Chronology
of War and Peace in Mozambique

Nationalist Struggle

1962 The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) is founded in the Tanzanian capital Dar-es-Salaam with Dr. Eduardo Mondlane as its first president.

1964 Frelimo launches an armed struggle in northern Mozambique to achieve independence from Portugal.

1969 Mondlane is assassinated by a parcel bomb in Dar-es-Salaam. Suspicion falls on Frelimo dissidents and the Portuguese Secret Service.

1970 After an internal power struggle, Samora Machel is elected the next Frelimo president.

1972 Guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) begin operations against the minority government of Rhodesia from bases in Frelimo-controlled areas of Mozambique.

1974 A military coup d'état in Portugal brings to power officers who favour independence for the country's African colonies. A transitional government in Mozambique is formed with Joaquim Chissano serving as prime minister to prepare the country for independence.

Regional Realignment

1975 Mozambique declares its independence, with Samora Machel sworn in as President and Chissano named Minister of Foreign Affairs. The government sets into motion the first of its ambitious reforms which involve nationalisation, 'villagisation' and policies to reduce the influence of the church and the political opposition.

1976 Mozambique closes its border with Rhodesia in support of Zanla and UN sanctions against the minority regime. The obscure Africa Livre movement, with some support in Malawi, begins attacks on government establishments in northern Mozambique.

1977 Frelimo declares itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and turns towards the Soviet Union for support. The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR, later Renamo) is established by the Rhodesian government and commences activities inside Mozambique to destabilise the Frelimo government and attack Zanla guerrillas.

1978 Guerrillas loyal to the African National Congress (ANC) step up their attacks on apartheid South Africa from bases in southern Mozambique. With the rise to power of military figures in the South African government, foreign policy shifts towards destabilising the Southern
African 'Front Line States' (FLS) to force them into the South African economic sphere and punish them for supporting the ANC.

1979 Renamo’s first leader, André Matsangaissa, is killed by government soldiers in a clash in Gorongosa, Sofala province. Following a violent succession struggle, Afonso Dhlakama becomes the new Renamo leader. The Lancaster House agreement brings an end to the civil war in Rhodesia.

1980 Control of Renamo is transferred to the South African military which begins to build up the rebel movement. The new majority-led government in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) signs a security co-operation agreement with Mozambique to defend its trade routes to the Indian Ocean and to destroy Renamo. First meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) is held in Maputo.

The War Intensifies

1981 After a year of relative calm, a revitalised Renamo starts infiltrating from South Africa and, over time, becomes active in nine out of ten Mozambican provinces. The rebels target symbols of government services, including clinics and schools. The South African Defence Force (SADF) also launches raids into Mozambique, attacking economic infrastructures and ANC bases. Africa Livre is absorbed into Renamo.

1982 The war and growing drought threaten widespread famine in Mozambique’s southern and central provinces, displacing large numbers of people. The war escalates in Gaza, Inhambane and Zambezia provinces, paralysing the transport corridors linking Malawi and Zimbabwe to the sea. Zimbabwe sends 1,000 troops to protect the Beira corridor. Subsidiaries of the UK-based multi-national, Lonrho, sign secret agreements with Renamo leaders to protect their assets.

1983 Frelimo launches ‘Operation Production’, forcibly relocating tens of thousands of urban unemployed to rural areas. Despite its Marxist credentials, Mozambique is refused membership of Comecon, the economic co-operation body of the Soviet bloc. With the threat of famine growing in the south, the government, under pressure from the US, begins peace negotiations with South Africa. Orlando Cristina, Renamo’s first secretary-general, is murdered at a Renamo base in South Africa. After a bitter power struggle, he is replaced by Edo Fernandes, a Goanese with strong Portuguese as well as South African connections.

1984 Tens of thousands of Mozambicans are estimated dead due to famine. Mozambique and South Africa sign the ‘Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact’, committing each to ensure that their territory is not used as a base for attacks against the other. Talks between the government and Renamo break down and the rebel group escalates its activities in Mozambique. The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) sets up its Peace and Reconciliation Commission and begins to explore constructive avenues for dialogue.

1985 Faced with a decline in external support, Renamo changes its strategies and adopts more predatory activities against civilians. Zimbabwe increases its forces in Mozambique to 10,000. Initial efforts by the CCM to secure government backing for low-key dialogue with Renamo fail. While South Africa publicly disassociates itself from Renamo, evidence emerges of continuing support from conservative and military elements within the government.

1986 Under pressure from the Front Line States, Malawi expels Renamo forces operating from its territory. The influx of rebels into Mozambique’s northern provinces causes an upsurge in violence forcing tens of thousands of refugees into Malawi. The Frelimo government signs new agreements with Tanzania and Zimbabwe leading to increased mili-
artial military deployment from both countries inside Mozambique. While continuing to enjoy significant levels of Soviet aid, government forces also receive British military training in Zimbabwe. On his return from a FLS summit, President Machel is killed in a mysterious plane crash over South Africa. Joaquim Chissano, who replaces him, remains committed, at least publicly, to a military solution to the war.

1987 The United Nations raises US $330 million of emergency assistance for Mozambique, now ranked the world’s poorest country. Large massacres in Inhambane and Gaza provinces are attributed to Renamo. A joint Renamo/South African offensive in Zambézia province brings the country to the brink of collapse, but is repelled by the Mozambican army with Zimbabwean and Tanzanian support. Chissano publicly denounces church calls for dialogue with Renamo but secretly explores the possibility of church leaders establishing contact with the rebels. In the face of military stalemate and looming economic catastrophe, Mozambique launches a harsh ‘structural adjustment’ programme under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Search for a Settlement

1988 January-March
The CCM and the Catholic Archbishop of Maputo meet Renamo’s US wing in an attempt to initiate dialogue, but find it out of touch with developments on the ground.

April
A US State Department report implicates Renamo in the death of 100,000 Mozambicans. Epo Fernandes, Renamo’s secretary-general, is murdered in Lisbon by the Mozambican secret service. Bethuel Kiplagat, an envoy of Kenya’s President Moi, consults with Chissano on possible Kenyan involvement in the peace process.

May
The government refuses to give Renamo political recognition but resumes talks with South Africa on common security and economic issues. CCM and Catholic Church leaders seek dialogue with Renamo through the Kenyan authorities. Mozambican churchmen, including Jaime Gonçalves, Catholic Archbishop of Beira, meet Dhlakama without Chissano’s consent at his Gorongosa headquarters.

June-August
With a major Mozambican/Zimbabwean/Tanzanian offensive underway in Zambézia, the churchmen report to Chissano that only negotiations with the internal wing of Renamo are likely to bear fruit. Frelimo announces the return of all church property nationalised in the 1970s.

September-October
In Mozambique, Pope John Paul II echoes Gonçalves’ call for reconciliation but Chissano remains publicly hostile to face-to-face talks with Renamo. South African President P.W. Botha formally repeats his government’s pledge to abide by the Nkomati accord; economic and military cooperation between Mozambique and South Africa is stepped up.

November
The churches’ peace initiative becomes public and Chissano mandates the Peace and Reconciliation Commission, headed by Anglican Bishop of Lebombo Dinis Sengulane, to talk to Renamo leaders about accepting amnesty.

December
Moi sends Kiplagat to meet Dhlakama in Gorongosa. Soon after, the CCM travel to Nairobi to formally request a meeting with Dhlakama. Tanzania withdraws the majority of its troops from Mozambique.

1989 January-February
In the presence of Kenyan facilitators, CCM and Catholic churchmen meet Renamo representatives sent to Nairobi by Dhlakama. Informal meetings also take place in Harare between Renamo and the Zimbabwean authorities. As the Nairobi initiative gains momentum, proposals from South Africa’s Foreign Minister ‘Pik’ Botha for formal peace talks involving South Africa, Mozambique, the US and the USSR are shelved.
March-May
With the number of people in need of emergency famine relief rising to an estimated seven million, Renamo announces a unilateral ceasefire in some areas to allow access to relief agencies. In Zimbabwe, opposition grows to the deployment of troops in Mozambique.

June
Renamo convenes its first 'Party Congress' in Mozambique as it begins the slow task of transforming itself from a rebel army into a political party.

July
At its Fifth Party Congress, Frelimo drops its Marxist-Leninist designation and widens its programme of political and economic reform. It issues a document containing '12 Principles for Dialogue' which are preconditions for direct talks with Renamo. Presidents Mugabe and Moi become joint facilitators at the Nairobi talks between Dhlakama's delegation and the churchmen. On the eve of his departure for Nairobi, Dhlakama is nearly killed in a joint attack on Gorongosa by Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops.

August
After deferring for five months, Dhlakama leads a Renamo delegation to Nairobi. The rebels deny responsibility for human rights atrocities and respond to the government's 12 principles for peace with their own '16 Point Declaration'. With these talks and a second round failing to make headway, Lonrho chief executive 'Tiny' Rowland meets Kiplagat to promote his own initiative for direct dialogue between Renamo and Frelimo. In South Africa, the inauguration of President F.W. de Klerk undercuts the role of the military in supporting Renamo and the rebel group is further isolated.

September-November
Rowland gains Portuguese backing for his role in the peace process and transports Kiplagat to South Africa for talks with foreign minister 'Pik' Botha. Exploiting links with Archbishop Gonçalves and the Italian government, the Sant' Egidio lay community starts to promote direct talks in Rome between Renamo and the government.

December
'Pik' Botha is flown in a Lonrho jet to meet with Moi in Nairobi. Separately, representatives of the Mozambican government and Renamo also hold talks with the Kenyan government. In Nairobi, US State Department officials present Dhlakama with a new seven-point peace proposal. Though initially rejected, it later re-emerges as the basis of a new proposal for direct talks presented to Dhlakama and Chissano in a secret letter from Moi and Mugabe.

January-February
Chissano circulates the draft of a new constitution for public review in anticipation of free elections in 1991. A Portuguese mission to Malawi fails to secure a Chissano-Dhlakama summit in Lisbon. In South Africa, the ANC is legalised and its leader, Nelson Mandela, is released from prison.

March
Kiplagat accompanies Dhlakama to Malawi for discussions with President Hastings Banda. Dhlakama then travels to Rome for talks with members of Sant' Egidio and officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Sant' Egidio assures Dhlakama of parity of status in any dialogue it might facilitate, while the Italian government expresses its willingness to finance peace talks held on its soil. Chissano meets US President George Bush in Washington and affirms his readiness to talk directly with Renamo.

April-June
Chissano again rejects Lisbon as a venue for direct talks, while Renamo continues to favour Nairobi. Dhlakama and Kiplagat are flown to Blantyre, Malawi, in a Lonrho jet on 11 June for talks with a Mozambican delegation. These discussions fail to materialise, however, due to Dhlakama's reservations about security and the neutrality of the Malawian authorities.

July
The first direct meeting since Nkomati between delegations of the Mozambican government and Renamo takes place in Rome. Archbishop Gonçalves acts as an observer to these talks, together with two representatives of Sant' Egidio and an
Italian socialist parliamentarian. The two sides adopt a joint communiqué expressing their common interest in ending the war.

August-October
A second round of direct talks founders in the face of Renamo insistence that Kenya mediate future negotiations. The parties eventually agree to upgrade the four existing ‘observers’ to the status of official mediators. The US offers Sant’ Egidio technical support for the negotiations. Renamo promises Malawi it will cease attacks on the Nacala transport corridor.

November
The Mozambican legislature approves the new constitution which lays the basis for a multiparty political system, universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, the right to strike and a market economy. As a third round of talks gets under way in Rome, US assistant secretary of state for African affairs Herman Cohen presses Dhlakama to engage more meaningfully.

December
An agreement is signed establishing a partial ceasefire in Mozambique and granting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) permission to undertake humanitarian operations throughout the country. An international Joint Verification Commission (JVC) is set up in Maputo to monitor the agreement. Progress at round four of the Rome talks is hindered due to Renamo complaints that the government is advancing ‘unilaterally’ with political reforms. Zambia’s President Kaunda presses Dhlakama to meet Chissano face-to-face. Dhlakama refuses, but gives Kaunda a list of his preconditions for such talks.

1991 January-April
After it is accused of ceasefire violations, Renamo calls into question the neutrality of the JVC. The rebels also refuse ICRC access to the Tete corridor. The fifth round of the Rome talks ends in deadlock. Dhlakama calls for all Zimbabwean troops to withdraw from Mozambique and threatens to break the ceasefire decisively.

Renewed attacks in the Nacala corridor lead to the resumption of talks between Renamo and the Malawian government.

May-July
Round six of negotiations commences. The mediators draft a protocol of basic principles for future talks after an agenda is agreed which defers to Renamo pressure to address military issues after central political questions have been resolved. The ICRC presses for the establishment of ‘safe havens’ for humanitarian operations in Renamo-held territory.

August-September
The seventh round of talks is suspended after the government claims the mediators’ protocol might violate Mozambican national sovereignty. The Renamo delegation returns to Gorongosa expressing disillusion with the peace process. A meeting is called in Malawi between two of the mediators, Malawian officials and Dhlakama. Renamo drops its insistence on a post-ceasefire transitional government, but proposes that key government ministries are brought under UN control until elections. The UN reject this proposal.

October-November
Mozambican churchmen appeal for an immediate ceasefire, blaming both sides for prolonging the conflict. Round eight of the Rome talks produces two protocols establishing mutual political recognition, a role for the UN in monitoring compliance with the peace agreement, the sole authority of the government to oversee organisation of the elections, and the right of Renamo to begin party political activities with the signing of a General Peace Agreement (GPA).

December
Renamo holds its second party congress in Gorongosa, funded by the Italian government. In the face of extreme drought, the morale and command structures of the Mozambican army collapse in many areas. At the ninth round of the Rome talks, the mediators present a draft proposal for an electoral law protocol. Meanwhile, US officials instigate informal discussions between the parties on military issues, but fail to secure an end-of-year truce.
1992 January-May
The third protocol of the GPA is signed in Rome. With US encouragement, Dhlakama agrees to defer discussion of the new constitution until after military issues have been addressed. Dhlakama continues to resist US pressure for a truce to ease relief distribution, fearing the Mozambican army will exploit this militarily. ‘Tiny’ Rowland facilitates a meeting between Dhlakama and Mugabe in Malawi but a second attempt to bring the two together in London is frustrated. The CCM presses Dhlakama and Chissano to ‘summitise’ the Rome talks.

June
In round eleven of the Rome talks, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations are granted observer status. Renamo is assured that constitutional issues will be addressed before negotiation of a final ceasefire, but continues to complain that the JVC is biased in favour of the government.

July
Under pressure from the ICRC, Renamo and the government sign an agreement permitting the use of all Mozambican roads and air space for humanitarian operations. A committee is established to oversee implementation of this agreement, but is delayed because the Renamo member fails to take his seat. Talks in Botswana, facilitated by Rowland and President Masire, lead to a rapprochement between Mugabe and Dhlakama. The latter expresses a willingness for a summit with Chissano and Mugabe promises to assist Renamo’s political transformation.

August
Chissano and Dhlakama meet for the first time in Rome, initially in the presence of Mugabe and Rowland, but later with the official mediators and observers. Dhlakama receives personal assurances of security and continued support for Renamo from Mugabe. Subsequently, he and Chissano sign a joint declaration committing themselves to the spirit of established protocols and ensuring that agreed constitutional guarantees will be adopted as law before a final peace agreement is signed.

The twelfth and final round of negotiations reaches stalemate over the size of the new army and the status of the State Information and Security Service (SISE), which Renamo wants abolished. The mediators dispatch letters to Chissano and Dhlakama, signed by their representatives in Rome, requesting urgent action.

September
‘Tiny’ Rowland, with Mugabe’s support, engineers a second Chissano-Dhlakama summit in Botswana at which a breakthrough is reached on outstanding political issues. Chissano requests UN financial support for reintegrating refugees, demobilising soldiers, forming the new army and organising elections.

October
With Dhlakama, Chissano and Mugabe in Rome, the delegations carry out a line-by-line review of all the agreed protocols. The General Peace Agreement (GPA) is then signed on 4 October. The UN is invited to monitor and verify implementation and, after ceasefire violations are reported, deploys two teams of military observers to Nampula and Beira.

November-December
The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) is established, including both government and Renamo delegates and charged with overall responsibility for overseeing implementation of the GPA. Dhlakama agrees to the continued presence of Zimbabwean troops along the Beira corridor pending the arrival of UN forces. A donors meeting in Rome pledge nearly US $400 million of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to support the peace process. Renamo seeks additional funds from the Italian government. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is formally established with a broad mandate, which includes organising elections, initially scheduled for October 1993.
Re-establishing Political Stability

1993 As ONUMOZ units are gradually deployed to verify the ceasefire, Zimbabwean and Malawian troops are fully withdrawn from Mozambique. Renamo leaders press for more financial assistance and political concessions, stalling the peace process for three months. At Italy’s request, a UN trust fund is set up to finance Renamo’s transformation. International pledges for reconstruction assistance reach US $520 million. In the face of tensions between Renamo and Frelimo and a slow deployment of ONUMOZ, elections are postponed until October 1994. The cantonnement of combatants prior to demobilisation commences in strategic assembly areas. The Mozambican churches continue to play a key role in brokering local ceasefires and defusing community tensions.

1994 Despite difficult conditions and riots, demobilisation of both sides’ combatants is finally completed and a new army is formed. An estimated 81 per cent of eligible voters are registered for elections. A last-minute threat by Dhlakama to boycott the polls is reversed after pressure from the UN, the CSC, Mugabe and South Africa’s newly-elected President, Nelson Mandela. The elections take place on 27-29 October. Frelimo wins a slim majority in the Assembly, while Chissano is re-elected President. An all-Frelimo cabinet is appointed, still dominated by southerners, but with higher technical qualifications than previous administrations and an improved balance of age, ethnicity and gender. The mandate of ONUMOZ expires in December.

Postscript 1997

Five years after the ending of the war, and three years after elections, many ex-fighters continue to nurse grievances due to the few economic opportunities open to them and the lack of recognition of their contribution to the war and the suffering they endured. This said, the process of reintegration has been relatively successful and most fighters do not pose an immediate threat to their local communities.

With the next national elections only two years away, and the immense stakes this represents, relations between Frelimo and Renamo still swing back and forth between cooperation and confrontation. Soon after the elections, the government rejected Renamo’s wish to appoint provincial governors where it had won majorities. In late 1997, disillusionment among the former rebels was further compounded by the postponement of local elections, now due in mid-1998. Some former Renamo zones remain practically off-limits to the government and ‘dual’ local authorities have persisted in some areas, where Renamo administrators appointed under the Rome accords unofficially retain their functions. Despite its status as the official opposition, Renamo is still faced with extensive debts and its organisation, especially at local level, remains in tatters.

Foreign aid constitutes around 60 per cent of the Mozambican national budget. While the country remains a darling of the donor community, the ethics and efficacy of the economic adjustment policies spearheaded by the IMF have been widely questioned. Questions also remain concerning how the country will manage if aid dries up.