Discussion paper:
‘Normalization’ after a peace agreement
Reflections for dialogue in Mindanao

Kristian Herbolzheimer, August 4, 2012

The challenge

One of the most complex issues in a peace process is to help people in the transition from war to peace. After decades of confrontation hundreds of thousands of men, women and children, combatants and non-combatants, need to adjust to the new circumstances. There is a need to rebuild not only the damaged infrastructure but, especially, the damaged relations. Former enemies need to look at each other without fear nor hatred. The psychological wounds of war need to be healed. Those who have turned war into a way of living will seek to join the formal economy. Weapons need to be destroyed. Government will be able to invest more money in social development instead of defense budget, which usually entails a downsizing of the Army forces and a broader Security Sector Reform.

Mindanao already faced a similar challenge back in 1996, after the Government and the MNLF signed the ‘Final Peace Agreement’. Many lessons can be learned from that experience.

The United Nations has traditionally called this a DDR process (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration). But in places where the UN does not take the lead the process receives other names. In Mindanao the Government and the MILF have agreed on the term of ‘normalization’, which is less technical and more friendly and comprehensive than DDR: ‘normalization’ alludes to hardcore security as well as to human security and even economic development.

This document does not offer any ready-made responses to the challenges in Mindanao. Instead, it describes lessons from previous experiences as well as international trends and developments. The goal is to provide references to stimulate a creative, inclusive and context-specific discussion by concerned actors in Mindanao and the Philippines.

Questions for the Mindanao peace process

- What are the social and economic challenges in Mindanao in moving from war to peace?
- How deep are the psychosocial wounds of the conflict and how can they best be addressed?
- What is the best way to address the proliferation of fire-arms?
- What is the professional future of the members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF)?
- Is there a need for a formal BIAF demobilization? Or can an alternative approach be implemented?
- How much do the Armed Forces need to downsize their troops? What sort of re-deployment is needed and when is the right timing for that?
- What sort of security is needed after the conflict? Who will provide it? How can security-providers be held accountable to local communities?

1 Conciliation Resources drafted this document as a contribution to discussions at the negotiating table between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). After the signing of a Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (October 15 2012) CR decided to publish this and other related Discussion Papers, to trigger further dialogue on the implementation of the Agreement.
International trends and developments

Armed conflicts are dynamic processes that change over time. The peace responses have to adjust accordingly.

During the cold War many armed confrontations were proxy wars between the East and the West. The UN was unable to perform its peacemaking duties due to lack of consensus and only some 10 peace agreements were signed between 1946 and 1988.

By the end of the Cold War countries did not go to war against each other as in the past but instead faced internal confrontations between the State and rebel groups. The UN was now able to play a bigger role and developed its peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding capacities. 144 peace agreements were signed between 1989 and 2005, with significant international mediation. The number of armed conflicts and human casualties went down by more than half. Peaceful settlements of armed conflict became mainstream, and international and local capacities to build peace increased significantly.

This wealth of experience has offered a number of lessons, but transition from war to peace remains a fragile development. The challenges are still huge, especially when it comes to implementing agreements. Most peace processes don’t meet the expectations and the global challenge therefore is to improve the quality, that is, being able to deliver. In this quest for improvement there is a need to carefully analyse shortcomings and to be creative and innovative. There is no ready recipe to a successful implementation as each process has to respond to local circumstances.

Initially the efforts to changing the security paradigm were focused on the combatants and their weapons. But over the years the focus has moved to a broader human security framework, paying attention also to the needs of conflict-affected communities.

In most cases the international community has played a key role in peacekeeping and other related activities. The UN has played a leading role, but other regional organisations, countries, and also NGOs are increasingly playing a more active role. There is a trend towards more hybrid missions (like the International Contact Group and the International Monitoring Team), combining diplomats and NGOs, international and local actors.

The objectives of DDR/normalisation are very context-specific. In any case they have wide implications, ranging from short-term priorities (security) to long-term endeavours (development). The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR has identified the following goals:

1. To contribute to security and stability. This is the priority of any peace agreement and people expect post-agreement developments to rapidly lead to a decrease of violence and suffering. Unfortunately violence reduction is not always related to agreement implementations. In several countries violence has even increased above war-time levels (El Salvador, South Africa).
2. To return a sense of trust in relations between combating factions and the population in general. Normalisation is often referred to as a confidence-building measure: confidence among the conflicting parties as well as confidence between fighters and the broader

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population. In absence of trust in the peace process people may have the temptations to arm themselves out of fear, and thus ignite a new cycle of violence.

3. To help prevent or mitigate further conflicts. If arms are easily available, structures of command still in place, and former fighters don't find a way back to civilian life, the risk of renewed violence is high. A proper normalisation process is essential in the quest for peace.

4. To contribute to national reconciliation. The wounds of violent conflict may be profound and difficult to heal. Despite becoming a priority for post-conflict rehabilitation, reconciliation is an extremely complex challenge. A successful normalisation-process may help address this complexity.

5. To free human and financial resources for reconstruction and development. In times of peace, provisions to sustain fighting forces can be addressed to social needs instead. Most people in conflict-affected areas will need to perceive a ‘peace-dividend’ in order to believe and thus support and commit to the peace process.

Key concepts:

According to the UN:

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population.

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) can be defined as ‘the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security and justice.’ In post-conflict situations SSR is a broad framework that can encompass a number of instruments including:

• DDR
• Combating Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
• Transitional Justice
• Strengthening the rule of law
• Demining
• Fighting trafficking in human beings, weapons and drugs
• Good practices for the security sector

To apply this instruments in a stand-alone manner would not suit the requirements of SSR. Only by integrating all instruments and combine them with democratic oversight can SSR influence the security situation substantially and sustainably and prevent the region from a flare up of the armed conflict.

Other sources: [http://www.ssrnetwork.net/about/what_is_ss.php](http://www.ssrnetwork.net/about/what_is_ss.php)

Transitional Justice. As a political transition unfolds after a period of violence or repression, a society is often confronted with a difficult legacy of human rights abuses. Refers to the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with

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differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.

Increasingly, these approaches are used in combination to achieve a more comprehensive and far-reaching sense of justice. Each country situation is unique and, therefore, might require a different set of complementary measures.

**Lessons from past experiences in the Philippines**

As early as 1993 the National Unification Commission (NUC) identified as one of its six “paths to peace” the need for reconciliation, reintegration of former combatants, and rehabilitation of conflict-affected communities.

This ‘RRR’ approach has been implemented in different degrees with the armed groups that have entered or concluded peace negotiations with the Government. Agreements have most often included provisions related to rehabilitation, and in the case of MNLF and CPLA also of integration into AFP, PNP or special forces.

**Table 4: Reintegation and rehabilitation provisions in agreements with different armed groups.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Provisions for Reintegration</th>
<th>Rehabilitation and development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPLA</td>
<td>Mount Data Peace Accord, 1986. MOA 2011.</td>
<td>264 combatants integrated in AFP and 528 in CAFGU in late 80s. Provisions for economic reintegration of 1,221 CPLA members, and integration of further 120 combatants in AFP (2012). The 2011 MOA considers the transformation of the CBA-CPLA into a socio-economic organization, and includes provisions for community, inter-municipal and inter-barangay development projects. There is also a provision to document the CBA-CPLA struggle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations:**

- The Government has signed major peace agreements with three armed groups.
- The focus in these agreements has been on immediate assistance to former combatants and economic rehabilitation of conflict-affected communities.
- A common feature in all three agreements has been the slow pace (or lack of) implementation.

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4 Biggest donors have been: Japan, UN Multi Donor Assistance Program (MDAP), USAID.
Disarmament and demobilization were considered touchy issues during GPH-MNLF negotiations and therefore not addressed in the peace agreement. Many former combatants were allowed to keep their arms. The integration component of the Agreement between GRP and MNLF is generally acknowledged as the least problematic or most successful aspect of the implementation of the 1996 Agreement.

The Regional Internal Security Force described in the GPH-MNLF peace agreement was never established. Amnesties have been common and there have been limited developments in terms of transitional justice. Weapons recovery programmes have had limited impact. Arms proliferation (in Mindanao as elsewhere in the world) is considered one of the major impediments for human development. Although women played a prominent role in the MNLF, they were not consulted in the discussions on normalisation and the ensuing programmes had no specific focus for addressing their needs and concerns.

Design and implementation of a normalisation process

The way DDR is handled can significantly influence the outcome of peace processes and contribute to their success or failure.

Ideally DDR should allow several stakeholders to take part in it, especially those that might be called to play a role in the implementation of the agreement. As with the overall peace process: the more inclusive the better. Donors might also be more willing to early provision of funds and commit to a sustained contribution if they have had the opportunity to be close to the process.

Since the options of implementation are extremely broad, the design of the process becomes an essential component. Some essential steps include:

- Agree on objectives, target groups, criteria for eligibility, priorities, etc.
- Identify a baseline and agree on a monitoring and evaluation process.
- Suggest implementing agencies (national, international, both).
- Design monitoring, conflict-solving and evaluating mechanisms.
- Develop a budget (and appeal for donors).
- Schedule the implementation. Timing and sequencing is essential.
- Draft a strategy of communication to the public opinion.

Disarmament


6 Coronel, Miriam (1999). Integration of MNLF Forces into the PNP and AFP. Integration without Demobilization and Disarmament. UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies.


8 "The presence of United Nations is common in countries with DDR programmes, either through formal missions (dependant on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the Department of Political Affairs) or through UN agencies, most often coordinated by UNDP." "Other ad hoc bodies have been created in Aceh (AMM) and Afghanistan (ISAF)." Carames, Albert; Eneko Sanz, DDR 2008. Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes in the World during 2007. Escola de Cultura de Pau, Barcelona, 2008, p. 13.
Weapons often carry a symbolic, ideological and psychological significance that far exceed their objective military utility, making questions of disarmament particularly resistant to deal-making and compromise.9

Weapons are the main symbol of violent power. Weapon-holders feel safe and strong and contribute to develop a culture of violence that may become one of the main obstacles in the transition to peace. Weapon-holders also know that the main reason for the other party to engage in talks is often precisely the harm they can do with their weapons. In other words: without weapons they would be powerless. This is precisely the reason why armed actors are reluctant to hand over their weapons before the other side has shown definite signs of commitment.

Disarmament also conveys a strong symbolic message to the overall population that the parties are resolved to desist from using violence.

Technically disarmament consists of 4 phases:

**Registration** of weapons takes place once the troops have withdrawn to an area of assembly, and is an essential step to keep track both on the weapons once the disarmament is over, as well as to monitor any other weapons that might “appear” later in the process.

**Collection** is the actual hand-over of arms. In most cases it requires the presence of a neutral third party to avoid any perception of surrender. When the handing-over of arms is public and transparent, the general awareness and confidence in the peace process increases. The number of weapons that are handed in is usually low. Ratios of recent disarmament processes range from 0.18 in Nepal to 0.77 in Afghanistan10. Several arguments explain these low figures. In many cases not all weapons surface; actually collection often includes old and damaged weapons, while some of the newest and best arsenal remains hidden. It is also important to take into consideration that not all militants wear weapons: armed groups need a strong logistical support consisting of unarmed collaborators. In addition to that, in some cases (as in Mindanao) combatants rotate from armed “service” to civilian activities (like when combatants are farmers who at some point have to take care of their crops). Not all combatants who demobilize are on duty at the same time.

Collected arms will have to be **stored** in a safe place until their final destination. Where the arms will be stored and who has access to them is another important topic of discussion.

Final destination is either destruction or reuse. To further close the cycle of symbolism destruction is a preferred option. There are too many cases in which weapons have ended up in the wrong hands when not destroyed. El Salvador and South Africa are cases in point, where violence after the peace agreement even increased above levels during armed confrontations. About 250,000 people die every year due to gun homicide and suicide in countries that are “at peace”11, more than due to armed conflict.12

Several methods of destruction are available, from dumping them into the sea to shredding them into small pieces. Weapons are sometimes also melted and converted into some kind of monument in remembrance of all the harm they did.

**Comprehensive disarming**

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9 Waszink, 6.
“Collecting and destroying guns will not reduce arms availability in the long-term unless accompanied by measures aimed at reducing people’s desire for weapons, as well as their ability to acquire them.”

An additional challenge to disarmament is the fact that many arms are in other hands than those of the parties to the negotiations. Private security, paramilitaries, criminal gangs, other rebel groups that are not part of the talks, as well as common citizens who feel safer having a weapon, become an additional hindrance. It is difficult to argue for disarmament of any given group if the same measure does not apply to everybody.

In heavily armed societies and contexts it is therefore not always realistic to aim at a complete disarmament or gun-ban. Measures that push for “weapons reduction” become an alternative approach, with three basic strategies:

1. Control existing stocks.
2. Reduce the demand, that is, the motivations for acquiring arms.
3. Control existing supply through legislation and practices which reduce their use.

A comprehensive approach to weapons reduction has been successfully implemented in places like Cambodia.

In the Philippines a myth has developed that considers Moro (and some Lumad) societies to be tied to a gun-culture. This mis-perception is obviously rooted in prejudice (that dates back as far as the Spanish colony), but may also be an instrumental argument for those who benefit from justifying a culture of violence, be it rebels, military or even civilians who don't want to disarm. The reality is that Moros themselves are the primary victims of that gun-culture. The fact that neighboring Malaysia and Brunei have a strong gun control is a reminder that the supposed gun-culture is a social construction that may well be challenged.

Demobilization

The phase of demobilization typically includes the following steps:

- In the first stage the troops (and sometimes their family-members) assemble in temporary camps (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks).
- Once assembled, combatants and their weapons are registered. If needed, they will be issued legal and updated ID's.
- The process of disarmament is actually a step in the frame of demobilization.
- Combatants further receive a pre-discharge orientation about their rights and their duties, available services and options for skills-training, and medical and psychological check-ups.
- The final discharge is also called reinsertion. It usually includes a support package for immediate needs and transportation to communities of origin or, in some cases, integration into Armed Forces or (sometimes newly established) police forces.

The political situation preceding demobilization affects the chronological sequence and the relevance of the individual steps. While demobilization can take place in just a few weeks, stalemates in the peace process in Nepal kept rebels in camps for over years without the

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14 Buchanan & Widmer, 11.
proper living-conditions nor the logistical infrastructure needed, thus creating a volatile environment.

**Reintegration**

The last phase of the DDR process is also the most difficult one. It is essentially a social and economic process, with an open time frame. The scope depends on how ambitious the overall process is. In some cases reintegration is limited to little more than reinsertion and resettlement, that is: a short-term financial, material and social support for the ex-combatant. Reinsertion and resettlement approaches are common when there is a lack of financial and human resources to implement a broader approach, or when ex-combatants find their own individual solutions to deal with the challenges of their new situation and to integrate into civilian life.¹⁷

More comprehensive processes also address the challenges of rehabilitation, reconciliation and long-term development, increasingly with a shift of focus from the ex-combatant to the broader community. In these situations reintegration is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility.

One of the major challenges is the financial burden, since this is the most costly phase of the process. Long-term external assistance becomes essential, even in developed contexts such as Northern Ireland, where the European Union pumped in huge amounts of money to foster development and provide peace-dividends.

Reintegration also faces a moral dilemma, especially in poor countries. In a context of scarcity it happens that ex-combatants (perpetrators) might end up receiving more public support than civilians (often victims). This is one of the reasons why reintegration is increasingly shifting focus from the individual to a broader collective: communities facing integration of combatants are rewarded with development projects that benefit everybody, not only the ex-combatant. This is a not only a more decentralized and participatory approach, but also one that has a greater potential for reconciliation.

**Other issues related to normalization and DDR**

**a) Groups with special needs.** Beyond the distinction between participants and beneficiaries, it should be noted that some groups have certain specific needs. Such groups include child soldiers, women, and disabled soldiers.

Averages of 11 percent of members of armed groups are **children** (under 15 years old). Traditionally, peace efforts have paid little attention to the demobilization of child soldiers, despite their ferocious experiences and the trauma of their direct involvement in armed conflict. The UN Secretary-General has condemned this in a report to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.¹⁹ Beyond underage ex-combatants, the majority of DDR participants are between the ages of 15 and 24. Known as "almost adults" or "young adults", these underage combatants are recruited as minors and demobilized as adults. They require special attention due to their lack of "conventional" family socialization.²⁰

In nearly all cases armed forces and armed groups also involve **women and girls** who nevertheless remain invisible during the DDR process. Not only should the participation of

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¹⁸ Carames & Sanz, p.22.


²⁰ Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR.
women in terms of conditions be equal to that of other combatants, but also DDR programs should incorporate women's specific needs, including protection from sexual violence and accommodation of dependent children.

**Disabled combatants** also are a group that may have specific needs that have to be acknowledged and addressed.

**b) Security Sector Reform (SSR).** Transit from war to peace implies a new role for security forces and a release of military budget to provide peace dividends. Typical measures include significant reduction in military budget, as well as down-sizing or complete restructuring of security-forces (although this may not be possible when integration of former rebels into government security-structures is a provision of the final agreement). SSR includes supervision of the code of conduct of the state's security personnel and may involve a re-examination of the legal system, leading, if necessary, to legal reform.”

21 All branches of government may be included or affected by SSR.

**c) Human Rights and Transitional Justice.** One of the more controversial aspects of DDR is the legal and political treatment of ex-combatants. Generally, this involves discussions on the criminal responsibility of armed groups who may have participated in serious human rights violations, including massacres, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc. Although amnesty is still the common rule22, international standards for the protection of human rights make it increasingly difficult to avoid some degree of accountability. The UN is not able any longer to endorse agreements that not abide by these standards, like the Truth Commission that Timor Leste and Indonesia decided to create.23 Current debates should not longer be framed as a competition between “justice or peace” but should instead aim at measures of transitional justice that can be acceptable from a perspective of international law and at the same time implementable in a given context of negotiations.24

**Budget and financing**

The average cost per demobilized person in 2007 was thus US$1,434. This figure is nevertheless subject to great variations, depending on the economy, the development of each country, and other factors, with figures ranging from US$415 (Uganda) to 20,000 (Aceh).

The biggest donors have so far been the World Bank, UNDP, the EU, Japan and the USA.25

**International examples**

Normalization is a process rather than a program, meaning its challenges and implications go far beyond the technical procedure. DDR Handbooks are actually available, but precisely


25 Carames & Sanz, p.25.
where the priorities are set and how wide the process becomes depends on local circumstances.

Table 2 illustrates this diversity. The priority in El Salvador was to demilitarize a country four times smaller than Luzon\(^\text{26}\). 15,000 rebels actually demobilized and government forces were downsized from 60,000 to 30,000. But the disarmament component was poorly designed and weapons ended up in the hands of civilians, which triggered criminal violence. On the other hand, reintegration was hasty conceived and poorly implemented. Although several thousand former combatants benefited from land reform, other additional measures to ensure sustainability were not well implemented.

In Aceh DDR was limited to disarmament\(^\text{27}\). Rebel groups had not gained enough confidence in the government to present a list of combatants to be demobilized and reintegrated. Since DDR was addressed previously to the final compact, the parties even agreed to the precise number of weapons the rebels committed to turn in. Disarmament was then conducted in an extremely smooth and efficient process that only lasted for three months. Weapons were collected and immediately destroyed in public ceremonies, which were attended with great expectations by scores of people. This transparency helped develop trust in the process and broad media coverage became an additional incentive and pressure for the parties to move ahead with the implementation of the peace agreement.

### Table 2: Priorities in different cases of DDR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disarmament</th>
<th>Demobilization</th>
<th>Reintegration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (1992)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh (2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF (1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland (1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Northern Ireland is considered to be one of the most successful peace processes in the last years. Even so, the issue of disarmament became one of the most contentious of the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. It took seven years after the signing of the agreement to fully comply what in that case was called decommissioning (a more neutral term than disarmament, that for some rebel groups has a connotation of surrender) and normalization (the withdrawal of the UK army). Weapons were further collected and destroyed without any public record whatsoever, again the opposite from what happened in Aceh. Reintegration became also a contentious issue, especially because most political offenders were released from jail during the two years that followed the peace agreement. But people in Northern Ireland did definitely enjoy a peace dividend in the form of increased economic development. The European Union invested huge amounts of money to bolster the

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process and despite the hot political debate, nobody wanted to go back to the years of violence.

Finally the case of Sudan illustrates the biggest effort so far by the UN to implement a comprehensive DDR process. The peace process between the South and the central government became a pilot project to implement the Integrated DDR Program, the latest development in UN DDR-policy. Despite some important innovations, the process has suffered from the fact that major issues of the peace agreement were deferred until the referendum of independence in 2011.

The five cases described clearly illustrate the diversity in approaches towards implementing DDR. Both scope and the scale are rapidly evolving. To be sure, there is not a recipe to follow. DDR is not even necessarily a linear process. Components may be left out either because of a political decision or due to lack of conditions to implement them.

The following table offers more details on some major DDR programs:

Table 3: Some examples of DDR programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Implementing bodies</th>
<th>Period (start and end dates)</th>
<th>SAF</th>
<th>AOG</th>
<th>Combatants to be demobilized</th>
<th>Programs for vulnerable groups</th>
<th>Total budget ($ millions)</th>
<th>Financing formula</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10/03 to 12/08</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>63,380</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>141.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>08/02 to 12/08</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>255.8</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>255.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>12/04 to 12/08</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (AUC)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>11/03 to 08/06</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31,671</td>
<td>302.6</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>302.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>12/08 to ?</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>10/02 to ?</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (GAM)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>09/05 to 12/09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>12/03 to 06/08</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>12/06 to ?</td>
<td>19,602</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>12/01 to 12/09</td>
<td>21,684</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>09/05 to 09/12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implementing bodies: N - National / Int - International / M - Mixed

Troops to be demobilized: SAF - State armed forces / AOG – Armed Opposition Groups

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Lessons

Normalisation/DDR is still a work-in-progress, but current and recent experiences in different places around the world can provide with some background information that can help draft the approach that better suites the different peace processes in the Philippines. Lessons learned suggest the following guiding principles:

1. **Timing and sequencing** is essential: the issue should be discussed not too early (confidence must already be strong) and not too late (ideally before the final agreement).
2. DDR cannot be imposed. It is the result of a political agreement.
3. DDR is a two-way process: it affects both the rebel groups as well as the security forces.
4. There are no recipes. Normalisation is strongly context-specific. The Philippines needs to identify its own native approaches: terminology, objectives, priorities, target groups, implementing agents, related issues (transitional justice, security sector reform), etc.
5. **National ownership** is essential. Government, rebels, opposition parties, civil society, etc. must share a common sense of commitment, responsibility and confidence in a better future.
6. **International assistance** can provide neutrality, guarantees, expertise, and funding.