raj Thamotheram; Mark Hoffman.

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