Conflict and Peace in Mindanao (MILF)
A summary of Accord and other publications

February 6, 2010

General information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>ARMM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>300,000 km²</td>
<td>95,000 km²</td>
<td>27. km²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>90 million</td>
<td>21.5 million</td>
<td>4.1 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Some 12 million</td>
<td>13 Muslim ethnomlinguistic indigenous groups (8.3 million)²: Maranao (2.3), maguindanao (2), tausug (1.5). 18 ethnomlinguistic non-Muslim indigenous groups.</td>
<td>Predominantly Muslim</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Catholic (83%), Muslim (5-10%), Other</td>
<td>Catholic Muslim (18-34%) (76% in 1903), Other</td>
<td>Catholic Muslim (&gt;60%), Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>102 /179 (2008)</td>
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Summary of the conflict and the peace processes

Islam arrived to Mindanao before the Spanish Catholic colonizers, and a number of Sultanates were able to resist attempts of external dominance until the US took over as colonial power in 1898. The US and – later- the newly independent government in Manila promoted the settlement of Christians from the rest of the Philippines in the fertile lands of Mindanao, displacing local (Muslim and non-Muslim) population. By the 1960s the local population had been minoritized, while deep-rooted prejudices against Muslims remain up to date in the rest of the Philippines.

Discrimination, Islamic revivalism, and the massacre of several Muslim soldiers during their military service sparked armed struggle for an independent state, first against the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and subsequently against the democratic State. When the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) accepted the option of autonomy, a Final Peace Agreement was signed (1996). In 1977 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split from the MNLF in disagreement with the leadership and their willingness to accept autonomy. Peace negotiations between the government and the MILF have been dragging on since 1997. While MILF has also dropped the demand for independence, the most contentious issues are the territorial extension and the degree of economic and political power of a new devolved entity. Meanwhile, the MNLF and the government are still negotiating the implementation of the 1996 agreement.

Armed conflict and peace negotiations in Mindanao have become among the most protracted in the world. At the same time, Mindanao also benefits from one of the most vibrant and creative civil societies.

Main agreements (GRP-MILF)

2001 June: Tripoli Agreement on Peace.
 August: Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement.
 June: The Bangsamoro Development Agency, is set up.
2008 August 5: MoA on Ancestral Domain (signature aborted by Supreme Court)
 October 27: Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component in the International Monitoring Team
 December 8: Resumption of peace talks (Kuala Lumpur)

2 Tausug are from the Sulu archipelago; Maguindanaws are from the Cotabatos; Maranaws are from the Lanao provinces. Misuari is a Tausug; MILF is mainly Maranaw and Maguindanaw.
3 Figures are contested: estimates of the Moro population range from 3-11 million (Tuminez 2008).
4 Still a contentious issue between the official census and the Office of Muslim Affairs (Human Development Report, 2005)
### Actors

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government (GRP) - MILF (MNLF, NPA, Abu Sayyaf)</td>
<td>(US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPAPP (GRP) and MILF Peace Panels and Technical Committees.</td>
<td>• Libya (2001), Malaysia (since 2001)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• International Monitoring Team (Malaysia, Indonesia, Libya, Brunei, Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• (US, European Union, OIC, have offered facilitating roles)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• UNDP (2005-2009 Program of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• World Bank (heads multi-donor trust fund for development in conflict affected areas)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• ICRC (observance of IHL)</td>
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<td>• International Contact Group (Japan, Turkey, UK + 4 International NGOs) (see below)</td>
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**CSOs**

- Bishops-Ulama Forum, Konsult Mindanaw
- Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
- Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus
- Mindanao Peace Weavers
- University Consortium
- Mindanao Commission of Women
- Philippines Council for Islam and Democracy,
  Young Moro Professionals Network etc.
- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
- The Asia Foundation
- Conciliation Resources
- USIP (2003-2007)
- Nonviolent Peace Forces (J. Galtung, JP Lederach,...), etc.

### Data on the armed conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>1984 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incompatibility</strong></td>
<td>Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors leading to conflict</strong></td>
<td>Moro common identity develops in the late 60s as a reaction to discrimination and influenced by Islamic revivalism.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government troops</strong></td>
<td>Legal: CAFGU (in support of the Military), CVO (in support of the Police). Illegal (very active in the 70s): Ilaga (Christian), Barracuda (Muslim). Several local politicians have government-tolerated private armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition troops</strong></td>
<td>MILF: some 13,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Child soldiers</strong></td>
<td>Deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deaths</strong></td>
<td>120,000 (1970-2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugees</strong></td>
<td>Thousands of Moros fled to Sabah (Malaysia) in the 70s.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Finance</strong></td>
<td>Rebels have had external support from Libya, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan at different times. Current main source of finance seems to be zakhat.</td>
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### Data on negotiations

**Negotiations between armed actors**

- **1996-2000, the “Domestic Stage”** (close to Cotabato, in Mindanao)
  - Low-level negotiations: January 97-September 99. MILF presents a **nine-point non-exclusive agenda**. Recurrent hostilities. Forging of the:
    - Agreement of General Cessation of Hostilities (18 July 1997).
  - Formal Peace Talks: October 1999-June 2000:
    - 3 rounds of formal peace talks (Jan., March ’00), and Technical Committee meetings (Feb-June ’00), with Technical Working Groups on MILF’s 9 agenda items.
    - Aide Memoire (27 April ’00) of a special meeting of the peace panels which anticipated a GRP proposed political package, presented in subsequent meetings (May-June ’00) as a proposal for meaningful autonomy.

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*www.iiss.org*

* This section draws mainly from Santos (2005).
* Ancestral domain; displaced and landless Bangsamoro; destruction of properties and war victims; HR; social and cultural discrimination; corruption of the mind and the moral fiber; economic inequities and poverty; exploitation of natural resources; agrarian reform.
Monitoring

Ceasefires

Comments

Negotiators

Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH); Local Monitoring Teams (LMT) in 13 provinces; Joint CF Monitoring Posts (JCMP) with participation of Bantay Ceasefire (local NGO);
### Analysis

#### Strategic What
- Moros: right to self-determination
- Govt. Philippines: national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Constitution).

#### Main features of conflict and negotiations
- On-off peace process, with frequent CF violations from both sides despite multi-layered monitoring provisions.
- Armed Forces "won" the 2000 "all out war", but did not achieve any peace.

#### Factors leading to / enhancing negotiations
- Political will of Pdnt. Ramos leads to talks (1996).
- Conditions for resumption were met:
  - 2001: MILF asked for mediation by OIC member country, neutral foreign venue, honouring all past agreements.
  - 2009: GRP dropped demand of surrender of MILF rogue commanders and DDR as pre-condition; ICG was established to provide additional international "guarantees".
- HD Centre promotes private meetings of "Eminent persons" (Kofi Annan, Jonathan Powell, Gerry Kelly, Francesc Vendrell) September 2008 – June 2009 with the parties.
- MILF has dropped the demand for independence.
- International Contact Group (since Dec09).

#### Factors blocking negotiations
According to Ferrer (2004):
1. Incoherent Govt policy and absence of peacebuilding leadership (on both sides).
2. Lack of national consensus on the need and way to solve the conflict.
3. International order (Global War on Terror).
4. Pro-war interests (military, economic, political (Gov’t).
5. Poor governance, patronage, and underdevelopment.
6. Failure of the ARMM.
   - Election periods.
   - Philippines still needs to find its own identity. Is it a nation of nations? (Galtung 2009)
   - Competing policy positions (Oquist 2005)

#### Successes / Innovations
- Consultative process initiated by the National Unification Commission (1992), leading to the “Six Paths to Peace” Gov’t peace policy (1993).
- Peace advocates appointed in GRP panels. (Sylvia Okinlay-Paraguaya; Ging Deles).
- Zones of peace as grass-roots initiatives.
- Inter-faith dialogue.
- Civilian monitoring of ceasefires (Bantay Ceasefire).
- Bakwit Power (IDP mobilizations)

#### Challenges
- Distrust has not been addressed.
- Feelings of resentment among the majority population.
- Traditional patronage politics.
- Reluctance of OIC, ASEAN to play a role.
- Lopsided distribution of funds to ARMM provinces.
- Lack of government transparency, intentions, unified voice.
- Neither GRP or MILF seem to be in fully command of its forces.
- The 9 MILF demands (1999) to address the Moro problem have not been met.
- Congress, more than the executive, will emerge as the key institution with the mandate and power to resolve the troubles, for it is the venue where the substantial provisions for autonomy will be debated.
- Local governments should play a bigger role in ARMM (and the peace process).
- Efforts needed to get the process back on track:
  1. Rethinking military strategies (eventual pull out). Sectors of the military may be part of the solution.
  2. Sustained social discourse on the issue of a multi-nation state to accommodate identities earlier excluded in the core of national values.
  3. Peace constituency building.
- The land problem (“the greatest potential threat to peace and order”, Oquist 2005).
- Opposing paradigms: liberal democratic system and Moro Islamic system (Santos 2002).
- Arms proliferation. Culture of violence.

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Other layers of conflict:
- MNLF-GRP: 1996 agmt. has yet to be fully implemented.
- MILF-MNLF: despite several efforts, differences and rivalries remain significant. Option of 2 Moro homelands? (Tuminez 2008).
- Intra MILF and intra MNLF: both groups face internal dissent.
- Family and clan feuds (rido) among Moros and among Lumads (and Christians).
- Moros-Lumads: many Lumads feel excluded from the negotiations processes.
- Lumads-Lumads: unity is difficult.
- Malaysia – Philippines: GRP and MNLF still claim the Malaysian province of Sabah.

Patterns since Marcos’ times (70s):
- Constitution as a stumbling block.
- Pendulum swings between war and peace.
- Government efforts to divide and rule by co-opting Moro leaders.
- Opposition to agreements from (the same families of) local leaders and Congress.
- Government doesn’t speak with one voice.
- Fragmentation in rebels ranks; rogue leaders.
- GRP unilateral implementation of agmt with MNLF (1976, 1986).
- ARMM (and SPCPD) nothing but another bureaucratic layer providing little except position and privilege for self-interested Muslim politicians.
- Lack of transparency.
- Lack of grassroots consultations.
- Lack of popular support to agreements.
- Little effort to explain the agreement to the population.
- Neglect of concerns of constituencies other than the ones in dialogue (focus on MNLF in 1996, MILF in 2008).
- Moro hope to expand ARMM (1996, 2008).
- Institutional support from churches, business and the media is lukewarm or at times completely absent.
- GRP sometimes abandons the established framework in the rush to an “all-or-nothing” resolution.
- Each time talks are suspended they become more difficult to resume.

* Recommendation of a Consultative Meeting January 2002

Role of Civil Society Organizations
- CSOs met GMA to present a post-Estrada plan of action (2001).
- In 2001, GMA ordered consultations with CSOs in Mindanao, especially women and IPs.
- Many civic actors viewed the re-escalation of the conflict in 2000 as an illustration of the vulnerability of their efforts and as a setback to nearly 30 years of peacebuilding.
- Lessons learned in the series of Bishops-Ulama Forum meetings have not trickled down to grassroots level because membership comprises primarily middle to top level religious functionaries.
- Spaces for peace (former “peace zones”) improved relationships between Muslim and Christian.
- Kusog Mindanaw (Jun Mercado) came up with a ‘first 100 days’ Mindanao agenda for Arroyo.
- GRP held consultations with CSOs before the first round of negotiations in Tripoli (June 2001), but they were conducted in a rush and lacked broad participation.
- During the second round, MPC sent a team of four observers, including 2 Lumad, who could interact with negotiators during breaks and meals.
- Only the limited circle of peace advocates in Mindanao are fully aware of the extent of the group’s involvement in the peace talks. They wider public remains unaware.
- Local Monitoring Teams are composed of five members: 1 local government, 1 MILF, 1 NGO nominated by GRP, 1 NGO nominated by MILF, and 1 religious leader mutually agreed on by both parties.
- LMT’s activities have so far (2003) been restricted to workshop facilitation, with no serious monitoring. The number of LMT’s is limited, and have been severely affected by each episode of violence.
- MPC therefore developed more active local monitors-Bantay Ceasefire (since 2003)- as an alternative voice.
- CSOs have been very active, but the powers to decide on war rest in Metro Manila with people who have not, and will not feel the consequences of their decisions.

Steven Rood (2005):
- Weaknesses of CSOs:
  - Ideological differences (conflicting peace agendas)
  - Muslim underrepresentation.
  - Moving from specific demands to aggregating a broad political agenda.
- “There is little evidence that interreligious dialogue is having much effect on public opinion.” (23) The same for zones of peace and engagement in peace talks.
- Main area of impact: monitoring.
- “CS paradoxically strengthens the state in a number of ways” (35)
- “CS has had an impact in making it politically possible for policy elites to adopt positions other than victory.” (2)

- MILF has conducted mass “consultations” in several Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assemblies: December 3 -5, 1996, attended by 1,070,697 delegates; June 1-3, 2001, attended by 2,627,345 delegates and May 29-31, 2005.11

11 www.luwaran.net, accessed August 9, 2009
Sources:


Chronology

XIVth Century  Islam is introduced in Mindanao and Sulu.
1450          Sulu sultanate established.
XVIth Century Maguindanao sultanate and Buayan sultanate established.
1521          Magellan arrives to the Philippines.

1565-1898   Spanish colonial rule
1619          Sultan Qudarat becomes ruler of Maguindanao. Greatest Moro expansion.
1645          Treaties delineate boundaries Maguindanao-Spain and Sulu-Spain.
1751          Spain's encouragement of private expeditions against Moros triggers bloodiest period of Moro-Spanish wars.
1876          Final Jolo campaign.
1898          February: USA declares the war on Spain.

1899-1945   US colonial rule
1906          US troops massacre almost 1000 Moros on Bud Dajo (Sulu).
1912          First formal plan to settle Mindanao with Christians.
1913          US troops massacre more than 500 Moros on Bud Bagsak (Sulu).

1941-1945    Japanese occupation

1965 – 1986 Marcos regime
1968          March: Jabidah massacre of Moro army recruits releases anger from years of prejudice, ill treatment and discrimination.
1969          MNLF founded by young secular-minded students and professionals in Manila.
1977          Christian paramilitary (Ilaga) kill 65 in a mosque in Manili.
1971          Intense fighting between Barracudas (Muslim paramilitary) and AFP.
1975          War reaches a stalemate. MNLF accepts autonomy.
1977          CFA. Shariah courts established as part of the national system of courts. April: only 10 of the 13 provinces vote for autonomy in a plebiscite. Marcos unilaterally divides the 10 provinces into two autonomous regions. Negotiations break down.
1978          May: MNLF granted observer status at OIC.
1979          Surrendered MNLF founder member A. Alonto joins the GRP panel. Diplomatic initiatives focus on ensuring the Tripoli Agrmt is being implemented.
1980          March: Malaysia and Indonesia offer to serve as 'honest brokers'.
1981          Misuari fails to receive support for secession.

12 1899-1916: 20.000 Moros killed (Jubair, 1999, 81)
1982 Marcos consolidates the Philippines’ diplomatic position. Efforts to link NPA and MNLF fail, but co-operate on the ground.

1983 OIC calls on Moros to unite prior to new negotiations.

1984 March: **MILF is founded**, with a religious as well as nationalist agenda.

1986 – today: Democracy
1986 People’s Power I. Marcos into exile. Corazon Aquino new President. March: MILF ready to discuss peace with Aquino.

August: With Muslim mediation MILF and MNLF agree to negotiate jointly.

September: Misuari gains recognition from GRP as its negotiating partner.

1987 January: **Jeddah Accord** GRP-MNLF, but talks break down as GRP unilaterally implements the autonomy mandate in the newly approved Constitution. Both MNLF and MILF denounce GRP’s moves.

1989 **Republic Act 6734 creates the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, rejected by MNLF.**

Nov.: plebiscite, boycotted by MNLF, MILF. Only 4 provinces opt for autonomy.

1990 Regional elections in ARMM.

1992 May: Ramos elected President.

July: National Unification Commission (NUC) formulates amnesty programme and a negotiation process, based on public consultations.

October: exploratory talks with the MNLF begin.


October: formal talks begin. Interim CFA. MILF poses no objections to the talks.

1994 Ramos organises executive-legislative discussions, to gain support for peace.

1995 April 4: a new Islamic rebel group, **Abu Sayyaf**, kills 50 people in Ipi.

Dec.(?): Interim Agreement containing 81 points of consensus.

1996 GRP rushes to mollify politicians opposing the Interim Agreement. Agmt. to establish Southern Phil. Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Senate presents 9 amendments to dilute autonomy of the agreement. Exploratory talks with the MILF begin.

**Sep.2: GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.**

Misuari runs for governor and wins ARMM elections.

6 MNLF leaders elected to the Regional Legislative Assembly.

Dec.: MILF holds a huge assembly and reaffirms commitment to independence.

1997 March: GRP-MILF Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee.

June: AFP launches its biggest offensive against MILF.

July: **GRP-MILF cessation of hostilities.**

1998 Estrada elected Pdnt. in alliance with politicians opposed to peace agreement. MNLF leaders, save for one, lose their bids for local positions.

1999 On and off MILF-AFP fighting throughout the year.

Oct.25: formal GRP-MILF peace talks begin.

2000

MILF-AFP skirmishes throughout the year along peace talks.

March 21: Estrada announces an *all-out war* against the MILF.

March 26: MILF calls for a UN-organized independence vote for Muslims.

May 31: MILF Camp Bushra is bombed, and Philippine flag raised in a mosque.

July 9: GRP declares victory and announces MILF’s 46 camps taken over.

Sep.2-24: MILF’s General Assembly confirms withdrawal from peace talks.

2001

Jan: Estrada falls, Arroyo declares “all-out peace” policy.

March: Arroyo names Misuari Special Envoy to the OIC.

March 24: **GRP-MILF General Framework of Agreement of Intent.**


June: **Tripoli Agreement on Peace (GRP-MILF).**

Aug.7: MNLF and MILF sign an Agreement on General Framework for Unity.

Aug.14: Plebiscite on expanded ARMM. One city and one province vote to join.

Nov.24: Misuari arrested in Malaysia, accused of rebellion.
### 2002

**March:** Arroyo suspends formal peace talks with the MILF after skirmishes.

**April:** Geneva Call persuades the MILF to sign commitment against landmines.

**May:** MNLF, MILF agree to send a joint delegation to OIC Conference in Sudan.

**June:** MILF’s Bangsamoro Development Agency, is set up to “lead, manage and determine” rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas.

### 2003

**January:** Chairman S. Hashim writes to G. Bush and urges US to help solve the conflict.

**Feb.10:** GRP presents draft final peace agrmt. with MILF to Congress leaders.

**March-May:** Several bombs kill dozens of civilians around Mindanao.

**May 5:** Bishops Ulama Conference offers to mediate.

**May 14:** OIC recognizes ARMM governor Parouk Hussin as chair of the MNLF.

**May 17:** Arroyo declares a war of “will and vision” and orders “selective attacks” on “embedded terrorist lairs” in central and western Mindanao.

**May 28:** MILF announces unilateral 10 day CF, and extends it 10 more days.

**June 20:** Hashim rejects “terror as a means to resolve differences”.

**June 22:** MILF extends its ceasefire indefinitely and requests a matching gesture from the military.

**September 5** 
- Agreement to: 1) gradual pull-out of the troops in Buliok; 2) deployment of IMT 3) formation of the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG); and 4) ancestral domain is set as next agenda for the peace talks.

### 2004

**January 18** 
Deployment of IMT (Sixty peace monitors from Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya).

**December 20** 
The discussion on ancestral domain, the last of the three major agenda items, is divided into four strands: concept, territory, resources, and governance.

### 2005

**Iqbal announces MILF is considering 4 governance possibilities: federal, commonwealth, association of free states and independence.**

**April 16** 
7th round of exploratory talks concludes discussion on concept, territory, and resources.

**September 17** 
Silvestre Afable, head of the GRP panel, and Iqbal say the panels successfully finished the “most difficult hurdle in the ancestral domain agenda.”

### 2006

**February 6** 
Peace negotiators promise to draft an overall framework of the ancestral domain by late March.

**February 24** 
Arroyo declares state of emergency (lifted one week later).

**March 6** 
Malaysia cancels the peace talks between the GRP and the MILF because of the political situation in Manila.

**August 31** 
Japan sends a delegation to Manila to talk about Japan’s contributions to the peace process.

**September 3** 
Peace talks resume. Impasse over areas to be placed under the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE).

### 2007

**May 12** 
Arroyo instructs the AFP to “work closely with the mechanisms of the peace process to keep combatants in place.”

**June 16** 
Afable resigns reportedly because of lack of support from the Gov’t.

**July** 
10 Marine officers are beheaded in Basilan after skirmishes with the MILF.

**August 17** 
Arroyo calls “urgent” peace talks with the MILF to resolve the Basilan situation.

**October 24** 
GRP panel chair Rodolfo Garcia and Iqbal announce ending the **13-month impasse** between the two parties.

**November 15** 
The parties agree to the scope and boundaries of the AD and affirm “all previous points of consensus on the core items of the territory issue.”

**December 16** 
Peace talks are stalled due to constitutional issues.
2008

May (?) The Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute is established.
July 24 GRP and MILF start their talks in Kuala Lumpur. In Manila, pro-government legislators in the House of Representatives file a bill to postpone the August 11 elections in ARMM.
July 27 Joint communiqué on the Muslim ancestral domain. The MOA provides that about 700 villages in Mindanao will hold a referendum within 12 months (of the MOA signing) if they want to join the Muslim homeland. The signing of the agreement is temporarily set on August 5. Formal peace deal scheduled to be concluded in November 2009.
August 2 Local officials from North Cotabato ask the Supreme Court to block the signing of the agreement.
August 4 The Supreme Court issues a Temporary Restraining Order for the signing of the ancestral domain in Malaysia on August 5.
August 11 Sen. Mar Roxas and former Senator Franklin Drilon file petitions with the SC to stop the Philippine government from concluding the MOA with the MILF.
September 3: GRP dissolves its peace panel, announces new paradigm for the peace process based on community consultations and DDR.
September: Kofi Annan and Ermita meet in Geneva (HD Centre).
October 14: Supreme Court declares MOA-AD unconstitutional.
November 6: MILF identifies stumbling blocks: 1) Pdnt’s lack of will; 2) Oligarchs (business and political) in Mindanao and Manila; 3) lack of support from Catholic Church.
November 30: Expiration of IMT’s TOR
December: GRP names new peace panel. Head: Rafael Seguis (Foreign Affairs Usec.) MILF suggests five points to resume talks:
1) International guarantees
2) MOA-AD as a done deal
3) IMT should investigate all ceasefire violations from July 1
4) AFP suspension of military operations against three rogue commanders
5) Malaysia should remain as facilitator.
GRP conveys to Malaysia readiness to respond to MILF’s 5 points.

2009

Jan: Jonathan Powell and Gerry Kelly (Northern Ireland) visit bot parties (HD Centre). Seguis drops preconditions (surrender 3 rogue commanders, DDR).
Feb: Pdnt Arroyo makes urgent request to PM of Malaysia to schedule resumption of talks. Malaysia assures continued support.
Mar.16: PAPP Razon announces new strategy based on “3 Rs”:
1) renegotiate (MOA-AD) in accordance with parameters and principles reflected in the decision of the Supreme Court
2) reaffirm the primacy of the peace process and reassert commitments to implement all signed interim agreements
3) Review the facilitating process to allow the involvement of ‘eminent persons’.
Guidelines for the peace panel:
1. Any consensus or agreement “shall always be subject to constitutional processes.”
2. Any future agreement “must be within the purview of Philippine citizenship” and “there shall be no talk of independence.”
3. The government panel will “endeavor to exert utmost efforts and utilize available mechanisms to reflect in the agenda and the agreements the values, sentiments and principles of the Filipino people.”
4. DDR “shall be the overall framework and context governing our engagement with the MILF in the peace talks.”
5. “Whether the negotiations succeed and result to a peace agreement or not, cessation of hostilities on the ground must continue.”
6. While peace negotiations are ongoing with the MILF, “government shall also intensify development efforts in the conflict-affected areas as part of its confidence-building measures.”
June MILF visits Turkey, Northern Ireland. Francesc Vendrell visits both parties (HD Centre).
July 21 Bakwit Power II (mobilizations of IDPs to call for resumption of talks).
July 23 Government declares a Suspension of Military Operations (SOMO).
July 25 MILF declares a Suspension of Military Actions (SOMA).
July 29 First meeting after breakdown of talks in 2008. Ends with a Joint Declaration.
Oct. OPAPP visits Northern Ireland, London

Dec. 8-9 1st round of talks in KL attended by ICG

2010

January
27: Exchange of drafts, KL.

February
17 (approx): MILF shares a new document: “Declaration of Principles on Interim Governance Arrangements” (7 pages). GRP immediately starts analyzing it and developing their own new proposal. The idea of a comprehensive compact is definitely dead, and both sides work hard on some kind of interim agreement.
19: CR produces a summary of MILF’s draft.
28: Redeployment of IMT.

March
4: Question and Answer session in KL.