RECONSTRUCTING MASCULINITIES
Gender dynamics after conflict in Aceh, Maluku and Bangsamoro Mindanao
RECONSTRUCTING MASCULINITIES:
GENDER DYNAMICS AFTER
CONFLICT IN ACEH, MALUKU
AND BANGSAMORO MINDANAO

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research rationale
The adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in 2000 has advanced an international norm to focus on the impacts of conflict on women and the need for their influence on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, efforts to strengthen gender equality in peacebuilding are often undermined by unequal gender norms embedded within decision-making systems dominated by men and elites who promote militarized masculinities. This has bolstered violent coercion, military operations and armed rebellion, and perpetuated the disproportionate exclusion of women and other historically marginalized groups both during and after conflict.

This paper examines three regions, Aceh and Maluku in Indonesia and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Bangsamoro) in the Philippines, which have many comparable socio-cultural characteristics, histories and experiences of conflict and peace. All regions are dominated by militarized masculinities, which associate masculinity with power, control and violence and are linked to institutions that encourage violence, exclude or marginalize women and fund conflict. Each context has struggled to implement the WPS agenda, as the peace processes were largely gender exclusionary and the post-conflict focus on security and infrastructure has failed to transform the drivers of gender inequality.

Research objectives
This research explores how ideas of masculinity prior, during and after armed conflict influence the power and place of women in post-conflict societies. It examines the complex and dynamic ways masculinities and masculine norms shape violence and unequal gender relations in families and community-level social institutions. The analysis seeks to understand how the dominance of masculine elites in decision-making affects inequitable distribution of political power and economic opportunities between men and women.

Specifically, the research aims to understand:
• the relationship between the perceptions of women and men on the gender division of work at home and in public, and the actual status of women in their post-conflict societies,
• the relationship between perceptions and the everyday experiences of gender equality, peace and security of diverse groups of women and men, and
• how peacebuilding and conflict prevention policymakers and practitioners can transcend rhetoric to implement the WPS agenda and equitably include women in achieving sustainable peace.

To raise awareness of the structural challenges of implementation of the WPS agenda in the three regions, this report examines the narrow instrumentalization of women’s agency by international actors and local elites. It investigates the impact of WPS frameworks, mediation and peacemaking processes that prioritise women’s representation in formal settings, but which overlook the patriarchal power dynamics and cultural, socioeconomic and historical contexts that hinder gender equality. By critically examining localized cultural and religious practices and the roles of political economy and powerful (predominantly male-led) institutions at all levels of society, this research reveals how discriminatory gender norms are reproduced.

Methodology and scope
This research, led by Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) and Integral Knowledge Asia, with support from Conciliation Resources, draws on extensive consultations with local partners in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro. Local research teams conducted surveys of 6036 people (3090 women and 2946 men) followed by participatory focus group discussions (FGDs) and interviews involving a total of 359 people (192 women and 167 men): in Maluku, 119 people (58 women and 61 men); Aceh, 136 people (78 women and 58 men); and the Bangsamoro, 104 people (56 women and 48 men).

The study builds on previous analysis by SPF examining masculinities and men’s perceptions over shifting gender division of labor and by Conciliation Resources on gendered political transitions after conflict and integrating masculinities in peacebuilding. It engages with research on gender equality in conflict-affected contexts and the localization of the WPS agenda, and it critiques the absence of masculinities and decolonial perspectives in both. These critical lenses are necessary in post-colonial contexts, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, with their specific challenges of gender and racial hierarchies.

The research is grounded in critical reflection by Global South researchers and practitioners on how concepts and work related to gender equality, peace and security can engage with local interests and perspectives. The findings aim to strengthen WPS discourse and inform gender-transformative peacebuilding practices to better respond to the complex problems of gendered violence and unequal power.
Key findings

There are six key findings from the research:

1. Masculinities are complex and have shifted, but unequal gender norms and structural inequalities persist and prevent more widespread transformation of gender norms after conflict. Myriad expressions of masculinity and gender norms exist in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro. Physical strength and violence are no longer widely perceived as dominant forms of masculinity. Instead, post-conflict masculinities are centred around being the decision-maker, breadwinner and protector of the family. Post-conflict transitions have enhanced women’s socioeconomic opportunities and improved men’s awareness of the harmful impacts of some expectations of being a man. Nevertheless, gender roles ascribing women as caretakers and homemakers endure. Men tend to hold more gender-equal views when their socioeconomic status increases, indicating the importance of considering socioeconomic status when seeking to transform violent masculinities.

2. Family, religious and customary institutions are important but overlooked domains for influencing masculinity and transforming gender inequalities after conflict. Family (mothers, fathers, spouses), religious leaders, and clan leaders (in the case of the Bangsamoro) are most influential in shaping men’s protective role and highlighting men’s duties as family leaders and primary income providers. When decision-making is more equal in the home, women support other women to work and hold leadership roles outside the home and men endorse women to work outside the home. Men who are involved in doing household chores also tend to support a more gender-equal division of labor at home. Renegotiating household chores and care responsibilities are important entry points in shifting unequal gender norms. Nevertheless, household and community domains are often overlooked by policymakers and peace practitioners.

3. Conflict-related trauma shapes men and women’s support for violence and while trauma healing and mental health and psychosocial support is limited, demand is strong. Men and women with no experience of conflict-related trauma are more likely to reject the idea that violence is appropriate. The breakdown of social systems and community networks after conflict have also contributed to violence, which disproportionately affects women. For example, women in polygamous or unregistered marriages experience poorer levels of mental health. While demand for trauma healing and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) is strong, addressing the legacy of conflict-related trauma has had limited attention in peace agreements, the WPS agenda and post-conflict peacebuilding.

4. Women’s opportunities are constrained by men’s need to uphold traditional family structures and to exercise economic and decision-making control. While men accept women leaders and decision-makers, male gatekeeping – preventing women’s economic and political opportunities – persists because they need to uphold the masculinity ideals that prioritise men’s roles as family protector and breadwinner. Relationship status matters: married women are significantly more likely to be prevented from working outside the home. Increases in men’s socioeconomic status did not increase their support for married women working outside the home, perhaps because they can afford not to have women’s contributions to household income. Conversely, men with lower socioeconomic status do not stop women from working, provided it benefits household finances. Even if women work, they are expected to fulfill their domestic chores and maintain respect and obedience to their husbands or fathers. Men still dominate decision-making on pricing, market access and profit.

5. Women have made important contributions to peace, but this has not translated to widespread influence or changed perceptions about their leadership. Yet, in some spaces, gender roles are shifting. Women led effective community-level peacebuilding efforts, such as the All-Acehnese Women’s Congress, inter-faith networks in Maluku, and peace networks across the Bangsamoro. Still, most people agree that men should hold visible power, and that women should refrain from taking public roles expected for men. However, men who participated in peace or gender equality training tended to approve of women’s involvement in peacebuilding. Men who agree that gender norms have shifted as a result of conflict are also more likely to accept women’s participation in peacebuilding. In practice, men are taking on household chores and women hold specific roles in customary, religious, political and private sector settings that could be further cultivated for women’s inclusion. Increased socioeconomic status of men and women also improves their support for women’s decision-making and leadership at work.
6. Post-conflict reconstruction and governance prioritised elite, masculine, military interests of security, political stability and infrastructure at the expense of gender-responsive social welfare and economic development. This has exacerbated the root causes of conflict in each region: compounding poverty and disillusionment toward government, ignoring past trauma and historical grievances, and further excluding many non-elites from peace dividends. Infrastructure development has resulted in land evictions, community relocations, unequal distribution of natural resource wealth and environmental damage. Levels of unemployment, mental health problems and substance abuse are high. Men who are unable to achieve masculine ideals are more likely to act violently, including perpetrating domestic violence.

Implications

The research identified four entry points to shift dominant masculinities and create opportunities for women to meaningfully participate in peace processes and public decision-making. First, working in private and community spaces with parents, husbands, and clan and religious leaders, is key to transforming gender inequalities. Second, context-specific and gender-responsive trauma healing and MHPSS services, and third, tailored training programs focused on peacebuilding, gender equality, and transitional justice, and which incorporate a strong masculinities lens, should be made widely available. Fourth, providing long term, core, flexible and easy to access financial and political resources to women’s community-level activities and organizations enables them to influence gender-responsive post-conflict political transitions.
2. BACKGROUND

Southeast Asia is one of the most densely populated, ethnically and culturally diverse regions in the world. It is a region where post-colonial state building and the transition to global markets and federal governance have resulted in many protracted conflicts. Conflicts include armed separatism towards central governments, and civil warfare motivated by unsettled territorial and maritime claims and grievances over human rights violations, historical injustices and inequitable laws and policies. Conflict has disproportionately affected women, girls and people with diverse sexual orientations, gender identities and expressions, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC), and impacted men and boys.

The armed violence in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro is typical of these conflicts. Armed groups in Aceh and the Bangsamoro declared resistance against the central state. The sectarian, ethno-political conflict in Maluku involved mass inter-communal violence. Violence is rooted in struggles for political and resource control, and exacerbated by religious, ethnic and class divisions, and clan and family allegiances. The three regions also have similar patriarchal and colonial legacies, elite masculine governance and limited civilian agency, particularly for women, that continue to affect localized, gendered violence. A description of common patterns across the three regions follows.

Historical issues related to grievances over identity and competition over political control led to insurgency and horizontal violence. Broken promises by the Indonesian Government to grant Aceh a self-governing province at the end of Dutch colonialism drove the Darul Islam movement (Islamic State of Indonesia) to demand an Islamic state in 1953. The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) (Free Aceh Movement) sought separatism from 1976 following the establishment of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime (1967–1998).

In Mindanao, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established in reaction to the 1968 Jabidah Massacre that killed Moro (Muslim-majority Indigenous communities) army recruits by the Philippines Armed Forces. MNLF proclaimed regional autonomy as a distinct nation based on their identity as pre-colonial people of Muslim sultanates, separate from the Christian-majority Philippines. Ideological differences between MNLF leaders led to a factional split in 1977 resulting in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

In Maluku, Dutch colonialism gave preferential treatment to Christian elites, who dominated political and economic resources. Rivalries between Christian and Muslim elites were maintained after Indonesian independence, led by religiously-affiliated patrimonial networks. Intense polarization led to violent riots between Muslim and Christian communities in 1999. These occurred in parallel to Suharto’s fall, inter-ethnic riots across Indonesia and the regional economic crisis. The conflict intensified in 2000 when the Islamist militia group Laskar Jihad (Warriors of Jihad) joined to respond to Christian attacks.

Decades of conflict in all three regions resulted in very different experiences of violence depending on gender. Men were more likely to be recruited as combatants and experience physical violence or taken captive. Women were disproportionately subjected to physical and sexual violence, forced displacement and illegal detention or imprisonment. In Aceh, for example, Indonesian elite forces placed women suspected of being related to or providing support to GAM into illegal detention to lure male combatants out of hiding. GAM members used women to safeguard and hide them during security sweeps and interrogation.

Natural resource exploitation, inequitable laws and policies, and migration widened socioeconomic gaps and deepened injustice felt by certain groups. In Aceh, this was clear after the influx of Javanese officials and non-Acehnese mining workers in the 1970s and 1980s. The same pattern is clear in Maluku where both colonial and post-colonial governments undermined traditional male authority in customary (adat) institutions which once maintained property rights and kinship ties among ethno-religious groups.

In the Bangsamoro, the armed struggle is linked to the dispossession of the Moro from their land and resources as well as the non-recognition of their identity as distinct from Christianized peoples in the northern Philippines, as a result of Spanish colonialism. American colonialism introduced private property laws, encouraged migration from the northern Philippines, and gave political power to the Christian majority after independence. This further disempowered Moro customary institutions which had governed local resources and communities. Non-Muslim Indigenous communities were also exposed to decades of violent conflict and dispossession of their ancestral lands, with their human rights routinely violated.
These injustices significantly impacted women and men. For example, in the Bangsamoro, men are more likely to be targets for *rido* (retaliatory clan or kinship feuds) and women are sometimes placed on the frontline when it comes to carrying out acts of violence or retaliation. Men’s limited mobility has forced women to take on new livelihood responsibilities and more political activities in public spaces, risking their safety and compounding their reproductive and household burdens.

**Protracted male-led peace negotiations and unresolved post-conflict political transitions** perpetuated violence and human rights violations. Formal peace processes took place, each with support from international (Aceh and the Bangsamoro) or national (Maluku) mediation actors. Elite men dominated peace mediation processes and continue to shape political decision-making in the three regions. While the peace agreements succeeded in reducing militarized, armed conflicts (mainly vertical conflict in the Bangsamoro), they have fallen short of establishing inclusive or gender-transformative political transitions after conflict.

Large-scale migration, dispossession of land, and loss of control over natural resources have prolonged tensions in each region. Violence against women and children (including sexual violence, sex trafficking and aggression under the influence of alcohol or drugs), new competition over resources, as well as ethnic and religious polarisation occur across all three regions. In the Bangsamoro, past conflict has transformed into localized armed violence and *rido*, due mainly to contestation of political power – furthering insecurity and mutual distrust.

During the implementation of *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM) (Military Operation Zone) from 1990 to 1998, the Indonesian police and army attacked separatists, carried out executions, torture, disappearances, harassment and rape, and killed thousands of civilians in Aceh. In Maluku, Indonesian security forces were accused by both Christian and Muslim groups of actively helping the other side, or of standing by and doing nothing, during violent attacks.

Indonesian elite troops partitioned communities in Maluku into Christian and Muslim cantonments to stop sporadic violence. The resulting land dispossession worsened social tensions and communal violence and boosted religious segregation. Women and children make up the majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs). They disproportionately risk gender-based violence, poverty, labor force exploitation and mental health problems.
Across the three regions, women were rarely involved in peace negotiations, and the agreements failed to prioritise women’s issues or address gender-specific drivers of violence. The agreements reflect elite men’s narrow perspectives on political, security and economic development, and the experiences, needs and interests of non-elite men, women and people with diverse SOGIESC were largely ignored. Patriarchal power continues to diminish women’s inclusion and dominate decision-making after conflict.

The Aceh peace process between the Indonesian Government and GAM began in 1999. The second negotiation after the 2004 tsunami agreed Aceh’s status as a special autonomous political entity within Indonesia. The 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement only included one gender provision and sidelined women’s issues. The agreement gave 3000 GAM members compensation, but overlooked women ex-combatants and did not include provisions for gender-responsive support for sexual violence survivors.

Islamic shari’ah law was reintroduced by the Acehnese government after the conflict without involving any women. Women were also underrepresented in the Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA) (Aceh Reintegration Board) and Komite Peralihan Aceh (KPA) (Aceh Transitional Committee). Criticism has been rightly directed at the gender-exclusionary nature of the Aceh peace agreement. However, even five years after UNSCR 1325, no country had initiated a comprehensive public awareness campaign explaining its rationale and implications. Additionally, the UN and international organizations fell short in effectively advocating for UNSCR 1325 and providing support for its implementation.

The signing of the 2002 Moluccas Agreement (Malino II) ended the Maluku conflict. Three women were part of the Christian negotiating team, but no Muslim women were represented and no gender provisions were included. The agreement ended the violence but failed to address socio-cultural divisions and sidelined issues central to women.

Prolonged conflict and multiple peace processes in the Bangsamoro have given opportunities for women to play more substantial roles in peacemaking, compared to Aceh and Maluku. Two earlier peace agreements – the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Jakarta Peace Accords – had no women participants. Over time, women acted as the Government’s Chief Negotiator, Presidential Adviser, panel members and technical advisors on both sides and led local consultations, training and lobbying. There are gender provisions in the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the MILF and the Philippines Government on institutional reform, economic development and political participation. Even so, women, Indigenous groups and non-elites still have limited access to political power and economic resources.

Compared to Aceh and Maluku, international mediators, conflict parties and civil society in the Bangsamoro used the WPS agenda to promote women’s rights during the peace process. Nevertheless, both female GAM ex-combatants in Aceh (also called Inong Balee) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade (BIWAB) – the women’s counterpart of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAM) – were sidelined from post-conflict reintegration compared to their male counterparts. This was partly due to marginalization of women and a limited gender equality focus on the part of international actors. It was also due to structural and cultural barriers within the armed groups and society more broadly that tend to favor narrow interests – usually male and elite – and military and security considerations.

Across the three contexts, women have used multiple strategies and collective mobilization to mediate conflict, resolve tensions and maintain peace at community level. Nevertheless, women’s diverse roles during conflict and investments in peace were ignored or undervalued by local and international policymakers, particularly in Aceh and Maluku. The gender-exclusionary nature of formal peace processes failed to ensure that gender perspectives on thematic issues or issues specific to women and people with diverse SOGIESC were included. These failures compounded gender inequality, silencing women’s rights to seek justice and ignoring their capacity to contribute to more robust peacebuilding processes.

Women’s meaningful participation in peace processes was accelerated by the adoption of UNSCR 1325, and has become a norm for international and local policymakers. In reality, however, efforts to integrate the WPS agenda have been insufficient across the three regions. The focus on numbers of women participants risks being mainly symbolic and ignores the impact of patriarchal power and socioeconomic inequities that negate women’s agency.

In 2010, the Philippines became the first Asian country to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Women’s roles in the Bangsamoro peace process are internationally regarded; nonetheless, political power appears to be limited to elite women. Indonesia’s 2014 NAP was created to recognise and protect women peacebuilders and the rights of survivors of conflict-related violence. However, the lack of recognition of women’s contributions to peace, bias against women leaders, low capacity in local governments and NGOs, ineffective coordination and limited funding continue to prevent implementation.
3. RESEARCH APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGY

This research used an explanatory sequential design where quantitative data is first collected and analyzed, and these results inform qualitative analysis in the second phase. Between October and December 2022, mixed-gender groups of 96 enumerators (67 women and 29 men) conducted survey data gathering in eight sub-regions in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro.

These sub-regions were chosen based on detailed mapping of major conflict locations, demographic analysis to ensure inclusion of a broad cross-section of society, and consultations with local partners to make sure enumerators had local language skills and safe access to communities.
Reconstructing masculinities: Gender dynamics after conflict in Aceh, Maluku and Bangsamoro Mindanao
### TABLE 1: SAMPLE SIZE BY PROVINCES, SUB-REGIONS, AND GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB-REGION</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Province: Aceh</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Aceh</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bener Meriah</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pidie and Pidie Jaya</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>2,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Province: Maluku</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambon</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tual City</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Maluku</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Maluku</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buru</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Province: Lanao Del Sur</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Province: Maguindanao</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quantitative analysis examined the data both in aggregate (across all three survey sites) as well as by each survey site independently. Chi-square tests were used for independence, to allow assessment of whether a statistically significant relationship exists between variables. In cases where a statistically significant relationship did exist between two variables, a second level of analysis was conducted using adjusted Pearson residuals or Spearman rank-order correlations, as appropriate. Given the random sampling of survey respondents, it is assumed that the distribution of survey respondent answers are equal.\(^{51}\)

The qualitative data originated from focus group discussions (FGDs) and interviews led by partners from January to April 2023, supplemented by secondary sources. FGDs and interviews used local languages and terminology, gender and age disaggregation, and safe, small groups to ensure inclusivity. A joint analysis workshop held in Japan in May 2023 with local partners (17 people; 15 women and 2 men) determined research findings and recommendations.

Four research approaches guided the data collection and analysis. Firstly, a **gender-transformative peacebuilding approach** was used to identify the root causes and effects of gender inequalities and violence. This included using a masculinities lens to reveal patriarchal power dynamics, societal norms and structures, drivers of militarized masculinities, and opportunities for men and boys to promote gender inequality.

Secondly, an **intersectional approach** unearthed the varied impacts of violence on different gender and identity groups. This approach provided a practical tool to identify and address exclusion tied to context-relevant identity markers such as ethnicity, age and socioeconomic status. An intersectional approach enabled a closer look at the complex relationships between and within different groups of people and how these affect their experiences of violence and their capacities for peace.

Thirdly, **complex systems approaches** were used to visually map and analyze the data. This approach helped show the interconnected relationships between social, cultural and religious institutions and the gendered patterns of behavior and power dynamics between and within groups of people. This approach was used to understand how these patterns change over time, and to determine and verify the findings.

Finally, a **decolonial feminist approach** was used to centre conflict-affected populations’ knowledge, recognizing and reflecting on the complex legacies of colonialism and contemporary transnational geopolitics.\(^{52}\) This approach prioritised local partners’ experiences and perspectives – particularly those of women – in conflict resolution, peacemaking and WPS implementation that centres Global South knowledge systems. It enabled their active participation in the research design, data collection, analysis and development of recommendations.

A decolonial feminist approach problematizes public-private domains, particularly in terms of the WPS agenda. In Western contexts, public-private domains are framed as two almost separate spheres delineated by factors such as access, interaction with strangers, and property ownership and rights. In contrast, Islamic societies define private-public domains through concepts like *mahram* and *non-mahram* (social relations based on family and marriage), as well as kinship-based understanding of space.\(^{53}\) This framing impacts how women and men experience domestic ‘private’ space and non-domestic ‘public’ space. While this dichotomy limits women’s mobility in male-dominated public spaces, it also provides avenues for women to actively contribute and influence female-centric public spaces.
Differences in historical experiences of modernization and demographic transitions, as well as socioeconomic conditions, determine patterns of private-public division in each society. In the Global North since the 1970s, changes to the marriage system have created private spaces that are increasingly individual. In the three post-conflict societies examined in this research, private spaces are linked to continuing marriage, family and kinship ties. In proposing a decolonial feminist approach, this research posits the need to analyze women’s agency and potential public roles based on careful understanding of the interconnectedness of the private and public spaces in each context. Furthermore, this research suggests the possibility of systemic transformation by enhancing men’s roles in the private domain.

These approaches and methodology have limitations. Due to sensitivity around topics like sexual orientation, mental health, substance abuse, domestic and sexual violence, employment and income, enumerators were selected from different communities to respondents. Survey data was primarily collected by in-person interviews, except for limited cases when respondents requested not to be attended by enumerators. Yet there was significant underreporting on these sensitive topics, which may be related to the in-person data collection methodology. There was also a tendency by respondents to lower their income level, as this is closely related to receiving financial assistance. The analysis therefore makes use of secondary data from international agencies and national ministries for accurate analysis of these topics.

Due to risks associated with public identification, the identities of diverse SOGIESC participants were not systematically recorded. Shame, upholding community and family honor, and concerns over exacerbating violence prevent self-reporting on sexual orientation, substance abuse, domestic and sexual violence and mental health. As a result, this report has a strong heteronormative bias.

The qualitative data gathered on the diverse identity characteristics of participants were used to analyze some intersectional relationships (for example, gender, socioeconomic and marriage status, etc.). However, due to the scale and complexity of the data the impacts of religion, ethnicity or age were not measured. Future data analysis could draw out additional intersectional nuances for policymaking and programming.

In Aceh we worked with the International Center for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies (ICAIOS), a research institution based in Banda Aceh, and Pengembangan Aktivitas Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat (PASKA) (Development of Community Socioeconomic Activity), a local women’s organization in Pidie. In Maluku, we worked closely with the Center for Women’s Empowerment and Children Protection at Pattimura University based in Ambon City, and Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak (LAPPAN) (Women and Children Empowerment Institute), a local women’s organization in Ambon. In the Bangsamoro, we collaborated with the Mindanao State University (MSU) in General Santos.
4. DETAILED FINDINGS

Finding 1

Finding 2

Finding 3

Finding 4

Finding 5

Finding 6
Finding 1

Masculinities are complex and have shifted, but unequal gender norms and structural inequalities persist and prevent more widespread transformation of gender norms after conflict.
During conflict, being a man is often closely linked with having physical strength and participating in violent confrontation. However, the research reveals men across all regions place limited importance on physical strength, and both men and women reject physical violence (especially towards children, women and community members). This signifies a noteworthy shift in masculine norms away from physical violence after conflict. Instead, post-conflict masculinities are centred around marriage, being the decision-maker, breadwinner and protector of the family and a good father.

Men and women share an equally high level of agreement for the expectation that men will work outside the home and be the family breadwinner, and women work at home and be the primary caregivers to children and other family members. Across all three regions, support for traditional gender roles – specifically that women do not deserve to make decisions in the household – are stronger among male-headed households. These findings highlight that masculinity is rooted in social institutions (family, kinship and clan) and the importance of clearly differentiated gender roles in these private spaces.

Gendered expectations are deeply embedded in Acehnese culture, which has a local term associated with ‘woman’: po rumoh (one who owns the house). Home is not viewed in terms of the limited space a woman has, but is described as an asset she is attached to. However, across Aceh this is often interpreted to mean ‘one who stays at home’, widely associating women with the cultural responsibility for providing primary care for the elderly.

Most men – particularly male household heads – see themselves as household leaders. This dominant, traditional form of masculinity influences gender relations at home. Men, particularly household heads and primary income earners, do not agree as strongly as women that women deserve to make decisions at home. Men’s support for women to make decisions in the home is lower in Aceh and Maluku than the Bangsamoro. Across all regions, women do the majority of all household chores. The chore most often done by men is buying food, an activity outside the home that requires handling money. Again, significant gender disparity between who is responsible for household chores is found in Aceh and Maluku compared to the Bangsamoro.

Lower gender disparity in household work between men and women in the Bangsamoro can be explained as the result of lingering riding over territory and resource access, which is driven by complex socioeconomic and security factors. In riding, educated, wealthy and powerful men, usually patriarchs, are targeted by opponent clans to weaken the other family. The involved clans wield economic, political and military power (through their private militias). Bakwit (displacement by force) is no longer due to violence between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Moro armed groups; rather, bakwit is now caused by riding.

In this insecure environment, men are more likely to continue to value and perform ‘protective’ forms of masculinity to defend their family or community. Protective masculinity may transform into militarized masculinity as men access weapons and see these as key to ensuring family safety. Women in the Bangsamoro may perform more roles outside the house than women in Aceh and Maluku due to the permanent threat towards men and the prevalent perception that women are less capable of violence.

Nevertheless, across all three regions the persistence of traditional gender norms at home remains the dominant pattern. This shapes the gendered dichotomy in public and private domains, where men dominate in public and women in private. In practice, however, women and men are renegotiating gender relations as they adapt to life after conflict. As more women access education, jobs and public roles outside their home, more men also realise that traditional expectations of masculinity are not working for them. More than half of male respondents in all sub-regions agree that they wish the next generation will hold different expectations of being a man.

Higher socioeconomic status is linked to lower gender disparity in household work. Similarly, increases in educational attainment diminish men and women’s support for women being solely responsible for household work and childcare. The data also shows that men with greater involvement in household work tend to disagree with traditional gender roles such as who should do household chores and care work, and who should be the breadwinner. More equal decision-making in the home is associated with women’s increased agreement that both men and women can equally assume leadership roles in several public positions (including military and law enforcement, judiciary, rural employment, micro, small and medium enterprises [MSMEs], member of parliament, head of executive leadership, religious figures, community leaders).

Compared to their non-migrant counterparts, migrant women in Ambon and Central Maluku are more likely to be responsible for household work. This group is also more likely to support men to lead household decision-making, be tough, tolerate violence toward women and children, and control women’s movement outside the house. Migrant communities in Maluku – comprising Buton, Bugis, Java and Makassar ethnicities – occupy the majority of informal jobs, such as market trading, fishing and farming. The informal economy is associated with irregular income, uncertain working hours, unsafe workplaces, low skills, and lack of access to information and training – all of which restricts opportunities for migrant communities to expand beyond traditional gender roles.

These findings show that masculinities have shifted after conflict in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro. While physical violence is no longer seen as central to masculinity, several male-dominated social and cultural hierarchies persist at the household level, reinforcing the unequal divisions of labour between men and women. Evidence shows that widespread transformation of gender norms and positive models of masculinity need an enabling environment, where higher educational attainment and improved socioeconomic status can strengthen support for some measures of gender equality.
Finding 2
Family, religious and customary institutions are important but overlooked domains for influencing masculinity and transforming gender inequalities after conflict.
Research findings suggest that gender socialisation largely takes place in the family and the community: households and religious institutions are the primary sites shaping masculinity in all three regions. This highlights the important role of women as mothers and spouses, and of fathers, as the most influential people in socializing gender roles. In the three regions, patriarchal culture maintained in the kinship system has shaped women’s power, social status and rights to inheritance. It has also embedded men’s control over productive resources and decision-making in the family and community. Family is a key cultural institution that socializes women and men’s appropriate behavior and roles.

Norms that idealize women’s place at home with caregiving and domestic roles, and men as breadwinners and protectors, are core patriarchal family values across all three regions. Male leaders in customary or clan governance are determined by the patrilineal system inherited from past generations. Gender norms are transmitted from generation to generation through close familial and kinship relationships, which can make them highly resilient to change.

Prior to modernity, there was no rigid dichotomy between private and public spaces in Western societies, either; home was a site of social and economic production. Modernization and its resulting demographic transition created the dichotomy and gendered divisions of labor in public and private spaces. As a result, in many Western contexts the home is relegated to a private, secondary status. This can perpetuate the view that women at home are excluded from social, political or economic activities, or that women at home lead isolated and monotonous lives detached from society. However, for many women in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro, home is a hub for crucial social, economic and cultural activities. It is the site of women’s role as community mobilizers, emphasizing their kinship and community ties and highlighting their solidarity with other women.

There is inconsistent support across the three regions for women’s leadership in the household. More than 53% of women in Aceh and Maluku agree that women deserve to be decision-makers within the household, and above 38% of men in these regions support this statement. This perspective differs in the Bangsamoro, where an average of 75% of both men and women agree that women should have decision-making authority at home. However, there are different patterns of how masculinity is being taught by religious leaders in Aceh and the Bangsamoro. In conflict-affected areas of the Bangsamoro, it is common for men and boys to have daily exposure to weapons such as firearms and grenades. In some madaris (Islamic schools), albeit in very limited numbers, young Muslim men are educated by religious leaders about jihad (Islamic conception of struggle) against the Christian-dominated Philippines Government and the qualities of a mujahidin (one who struggles on behalf of Islam). In these madaris, some religious leaders may influence the construction of militarized masculinities.

During the conflict in Aceh, dayah (Islamic traditional schools), which are mostly in rural areas, became the central place of local education, including for conflict-affected children who missed out on formal education. Dayah still perpetuate patriarchal norms, emphasizing women’s primary roles as wives and the superiority of male leadership. Dayah education in Aceh does not propagate jihad teachings, as the conflict was not viewed as a religious struggle; as the Government of Indonesia is predominantly Muslim, it was seen rather as a political conflict. Militarized masculinities in Aceh are influenced by GAM leaders (who now control regional and community-level politics), rather than religious leaders.

Gender socialization is grounded in family, religious and customary institutions, and masculinity is fundamentally shaped by the actors in these domains. Parents, spouses, religious and clan leaders (in the case of the Bangsamoro) can maintain norms that socialise patriarchal, militarized masculinity to men and boys. It is therefore crucial to work closely with these groups – who understand familial, faith and clan relations – to challenge and transform unequal or violent gender norms.
Finding 3

Conflict-related trauma shapes men and women’s support for violence, and while trauma healing and mental health and psychosocial support is limited, demand is strong.
Experiences of conflict-related violence shape women and men’s perceptions of using violence in all three regions. **Men who have direct experience of sexual violence during conflict are more likely to accept the use of violence to protect the community.**

Witnessing physical violence during conflict also means that men are more likely to accept the use of violence against women and children, but it does not influence men’s acceptance of the use of violence to protect the community.

The intensity and types of violence reported across each sub-region vary, but overall, the rates of reported violence are very low. They do not correlate with national data sources which report higher rates of domestic and sexual violence in all three regions. The data from indirect reporting (asking respondents if they know someone personally or in their neighbourhood who is experiencing domestic or sexual violence) correlates more strongly with the secondary data.

This underreporting may be due to the rigid socio-cultural barriers around reporting violence – especially sexual and domestic violence – in all three regions. Reporting violence to legal authorities makes domestic issues public, which can bring shame, humiliation or disgrace to the whole family or clan. Women often do not report violence due to cultural stigma and patriarchal gender norms that assign primary responsibility for preserving family honor and marriage status to the wife. Women’s limited social networks narrow their access to information or to paid employment, so women depend on men for their livelihood and social status, adding another barrier to disclosing violence or to leaving violent relationships.

During Aceh’s conflict, GAM strongholds were located in the sub-regions of Pidie and Pidie Jaya. In Aceh, these two sub-districts reported the highest percentage of respondents who had experienced physical violence, witnessed physical violence against others, or endured traumatic experiences during conflict. Women and men in the sub-regions of Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar reported the highest prevalence of domestic violence. Particularly in rural areas, survivors of violence often prioritise maintaining family ties and community harmony. While Acehnese communities still have strong familial bonds, conflict-related trauma has strained these networks. An absence of survivor-centred healthcare and responsive justice mechanisms means that reports of sexual violence often go unaddressed, perpetuating violence.

Women in Southeast Maluku, Tual City and Buru indirectly report experiencing the highest rates of sexual violence, possibly because of less social stigma attached with discussing sexual violence in Maluku. The higher rates of reported sexual violence may also be attributed to the economic marginalization of people who work in gold mining in Buru and the maritime industry in Southeast Maluku and Tual City. Both industries are linked to labor exploitation, sex trafficking and prostitution.

Women, as well as men, can be perpetrators of violence at home, and children risk being targets of violence by their parents. Interestingly, more women than men in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Ambon, Central Maluku, Tual City, Southeast Maluku, Pidie and Pidie Jaya reported conducting verbal attacks at home in the past year. A significant number of women in Lanao del Sur also reported carrying out physical assaults at home. More than half of all men and women in Lanao del Sur support the use of violence against children to instill discipline.

In Tual City and Southeast Maluku, domestic or sexual violence cases are normally settled in customary courts, mostly led by men. Perpetrators might be required to pay fines and conduct ceremonial rituals, but are not subject to social sanctions or punitive measures.

In the Bangsamoro, the decision to report domestic violence or physical or sexual abuse is determined by male clan leaders, who often do not report due to the risk of provoking *rido* – especially if other communities are involved. Maintaining these patriarchal traditions can perpetuate injustices, as there is no accountability for the perpetrator and no healing process for the survivor. Customary processes can constrain women’s right to justice by using gender-discriminatory notions of honour, shame and community responsibility.

The research also highlights that a lack of customary or legal protections can contribute to domestic violence. Across all regions, women in unregistered marriages or polygamous marriages [who share their husbands with other wives] are more likely to experience marital rape, physical assault or forced sexually indecent actions. Traditionally, religious leaders require a permit from the religious court to conduct and register a polygamous marriage, based on guarantees that a man can equally provide for each of his wives and children. The practice of *nikah siri* (marriage by Islamic law without legal registration) in Indonesia has created more opportunities for polygamous marriages, but without the assurance that a wife and children can access livelihoods or inheritances. Unregistered marriage and polygamy increase the likelihood that women will experience mental ill health, such as high levels of distrust of other people. This highlights cracks in traditional social and religious institutions which lack accountability mechanisms to protect women.

The Indonesian Government manages violence against women and children through the *Dinas Perlindungan Perempuan dan Anak* (DPPPA) [Women and Children Protection and Empowerment Services]. DPPPA uses a community-based cross-sectoral approach involving *Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak* (P2TP2A) [Integrated Service Centre for the Empowerment of Women and Children], the health service and the police. It engages with community-level children’s forums and deploys a child protection task force in villages. P2TP2A has performed unevenly: limited facilities, temporary shelters and expertise in gender and clinical psychology, restricted budgets and poor coordination all hamper effectiveness.
The research highlighted that conflict survivors in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro are reluctant to share their stories or express their feelings because of the widespread cultural stigma attached to disclosing traumatic experiences. Across all three regions, respondents report their most challenging mental health problem is fear for their family’s safety.99 This indicates that there remain widespread impacts of conflict on mental health.

Cases of drug abuse (in Aceh and Maluku) and alcohol abuse (more prevalent in Maluku) in the community were reported.100 Unemployed, poorer men were viewed as more likely to experience substance abuse, particularly young men who are struggling to conform to masculine ideals. Respondents linked alcohol abuse to increased inter-communal and domestic violence, with women mainly affected.101

Substance (primarily drug) abuse is also considered to be a significant driver of post-conflict violence in Aceh.102 Drug abuse has resulted in physical violence and verbal abuse, affecting family and other relationships in communities.103 Economic insecurity and high unemployment have meant that some drug users have also become dealers, worsening the cycle of substance abuse and criminality. In Aceh, communities grappling with substance abuse may prefer non-legal community-based solutions in order to maintain their reputation. There is a tendency to use village officials and community leaders to investigate matters and to use sanctions [such as fines and community work] to address youth substance abuse.104

Secondary research shows that Acehnese civilians suffer extremely high levels of conflict-related trauma (depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]), comparable to Bosnian civilians following the Balkan war or Afghans after three decades of conflict.105 Many ex-combatants found it difficult to adapt to civilian life, possibly as a result of conflict-related trauma. Aceh established a local truth commission under the Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi (KKR) [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] in 2013, but it had significant structural constraints that hindered holding perpetrators accountable for their actions during the conflict.

Although it was recognised that conflict-related trauma has a long lasting impact, post-conflict programming in Aceh after 2005 focused on economic development, infrastructure and livelihood recovery, not MHPSS.106 Limited numbers of people sought professional mental health support, and implementation of government-supported trauma healing programs relied on the efforts of civil society organizations (CSOs) and women’s groups working with limited staff, specialised skills and funding.

In Maluku, there remains a large gap between urban and rural areas because MHPSS and trauma healing services are only available at district and provincial levels. Government programs are focused on physical health and building health infrastructure. Trauma healing services are rare, mostly provided by CSOs and focus on women and children. They are not integrated into provincial health and social protection systems, or subject to continuous monitoring to judge effectiveness. The smaller number of services available for men after the conflict were discontinued because of limited demand.107

To date, the Bangsamoro government’s militarized focus on security and stabilisation has sidelined MHPSS services. However, conflict-related trauma is acknowledged as an invisible outcome of war that will require healing to achieve normality. In June 2023 the Ministry of Health created the Bangsamoro Council for Mental Health, and is working with international NGOs to roll out MHPSS services which include an Islamic approach to mental wellbeing.108

While barriers remain to accessing widespread MHPSS services, respondents in Aceh and the Bangsamoro described using Islamic or religious healing processes, such as seeking solace through prayer, chanting and meditation, consulting religious leaders and teachers, using medicinal herbs, dietary practices (fasting), and applied therapy (cupping and massage).109 Demand for this support was high, and usually provided in community, family or religious spaces which are considered readily accessible.

As an alternative to psychiatrist-led MHPSS programs usually provided by the government, people use multiple resilience strategies for coping with trauma. These include confiding in friends or family or suppressing their distress by trying to forget the past. In Aceh, Relawan Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan (RPuK) [Women Volunteers for Humanity] is a non-profit organization with a focus on trauma healing that works with refugee women and children and survivors of conflict-related violence and sexual violence. RPuK builds mutual trust between their staff and the survivors of violence. They explore the survivors’ traumatic past memories of violence using creative methods such as storytelling with drawing, writing and poetry. RPuK supports survivors to analyze the impacts of conflict on their present life and helps them restore a sense of peace and self-resilience.

There is a complex interplay between experiencing conflict-related trauma and acceptance of some forms of violence. Post-conflict economic marginalization, inadequate restorative justice and ongoing insecurity further destabilizes society, sustaining high levels of mental illness. This requires comprehensive, contextualised and gender-responsive trauma healing and MHPSS efforts in peace agreements, post-conflict peacebuilding and WPS programming. This can include community-based, religious or customary trauma healing processes, which require multi-year funding and specialised, trained staff. Legal protections for women and people with diverse SOGIESC, and equitable socio-economic interventions for communities with high rates of conflict, may also mitigate the risk of ongoing trauma.
Finding 4

Women’s opportunities are constrained by men’s need to uphold traditional family structures and to exercise economic and decision-making control.
Patriarchal dynamics at the household level influence women’s economic and decision-making control in various ways. Across all three regions, male household heads agree less than female household heads with women playing leadership roles at work and their rights to work outside the home. Male household heads also agree less than women household heads in all three regions with women’s right to work outside, even if they contribute to the household. Men’s restrictive views on women’s employment and leadership at work influence gatekeeping practices within spousal relationships. Relationship status matters: married women are significantly more likely than unmarried women to report that they are not allowed to work outside the home. However, more than half of all women and men share relatively positive perceptions of women leaders and decision-makers.

Men’s continued resistance to women working outside the home can be explained by dominant views of masculinity that associate being a man with the ability to provide protection and the majority of the household income – leaving unpaid, domestic work to women. Gender socialization in families and communities idealises this version of male supremacy at home and in public. This is reinforced by conservative interpretations of religious teachings and everyday practices that present gender inequality as ‘natural’.

Male gatekeeping is also intertwined with socioeconomic status. Men with higher socioeconomic status show less support for women working outside the home, even if it contributes to household income. Men whose mothers, wives, daughters or sisters work outside the home may not be seen to fulfill expectations of masculinity as the family provider. Changing gender norms fuel men’s fear that women who have financial independence and decision-making power are more likely to undermine their authority, and that women who spend more time outside the home will neglect their roles as dedicated wives and mothers. Even if men have higher socioeconomic status and are more likely to earn sufficient household income without requiring women to contribute, they may feel shame or embarrassment, and act to gain control of women by gatekeeping.

This may seem contradictory with the finding that men from higher socioeconomic status are less likely to agree with the traditional gender division of labour, suggesting the complex nature of masculinities and perceptions toward gender norms. These findings might be interpreted that men from higher socioeconomic status are more flexible or more open to changes to gender roles. However, some men may also see women’s economic empowerment as threatening to their role as the family provider, and they may find it difficult to support women working outside the home.

In Aceh, the male-dominated patronage system of economic redistribution hinders poorer women and men from gaining economic access and decision-making control. The BRA and KPA are dominated by ex-GAM commanders, resulting in a focus on male ex-combatants. For example, income support mechanisms are typically extended to women only when their husband or children die, leaving elderly women without support. People who do not have networks into government agencies or local elite GAM members are especially excluded. Interestingly, Bener Meriah and Central Aceh display a more equal division of labor outside the home in contexts where both men and women are property owners or laborers in coffee plantations. However, there remains a gender-unequal distribution of profits and decision-making over prices, which men control.

Better education provides women with improved access to jobs and leadership positions in the public domain. Notwithstanding this greater freedom, women are still burdened with persistent unequal gender norms at home and must exert significant efforts to perform their public roles while navigating expectations that they maintain their domestic responsibilities. The breakdown of traditional support mechanisms (such as living in extended families who provide household support) may also increase challenges for women working outside the home. Despite the challenges of navigating private and public roles, women with higher socioeconomic status do not conform to the gatekeeping practices that limit their economic opportunities; they report their support for women to work outside the home.

The findings shed light on several patterns of gatekeeping in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro. Ideal masculinity revolves around men’s role as leader, protector and breadwinner, affecting both men and women’s willingness to support gender equality in the workplace and public and private decision-making. Regions and communities that have experienced conflict tend to have ongoing insecurity, which provides another reason to control women’s movement under the guise of ensuring their safety.

Continuing insecurity, conservative religious interpretation of gender norms, and expectations of male authority encourage some men to restrict women’s mobility and employment outside the home. Furthermore, gatekeeping practices are also upheld by women, who recognise that familial and cultural expectations negatively impact the mental health and wellbeing of women if they work or take on public leadership roles. Policy reforms should examine these issues to better understand the conditions in which men and women will support gender norm transformation.
Finding 5

Women have made important contributions to peace, but this has not translated into widespread influence or changed perceptions about their leadership. Yet, in some spaces, gender roles are shifting.
Conflict has created opportunities for women to reject restrictive gender roles. Across all three regions, women and men respondents who think that since the conflict has ended there has been a shift in traditional gender roles are also more likely to agree women should play a significant role in peacebuilding. Support for women’s representation in peace negotiations and peacebuilding is relatively high in all three regions, with women generally expressing stronger support than men. This support reflects women’s visible peacebuilding roles during and after conflict.

Nevertheless, formal and customary peacebuilding remains male dominated and there is a prevailing belief that men should lead peacebuilding efforts. More than half of the men across Aceh and Maguindanao disagree that women should lead peacebuilding efforts. Interestingly, men in Lanao del Sur in the Bangsamoro have the highest support for women holding leadership roles and agree they perform well (even higher than women respondents who share this view). In the Bangsamoro, respondents concur that women have a significant role to play in peacebuilding and they endorse peace processes being inclusive of all social groups. The results in the Bangsamoro may be explained by the shift in gender norms toward equality, influencing people to hold more gender-equal views.

More than half of all respondents accept women as leaders and decision-makers at work. However, men and women across all regions are more inclined to agree that men should take leadership roles and that they perform well in peacebuilding efforts. This may be explained by most women and men agreeing that women should prioritize their household responsibilities before pursuing higher positions in their careers.

The resistance to women assuming leadership roles or managerial positions, particularly in politics, stems from male-dominated institutional practices and religious and cultural gendered norms about who should make decisions in public spaces. In Aceh, it was acknowledged that women needed to strive harder than men to be recognised or chosen as leaders. Even if a woman has the same qualification as a man, the man will typically be prioritised for promotion or given a better position.

Many leadership roles, particularly political or religious positions, need the person to lead prayer, travel at short notice or join mixed-gender meetings at night. These positions are seen as risky or unfavorable for women. In the Bangsamoro and Aceh, women are commonly perceived by both women and men to be more emotionally driven in their decision-making processes and therefore less reliable. Some Maranao people in the Bangsamoro believe that women in leadership positions will attract curses from God.

The low level of men’s support for women’s leadership of sensitive or political issues may reflect the nature of women’s public engagement, which tends not to be expressly political. Women’s tasks still echo traditional gender roles in education, social welfare or health care. Indonesian women are active in government-funded work on family welfare and health in villages, such as Pos Pelayanan Kesehatan Terpadu (Posyandu) [Integrated Community Health Service] and the Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) (Family Welfare Programme). This phenomenon is also observed in the Bangsamoro.

Women have progressed into public leadership strategically, through negotiation, fostering open conversations and creating pathways to leadership roles. There is nuanced acceptance of women’s leadership in specific roles. These include community leadership, heading public offices, judiciary, business ownership, parliamentary membership, military and law enforcement positions, religious leadership and rural employment. Women lead Quranic reading in women-designated religious spaces, run NGOs that provide early childhood education or livelihood training, and own small businesses. Through their efforts in building intercommunity peace and their expanded roles in local governance and religious spaces, women have improved people’s everyday lives by providing healthcare services, informal education, and support to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

Historically in Aceh, elite women held influential positions. This may explain why some women’s public leadership roles are recognised, while women’s agency in the family and community is ignored or undervalued. Despite women being largely excluded from formal peace negotiations, they displayed considerable influence at the community level. A notable example is the All-Acehnese Women’s Congress held in Banda Aceh in February 2000, predating UNSCR 1325. This congress gathered 500 women from diverse backgrounds to call for the prioritisation of peaceful dialogue to solve the conflict and for greater women’s participation in all political decision-making.

During and after conflict in Aceh, women’s rights organizations and women-led CSOs coordinated humanitarian aid and promoted peace through education and lobbying. Nonetheless, when women in community-based groups advocate for women’s interests in formal decision-making spaces, they encounter numerous barriers and a lack of structural support, including lack of interest by male elites and limited funding. It is a common belief that elite men can adequately represent women’s interests and needs.
In Maluku, women play significant roles normally only in peacebuilding at community level or in women-designated religious organizations. During the conflict, women peacebuilders in the Gerakan Perempuan Peduli (GPP) [Concerned Women’s Movement] maintained trust across religious divides and provided safe spaces for conflict survivors, particularly women and children. Women used social practices to carry out shuttle diplomacy to deescalate communal tension. For example, *papalele* [a traditional process of commodity exchange in the market that relies on relationships with different social groups] connected conflict parties and diffused tension. 

Asymmetric gender power exists in political and customary institutions and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms across the three regions. In the Bangsamoro, political representation is limited to women and men with recognised status and positions in society, especially those who hold political titles (mayors, governors, etc.) and traditional titles including sultan [most exalted king] and *bai a labi* [most exalted queen]. Nobles are from elite families and clans and are prominent and influential. The opportunities for women to engage politically, such as affiliating with political parties or advocating for particular policies, are limited. This is especially the case if they are not affiliated with elite families or clans, or are located in rural areas.

Technical skills in formal mediation or peace process design hold little value in the Bangsamoro, as the terminology and processes are different from traditional *rido* settlement. *Rido* reconciliation relies on lineage tracing using the *tarsila* [a genealogical record], a skill conferred only to men. Women can offer advice to men, and in certain instances female leaders or clan matriarchs contribute by assisting men in reading *tarsila*. Women often instigate reconciliation, particularly in persuading conflicting parties to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue. Conflict management is a collaborative effort involving influential individuals of both genders; however, the specific spaces for *rido* settlement are predominantly male-exclusive realms.

**Gender roles are being renegotiated in both private and public spaces.** Women adeptly wield power in less visible ways by challenging or navigating cultural norms without explicitly asserting authority. Women’s influence stems from informed negotiation, drawing upon their direct engagement in community and religious activities, as well as their involvement in managing the household. Their impact extends beyond decisions concerning wedding and dowry negotiations or children’s education [which exemplify their integral role in shaping the family’s future]; women are also active in political campaigning during elections, and community advocacy for justice for survivors of violence. In religious institutions they promote peaceful solutions to conflict and prevent any visible community tension.

Within the family structure, women actively mold decisions and interpersonal dynamics using subtle influence, emotional connections and adept interpersonal skills. In conservative communities, women [wives or daughters] frequently shape decisions through private conversations within the household. This nuanced approach allows them to subtly challenge societal expectations. Additionally, women’s participation in building networks and alliances, often discreetly behind the scenes, further showcases their capacity to exert influence within professional and community settings.

In all three regions, men and women who have participated in training on peacebuilding, gender equality or transitional justice, including truth-seeking commissions, tend to disagree with the idea that men should dominate peacebuilding efforts. Respondents who participated in peacebuilding training are more likely to believe that women have a significant role to play in peacebuilding, particularly in Aceh and the Bangsamoro. A similar positive relationship is observed between respondents who attended gender equality training and the conviction that peace processes should be inclusive. In all three regions, a significant majority [over 78% of all respondents] expressed the need for improvements in the security and wellbeing of women and girls.

While training has been successful in building support for gender equality and inclusive peacebuilding, its reach is limited. Less than 30% of all respondents in Aceh and Maluku attended any relevant training. Most training participants from Aceh and Maluku were local activists or NGO staff, former combatants, or individuals with connections to prominent local politicians. In Maluku, interfaith dialogues and youth peace initiatives are facilitated by religious leaders, which may limit involvement from members of other religious groups. Gender equality training had the highest participation in the Bangsamoro, probably because this was a focus of the government, local activists and international donors. These programs need to be accessible and must engage communities more broadly, not just people already involved in community activism.
Finding 6

Post-conflict reconstruction and governance prioritised elite, masculine, military interests of security, political stability and infrastructure at the expense of gender-responsive social welfare and economic development.
A significant proportion of respondents believe that peacebuilding processes in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro have been effective in rebuilding people’s lives and providing community security. The achievements include safety and security, people’s participation in decision-making, and trusted relationships between and within communities. Across the three regions, security and safety of people was the most highly rated achievement (albeit lower in the Bangsamoro, which continues to experience armed violence). This shows acknowledgement of some measures of effective post-conflict political transition, such as law enforcement to ensure people’s freedom to move and conduct daily activities, safe travel to markets, and the ability to access healthcare and community justice.

Respondents also believe, however, that peace dividends such as good governance, economic welfare and poverty reduction have not been achieved. One of the key drivers of violence in all regions was unequal access to resources and economic opportunities. Yet achievement of economic welfare and poverty reduction was rated lowest by all respondents across the three regions. This signals that a number of root causes of conflict in each region remain unresolved.

Prolonged conflict has stymied economic growth, destroyed infrastructure, distorted public spending toward military spending and displaced workers. Conflict-related poverty has affected all citizens, but particularly women and people from lower socioeconomic or low status clan groups. Issues of unjust economic development, unfair resource use and allocation, and lack of accountability of past abuses, combined with gender inequity, require resolution to reduce future violence.

Respondents’ low perception of good governance and welfare seems to contradict other findings. For example, the majority of respondents reported that infrastructure facilities and financial and municipal services – such as electricity, water, and sanitation – are available and accessible, with no significant gender disparities. Respondents’ negative perceptions regarding governance and welfare appear to be linked to their lack of trust in or access to elected government representatives, who they see as responsible for these outcomes. This reflects a fundamental aspiration for more effective and democratic political representation.

Achievement of economic welfare and poverty reduction requires understanding and taking into account the experiences, needs and interests of diverse groups of women and men. Accessible and inclusive forms of governance and decision-making are essential to this outcome. For example, women in Banda Aceh have used the Musyawarah Rencana Aksi Kaum Perempuan (Musrena) (Council Action Plan for Women and Children) as a local democratic platform to articulate their concerns on development planning and budgeting. Despite its strengths, Musrena faces challenges akin to the Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Musrenbang) (Council for Community Development Planning), where policy decisions are typically made by male elites and lack formal mechanisms to connect community decisions to the district or provincial planning and development institutions.

The post-conflict political transition in Aceh has not guaranteed social or economic justice to all conflict parties and communities. Aceh was already among the poorest provinces in Indonesia, and the focus on infrastructure development and providing support to ex-combatants created additional social issues. Prior to the conflict, some elite groups were able to access significant resources and privileges, but the majority – especially rural women and men with lower socioeconomic status – received little support from the government.

Multilateral and international donors played a significant role in providing support to male ex-combatants in Aceh. DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) programs were established for male ex-combatants to acquire new skills and gain non-military employment. The DDR process intensified the glorification of militarized masculinities. Male ex-GAM members continue to wield significant influence, often due to their military leadership skills and existing hierarchical social structures.

Aceh’s DDR process failed to cater for women ex-combatants, who rarely accessed any DDR programming and did not experience the same community respect as their male counterparts. Popular narratives reinforce the idea that the most respected and rewarded roles in society should be linked to military prowess. This perpetuated male-dominated military power in Aceh, which further entrenched traditional gender roles and notions of violent, militarized masculinities.

Overcoming poverty and economic hardship are reported as conflict drivers which have had limited resolution in Ambon in Maluku, which experienced intense violence during the conflict. In comparison, Buru, Southeast Maluku, and Tual reported that economic inequalities were less problematic.

In Maluku, the government has invested in economic development; less attention has been paid to social reintegration and restorative justice between communities. This has strengthened the pre-conflict domination of decision-making and resource allocation by elites in the private sector and government bureaucracy. It has resulted in land evictions, community relocation, excessive natural resource extraction and pollution, and compounded the social stratification and exclusion of women and poorer people. For example, violent outbursts in Buru are often triggered by land disputes related to the activities of gold mining companies. The Amori community in Ambon were relocated next to landfill and are now deprived of clean water, fresh air and fertile soil.
The risk of conflict relapse is high in the Bangsamoro. Active armed conflict and widespread threats to security that have the potential to jeopardise the current peace agreement have led to a militarized post-conflict peace and reconstruction process.\textsuperscript{156} DDR programs are coordinated by the counterterrorism and counter-insurgency parts of the military, and focus on building security, not restorative justice in communities. These programs have included the disbandment of armed groups, including BIAF, women members of the BIWAB and non-MILF militants. Members of violent extremist organizations, such as Abu Sayyah, Daulah Islamiyah (DI) (Islamic State) and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Maute, are given opportunities to go back to civilian lives. This militarized approach is deemed necessary by many respondents, but there is also acknowledgment that many broader peace priorities – such as good governance, economic welfare and poverty reduction – are not being achieved, risking future violence.

Some milestones on gender equality have been achieved by the Bangsamoro Government. Gender equality principles, in compliance with national policy, are integrated in the Bangsamoro Development Plan. The Regional Action Plan of Women Peace and Security (RAP-WPS) is linked to the WPS agenda and key policies appear to be gender-responsive, at least on paper.\textsuperscript{157} But few women-led community-level organizations are invited to participate in Municipal Development Councils or the Bangsamoro Economic Development Council. The dearth of women participating in these influential institutions is linked to broader failure of democratic governance processes that undermine inclusion in the post-conflict political transition.\textsuperscript{158} It is crucial to shift the focus from militarized provision of security, infrastructure and economic development to a gender-responsive approach to reconstruction and development: one that emphasizes rebuilding social welfare infrastructure (including quality education facilities), social protection for high risk groups (such as young rural men and women), fair distribution of employment opportunities, widespread access to MHPSS and dignified justice outcomes for conflict survivors. Integrating gender perspectives into all aspects of post-conflict planning and interventions, including addressing gender-based violence and promoting women’s rights, can address the interests of the broader population rather than a select male elite.
5. DISCUSSION

a. A focus on masculinities is key to understanding and transforming the drivers of unequal gender norms after conflict.

The findings show there has been a substantial shift away from valuing physical strength and violence in post-conflict masculinities across all three regions. Instead, the dominant forms of masculinity center around family values: being a good father, family protector and breadwinner. However, these markers of masculinity are not completely disconnected from behaviors and ideas that enforce male strength, power and privilege. Many traditional gender norms remain after conflict: both genders agree men should still be the household leader and decision-maker, and women should remain responsible for household chores and care work.

Many men still agree with restrictive gender perspectives that uphold their responsibilities as providers. This is more evident among male-headed households, men who are the main earners and those who have higher socioeconomic status. These patterns of male domination are maintained through everyday household practices, religious traditions and clan authority that justify male superiority and female subordination. For example, nowhere is there an equal gender division of labor across the three regions, as women largely continue to shoulder the majority of household chores and caregiving work.

Across the three regions, patriarchal power – characterised by male dominance and female subordination in public and private spaces – fuels inequality that perpetuates violence and discrimination, particularly against women and people with diverse SOGIESC. For example, women who are in unregistered or polygamous marriages tend to have higher reported rates of mental ill health than women in registered marriages. In Aceh, homosexual or trans-identifying people are targeted for public beatings and other forms of abuse by the Wilayatul Hisbah (Islamic religious police responsible for administering shari’ah law).

Transforming positive masculinity around family values – being the breadwinner and a good father – can be an effective entry point to promote the rejection of violent behavior and increase men’s involvement in all aspects of home life, such as domestic chores and caregiving. Therefore, while support for women’s participation in the public domain is imperative to implement the WPS agenda, policymakers also need to align this outcome with strategies to encourage men to take on an equal share of household and caring tasks. These findings have implications for understanding how gender norms shift during and after conflict. They also show the role of masculinities in determining women’s influence in peace processes and the post-conflict political transition. By evidencing how masculinities have shifted, entry points to practice gender equitable relationships can be identified, both at home and in public spaces.

b. Prioritizing family and community domains are important to transform gender norms.

The research shows that gender socialization largely takes place in private and community domains. Households, religious and (in the Bangsamoro) clan spaces were identified as the primary sites to normalise or challenge gender norms; parents, spouses, religious and clan leaders are the people most responsible for shaping masculinity. This finding affirms the role of society and culture as forces that reproduce or maintain masculine norms. It highlights the formative role of women (as mothers and spouses) in shaping men’s attitudes and behaviors; it also points to the crucial intergenerational role played by parents and children in instilling and maintaining power dynamics between women and men.

Family, clan and religious institutions that promote patriarchy and militarized masculinities play an important role in shaping violent norms, particularly among elite men. These institutions are often overlooked by international peacebuilding and conflict resolution policymakers and those designing programming interventions; yet they signal important entry points for transforming violent gender norms and practices.

Men and women have varying perspectives with regards to gender norms. Some men support women’s leadership and roles in the public domain, while not all women are in favor of women’s emancipation. The acceptance of women in leadership and decision-making roles outside the home coexists with the expectation that women should primarily focus on domestic responsibilities and maintain respect and obedience towards their husbands and fathers. This position is maintained by both genders, demonstrating that women also contribute to upholding patriarchal gender norms.

Women’s support for patriarchal attitudes can be explained by two main factors. The first is that the rigid, unequal division of household labor overburdens women with domestic chores and care responsibilities;
when combined with other duties outside the house, this can mean that women do not want additional pressure to perform as breadwinners or community leaders. The lack of a robust formal or informal support system for women does not incentivise them to break the barriers between public and private spheres.

Where there is more equal decision-making at home and male involvement with household work, there is less support by women and men for traditional gender norms. Therefore, gender equality reform requires identifying and engaging with influential figures who hold authority at home and in religious and clan structures in order to transform gender expectations and to develop new role models for men.

c. Gender-responsive trauma healing should be integrated into peace-making processes and prioritised in post-conflict peacebuilding.

Trauma rehabilitation and restorative justice are fundamental needs in post-conflict societies in order to prevent ongoing cycles of violence. If unresolved, conflict-related trauma correlates with attitudes that endorse violence, particularly within the family or at community level, risking future conflict. However, across all three regions, governments have prioritised economic development and infrastructure reconstruction over trauma healing and MHPSS services after conflict. Respondents highlighted the need for conflict-related trauma to be treated appropriately with community-based, gender-responsive, religious and context-specific trauma healing and MHPSS interventions.

Individuals and communities in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro often try to deal with trauma healing by themselves or through traditional processes. However, many traditional (Indigenous and customary governance systems) and religious (Muslim and Christian) institutions are male dominated; their implementation of trauma healing programs often ignores gender or perpetuates gender inequalities. For example, customary mechanisms for responding to sexual violence against women and children are still used in Maluku, but settlements generally do not result in accountability of the perpetrator, who faces no serious financial, social or moral sanctions.

Peace process design and mediation practice has also failed to recognize, address and incorporate strategies to transform conflict-related trauma, both of the combatants and the communities involved. This could entail training peacemakers at national and local levels in context-sensitive trauma-informed approaches to manage traumatised conflict parties with empathy and address grievances.

The WPS agenda has primarily focused on addressing women’s experiences and concerns, including issues like conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Even so, WPS programming and advocacy, including by international actors, has failed to pay attention to conflict-related trauma or prioritise trauma healing or MHPSS.

There is concern that incorporating targeted MHPSS programming on men’s trauma may unintentionally shift the focus and potentially overlook the transitional justice needs of women. Acknowledging male trauma is essential, but it should not overshadow the unresolved issues related to gender justice. Neglecting this aspect could perpetuate the underlying causes of violence, highlighting the necessity of expanding the WPS agenda to ensure a more comprehensive approach.

d. Removing systemic barriers to inclusion within families, customary and religious institutions is key to empowering women.

The dominant view of men’s rightful authority in the home extends to men’s place in the public domain. This is linked to men’s belief in their right to control public sector leadership and decision-making, and their gatekeeping of women’s economic opportunities. Economic insecurity as a result of conflict has increased unemployment and welfare dependency, particularly for less educated people; lower educational attainment is linked to increased support for the use of violence to maintain security in communities.

Economic necessity also drives greater acceptance of women’s expanded economic roles; views on women’s economic roles are more likely to shift than perceptions of men’s economic roles. Men have changed roles or taken on tasks that were typically carried out by women, but social and cultural norms have failed to keep up with these changes in practice. Men tend not to stop women from working outside the home, provided it benefits family income. But if the household can be sustained by only the man’s income, women are more likely to experience gatekeeping. Male domination arises from men’s desire to retain their dominant power. There remains a rigid gendered division of public and private domains, even amid widespread socioeconomic change after conflict, as this upholds men’s status within the family structure.

Discriminatory male attitudes persist toward women in leadership. The majority of women, too, agree that men should hold visible power, control and leadership, revealing the internalization of restrictive gender norms. In practice, women do play widespread but unrecognized leadership or decision-making roles, including as women ulama in Aceh or by supporting the traditional rido settlement in the Bangsamoro using the tarsila system. This implies that across all three regions, despite multiple burdens and barriers to participation, women access various forms of invisible power and have real influence over crucial aspects of life.
Importantly, however, women rarely openly or visibly claim these leadership roles. Women may refrain from publicly highlighting their interest or ability to perform socially prescribed male roles because this may undermine the limited power they do hold. They may also prefer to publicly endorse traditional gender norms for reasons of personal safety, community cohesion and to uphold family honor.

The peace agreements in Aceh and Maluku notably lacked women’s active engagement or gender-responsive provisions. In contrast, women in the Bangsamoro played a pivotal role in securing legal advancements for women and gender equality through the peace agreement and lent legitimacy to the peace process. In Maluku, men acknowledge women’s vital roles in resolving the conflict. For example, men in Ambon referred to the effectiveness of the GPP – the first joint forum of Muslim, Catholic and Protestant women – in creating peace in Maluku. The GPP conducted interfaith meetings to ensure the distribution of emergency aid, and encouraged reconciliation between Muslim and Christian women. Acehnese women’s groups continue to raise important issues related to the unequal distribution of peace and reconstruction funds and the ongoing gendered violence in communities.

In all three regions, women’s civil society dominates community-level peacebuilding through their daily activities, community outreach and political engagement. However, despite their agency during conflict, women are rarely part of any national or provincial post-conflict decision-making. Women are made invisible as male-led, patriarchal institutions maintain gender discrimination. The imbalanced representation of women is just one part of a patriarchal system – characterised by male authority and coercion, and women’s subordination – that causes or exacerbates violence. Consequently, women’s participation in the public domain and their access to political power is far below their male counterparts.

Supporting women’s broader engagement can advance inclusion, but affirmative action is insufficient. The ‘just add women and stir’ approach – using quotas and reserved seats to assign leadership positions to women and other marginalized groups – has been used for local government in Aceh and Maluku. These measures have increased women’s representation, but have not removed barriers which still create disparities among women. Poor, rural and Indigenous women, for example, face additional socioeconomic barriers and lack of access to social networks and connections to elite men.

Male-dominated political networks, women’s lack of financial resources, limited self-confidence or self-belief, family and household responsibilities, and lack of transparency in recruitment were also identified as major barriers to broadening women’s participation. It is also more likely that women will be selected to stand for marginal seats. Building an enabling environment so that women can influence public decision-making requires systemic changes to local governance structures, removal of household-level barriers, and access to funding.
Conflict has opened some new private and public spaces for women to lead. For example, women use social practices and skills that maintain trust across divided communities and warring parties, as well as provide safe spaces for conflict survivors, particularly other women and children. In Aceh, this is exemplified by their public roles in government offices, courts, NGOs and village governance in advocating for women’s protection against domestic abuses and economic vulnerability. In Maluku, women peace activists initiated interfaith dialogues between Muslim and Christian women.

While it is clear there remain widespread expectations that women should be confined to private spaces, the research also shows that women’s activism at community level and in religious spaces have become arenas where women renegotiate masculine power and seek to influence post-conflict peacebuilding and other decision-making processes. WPS interventions have focused on increasing women’s roles in public spaces, but these efforts have met with multiple barriers. Sustained funding and political support for these new arenas where women are actively engaging may more effectively open up opportunities for women’s leadership and gender-responsive post-conflict transitions.

e. Decolonizing narrow interests (elites, male, military) and agendas (security sector and resource extraction) can progress gender equality and the WPS agenda.

The findings highlight a need for radical transformation of the dominant approach to the WPS agenda and gender equality in peacebuilding. A one-size-fits-all approach to WPS funding and programs has resulted in interventions that didn’t meet the needs of local women and men. This change could be achieved by decolonizing analysis and decision-making processes. Such a shift is especially essential as the three regions studied are post-colonial nations in the Global South.

This radical transformation goes beyond analysing the diversity of masculinities in any context. It involves uncovering localized understandings of masculinities, male-dominated power and security and how this intersects with gender inequality and violence. This information can be used to identify deeply contextualized entry points for transforming gender norms and violent masculinities that repress women and other marginalized groups.

A decolonized approach involves tailoring context-specific approaches to challenging unequal gender norms with households and communities, engaging trusted leaders, men and boys as allies. It includes working within family, community and religious power structures that are involved in teaching and perpetuating gender-unequal behaviors and expectations. By adopting localized processes, the WPS agenda can become more comprehensive and effective in advancing gender equality and peace in different contexts.

Using local concepts and terminology is key to decolonizing the WPS agenda. Talking about gender equality, masculinities and peacebuilding in all three regions was sensitive and not easily described using terms like ‘empowerment’, ‘meaningful participation’, and ‘equality’. These were considered ‘Western’ or ‘outsider’ terms and concepts, not relevant to respondents’ everyday experiences of injustice and poverty. It is essential to move beyond homogenising concepts or using standardised measures of gender equality and peace.

For example, in the Bangsamoro, local government officials are currently more open to using the term ‘gender justice’ because they see this terminology as an Islamic alternative to Global North concepts of gender equality. This interpretation has a risk of essentializing gender roles and embedding a patriarchal power hierarchy. Instead, there is a need to prioritize an ethical reform of Islamic justice that empowers women in all aspects of society (in the home and public spaces). This requires working together with religious, customary and clan leaders to promote egalitarian principles in the interpretation and application of religious teachings on Muslim women’s roles and rights.

For instance, in Aceh, women and men define a balanced gender relationship by emphasizing concepts like ‘mutuality’, which includes mutual support, fair treatment, and patience in facing life’s challenges together. While challenging the traditional gender division of labor, particularly male gatekeeping, it is crucial to understand the complex intersection of decolonization and feminist activism in each region.

Decolonizing gender equality involves elevating Indigenous and local knowledge systems. These offer valuable insights into context-specific gender relations, roles and practices, and local feminist approaches to transforming unequal power dynamics. These localised perspectives can inform new perceptions of gender equality and the WPS agenda, liberated from colonial and gender biases. This might mean reinterpretation of customary, kinship, clan or religious practices by local communities in order to challenge gender discrimination.

Despite gender norms shifting, patriarchal religious, cultural, military and political structures remain. The findings highlight a number of entry points to shift masculine dominance in leadership and decision-making. Transformational change requires securing backing from male family members and customary, religious and clan leaders for women’s changing leadership roles and the removal of barriers related to their reproductive and domestic roles.
To achieve this, the findings highlight the effectiveness of comprehensive, context-specific and widely accessible training programs and truth commissions on peacebuilding and gender equality for both men and women, in order to change attitudes about women in public leadership roles. Targeted training that focuses on shifting away from violent, militarized masculinities could cultivate cohorts of men who support gender equality and value women decision-makers as key to community security and wellbeing.

Across the three regions, women working in community organizations highlighted the challenges in receiving sustained funding to conduct their peacebuilding work. They called for international partners to identify and provide funding and political support to local women’s groups and networks to make sure the WPS agenda is effective and contextualized. Women also highlighted the risk that in conservative communities, any drastic changes may lead to backlash against women’s agency. Cultivating slow but strategic change within local institutions, and strengthening family and community support systems, was seen as the best way to ensure men’s active engagement for gender equality.

f. A gender-transformative, locally-led approach is needed to sustain peace.

The many different types of gendered violence, ranging from verbal abuse to war, can be illustrated in a continuum of violence. This complex, dynamic and interconnected understanding of gendered violence shows that various factors, such as conflict-related trauma and individual frustrations, contribute to violence at all levels of society. Understanding violence as a continuum suggests that interventions should be tailored to each specific context and stage of conflict – noting that this will change, sometimes rapidly.

In all three regions, women and men agree that good governance and overcoming poverty have not yet been achieved, and acknowledge that these issues were core drivers of the conflict. The politics of power-sharing by elites and political leaders – primarily men formerly in armed groups – dictated whether communities received support or were sidelined in the post-conflict political transition. This research shows that a focus on security and economic development did not resolve the underlying drivers of violence, nor work directly with the key stakeholders (families, clans and religious leaders) that underpin gender unequal behaviours and militarized masculinities.
Reconstructing masculinities: Gender dynamics after conflict in Aceh, Maluku and Bangsamoro Mindanao

For example, in each of the three regions, political and economic resources are usually confined to a few elite men and their families. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Maluku and Aceh prioritised infrastructure development at the expense of long-term welfare and gender-equal economic development. A focus on investment return and short-term financial gain has failed to rebuild social infrastructure torn by conflict and has often resulted in land evictions, community relocations, natural resource extraction and pollution. This approach continues cycles of poverty, marginalization, and exclusion of certain groups, which has hindered sustainable peace. It further exacerbates women’s multiple burdens, as poverty compels them to work as low-wage labor in plantations or rice fields. These outcomes underscore the complex connection between macro-level policies and the micro-level experiences of vulnerable populations, particularly survivors of conflict-related trauma, men and women with low socioeconomic status, and people with diverse SOGIESC.

The domination of elite, militarized masculinity in mediation, peacebuilding and post-conflict development also significantly affected implementation of the WPS agenda. To prevent this, it is crucial to include diverse groups of people and gendered needs and interests early in peace mediation processes. This requires using creative facilitation approaches and modalities during the agreement making process, to address diverse needs and interests and measure their implementation.

The findings suggest a need for a more comprehensive, gender-transformative approach to mediation design and practice, and post-conflict political transitions. This should go beyond focusing on security, political stability and infrastructure. It should also encompass collective trauma healing, widespread peace and gender equality training, rebuilding social connections and addressing poverty – each with a focus on men and transforming violent, militarized masculinities. These proposed strategies align with the continuum of violence, simultaneously addressing different forms of violence and emphasizing the need for comprehensive, context-specific approaches to implement the WPS agenda.

Trusted relationships with community-level powerholders, customary and religious leaders, women community leaders and minority ethnic leaders, are crucial in determining how people address various post-conflict challenges. In addition, other powerholders, such as ex-combatants [in Aceh and the Bangsamoro], local business leaders, Members of Parliament and political leaders at district or provincial levels, influence post-conflict decision-making on issues of welfare, overcoming poverty and economic challenges. Gender-responsive peacebuilding needs to take into account gender-disaggregated local perspectives and needs and engage with local gender power dynamics.

To address the challenges of elite male-dominated decision-making, respondents highlighted the need to adopt locally-informed approaches that identify the context-specific barriers that women face in their culture. This research shows that shifts in masculinities can occur through engagement with adult men to encourage new behaviors [such as taking on household chores] that contribute to the advancement and wellbeing of their family and the wider community. Only by actively listening to communities can outside stakeholders advocating for the WPS agenda find entry points for effective and localized change. This also includes promoting alternative masculinities that do not rely on violence or dominance.

173 Reflection meeting with enumerators who collected data in Central Aceh and Benar Meriah in Aceh, March 2023. © ICAIOS
6. RECOMMENDATIONS

International actors (governments, donors and organizations)

1. Promote the WPS agenda by partnering with and investing directly in locally-led gender-responsive peacebuilding initiatives. All projects should be co-designed to ensure greater contextualisation and to meet local communities’ priorities.

1.1 All humanitarian, development and peace initiatives should have at least one dedicated WPS / gender-focused project with earmarked funds for implementation and monitoring.

1.2 WPS budgets should be long term (5+ years), core, flexible and easy to access, to support local women’s expertise, scale up local initiatives and reduce the burdens local organizations face with short- or medium-term budget cycles.

1.3 Prioritise tailored, community-led approaches using women’s histories and role modelling, to encourage gender-equal relations and inform future gender-responsive peacebuilding strategies.

- Use gendered perspectives to analyze conflict and post-conflict history, e.g. tell herstories by mapping women’s notable roles in addition to men’s history.
- Facilitate mixed-gender and intergenerational public dialogues and training with community elders and leaders to map how gender roles and dynamics have evolved over time. Encourage sharing of stories and lessons learned.

2. Integrate a focus on masculinities in WPS and peacebuilding interventions, at family and community levels, to analyze, target and shift the drivers of male control and domination.

This could include gender-responsive analysis, financial assistance, training, and access by local activists and organizations to global networks and platforms for sharing work.

2.1 Target family members (parents and spouses) for training programs, dialogue and initiatives that encourage family values that foster gender-equal behaviors and attitudes. Focus conversations on reducing male gatekeeping in order to promote women’s economic and political inclusion.

2.2 Foster alliances with trusted male community leaders (customary and clan) and religious institutions. Engage in dialogue, using active listening and empathy to establish rapport, identify barriers to change and gain their support for gender-responsive peacebuilding and MHPSS programming.

2.3 Support locally-led awareness-raising training and campaigns that educate men on the benefits of women’s leadership and the positive impacts of women’s engagement in peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction.

2.4 Engage male community leaders as allies in promoting local-led gender justice initiatives. Encourage them to advocate for men’s roles in caregiving and housework, and women’s involvement in decision-making processes in the home and at work, community governance and religious institutions.

2.5 Amplify the views of male religious leaders who embrace egalitarian religious interpretation in their preaching and teaching.

2.6 Identify and promote the work of men and women who are community role models, advocating for non-violent and gender-equal family relationships.

3. Pay attention to conflict-related trauma and violence at all levels of society in mediation and peace process design and post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and WPS initiatives.

3.1 Train mediators on context-sensitive trauma-informed approaches, including working with traumatised conflict parties.

3.2 Incorporate provisions for trauma healing and MHPSS into peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts (education, empowerment, livelihoods, etc.). Ensure these have earmarked funding and are monitored for effectiveness.

3.3 Address conflict-related grievances and human rights violations and provide gender-responsive transitional justice mechanisms with legal and financial aid.

3.4 Integrate conflict and culturally-sensitive trauma healing and MHPSS programming in all post-conflict interventions. These should be locally led as this work requires trust and deep understanding of family honor systems, customary justice, and the history of sexual and gender-based violence in the context.

3.5 Support local professionals and community actors to collaboratively design and deliver culturally-appropriate trauma healing and MHPSS services. Make sure attention is focused on families and communities.

3.6 Build on local understandings of peace and resilience in each context to leverage community participation in MHPSS efforts. This includes addressing the spiritual dimension in the healing processes using religious rituals and traditional customs.
Local and national policymakers and practitioners

4. Provide clear commitments for social justice, inclusivity and gender-responsiveness in local and state legislations.

4.1 Develop comprehensive legislation and policies that promote equal opportunities, anti-discrimination and protection of marginalized groups in line with WPS National Action Plans and CEDAW commitments.

4.2 Provide gender-responsive post-conflict recovery and compensation funds to women ex-combatants and survivors of violence.

4.3 Incorporate inclusive development planning that considers the diverse needs of different groups, addresses economic, social, and environmental issues, and promotes equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. Involve women, men and people with diverse SOGIESC at all levels of planning and implementation.

4.4 Improve coordination among relevant national and local legal aid and justice institutions to ensure conflict survivors have access to legal aid and mechanisms to address grievances.

4.5 Implement initiatives that empower women and other marginalized groups through skill development, education and economic opportunities. Support local entrepreneurship and initiatives.

4.6 Consult and collaborate with local NGOs and community-based organizations to leverage their expertise and resources, and provide legal and financial support to implement their work.

5. Acknowledge and address the physical, emotional and psychological consequences of conflict-related trauma. Make sure all post-conflict interventions are accompanied by context-specific and gender-responsive MHPSS programming.

5.1 Ensure fair and impartial judicial processes to prosecute individuals responsible for human rights abuses and other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. This level of accountability can provide closure for survivors and can also act as a deterrent against future harm.

5.2 Consider convincing authorities or public officials to officially acknowledge the atrocities committed by state military agents and/or create a specific forum for public acknowledgment of the atrocities committed by individual perpetrators. This involves national policymakers recognizing the experiences and suffering of conflict survivors, validating their pain, and ensuring that their stories are heard and respected.

5.3 Provide survivors of conflict-related trauma with access to MHPSS services, socioeconomic support, and opportunities for community reintegration.

5.4 Ensure men who have survived conflict-related violence are provided with tailored, gender-responsive trauma healing and MHPSS services. Identify and address gendered barriers that prevent men from accessing these services.

6. Creatively support women and other marginalized groups usually working at local or community levels to participate in national-level decision-making.

6.1 Make targeted, locally-led training programs on peacebuilding, gender equality, and transitional justice widely available. All training should incorporate a masculinities lens.

6.2 Create community and national-level forums where women, marginalized men and people with diverse SOGIESC can express their needs, ideas and experiences to ensure post-conflict peace, reconstruction and development programming is gender responsive and trauma informed.

6.3 Identify and reinforce the existing creative strategies of women activists and peacemakers. Adapt gender discourse to local languages and religious contexts and use written and oral histories to promote women's leadership.

7. Preventing sexual and gender-based violence and abuse and increasing reporting of incidents requires shifting the entrenched culture of silence and shame. It requires long-term, inter-generational public health and education investments.

7.1 Use a survivor-centred approach to preventing sexual violence and abuse, including domestic violence. Support should include survivors’ families and community-level networks (customary, clan and religious).

7.2 Strengthen capacity of local governments and community-based health, education and justice organizations so that national and customary laws and policies can effectively safeguard against sexual violence and abuse.

7.3 Identify and respond to negative coping mechanisms for conflict-related trauma (for example, increased gender-based violence in families).

7.4 Teach all children (and their families) about preventing sexual and gender-based violence and abuse, at least by primary school (7 - 13 years old).
Researchers

8. Mobilize Global South research institutions (universities and think tanks) to lead development of context-specific knowledge products on how to undertake gender-transformative and conflict-sensitive peace process design and post-conflict transitions in their regions.

8.1 Support numbers and research capacity of Global South research institutions.

8.2 Governments to promote the academic freedom and advancement of Global South researchers to pursue research topics on gender, conflict, peace processes and post-conflict transitions by granting research permits and funding and promoting multidisciplinary research collaboration.

9. Global North research institutions should formally collaborate with their Global South colleagues, to fund, amplify and learn from their work. Research that is not led by context experts has failed to fully understand or explain social, cultural and religious practices, particularly on various forms and practices of masculinities as enabling factors for gender equality at the community level.

9.1 Partner with and prioritise the views of local researchers.

9.2 Ensure that previous research by Global North research institutions accurately reflects the language used and realities of the people in the conflict context in relation to gender equality and the role of violent masculinities.

10. Invest in research that reveals alternative, feminist and decolonial narratives to male-dominated histories, including women’s roles in shaping history and culture.

10.1 Integrate the findings into regional educational curricula and tailored peacebuilding, gender equality and transitional justice training.
7. CONCLUSION

After conflict in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro, violence and physical strength are no longer central characteristics of masculinity. Men have developed other ways of exhibiting their dominant social status and maintaining patriarchal dynamics in households and the community. Elite, male-dominated institutions, along with cultural and economic barriers, still have detrimental impacts – confining women to private spaces and gatekeeping their political and economic opportunities.

The research identified four main entry points for shifting dominant masculinities, creating opportunities for women to influence peace processes and public decision-making.

- **Focus on private spaces**: Parents, husbands and religious and clan leaders maintain gender norms and act as gatekeepers for gender inequality; but households and communities are also key to transforming violent masculinities. Men who undertake domestic tasks, endorse democratic decision-making practices at home, and acknowledge women's vital roles during conflict, increasingly support women's inclusion in peacebuilding and are key to transforming gender norms. Families are often flexible around gender roles, particularly if women's income bolsters the household's economic security.

- **Widespread trauma healing**: Men and women who have conflict-related trauma were more likely to endorse the use of violence. A trauma-informed approach to peacemaking can ameliorate this risk. Transitional justice and MHPSS provisions should be included in peace agreements. Survivors of violence should be provided with access to context-specific and gender-responsive trauma healing and MHPSS services, socioeconomic support, opportunities for community reintegration and transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions and reparations.

- **Tailored training**: Male allies who publicly acknowledge and endorse women's leadership can encourage greater support for women in both public and private spaces. Targeted training programs focused on peacebuilding, gender equality, and transitional justice, and which incorporate a strong masculinities lens, should be made widely available. These can help participants recognise that gender norms are shifting, and the benefits of gender-responsive peace.

- **Sustained financing**: Shifting expectations of women remains a challenge in cultures that equate leadership potential, being assertive and exercising authority, with masculinity. However, women's activism in community, social, religious and private sector spaces are key arenas where women renegotiate their positions and exert influence. Women's community-level activities and organizations require long term, core, flexible and easy to access financial and political resources.

There is a need for a radical transformation of the WPS agenda, requiring a more inclusive and local perspective on gender equality. Advancing the WPS agenda requires constant dialogue with non-Western, Global South feminists, and understanding the complexity and interconnectedness of public and private domains. This means advancing women's leadership using multidimensional strategies which enhance women's influence in private (family, community and religious) spaces and broaden men's household responsibilities.

**Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro have distinct local drivers of future conflict that remain unresolved through the post-conflict political transition**. This includes the limited acknowledgement of colonialism in shaping violent conflict, gender inequality and social, economic and political structures in each region. Along with unequal economic redistribution, Maluku is enduring the legacy of community segregation between Muslim and Christian neighborhoods; Aceh has a sluggish process of compensation and unresolved accountability of past abuses; and the Bangsamoro's peace process is threatened by tension between powerful armed clans and other militarized groups.

The narrow focus of post-conflict political transitions in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro on elite, male, militarized interests has skewed reconstruction efforts towards security, political stability and infrastructure. But these efforts fail to deal with human rights abuses, unequal gender power dynamics and historical legacies of colonialism, which, if left unresolved, may contribute to future violence in each region. A feminist decolonization of the WPS agenda can enable gender-responsive and transformative peacebuilding and greater ownership among local communities to define their own pathways towards gender justice.
Notes

1. The research is focused on the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Bangsamoro), an autonomous region in the southern Philippines, located in the southwestern region of the island of Mindanao and the adjacent Sulu Archipelago. Following the peace agreement between the MILF and the Philippines Government, the Philippine Parliament passed the Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018, which established a devolved system of government for the Bangsamoro from 2019.

2. Gender exclusionary refers to discriminatory or prejudiced actions, initiatives or processes which can cause negative effects for different women, men or people with diverse sexual orientations, gender identities and expressions, and sex characteristics.

3. Through a partnership between SPF and Georgetown University’s Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS), survey data was shared with GIWPS and the findings are available: Robert U. Nagel, Joshua Allen and Kristine Baekgaard, Beyond engaging men: Masculinities, (non)violence, and peacebuilding [Washington DC, USA: The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, 2023].

4. A separate appendix will be available on the websites of SPF and its partners, detailing the quantitative analysis results.

5. Taga Futoshi et al., Men’s New Roles in a Gender Equal Society – Survey Results from Japan and East Asia [Tokyo, Japan: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2019].


9. This research explores expressions of masculinity by asking men about several important markers of being a man (being employed, protecting their family, being a good father, being physically strong, being married, being capable of violence, solving problems without violence, being a man of faith, being empathetic to the needs of others, having good social connections, and/or having expensive goods). See Appendix, Section 20, Table 20.2: Average importance of each factor for a man.

10. See Appendix, Section 20, Table 20.2: Average importance of each factor for a man.

11. Socioeconomic status is coded by the researchers of this study into four categories: (1) those with the lowest income reported and no land ownership; (2) those with the lowest income reported yet noting land ownership, or those with low to middle income rates reported and no land ownership; (3) those with low to middle income rates reported yet noting land ownership, or those with high to highest income rates reported and no land ownership; and (4) those with high to highest income rates reported and land ownership.

12. As men’s socioeconomic status increases, agreement with the statement that “men should work outside, and women take care of the household” decreases. See Appendix, Section 1.

13. This paper uses the term ‘family’ as a socially constructed concept that may include children who live with one or both biological parents or cared for in various other arrangements such as living with grandparents or extended family members, with siblings in child- or youth-headed households, or in foster care or institutional care arrangements. We also talk about ‘kinship’, ‘customary’ and ‘clan’ relationships, which indicates culturally recognized relationships defining roles and obligations between individuals and groups. In the three regions, kinship, customary and clan relationships extend far beyond those included in the conventional idea of a ‘nuclear family’.

14. For more detail on men’s perceptions of the importance of different persons in teaching what it means to be a man, see Appendix, Section 20, Table 20.1: Average importance of people in teaching what it needs to be a man.

15. As women’s agreement with the statement “women deserve to make decisions in the household” increases, agreement with the statement that “women shouldn’t be a decision maker and/or leader at work” decreases. See Appendix, Section 2.

16. As men’s agreement with the statement “women deserve to make decisions in the household” increases, their agreement with the statement that “women are encouraged to work outside their homes if it contributes to household income” increases. See Appendix, Section 2.

17. Male respondents’ support for the statement “household work and childcare needs to be done by women”, was significantly negatively correlated with whether their male family members are involved in any household work at all on a daily basis. See Appendix, Section 2.

18. A significantly large number of respondents who disagree with the statement “we need to resort to violence to keep security at the community-level” also note that they did not experience any physical violence during the conflict. See Appendix, Section 3.

19. A significantly large number of women respondents who are in unregistered marriages or in polygamous relationships also report that they “always” feel distrust of most people. See Appendix, Section 3.

20. There is no relationship between men respondents’ socioeconomic status and their agreement with the statement that “a married woman should have the same rights to work outside the home as her husband.” See Appendix, Section 4.

21. As men’s socioeconomic status decreases, their agreement with the statement that “women are encouraged to work outside their homes if it contributes to household income” increases. See Appendix, Section 4.

22. This variable is coded as a binary, capturing whether a respondent has (1) ever participated in any of the trainings/commissions asked about during the survey (a training/
workshop on peacebuilding; a formal or informal truth commission, public testimony, or peace dialogue; or a training/workshop on gender equality), or (2) not.

23. A significantly larger number of men respondents who participated in trainings/commissions (i.e. a training/ workshop on peacebuilding; a formal or informal truth commission, public testimony, or peace dialogue; or a training/workshop on gender equality) strongly agree with the statement "women have a significant role in peacebuilding." See Appendix, Section 5.

24. As men’s agreement that "as a result of the conflict, women did things that men previously had been doing [work outside of home, mingle more in public, take a leadership role in community]" increases, agreement that "women should be represented in peace talks and post-conflict peacebuilding processes" also increases. See Appendix, Section 5.

25. As one’s socioeconomic status increases, agreement with the statement "women shouldn’t be a decision-maker and/ or leader at work" decreases.

26. Gender-responsive peacebuilding identifies and responds to the effects of gender inequality and conflict – such as exclusion, stigma, gender-based violence and trauma – to ensure peace initiatives are more inclusive and beneficial for different groups of people.

27. Achievements of peacebuilding identified in this research include: safety and security of people, good governance, people participation in decision-making, welfare overcoming poverty and economic hardship, and trusting relationships at the community level. The achievements that are most agreed by respondents are ‘safety and security’ while ‘welfare overcoming poverty and economic hardship’ are the least. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.1: Achievement of peacebuilding.

28. This variable assesses whether men feel that they are able to achieve [what they feel are] important aspects of being a man [being employed, protecting their family, being a good father, being physically strong, being married, being capable of violence, solving problems without violence, being a man of faith, being empathetic to the needs of others, having good social connections, and/or having expensive goods).

29. A response by men respondents disagreeing that they are able to achieve masculine ideals is significantly positively correlated with their experiences of perpetrating physical assaults against people in the community and family members at home or sexual violence. See Appendix, Section 6.

30. This paper uses the term ‘people with diverse sexual orientations, gender identities and expressions, and sex characteristics’ [SOGIESC] in preference to LGBTIQ+. Diverse SOGIESC is preferred to LGBTIQ+ as it includes people whose lives do not fall into the categories of lesbian, bisexual, gay, transgender, intersex or queer, or people who use non-English terms to describe themselves.


36. This paper uses the term ‘post-conflict political transitions’ to describe the arrangements, usually forged between male elites, of how power is organised and exercised after conflict. Post-conflict political transitions describe a process, shaped by the peacemaking process and peace agreement outcomes, of governance transformation involving all formal and informal political, economic and cultural institutions in a society, as well as the processes, agreements and practices in which decisions are made. The power-sharing arrangements in peace agreements may indeed be able to stop violent conflict, but they can also sustain contestation between the conflict parties, perpetuating a militarized, securitized approach to peacebuilding, development and reconstruction after conflict.


40. Lee-Koo, "Gender at the Crossroad of Conflict".

41. Sanam Naraghi Anderlini and John Tirman, What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 1325 (October, 2010).

42. Gender provisions in peace agreements can seek to promote women’s inclusion in post-war institutions or integrate reforms to improve women’s rights.

43. Rohaiza A. Asi, Cate Buchanan and Irene H. Gayatri, Women at the Indonesian peace table: Enhancing the contributions of women to conflict resolution [Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010]: 1-43.

44. Makiko Kubota and Nami Takashi, Case Study on Mindanao the Philippines: Women’s Participation and Leadership in Peacebuilding [Manila, Philippines: JICA & GIKPS, 2016].


46. Stina Lundström and Shadia Marhban, Challenges and Opportunities for Female Combatants’ Post-war Community Leadership: Lessons Learnt from Aceh and Mindanao [Berghof Foundation, 2016].


48. These were identified at the National Digital Consultation on Reviewing the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in Indonesia, which was hosted by the Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN) Indonesia in collaboration with the Office of the Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister from 20 July – 31 August 2020.


50. During this three-year research project, Maguindanao was split into two provinces, Maguindanao del Sur and Maguindanao del Norte, according to Republic Act 11550, ratified through plebiscite on September 17, 2022, fully implemented in early 2023. This paper uses the name Maguindanao to describe the territory that is now the two Maguindanao provinces.

51. The Chi-square test is a statistical test used to check if two categorical variables are related or independent. Two other statistical tests were used to measure the relationships between variables: adjusted Pearson residuals measure the linear relationship between variables, and Spearman rank-order correlations measure the strength and direction of association between two ranked variables. Survey answers have not been weighted as it is assumed that they are representative.


55. See Appendix, Section 20, Table 20.2: Average importance of each factor for a man.

56. 52% of respondents from the three regions disagree with the statement that “children may be beaten to instill discipline”; 61% oppose the statement “if someone insults me I have to resort to violence to defend my reputation”; 51% disagree that “we need to resort to violence to protect our families”; 52% disagree that “we need to resort to violence to keep the security at community level”; 59% agree that “in any circumstances resort to violence is not justified”; and 67% support the statement that “we need to intervene if we witness violence against women.” See Appendix, Section 23, Table 23.5: Individual views on violence.

57. See Appendix, Section 20, Table 20.2: Average importance of each factor for a man.

58. An even split by gender is found for different statements about gender roles e.g. “men should work outside and women take care of household”, “men must be the breadwinner of the household”, “household works and childcare needs to be done by women”, “care for elderly members need to be done by women”, “childcare should be done exclusively by mothers while fathers watch school”, “women from migrant communities. The results for these differences are statistically significant for “buy the food”, “wash the dishes”, “wash and fold the clothes” and “clean up the house”. See Appendix, Section 21, Table 21.1: Perceptions about gender roles.

59. A statistically significant number of men respondents who are heads of households disagree with the statement “women deserve to make decisions in the household.” See Appendix, Section 7.

60. A significantly large number of men respondents who are heads of households agree or strongly agree with the statement that “women deserve to make decisions in the household.” Meanwhile, a significantly large number of women respondents who are heads of households agree or strongly agree with the statement that “women deserve to make decisions in the household.” See Appendix, Section 7.

61. While support among men for “women deserve to make decisions in the household” is low in the sub-regions of Aceh and Maluku, there is relatively high support for this statement among men in the Bangsamoro. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.1: Perceptions about women leadership.

62. See Appendix, Section 21, Table 21.2: Division of labor. The household chores surveyed include: buying food, preparing and cooking meals, washing dishes, washing and folding clothes, cleaning the house, and caregiving.

63. In Aceh and Maluku, women consistently exhibit higher average scores across various tasks, indicating a greater involvement in household work. In contrast, the sub-regions of the Bangsamoro show a relatively balanced distribution of household chores between men and women. See Appendix, Section 21, Table 21.3: Contribution frequency towards household work.

64. FGD with mixed gender group in Datu Abdullah Sangki, Maguindanao, 7 May 2023.


66. See Appendix, Section 20, Table 20.3: Answers to “I wish that the next generation will have a different expectation of being a man”.

67. A significantly large number of respondents with higher socioeconomic status noted that male family members are involved in household work on a daily basis (e.g. buying food, preparing food, washing dishes, washing and folding clothes, cleaning house, child/elderly care). See Appendix, Section 10.

68. As educational attainment increases, agreement with the statement that “household work and childcare needs to be done by women” decreases. See Appendix, Section 11.

69. As men’s involvement in housework (specifically preparing food) increases, agreement with the statement that “men must be the breadwinner of the household” decreases. See Appendix, Section 8.

70. Of those respondents who disagree that “women deserve to make decisions in the household”, only a small number agree that it is equally suitable for men and women to hold public positions (across eight different fields or occupations). See Appendix, Section 9.

71. This variable assesses the frequency of women from Muslim, Christian, and migrant communities in Maluku in doing six household chores (buy food, prepare and cook food, wash dishes, wash and fold clothes, clean up the house and caregiving). The results show women from Christian and Muslim communities in Ambon and Maluku Tengah are relatively less engaged in household chores than women from migrant communities. The results for these differences are statistically significant for “buy the food”, “wash the dishes”, “wash and fold the clothes” and “clean up the house”. See Appendix, Section 21, Table 21.4: Maluku migrant contributions frequency towards household work.

72. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.4: Maluku migrant perceptions about women leadership.

73. As men’s educational attainment increases, agreement with the statement that “household work and childcare needs to be done by women” decreases. See Appendix, Section 11. Further, as men’s socioeconomic status increases, agreement with the statement that “men should work outside, while women should take care of the household” decreases. See Appendix, Section 1.


75. Mazumdar and Mazumdar, “Rethinking public and private space: Religion and women in Muslim society”.

76. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.1: Perceptions about women leadership.

77. Ibid.

78. FGDs with women and men in Lanao del Sur, 29-30 April 2023, and in Maguindanao, 27 April 2023 and 7 May 2023.

79. While this is generally believed to be true, the 2009 Ampatuan massacre does not reflect this because there were more women than men victims, including a pregnant woman. This was allegedly a violent reaction of the powerful Ampatuan clan against the Mangudadatu family that wanted to challenge the Ampatuan patriarch in the local elections that year.

80. Interview with Khuzaizm Samporna Maranda, a Maranaw civil society leader, 17 June 2021.

81. In Mindanao, madaris teach Islamic values and Arabic as well as secular subjects like those offered in the Philippines public school system.

82. FGDs with women and men in Lanao del Sur, 29-30 April 2023, and in Maguindanao, 27 April 2023 and 7 May 2023.

83. A significantly large number of men respondents who experienced sexual violence during the conflict note agreement with the statement “we need to resort to violence
to keep security at the community level.” See Appendix, Section 18.

84. A significantly large number of men respondents who witnessed physical violence during the conflict note strong agreement with the statement “women and children should not be beaten even within the family.” See Appendix, Section 18.

85. There are low reports of experience of spousal violence [physical assault, threat to hurt/harm, and verbal attack] across both genders in all sub-regions. See Appendix, Section 23, Table 23.3: Spousal experience of violence.

86. For example, in Indonesia, based on 2021 National Women’s Life Experience Survey data, 26.1% or 1 in 4 women aged 15–64 years experienced violence throughout their lives. The type of violence by husbands/partners that is most often experienced by women is behavioral restrictions (30.9% during their lifetime and 22% during the last year). In terms of violence by non-partners, 8% of women had experienced physical violence, 15.4% had experienced sexual violence, and 20% of women had experienced physical and/or sexual violence. In the Philippines, the 2022 National Demographic and Health Survey showed that 18% of women have ever experienced any form of physical, sexual, or emotional violence by their current or most recent husband/intimate partner. Marital status is linked to whether a woman has ever experienced violence. 45% of women who are currently divorced, separated, or widowed have experienced violence, compared with 17% of currently married women.


88. See Appendix, Section 23, Table 23.2: Incidence of violence.

89. See Appendix, Section 23, Table 23.2: Incidence of violence.


91. See Appendix, Section 23, Table 23.4: Exercise of violence in the past 12 months.

92. See Appendix, Section 23, Table 23.1: Perceptions about domestic violence.


94. FGDs with women in communities in the Bangsamoro, February–May 2023.

95. FGD with women in Langgur, Kei Island, 15 February 2023.

96. A significantly large number of women respondents who are in unregistered marriages and/or polygamous relationships note that they have experienced marital violence. See Appendix, Section 12.

97. A significantly large number of women respondents who are in unregistered marriages or in polygamous relationships report that they “always” feel distrust of most people. See Appendix, Section 3.


99. Mental health indicators were measured using direct reporting on experiences of being alone or wanting to be alone around people, loss of motivation to do anything, distrust of most people, desire to die, fear of own safety, fear of family safety, desire to attack people verbally, and desire to attack people physically. See Appendix, Section 25, Table 25.1: Mental health problems.

100. Results of FGDs and KII with women and men from communities in Aceh and Maluku, January–March 2023.

101. FGD with a women’s group in Langgur, Kei Island, February 2023.

102. FGDs with women and men in Banda Aceh and Pidie, March 2023.

103. FGD with women and men in Pidie, March 2023.

104. FGD with men from communities in Pidie, March 2023.

105. Byron Good, Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, Jesse Grayman and Matthew Lakoma, Psychosocial Needs Assessment of Communities Affected by the Conflict in the District of Pidie, Bireuen and Aceh Utara [Jakarta: Institute of Migration, 2006].

106. FGDs with women and men from communities in Aceh Besar, Pidie, and Central Aceh, March 2023.


110. Male household heads agree more with the statements “I don’t want to have female bosses” and “women should not be decision-makers and/or leaders at work” compared to female household heads. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.5: Individual perceptions about women leadership by gender. Male household heads agree less with the statement “a married woman should have the same rights to work outside the home as her husband” compared to female household heads. See Appendix, Section 21, Table 21.5: Individual views about women having rights to work.

111. See Appendix, Section 21, Table 21.5: Individual views about women having rights to work.

112. A significantly large number of married women respondents note that they are not working because they are not allowed to, relative to other women. See Appendix, Section 13.

113. On average, there is less agreement with “I do not want to have female bosses” and “women should not be a decision-maker” for both genders across all sub-regions. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.2: Perceptions about women leadership at work.

114. See Appendix, Section 20, Table 20.2: Average importance of each factor for a man. FGDs with women and men from communities in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro, February–June 2023.

115. FGDs with women and men from communities in Maguindanao, 27 April 2023 and 7 May 2023, and Lanao del Sur, 29-30 April 2023.

116. As men’s socioeconomic status increases, agreement with the statement that “women are encouraged to work outside their homes if it contributes to household income” decreases. See Appendix, Section 14.

117. FGDs with male communities in Ambon and Buru, February–March 2023.

118. As men’s socioeconomic status increases, agreement with the statement that “men should work outside, and women take care of the household” decreases. See Appendix, Section 1.

119. FGD joint analysis workshop with local partners in Kamakura, May 2023.

120. A significantly large number of women respondents who are working have undergraduate or post-graduate educational attainment. See Appendix, Section 15.

121. FGDs with women communities in Maluku and the Bangsamoro, February–June 2023.

122. As women’s socioeconomic status increases, agreement with the statement that “women are encouraged to work outside their homes if it contributes to household income” increases. See Appendix, Section 14.

123. FGDs with women and men from communities in Maguindanao, 27 April 2023 and 7 May 2023, and Lanao del Sur, 29-30 April 2023.

124. As acknowledgement of shifting gender roles during conflict increases, agreement with the statement that “women have a significant role in peacebuilding” increases. See Appendix, Section 16.

125. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.2: Gender roles in peacebuilding, where the average percentages were calculated from all sub-regions in Aceh, Maluku and the Bangsamoro.

126. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.3: Perceptions about gender roles in peacebuilding. Over 70% of all respondents agree men should lead peacebuilding efforts.
127. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.3: Perceptions about gender roles in peacebuilding. 79% of men support women holding leadership roles and agree they perform well.
128. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.2: Gender roles in peacebuilding.
129. A significantly large number of respondents who have ever participated in training/commissions in the Bangsamoro disagree with the statement that “men should work outside, while women should take care of the household.” See Appendix, Section 17.
130. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.2: Perceptions about women leadership at work. In all three regions, there is a low average proportion of men and women who agree with the statement “women should not be a decision-maker” (below 40% in Aceh, below 25% in Maluku, and below 45% in the Bangsamoro).
131. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.3: Perceptions about gender roles in peacebuilding.
133. FGDs with women and men from communities in Maguindanao, 27 April 2023 and 7 May 2023, and Lanao del Sur, 29-30 April 2023.
134. This nuance was revealed during FGDs with women and men from communities in Aceh.
135. FGDs with women and men from communities in Aceh.
136. FGD with men and women in the Bangsamoro and FGD with men and women stakeholders in Central Aceh.
137. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.2: Perceptions about women leadership at work.
138. See Appendix, Section 22, Table 22.3: Perceptions about assuming leadership positions.
140. FGD with a women’s group in Kei Island, Langgur, 15 February 2023.
141. Interview with the director of women-led CSO, Ambon, 10 March 2023.
142. The tarsila is a genealogy that traces one’s lineage to the royal families of Shariff Kabungsuan, from the royal house of Johore, who is believed to have introduced Islam to mainland Mindanao communities (Maguindanao and Lanao provinces) and to Sharif Makhum, who established the first mosque in Tawi-Tawi in the early 12th century.
143. FGDs with women and men in Lanao del Sur, 29-30 April 2023, and Maguindanao, 27 April 2023 and 7 May 2023.
144. A significantly large number of respondents who have ever participated in training/commissions note strong agreement with the statement that “women have a significant role in peacebuilding.” See Appendix, Section 17.
145. A significantly large number of respondents who have ever participated in training/commissions note strong agreement with the statement that “women should be represented in peace talks and post-conflict peacebuilding processes.” See Appendix, Section 17.
146. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.1: Achievement of peacebuilding, and Section 24, Table 24.2: Gender roles in peacebuilding.
147. FGDs with men and women in Aceh and Ambon, January-March 2023.
148. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.4: Participation in peacebuilding training. An average of 62% of all Bangsamoro respondents attended gender equality training.
149. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.1: Achievement of peacebuilding.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
154. See Appendix, Section 24, Table 24.1: Achievement of peacebuilding.
155. FGD with mixed gender group in Ambon, 7 February 2023.
159. FGDs with communities in Maluku and Aceh, January-March 2023. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Integrating MHPPS and peacebuilding: a mapping and recommendations for practitioners (2024).
161. As educational attainment decreases, agreement with the statement that “we need to resort to violence, to keep the security at community level” increases. See Appendix, Section 19.
163. FGD with mixed group in Ambon, 7 February 7 2023.
166. FGD with mixed groups in Kei Island, Langgur, 15 February 2023.
168. FGD with local stakeholders and workshops with local partners in Aceh and Maluku, January-June 2023.
170. FGDs with men and women from communities in Aceh, February-June 2023.
171. FGDs in Aceh, February to June, 2023 and joint analysis workshop with local partners, Kamakura, May 2023.


Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). *Integrating MHPSS and peacebuilding: a mapping and recommendations for practitioners* (2024).


