


# Accord

The Mindanao peace process

**A supplement to *Compromising on autonomy***



This publication serves as a supplement to Accord issue 6, *Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao in transition*. The full contents of the original issue are available free of charge on Conciliation Resources' website. The publications are also available in print from Conciliation Resources.

[www.c-r.org/accord](http://www.c-r.org/accord)

**Conciliation Resources**

London 2003

## Acknowledgements

Accord Series Editor	Celia McKeon
Accord Editor/Researcher	Aaron Griffiths
Accord Distribution Coordinator	Nathalie Wlodarczyk
Accord Programme Supervisor	Andy Carl

Conciliation Resources would like to thank Rufa Cagoco-Guiam for all her work in coordinating this project in Mindanao. We would also express our gratitude to Ron May, Kim Ninh, Steven Rood, Mara Stankovitch, Erik Torch and Mark Turner for their advice and insights.

The publication was made possible thanks to financial support from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

Published by

**Conciliation Resources**  
**173 Upper Street**  
**London N1 1RG**  
**United Kingdom**

**Telephone** +44 (0)20 7359 7728

**Fax** +44 (0)20 7359 4081

**E-mail** [accord@c-r.org](mailto:accord@c-r.org)

**Website** <http://www.c-r.org>

© Conciliation Resources 2003

Permission is granted for reproduction and use of these materials for educational purposes. Please acknowledge your source when using the materials and notify Conciliation Resources.

Design Hoop Associates

Printed in the UK by Viking Associates

UK charity registration number 1055436

ISSN 1365-0742

***Cover: Villagers ride on water buffalo carts with their belongings as they flee their homes near Pikit on 11 February 2003.***

Source: REUTERS/Romeo Ranoco

# Contents

<b>Negotiations and detours: the rocky road to peace in Mindanao</b>	<b>4</b>
Rufa Cagoco-Guiam	
<b>Enlarging spaces and strengthening voices for peace civil society initiatives in Mindanao</b>	<b>12</b>
Carolyn O. Arguillas	
<b>Key texts</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Chronology</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Further reading</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>About Conciliation Resources</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Accord series</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Order form</b>	<b>32</b>

# Negotiations and detours:

## the rocky road to peace in Mindanao

### Rufa Cagoco-Guiam

Rufa Cagoco-Guiam is Director of the Centre for Peace and Development Studies at Mindanao State University in General Santos City. She is an anthropologist and freelance media practitioner involved in advocacy for peace and advising various non-governmental organizations.

The island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines has experienced protracted conflict over the last three decades. In Mindanao, unlike most of the country, Muslim (or Moro) and indigenous Lumad people live alongside the 'majority Filipinos' - the largely Christian descendants of twentieth century settlers from the northern and central Philippines. Mindanao has been home to a number of armed groups, including the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF, founded 1969), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, which split from the MNLF in 1977), the Abu Sayyaf (formed in the late 1980s), and groups that operate across the Philippines like the communist New People's Army (NPA). After over two decades of fighting between the MNLF and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), peace negotiations under President Fidel Ramos led to a *Final Peace Agreement* (FPA) in 1996. Following this agreement, many key MNLF leaders, including its chairman Nur Misuari, became government officials after regional elections in 1997 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM, an autonomous entity signed into law in 1989 consisting of four provinces that voted to join it in a plebiscite). However, despite their commitment to laying down their arms, the MNLF realized that the signing of the FPA did not put an end to the Moro struggle for self-determination. *Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition* (Accord issue 6) left the story of the Mindanao peace process in 1999, when it was already becoming clear that the island's troubles were far from over. Subsequent events have confirmed that there was nothing 'final' in the *Final Peace Agreement*: it was just a prelude to more detours on the rocky road ahead.

In the years since the FPA there have been major offensives against the MILF in 1997, 2000 and 2003. Declarations of all-out war by the government have been reciprocated by the insurgents, but also interspersed with negotiations and agreements. Sporadic skirmishes, bombings, ambushes and burning of villages by unidentified armed men still occur with unnerving frequency in key cities and mountainous communities in many parts of central Mindanao. The latter include alleged camps or "mountain lairs" of the MILF, who, having been sidelined in the first peace process, has continued its armed struggle for a separate independent Islamic state.



Meanwhile, the strengthened autonomy stipulated by the FPA has been beset by troubles. Then MNLF leader Nur Misuari was elected governor of the ARMM in 1996, but a former rebel leader heading a democratic bureaucracy spawned more negative public perceptions about the already beleaguered and fledgling administrative region. Mindanao mass media were replete with reports on even greater levels of graft and corruption in the ARMM than ever before. Misuari was also accused of always being absent from office. One joke circulating in the region referred to the region's acronym: Autonomous Region in Metro Manila, alluding to Misuari's preference to hold office in the regional liaison office in Manila. It was also widely perceived that Misuari, either through omission or incompetence, squandered various opportunities that were made available to the region after the signing of the FPA.

Misuari's rule was prolonged as Congress failed to pass the legislation to expand the ARMM, a commitment of the Philippine government under the FPA. The legislation should have been passed by 1998, to give ample time for the agreed plebiscite and election of officers of the 'expanded ARMM' by March or September 1999. But with the failure of the Philippine Congress to pass the law, Governor Misuari's term of office, which should have ended in September 1999, was extended.

## Escalating conflict under Estrada

May 1998 saw the election to the presidency of an erstwhile movie star, Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Numerous members of his political party, the *Partido ng Masang Pilipino* (Party of the Filipino Masses) were also elected, many of them strongly opposed to the FPA. MNLF candidates had supported Ramos's defeated Lakas-NUCD party, and had polled poorly across the country. Across Mindanao the vote for Estrada was high.

Three months later a *General Framework of Agreement of Intent* was signed between the GRP and MILF, leading to meetings of their peace panels in 1999. Talks opened in October 1999, but amidst increasing violence no meetings took place until January 2000 (soon after Estrada had issued an ultimatum for the members of both panels to come up with a peace agreement by 30 June). Despite the August 1998 agreement, the Philippine armed forces (AFP) launched military operations at several camps earlier recognized and verified as MILF camps in central Mindanao in late 1999 and early 2000.

Following incidents blamed on the MILF in February and March, President Estrada announced "all-out war" against the group. This may have been partly to rescind the previous recognition of MILF territorial control over

their camps: government peace panel chair Edgardo Batenga later acknowledged that the military action of the previous months was intended to correct a “government blunder” in acknowledging seven of 46 MILF camps under the terms of the 1997 ceasefire agreement. But the all-out war may also have been partly to deflect growing opposition to Estrada’s faltering administration.

Talks between the peace panels in late April centred around the clearing of MILF checkpoints from a 14-kilometer stretch of the Narciso Ramos highway in Mindanao. On 27 April, the panels signed an *Aide Memoire* agreeing “on the need to work towards normalization of the situation in Mindanao;” “to pursue the on-going peace process;” and to achieve “stability and development in Mindanao.” However, the next morning, claiming they had been attacked by a group of rebels, the army launched a military operation to clear the highway without the GRP panel’s knowledge. The following day they started heavy military assaults on Camp Abubakar, the MILF’s largest and most important camp.

The mixture of negotiations and fighting reflected the complexities of government-MILF relations. From late 1999 to early 2000, the Estrada administration, through its back-channel negotiator, Robert Aventajado, had pursued a series of talks with MILF leaders like Gajali Jaafar, the Vice-Chairman for political affairs, while the members of the MILF-GRP peace panels were also meeting. This was perceived as a sincere gesture on the part of government, who hinted at the possibility of a meeting between Estrada and MILF leader Salamat Hashim meeting within the year. On the other hand, this approach led to suspicions in some quarters that back-channel meetings aimed to convince some MILF leaders to become partners in a possible “foreign-capitalized” business venture to be formed out of the development of most of Camp Abubakar as an economic zone. It was also at this time that there were rumours of factionalization within the MILF central committee, with one faction allegedly talking with the back-channel negotiator while the other faced the GRP panel in the formal peace talks.

Whatever the truth, the public gulf between the parties was becoming clearer. The government demanded that the MILF drop its secessionist goal, give up terrorist acts and lay down its arms. The MILF now insisted on talks being held outside the Philippines, under the auspices of the OIC or mediated by an OIC member country. On 21 August, the MILF disbanded its peace panel.

Around this time Estrada was also alienating MNLF counterparts with the creation in July of the Mindanao Coordinating Council (MCC), chaired by himself, to

regulate infrastructure projects with the ARMM. Critics claimed it marginalized the institutions provided for by the FPA, including the SPCPD and the SZOPAD Consultative Assembly. However, there is little evidence that it did anything, and it soon became defunct.

## Arroyo peace initiatives

In October 2000 events took a dramatic turn when gambling fraud allegations emerged against President Estrada. His resulting impeachment gave ample time for civil society to meet with Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, his constitutional successor, to present a post-Estrada plan of action. Among the demands were the resumption of peace negotiations between government and MILF, the appointment of at least three Cabinet members from Mindanao, creation of a Mindanao Peace and Development Committee to craft a mini-Marshall plan and the immediate return of refugees. Estrada was finally ousted through a bloodless coup that catapulted Arroyo to the presidency in January 2001.

After she took office, Arroyo declared that she would be unlike her predecessor and immediately promoted an “all out peace” policy in Mindanao. She sent emissaries to the MILF to resume talks, named Mindanawons to the Cabinet – as secretaries and undersecretaries – and appointed peace panel members for negotiations with both the MILF and the National Democratic Front (linked to the NPA). For the first time, the government’s peace panel to negotiate with the MILF was all-Mindanawon and headed not by a retired military general but by a civilian – Jesus Dureza, also Arroyo’s Presidential Assistant for Mindanao. Arroyo also named two women, one a former university president and a Maranaw Muslim, and the other, a prominent Christian woman leader based in Davao, in the five-person peace panel.

In addition, all government line agencies were convened to form a presidential task force to lead rehabilitation of the areas in Mindanao devastated by the war in 2000. With the cooperation and support of the international donor community, she also asked her technocrats to craft an institutional reconstruction programme. A series of consultations with civil society actors, especially women, indigenous peoples and other marginalized or disadvantaged groups were held in many places in Mindanao to present the framework for such a programme.

Peace negotiations in the year 2001 were fast-paced. With the help of the Malaysian Prime Minister Syed Hamid Albar who sent his top aide to meet Hashim, the MILF was persuaded to resume talks. Hashim sent his deputy, Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim, to Kuala Lumpur to meet

**Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar looks on as Murad Ebrahim (left) of the MILF shakes hands with Jesus Dureza, Chairman of the Philippines Peace Panel, after signing a ceasefire agreement on 7 August 2001 in Kuala Lumpur.**

Source: REUTERS/Bazuki Muhammad



Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process Eduardo Ermita for secret talks that not even Jesus Dureza was aware of. Murad and Ermita signed an agreement on the resumption of talks on 24 March. Both sides followed up with commitments to suspend military action, and re-organized their peace panels, with Dureza heading the government team, and Murad heading the MILF's.

In March MILF delegates and what would later constitute the MNLF Executive Council met in Malaysia in what some claim to be the initial phase of a MNLF coup against Misuari. The insinuation is that while the Arroyo administration knew that any peace agreement with the MILF would have to be in consonance with the Constitution, territorial integrity and sovereignty and the 1996 FPA, the administration's view of Misuari as an ineffective and inefficient governor led back-channel negotiators to encourage an MNLF coup. Whether or not this was the case, in late April the 15-person MNLF Executive Council ousted Misuari and collectively assumed the chairmanship. The Council 'retired' the former leader and named him 'chairman emeritus', a post he rejected, accusing the Council of treachery.

Meanwhile, legislators passed RA 9054 and scheduled 14 August as the date of the plebiscite mandated by the 1996 FPA. The MNLF rejected RA 9054, claiming it was unfaithful to the provisions of the 1996 FPA and rendered the autonomous region "less autonomous." They urged the postponement of the plebiscite, but the government insisted it was obliged to carry it out. Both the MNLF and the MILF boycotted the plebiscite, the MILF claiming the ARMM had done nothing to improve the plight of Muslim Filipinos. The voters in the four provinces already in the ARMM were asked if they were in favour of the amendments to the Organic Act which included, among other things, the expansion of the autonomous region. The voters of the non-ARMM provinces and cities were asked if they were in favour of the inclusion of their province or city in the ARMM. The result was that only one of thirteen provinces (Basilan, excluding Isabela

City), and one of fifteen cities (Marawi) voted to join, meaning five provinces and one city were to form the expanded ARMM. Despite the President campaigning for a 'yes' vote, there was a large 'no' vote by the Christian population and both radio and print media in central, southern and western Mindanao reported an unusually low turn-out, with commentators claiming that, "only the flies came to the polling places that day".

Further talks were held with the MILF throughout the summer. In June GRP-MILF talks were held in Tripoli, resulting in the *Tripoli Agreement on Peace 2001* which called for discussion on security, rehabilitation and development of conflict affected areas, and ancestral domain. In August they focused on implementing guidelines on the security aspects of the June Agreement. The October talks, held in Malaysia, focused on possible mechanisms for rehabilitation of refugees and areas affected by armed conflict. Both panels signed the Manual of Instructions for the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs).

## Setbacks

Gains made in these 2001 meetings were to be undermined by several setbacks. Misuari-led factions of the MNLF attacked and seized several security outposts in Jolo in what some saw as a failed attempt to prevent the ARMM elections. He was suspended from his post and replaced as governor in the subsequent polls. As bloody skirmishes continued, Misuari fled to Malaysia but was brought back and arraigned on charges of 'rebellion' in January 2002, sparking a series of protests by many elements of the Moro community. By mid-2003 his trial had still not been held.

The growing effects of the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA also had an impact on the peace process. President Arroyo was one of the few Asian leaders who immediately expressed support for President

Bush's 'war on terrorism'. Arroyo's pledge of support included a series of pronouncements that if constituents did not support the war against local "terrorists" (that included Muslim armed groups, although the MILF was not designated as a terrorist group), they would be labelled coddlers of terrorists and not "nationalistic".

The kidnapping of several foreign religious missionaries by the Abu Sayyaf (a newly prominent rebel group practising kidnapping and extortion, founded by ex-MNLF member Abdurajak Janjalani in the late 1980s) reinforced the government's tough stance. In the context of the 'war on terrorism', some local government officials called for hard-line responses to the Abu Sayyaf and MILF as members of what they imagined to be a local network of Al-Qaeda. In reality, the links to 'international terrorism' are probably far more tenuous, especially in the MILF case. The MILF have joined the Muslim mainstream in rebuking the Abu Sayyaf and its activities, although it is possible that some of their fighters on the ground may have joined or colluded with them on occasions.

A series of incidents in the first quarter of 2002 seemed to erase whatever gains were made in the talks between the two panels in late 2001, especially those forged during the October meeting in Kuala Lumpur. As the new ARMM leadership was installed in Cotabato City, reports of serious ceasefire violations by the MILF were rife. In March, President Arroyo suspended the conduct of formal peace talks "to give the MILF the opportunity to show its sincerity to the peace talks with the government". But Arroyo sent her back-channel negotiator, Presidential Adviser on Special Concerns Norberto Gonzales, to Malaysia - reportedly to back-room negotiations with the MILF. The talks resulted in a *Joint Communiqué* issued on 6 May allowing for joint government-MILF operations to "isolate and interdict all criminal elements within the conflict-affected areas" including all criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups. On 7 May, *Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the 2001 GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement* were agreed. Not one of the GRP five-man peace panel was involved in the crafting or signing of the agreements. One GRP panel member lamented that she was only able to get a copy of the document a day after it was signed.

By July, the MILF agency to implement rehabilitation and development programmes in conflict-affected areas (the Bangsamoro Development Agency) was established, and from August to September, a series of meetings were held to settle issues affecting full adherence of both MILF and government forces to the ceasefire status and to form the Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs). The LMTs were created as a mechanism to involve local government units, MILF political committees and non-governmental

organizations and the religious sector in the prevention and resolution of conflict in affected communities.

The May agreements drew criticisms from numerous 'hawkish' Congressmen, and even led to a congressional investigation. They questioned the provisions allowing for indemnification of the rebels and wanted government negotiators to explain why the MILF was granted the "privilege" of creating their own development agency.

## **Violence escalates amid expectations of agreement**

As 2003 unfolded, hopes were high that finally an agreement would be forged between the government and the MILF. Many observers thought this was a foregone conclusion after President Arroyo was reported to have approved a draft agreement for presentation to the MILF panel in early February.

But within that period, there had been a build-up of government forces in Pikit, North Cotabato. Efforts to prevent a conflagration were exerted by local religious leaders. But on 11 February (an important Islamic celebration – *Eid'ul Adha* or the Feast of Sacrifice), the military launched its campaign purportedly to rid the area of the kidnap-for-ransom Pentagon gang. Philippine government forces stormed the Buliok Complex in Pikit, leaving scores dead. The area sustaining heaviest damage was a residential compound belonging to MILF Chairman Hashim, including a madrasah and a mosque. Efforts to get the ceasefire committees to meet on 12 February failed as the MILF declined to attend the meeting unless the government troops moved out. The military campaign was criticized especially because the 6 May 2002 agreement provided a mechanism for joint action against the Pentagon gang. Pronouncements by Defence Secretary Angelo Reyes suggested that the real target of the military campaign was the MILF.

In view of the Pikit incident, Jesus Dureza, the presidential adviser on Mindanao and chief government peace negotiator with the MILF, announced back-channel talks were taking place to pave the way for the resumption of formal negotiations. However, a series of violent incidents in south central Mindanao occurred thereafter. Bombings in Davao City on 4 March and 2 April, which killed a total of 38 persons and injured 200 others, were blamed on the MILF despite its denials. Charges of multiple murder and frustrated multiple murder were filed against MILF Chair Hashim, Vice-Chair for military affairs Al Haj Murad Ebrahim (the MILF peace panel chair), Vice-Chair for political affairs Ghazaali Jaafar, spokesperson Eid Kabalu and 146 others: most of them, according to critical Davao City civil society leaders, anonymous Muslims who happened to be in the vicinity of the airport at the time of





the bombing and members of the family of one Muslim blast victim who came to recover the victims' bodies.

The series of bombings in key Mindanao cities has led to a hard-line government stance towards the MILF. Yet talks have continued. In late March the government and MILF representatives met in Kuala Lumpur and signed an agreement on 28 March to continue formal peace negotiations. The technical committees of both peace panels were due to meet on 11 April to plan a further round of formal peace talks, although these were delayed. In June, following an extended unilateral ceasefire by the MILF an agreement was reached to resume formal negotiations with Hashim personally leading the MILF panel.

### **Enduring stumbling blocks: incompatible aspirations**

In order to imagine a way forward, it is useful to first remember the enduring stumbling blocks that have kept the two sides apart. Both government and MILF leaders have agreed that finding a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the problems confronting

Mindanao is imperative. But that is where the agreement ends. Central Philippine authority looks at the problem in Mindanao as a 'rebellion' but the Muslims consider armed struggle as part of their legitimate right to assert self-determination. For the government, MILF elements will always be labelled 'rebels' (and after September 11, threatened with the term 'terrorists'), but for Muslims who support the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination, they are noble *mujahideen*, or freedom fighters.

For the MILF, lasting peace is impossible as long as there exist nine major issues which constitute what they call the "Bangsamoro prolem": ancestral domain; displaced and landless Bangsamoro; destruction of properties and war victims; human rights issues; social and cultural discrimination; corruption of the mind and moral fibre; economic inequities and widespread poverty; exploitation of natural resources; and agrarian reform. The MILF Technical Committee presented these and other concerns on 25 February 1997, and there has been no significant diminution of those original demands. From the MILF point of view, solving this problem and "establishing a system of life and governance suitable and acceptable to the Bangsamoro people" will pave

the way for a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace” in Mindanao, although it is not entirely clear what this might look like.

In contrast to the MILF position, it is striking that the Philippine government’s set of principles for a comprehensive peace process defined in its framework, the *Six Paths to Peace*, start with the requirement that the process reflect “the values and principles of the Filipino as one community”. This strikes a discordant note among Muslims in the southern Philippines, who do not feel that they can identify themselves as Filipinos considering that the core of being such revolves around Christian-based values they do not share. Even Muslims themselves come from 13 different ethnolinguistic groups and have varying cultural traditions although they are members of the community of believers in Islam (*ummah*).

Another similarly contentious issue is component four of the *Six Paths to Peace*: the objective of “reintegration into mainstream of society and rehabilitation”. The terms “reintegration” and “mainstreaming” have always provoked heated debate in forums and consultative assemblies, with many Muslims quite apprehensive of “being mainstreamed” since this implies following the majority Christian-oriented way of life.

Since the start of the GRP-MILF peace talks, the latter has always asserted its demand for an independent Islamic state for the areas it claims to influence or control. But the Bangsamoro Islamic state conceived of by the MILF cannot find resonance in the present Philippine constitutional framework. Compounding this constitutional bind are two diametrically opposed realities: the central Philippine government will never allow a dismemberment of the Philippine state on one hand and on the other, the MILF refuses to engage in the Philippine government system, even through the constitutionally created ARMM.

## The prospects for a peaceful solution

Despite the threat of escalating conflict, some optimism remains amid debilitating events both within and beyond the region, springing from the dynamic and vibrant civil society groups now operating in Mindanao. Yet people also want to see ‘peace dividends’ unfolding before them and to participate actively in efforts to gain such rewards. It is imperative to tackle some of the real ground-level challenges in Mindanao that have caused detours on the arduous road to peace.

Firstly, high levels of distrust have not been addressed, but exacerbated. The arrest and detention of Misuari in November 2001 led one MILF official to reveal that they were seriously studying the continuing peace talks for

fear of the same happening to Salamat Hashim. The distrust is reciprocated by the government, who point to continued attacks attributed to the MILF amidst pronouncements on their readiness to talk.

Secondly, there are feelings of resentment among the majority population that despite the conflict the Muslims are ‘pampered’. Moreover, social preparation of any government-sponsored peace and development efforts has been insufficient. In this case, the activities could have included forums for community level conflict analysis and appropriate capacity-building programmes to enhance participation in interfaith dialogues and similar reconciliation processes. Without this, wider society fails to understand why there is a need to reach a peace agreement with the MNLF or MILF in the first place.

Thirdly, governance failures have occurred as a result of traditional patronage politics. The new ARMM officials have vowed to change this, but the appointment of their protégés to high positions negates this goal of transformative leadership. Most government officials are high on rhetoric but very low on making their pronouncements a reality.

Fourthly, the regional and global political concerns of international actors have shaped their involvement (or lack of it) in the peace process in Mindanao. The key mediating countries have been Indonesia and Malaysia. As fellow ASEAN countries they are committed to non-intervention in the Philippines’ affairs, although they are concerned about spill-over effects from Mindanao, such as Abu Sayyaf kidnappings in Malaysia. The OIC has not assumed the important role in the GRP-MILF negotiations that it did in the early stages of the GRP-MNLF process. It vacillated on its role in organizing a monitoring team to observe the implementation of the *2001 Tripoli Agreement*. Its experiences with a recalcitrant MNLF, and unwillingness to switch its backing to the MILF, leave it reluctant to engage.

Because of the Philippines’ so-called ‘special relations’ with the USA dating from colonial times, Philippine leaders have been able to invite American support when confronted with serious internal conflicts. The US and Philippine militaries cooperate in joint operations and training known as *Balikatan* exercises, which in 2002 focused on fighting Abu Sayyaf who had kidnapped US citizens. US-Philippine ‘special relations’ were calibrated after Arroyo became the first Asian leader to openly support the American government policies on terrorism. Her state visits to the USA underlined this and she obtained a US\$356 million package of defence and counter-terrorism aid for the Philippines. Interestingly, these relations have not disqualified the USA from being seen as a potential mediator by people on both sides.

The USA has expressed its interest in doing so, although it is not clear at this stage how realistic a prospect this may be.

Fifthly, a disproportionately small share of the national allocation for regional development goes to the region given the levels of poverty and instability, especially within the ARMM. Mindanao provinces are among those in the bottom of the socio-economic heap in the country as demonstrated by the UNDP 2002 Philippine Human Development Report. It is arguable that if not for the lopsided distribution of funds, Mindanao provinces would not fare so poorly in terms of overall human development and one of the factors fuelling the conflict would be mitigated.

Finally, while the government claims to have a clear peace agenda, its functionaries do not seem to be coordinating in its implementation. For instance, while President Arroyo appointed an all-Mindanao government peace panel, the members were not part of the deliberations that led to the signing of several crucial agreements with the MILF. Instead, the Arroyo administration relied on the back-channelling efforts of the Presidential Adviser on Special Concerns. Against the criticisms of the back-channelling efforts, the President's spokespersons have always made pronouncements on their positive outcomes, arguing that they are an informal confidence-building method (used in this case to agree on the "non-essentials") practised all over the world. Civil society activists responded by raising concerns that the lack of transparency was leading to waning public support for peace talks, demanding new efforts to strengthen the peace constituency and use civil society to monitor the peace process.

Perhaps a more serious variation of the lack of strategic coherence is the timing of military operations just after the signing of peace agreements, as happened in March 2000. Neither the government or MILF seems to be fully in command of its forces. With units spread all over central and western Mindanao, it is not clear if the MILF is in control of their fighters' actions. The more indiscriminate use of bombings in 2000-2003 (at least some of which can be attributed to the MILF) may be partly due to an ideological hardening of positions and greater factionalization and disagreement over whether it was worth pursuing talks at all when presented with the prospect of a weaker negotiating position under intense military pressure.

There are several fronts on which efforts could be made to get the Mindanao peace process back on track.

(1) Rethinking of military strategies in Mindanao, including the possibility of a gradual or eventual pull out, especially in areas that are slowly stabilizing. The constitutional provisions for the supremacy of the civilian-led police force in protecting peace and order should be put into practice. However, this can be problematic, as the military has constantly played a crucial role in influencing policy in Mindanao. Some opinion makers believe they are the *de facto* "determinants" of official government policy in Mindanao, exercising strong influence over Presidents. The military has, at worst, a unilateral, absolutist perspective, believing they can act independently of legislators, and seeing the military option as the only solution to the conflict. But they are not a monolithic block, and if they can be reoriented to look at the gargantuan costs of war instead of looking at the preservation of the so-called national security by all means (especially military), they might become part of the solution too.

(2) Sustained social discourse on the issue of a "multi-nation" state, to accommodate identities earlier excluded in the core of national values that serve to demarcate the national identity. This could include serious thinking and rethinking of the Constitution (and the question of federalism) and other legal remedies or instruments that could be used as parameters for discussing aspirations such as regional autonomy or a separate Islamic state for the Muslims.

(3) Peace constituency building on all fronts, and at all educational levels and accompanying sustained capacity building for peace-workers. This could include modules for various social actors, especially the military, to help them embark on more meaningful relationships with the civilian sectors.

Handled properly, Mindanao could be the linchpin that could pave the way for a vigorous regional economy and ultimately, a dynamic national economy built on self-reliance, fairness, justice and empowerment of its constituents. Mindanao has a vibrant civil society network composed of divergent groups and formations that are actively pursuing social development goals. It is wealthy in natural resources and has rich cultural diversity, owing to the many ethno-linguistic groups. Indigenous knowledge and skills could be further harnessed toward the formation of a vigorously developing society.

# Enlarging spaces and strengthening voices for peace:

## civil society initiatives in Mindanao

### Carolyn O. Arguillas

An award-winning journalist, Carolyn O. Arguillas chairs the Davao City-based Mindanao News and Information Cooperative Center (MNICC). She was the Titus Brandsma awardee for peace journalism in 2002.

As the pendulum swings between war and peace in Mindanao, civic groups in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict have employed a variety of tactics to influence the armed actors and insulate their communities from the violence. Some work to enlarge spaces for peace in their own communities while others make noise through the parliament of the streets. Some work quietly to establish “backdoor” linkages with both the government and the MILF. Still others hold conferences to craft a common peace agenda. The story of locally-driven peace initiatives in Mindanao involves a jigsaw of sectoral responses, including religious leaders, the media, women and indigenous communities, among others. With their different agendas and styles, they continue to act both individually and collectively in the struggle for peace.

### Calling for peace

Many civic actors initially viewed the re-escalation of the conflict in 2000 as an illustration of the vulnerability of their efforts and as a setback to nearly thirty years of peacebuilding in the province. But the human costs of the conflict, with its civilian casualties, massive population displacement and disruption of development programmes, have continued to inspire calls for its resolution. Demands for a peaceful settlement are articulated in various forms, against the backdrop of war as well as during times of negotiation. They are proclaimed in the usual chants and placards during street protests against the war and in the Women In White’s 40-day, hour-long, noontime silent protest in front of malls and in major streets in Davao City. They are expressed in the peace caravans travelling from Davao City to Cotabato City. They are delivered in sermons from the pulpits of Christian and Islamic places of worship and in the pastoral letters of Bishops. They appear in opinion pieces in newspapers, in cyberspace - particularly through the mindanao1081 listserv - and in letters to national officials from Mindanawon groups abroad. They are even reproduced in “Peace” stickers distributed by the Mindanao Women’s Group.

As the 2000 war re-ignited fears and prejudices amongst the population of Mindanao, it also challenged civil society to build bridges of understanding between members of the different faith communities. The Mindanao Bishops-Ulama Forum (BUF), established



in 1996 by Catholic and Protestant bishops and Muslim religious leaders under the auspices of the government's Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), has played an active role in peacemaking efforts. It has combined public mobilization initiatives such as the institutionalization of the annual 'Mindanao Week of Peace' (initially an activity of the Peace Advocates Zamboanga) with local mediation and dialogue efforts. Despite suspicion among the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the forum's connections to the Philippine government, local BUF groups have at times played an effective role in confidence-building initiatives, through forums such as the Priests, Imams and Pastors group in Kidapawan City and the Interfaith Network for Peace in Davao City. However, the BUF has also been criticized by civil society groups for its silence at key moments in the negotiation process and especially during clashes between the armed groups. Moreover, the lessons learned in the series of BUF meetings, dialogues and other activities have not trickled down to the grassroots level, and this is attributed to the fact that BUF membership comprises primarily middle to top level religious functionaries. Recently, it has tried to be active once more, through statements offering to mediate in the escalating conflict.

Other groups have also spoken out for peace. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines and

the Mindanao bishops reiterated calls for government to abandon its military approach to the conflict and return to the negotiating table. In December 2001, Mindanawon women leaders gathered in Davao City to set up the Mindanao Commission on Women. Composed of women from different religious groups, the Commission is mainly concerned with promoting women's issues and causes, including advocating a role for women in peacemaking efforts.

### Spaces for peace

While Mindanao-wide groups were initiating forums, fact-finding missions and lobbying work, peacebuilding activities have also continued at the grassroots, away from the glare of television cameras. In the past, communities already weary from the ravages of the conflict between government forces and the communist New People's Army (NPA) created their people-initiated responses called "peace zones," which first emerged in the Philippines in 1988. While many such areas have become moribund, similar mechanisms, largely based on the same people-initiated and community-based principles of conflict resolution, are slowly gaining ground in the aftermath of recent upsurges in violence. These areas are now referred to as "spaces for peace," to distinguish them from overrun MILF camps, declared "peace zones" by the Philippine government.

In Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, where then President Joseph Estrada declared his “all-out war” against the MILF on 21 March 2000, a white streamer hangs on the veranda of the town hall, the message in red, reading, “Promotion of Community-based Peace Building Initiatives”. Mayor Moamar 'Jack' Maruhom declared, “We're going to have a new image of Kauswagan. Kauswagan will mirror the image of peace.” Supported by a very active civil society, Maruhom proclaimed 17-22 March each year a “week of peace.” This year’s celebration included a *Panagtagbo sa Kalinaw* (convergence for peace), a peace forum and visits to historical sites. Several seminar-workshops have also been held on the theme of ‘a culture of peace.’ Carino Veron Antiquesa, convenor of the *Pakigdait* (mutual understanding) initiative, said they have been conducting training and working with different *barangays* (communities) in Kauswagan for almost a year, “to heal the ruined relationships between Muslim and Christians as a result of the all-out war policy of the deposed President Joseph Estrada.” *Pakigdait* linked up with local government units for their peacebuilding meetings. *Pakigdait* co-convenor, Sanguila Musa, said the peace advocacy training has helped residents cope with reports of impending rebel attacks. Musa said that when they ask villagers, “What will we do if our village is attacked?” the question is answered from the perspective of building peace and strengthening relationships between Muslims and Christians.

In Pikit, North Cotabato, where more than half of this predominantly Muslim town of 69,000 inhabitants have fled their villages four times in five years as a result of the war, peace efforts have also continued. Despite the havoc wreaked by the warring parties, relations among the peoples in Pikit – Muslims, Christians and indigenous peoples – are strong. By the roadside on the wall of the gym of the Immaculate Conception parish where at least a hundred Muslim and Christian families have sought refuge since 8 February this year, a faded streamer still hangs, greeting the Muslims “Happy *Eid’l Fitr*”. Muslims likewise greet Christians during Christian holidays and Muslim market vendors often donate offertory gifts to the parish.

After the “all-out war” in 2000, Muslim and Christian residents in various villages – 13 *sitios* (subdivisions of *barangays*) in five different *barangays* – declared their villages “spaces for peace”. Local government units, the MILF and religious leaders of various faiths acknowledged the declarations. As government military offensives against the MILF began again in February, villagers in the “spaces for peace” planned contingency moves but stood their ground against evacuation.

Elsewhere in Pikit, the 370 Muslim and Christian families that constitute the *barangay* of Panicupan also decided

to resist the violence. As conflict escalated in early 2003, village leaders – Muslims and Christians, police and military officials in the areas – met on 13 February to decide their course of action. Tired of evacuating, the villagers decided to uphold their June 2002 declaration that their community is a “space for peace.” Here too the community made contingency plans but the consensus was to resort to evacuation only as a last resort. Fr. Roberto Layson, parish priest of Pikit and head of the Inter-religious Dialogue of the Oblates of the Mary Immaculate, attended the village meeting as an observer. “Peace is the only path to peace,” Fr. Layson would repeatedly tell his parishioners and the Christian and Muslim volunteers in the Parish Disaster Response Team, condemning the violent tactics of the armed groups.

While it is too early to discern the true impact of the “spaces for peace”, one significant early outcome is the improved relationships between Muslim and Christian inhabitants in the area. In the Catholic parish house in Pikit, it is no longer considered shocking for Catholic parishioners to see a Muslim prayer room. Muslims often visit the parish house, and interact in a relaxed atmosphere with the Catholic members of the parish on Sundays. The spaces provide some sense of safety, albeit temporary, as the community members realize that war is still being waged within and outside their peaceful spaces and its consequences are beyond their control.

## Linking civil society to the formal negotiations

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo first took office in January 2001, her policy of “all-out peace” created opportunities for greater civic involvement in the government’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Anticipating the change in government strategy, *Kusog Mindanaw* (strengthen Mindanao), a Mindanao-wide grouping headed by Fr. Eliseo Mercado, sought direct input into future negotiations in November 2000 by coming up with a ‘first 100 days’ Mindanao agenda for Arroyo. Among its demands were the resumption of peace talks between the government and the rebel groups, return of evacuees to their villages, representation of Mindanawons in the Cabinet of President Arroyo and the demilitarization of Mindanao.

Before it left for the first round of negotiations with the MILF in Tripoli in June 2001, the government peace panel held consultations and workshops with civil society to create an opportunity for their views to be incorporated into the talks. However, the consultations were conducted in a rush and lacked broad participation. Consequently the urban and rural poor, persons with

**Sultan Esmail Kiram of Sulu  
and Catholic bishop Angelito  
Lampoon, Diocese of Jolo,  
during a Muslim-Christian  
peace rally in Jolo,  
25 June 2000.**

Source: REUTERS/Romeo Ranoco



disabilities and other groups only saw their marginalization deepened by the process as they were not able to present their agendas. A few leading civil society figures were able to make inputs in the consultations, but their voices were drowned out by highly influential and powerful local government officials who dominated the discussions.

During the second round of formal peace talks in Malaysia, the Mindanao People's Caucus (MPC - a non-governmental and non-partisan umbrella peace advocacy organization consisting of some twenty peace advocacy groups drawn from Muslim, Christian and Lumad populations) sent a team of four observers, including two Lumad (indigenous peoples) leaders. The government and MILF peace panels welcomed the observers during plenary sessions but not during the executive sessions. The MPC observers, however, managed to bring their issues to the peace panels during negotiation breaks. On several occasions during meals, government and MILF peace panel members sat at the same table as the observers.

The MPC also lobbied for the representation of the Lumad in the government and MILF peace panels' technical committees. Both panels were receptive. Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, Jesus Dureza appointed Datu Al Saliling of Carmen, North Cotabato to the technical working group on ancestral domain. Outside the formal arena, the MPC also initiated several tri-peoples dialogues and a Lumad-Moro leaders' dialogue. These initiatives aimed to forge unity between the communities, through a process of clarifying areas of mutual distrust between the groups and developing a common agenda to present to the primary parties in the peace talks. However, only the limited circle of peace advocates in Mindanao are fully aware of the extent of the group's involvement in the current peace talks. The wider public is not aware of their existence, much less of their peace advocacy efforts.

## Local monitoring teams

The peace panels also encouraged Mindanao's civil society to take part in the Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs) established in accordance with the ceasefire arrangements agreed in June and August 2001 and tasked with monitoring their implementation.

The LMTs are composed of five members, one from the Local Government Unit, one from the MILF, an NGO representative nominated by government, an NGO representative nominated by the MILF and a religious leader mutually agreed upon by both panels. The LMTs are supposed to report to the Joint Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCH). They were originally conceived to work at the municipal level, but have instead operated mostly at the provincial level. The reason for this may be that the MILF was reluctant to expose its local level supporters. So far LMT activities have been largely restricted to workshop facilitation. At least three LMTs (one in central, another in western and one in southern Mindanao) are known to have conducted a series of conflict analysis and conflict transformation workshops during 2002. They have not been doing serious monitoring work to enable them to determine the responsibility of the primary parties for ceasefire violations, much less hold both parties accountable for their actions. When two provincial LMTs were able to conduct investigations - one in Lanao del Sur and one in Maguindanao - and forward their findings to the CCCH, no action was taken on these reports by the CCCH.

The disruption caused by the fighting in early 2003 left many LMTs existing only in a truncated form without their MILF or MILF-nominated representatives. With only two or three people participating, they are more like an extension of the government-mandated Peace and Order Councils at the local government level. However, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Mindanao is now preparing for a resumption of these workshops with the LMTs in the coming months.

With the conflict escalating again in early 2003 and opportunities for civic participation in the political processes decreasing, the MPC decided to take action. It initiated a grassroots-based fact-finding mission in the conflict-affected areas, documenting reports of violations of the GRP-MILF ceasefire agreements from the communities affected. As the MPC does not draw its mandate from either the government or the MILF, these initiatives do not make the MPC a substitute body for the LMTs and the MPC team communicate with the LMTs in the areas they monitor. In playing this pro-active role, the MPC is viewed by the limited circle of civil society actors as an alternative voice in advocating the active participation of grassroots communities in the peace process.

Other civic initiatives and coordination meetings amongst peace groups continued during this period, despite the suspension of formal negotiations. However, the government chose not to engage civil society in exploratory talks with the MILF in Kuala Lumpur in March 2003 and the news came as a shock to many civic actors. Local and national media were informed only the day before the talks were held, giving insufficient time for civil society groups to prepare something to present to the parties in the talks.

## Media and the conflict in Mindanao

Despite the mobilization and advocacy efforts of numerous peace groups, they have often struggled to make their voices heard above the clamour of war. The national media's penchant for a focus on the shooting, body count and reports from official sources has been a major obstacle, with Mindanawon voices for peace drowned out not only by the sound of gunfire but also by national TV, radio and newspaper reports on the war presented by mostly Manila-based journalists. Efforts of Mindanao-based journalists to give a broader view of the war from the eyes of Mindanawons have often been hampered by the Manila-based desk's view of the war. Anti-Muslim vigilantes have also posed a problem, with one group even distributing statements in General Santos City calling for a "Muslim-free Mindanao".

While hardliners such as Defence Secretary Angelo Reyes, Zamboanga City Mayor Ma. Clara Lobregat and Cotabato Governor Manny Pinol were criticizing the agreements reached on 6 and 7 May 2002, Mindanao's media leaders – newspaper editors, radio and TV station managers and news editors – gathered in Davao City from 16-18 May for the First Mindanao Media Summit. Representatives of non-governmental organizations, the academe and government information officers attended the Summit as observers. The event generated critique of the coverage of the 2000 'all-out war' and led to the signing

of a covenant entitled 'This is OUR Mindanao'. It included a 'reverse press conference' where representatives of the Bishops-Ulama Forum, NGOs and local officials asked questions of the media. The event also instigated discussions on a peacebuilding partnership between media and the academe based on the need to understand the historical background of the conflicts in Mindanao.

Other cultural and political commentators took a different approach. Harnessing the power of film, a full-length movie feature, *Bagong Buwan* (New Moon), by award-winning director Marilou Diaz-Abaya, tackled the conflict in Mindanao and the plight of displaced civilians for the first time. Abaya had Mindanawons Fr. Eliseo Mercado of the Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference and Datu Michael Mastura, a lawyer and historian and member of the MILF peace panel, as consultants. In December 2001, the film was screened to jam-packed theatres across the Philippines, bringing tears as it played to Christian and Muslim audiences throughout the nation. Many viewers found the film an effective method of helping the Christian majority look at the situation in Mindanao from the eyes of the Muslims.

## Conclusion

Civil society's contributions to the peace process, through its engagements in the formal peace negotiations and its continued grassroots peacebuilding efforts, deserve commendation considering the difficulties and frustrations brought about by two major wars in a span of three years and the spectre of terrorism and anti-Muslim sentiments following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.

But despite the best efforts of civil society actors, the powers to decide on war rests in Metro Manila with people who have not, and will not feel the consequences of their decisions. This is the greatest challenge for civil society. There is much more to be done to expand the spaces and to strengthen the voices for peace to be able to influence policies at the national level or even merely to prevent another war from erupting.



# Key texts

Documents relating to the Philippines–Mindanao peace process, 2000–2003

All texts listed below, as well as those published in *Compromising on Autonomy* (Accord issue 6) are available on Conciliation Resources' website, <http://www.c-r.org/accord>

Titles listed in bold are reproduced here.

**General Framework of Agreement of Intent between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front**, March 24, 2001, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

**Tripoli Agreement on peace between the GRP and the MILF**, June 22, 2001, Tripoli, Libya.

**GRP–MILF joint communiqué**, issued August 7, 2001, Putrajaya, Malaysia

**Implementing guidelines on the security aspect of the GRP–MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001** signed by GRP and MILF, August 7, 2001, Putrajaya, Malaysia.

**Joint Communiqué between the GRP and the MILF** agreeing to the isolation and interdiction of all criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups operating in Mindanao, May 6, 2002, Cyberjaya, Malaysia.

**Implementing guidelines on the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspects of the GRP–MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001**, May 7, 2002, Putrajaya, Malaysia.

Joint statement signed by the MNLF and MILF, during the first meeting of the Joint Coordinating Council of the Bangsamoro Solidarity Conference, May 9, 2002, Cyberjaya, Malaysia.

GRP–MILF Joint statement signed by the GRP and the MILF, March 28, 2003, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

## **General Framework of Agreement of Intent between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)**

In the name of God, Most Beneficent, Most Merciful

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), herein referred to as the Parties

Recognizing the need for a negotiated political settlement to bring an end to the armed conflict in Mindanao.

Desiring to contribute toward the end and to promote an enduring peace and stability in Mindanao.

Noting the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities of July 18, 1997, signed at Cagayan de Oro City, between the Parties;

Have agreed as follows:

### **Article I**

The Parties commit to pursue the peace negotiations on the substantive issues as soon as possible, and resolutely continue the negotiations on the substantive issues as soon as possible, and resolutely continue the negotiations until the Parties reach a negotiated political settlement.

### **Article II**

The Parties affirm their commitment to protect and respect human rights in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

### **Article III**

The Parties negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and hereby pledge to implement the joint agreements/arrangements previously signed by the Parties representatives, such as the Agreement for General Cessation of the Hostilities signed on July 18, 1997 at Cagayan de Oro City and other supplementary agreements.

### **Article IV**

The Parties pledge to refrain from the use or threat of force to attain undue advantage while peace negotiations on the substantive issues are ongoing.

### **Article V**

The parties recognize that there will be lasting peace in Mindanao when there is mutual trust, justice, freedom, and tolerance for the identity, culture, way of life and aspirations of all the peoples of Mindanao.

For the GRP:

Lt. Gen. Orlando V. Soriano (Ret.)  
Chairman, GRP Negotiating Panel

For the MILF:

Aleem Abdulaziz Mimbantas  
Chairman, MILF Negotiating Panel

## **Agreement on peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front**

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front herein referred to as the “Parties” to this Agreement;

Determined to establish a peaceful environment and a normal condition of life in the Bangsamoro homeland;

Reaffirming the General Cessation of Hostilities dated 18 July 1997 and the General Framework of the Agreement of intent signed between the Parties on 27 August 1998, and committing to reach a negotiated political settlement of the Bangsamoro problem, and enduring peace and stability in Mindanao;

Recalling the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 and the Jakarta Accord of 1996 between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the OIC Resolution No. 56/9–P (IS) on 12 November 2000 of the Ninth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference in Doha, State of Qatar, urging the GRP and the MILF “to promptly put an end to armed hostilities and to pursue peace talks towards finding a peaceful resolution to the existing problem in Mindanao;”

Noting that the basic elements/principles for the resumption of peace talks between the MILF and the GRP panels have been facilitated by the Government of Malaysia, as set forth in the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed on March 24, 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia;

Further recalling Article VI of the said Agreement on General Framework for the Resumption of the Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in which Parties agreed to undertake relief and rehabilitation measures for evacuees, and joint development projects in the conflict affected areas; and

Recognizing that peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF is for the advancement of the general interest of the Bangsamoro people and other indigenous people; and, recognizing further the need for a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement of the conflict in Mindanao, the Parties welcome the resumption of the peace talks and, consequently,

Have agreed as follows:

#### A. SECURITY ASPECT

In accordance with the incremental characteristic of the peace process and agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of the Peace Talks, the Parties, as represented by their respective Peace Panels, consider that normalization in conflict affected areas can be achieved if certain principles and guidelines of conduct and action are adhered to by the Parties. That among these are:

1. All past agreements of the Parties shall be implemented in accordance with the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of the Peace Talks signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 24 March 2001 for the progressive resolution of the Bangsamoro problem with honor, justice, and integrity for all sectors of society.
2. The negotiation and peaceful resolution of the conflict must involve consultations with the Bangsamoro

people free of any imposition in order to provide chances of success and open new formulas that permanently respond to the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people for freedom.

3. The Parties agree to invite representatives of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to observe and monitor the implementation of all GRP-MILF Agreements. The Parties further agree to strengthen the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities dated 18 July 1997. Upon signing this Agreement, a Monitoring Team shall be constituted with representatives from the OIC.

#### B. REHABILITATION ASPECT

1. The observance of international humanitarian law and respect for internationally recognized human rights instruments and the protection of evacuees and displaced persons in the conduct of their relations reinforce the Bangsamoro people's fundamental right to determine their own future and political status.

2. The MILF shall determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict affected areas, except when public funds are involved, in which case Government procedures and rules will be observed.

3. The Parties shall safely return evacuees to their place of origin; provide all the necessary financial/material and technical assistance to start a new life, as well as allow them to be awarded reparations for their properties lost or destroyed by reason of the conflict.

4. In order to pave the way for relief and rehabilitation of evacuees and implementation of development projects in the areas affected by conflict, the Parties agree to implement the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities dated July 18, 1997.

#### C. ANCESTRAL DOMAIN ASPECT

On the aspect of ancestral domain, the Parties, in order to address the humanitarian and economic needs of the Bangsamoro people and preserve their social and cultural heritage and inherent rights over their ancestral domain, agree that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting.

D. ACTIVATION OF COMMITTEES  
Immediately upon signing of this Agreement, the Parties hereby agree to activate working committees for the purpose of discharging their mandates, particularly the implementation of all agreements between the Parties.

#### E. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Parties acknowledge the leadership of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in pursuing an all-out peace policy in Mindanao.

The Parties express their collective appreciation and gratitude to the Great Leader of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and to the Chairman of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi, for hosting the Formal Opening of the Resumption of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks in Tripoli, Libya; to His Excellency Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, Prime Minister of Malaysia and His Excellency Abdurrahman Wahid, President of the Republic of Indonesia, for their full and continuing support.

Done on this 22nd day of June 2001 corresponding to 30 Rabi' ul Aw'al 1422 in the presence of the representatives of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

For the GRP:  
JESUS G. DUREZA  
Chairman, GRP Peace Panel

For the MILF:  
AL HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM  
Chairman, MILF Peace Panel

Witnessed by:  
SAIF AL ISLAM GADDAFI  
Chairman of the Gaddafi  
International Foundation for  
Charitable Associations

## GRP-MILF Joint Communiqué

The Peace Panels of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) today signed a set of guidelines for the cessation of hostilities during the state visit of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in Kuala Lumpur.

Under the guidelines, the parties have agreed to normalize the situation in the conflict areas in Mindanao and pave the way for the successful conduct of relief, rehabilitation and development programs.

The guidelines implement an Agreement for Peace entered into by the parties in Tripoli, Libya on June 22, 2001. These prohibit hostile and provocative acts, harboring of criminals and lawless elements and all other acts that endanger the safety and security of the people in Mindanao.

The guidelines not only silence the guns for the peace of mind of the people. These also prohibit all public pronouncements that will tend to undermine the sincerity or credibility of both parties in waging peace.

Toward this end, the war of bullets and of words shall cease, and the parties shall follow the road to peace through earnest and principled negotiations. This will accord the Bangsamoro people permanent spaces for peace, self-reliance and development.

To prove the sincerity of both sides, the implementation of the ceasefire is open for all the people and the world to witness. Local monitoring teams shall include representatives of Local Government Units, Non-Governmental Organizations and the religious sector. Representatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), especially Malaysia, Libya and Indonesia, have been invited to observe and monitor the ceasefire as well as the implementation of all agreements.

In this spirit, the Panels express their appreciation and recognition of the noble efforts of H.E. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, H.E. Prime Minister Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohammad and the Great Leader Col. Muammar Khaddafi of the Arab Socialist Libyan Jamahiriyah

for advancing the cause of lasting peace, development and stability of the region.

The Panels agreed to hold their next round of talks within September 2001 to discuss the remaining agenda items on rehabilitation, development and ancestral domain.  
August 7, 2001

Atty. Jesus G. Dureza  
Chairman, GRP Peace Panel  
Al Hajj Murad Ebrahim  
Chairman, MILF Peace Panel

### Implementing guidelines on the security aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001

#### ARTICLE 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. GRP-MILF Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities dated July 18, 1997, including its Implementing administrative guidelines dated September 12, 1997 and Implementing Operational Guidelines dated November 14, 1997.
2. General Framework of the Agreement of Intent Between the GRP and the MILF dated August 27, 1998.
3. GRP-MILF Agreement on Safety and Security Guarantees dated March 09, 2000.
4. Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF signed on March 24, 2001 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
5. Agreement of Peace between the GRP and the MILF signed on June 22, 2001 at Tripoli, Libya.

#### ARTICLE II: DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following terms shall mean as follows:

1. GRP Forces - as referred to in the GRP-MILF Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities signed in Cagayan de Oro City on July 18, 1997.
2. MILF Forces - as referred to in the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities signed in Cagayan de Oro City on July 18, 1997.
3. Hostilities - is defined as aggressive or offensive military action such as aircraft bombing, artillery shelling, naval gunfire, attacks, raids, ambushes, sabotage, and related

actions such as kidnapping, hijacking of aircraft, vessels and vehicles, extortion, liquidation, arson, grenade throwing and other terroristic activities.

The "prohibited hostile acts" and "prohibited provocative acts" specifically enumerated under the Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities-Implementing Operational Guidelines ("AGH-IOG-1997") are embraced in the term "hostilities" and are construed as such as of the entry into force (EIF) of this Agreement.

3.1 The following are considered prohibited hostile acts:

3.1.1 Terroristic acts such as kidnapping, hijacking, piracy, sabotage, arson, bombings, grenade throwing, robberies, liquidations, assassinations; unjustified arrest, torture, unreasonable search and seizure, summary execution, as well as burning of houses, places of worship and educational institutions, destruction of properties, and abuse of civilians.

3.1.2 Aggressive action such as attacks, raids, ambushes, landmining, and offensive military actions such as shelling, reconnoitering, and unjustified massing of troops.

3.1.3 Establishment of checkpoints except those necessary for the GRP's enforcement and maintenance of peace and order; and, for the defense and security of the MILF in their identified areas, as jointly determined by the GRP and MILF.

3.2 The following are considered prohibited provocative acts:

3.2.1 Display of MILF flag in non-identified MILF areas.

3.2.2 Providing sanctuary or assistance to criminal or lawless elements.

3.2.3 Massive deployment and/or movement of GRP and MILF forces which are not normal administrative functions and activities

3.2.4 Public pronouncements that will tend to undermine the sincerity or credibility of either party in implementing the cessation of hostilities.

3.2.5 Other acts that endanger the safety and security of the people and their properties; and/or that which contribute to the deterioration of peace and order, such as blatant display of firearms.

4. Henceforth, should there be delineation of lines/positions agreed upon by the Parties, any action that projects forces or fire beyond one party's identified line/position shall be considered offensive military operations, which is prohibited under this Agreement.

5. OIC Monitoring Team - representatives of the member States of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as referred to in the Tripoli Peace Agreement dated June 22, 2001

#### ARTICLE III: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. The Parties shall commit their Armed Forces to a general cessation of hostilities pursuant to and in accordance with the Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities of 1997 and its Implementing Administrative Guidelines dated September 12, 1997 and Operational Guidelines dated November 14, 1997, effective upon entry into force (EIF) of this Agreement.

2. The Parties agree to implement all necessary measures to normalize the situation in the conflict-affected areas, to pave the way for, and ensure successful rehabilitation and development of said areas.

3. The Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) of both Parties shall continue to perform their powers and functions in accordance with Rule III, Section 4, of the Implementing Administrative Guidelines of the GRP-MILF General Cessation of Hostilities ("AGCH-IAG 1997") dated September 12, 1997.

4. Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs) are hereby established in all-conflict affected areas as mutually determined by the Parties.

4.1 To perform the functions of the Independent Fact-Finding Committees (IFFC) provided under Rule IV, Section 4, of the Implementing Administrative Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities herein referred to as annex "A",

4.2 To perform the functions of the Quick Response Team (QRT) provided under the Agreement Creating a Quick Response Team dated March 11, 1998, herein referred to as annex "B"

5. The Local Monitoring Team shall be

composed of five members, one each from the following:

5.1 Representative from the Local Government Units, designated by the GRP;

5.2 Representative from the MILF Local Political Committee;

5.3 Representative from NGOs nominated by the GRP;

5.4 Representative from NGOs nominated by the MILF; and

5.5 Representative from the Religious sector, chosen under mutual agreement; and The LMTs shall designate their respective Chairman and Co-Chairman.

6. The Parties hereby invite representatives from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), in particular Indonesia, Libya and Malaysia, and other interested OIC member States to observe and monitor the implementation of all GRP-MILF Agreements.

6.1 The OIC Monitoring Team shall formulate its guidelines, procedures and ground rules upon its constitution.

6.2 The Parties shall, upon request, provide the OIC Monitoring Team appropriate Technical and Administrative support, and security escorts in the performance of its functions.

7. The structure of the implementing mechanism on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001 is attached as annex "C" and shall form part of this Agreement.

8. The CCCH of each party shall, through their Parties, coordinate with the OIC Monitoring Team to address violations of this Agreement in addition to its powers and functions as provided for in Rule 3 of the Implementing Administrative Guidelines dated September 12, 1997.

9. Police and military actions and administrative/logistics activities shall continue to be undertaken by the GRP throughout Mindanao and the entire country. In the pursuit thereof, confrontational situations between the GRP and MILF forces shall be avoided by prior coordination with the latter. These actions include but are not limited to the following:

9.1. Peacekeeping and police actions such as preventive patrols, investigations, arrest, searches and seizures undertaken by the Government against criminality,

especially against, piracy, robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling, murder and other criminal acts.

9.2. Defensive or protective actions of the GRP to ensure the security of its forces, facilities, installations, equipment and lines of communications and the safety and tranquility of the civil government and population.

9.3. Hot pursuit of suspects by police and military personnel.

Paramilitary/irregular forces shall not be allowed to engage in hot pursuit under the terms of this Agreement.

10. Defensive or protective actions shall also be undertaken by the MILF [to ensure the security of its forces, facilities, installations, equipment and lines of communications and safety and tranquility of its civilian constituents.

11. In cases of alleged violations of this agreement, the Parties shall refrain from taking offensive or punitive military actions of any type against each other without prior investigation by the CCCH of both Parties in coordination with the OIC Monitoring Team.

#### ARTICLE IV: SAFETY AND SECURITY GUARANTEES

1. The Parties shall continue to respect and observe the provisions of the GRP-MILF Agreement of Safety and Security Guarantees dated March 9, 2000.

2. The safety and security guarantees extended by the Government to the MILF members who are directly and principally involved in the GRP MILF Peace Talks signed on March 9, 2000 shall remain in full force and effect as a necessary safeguard for the conduct of the peace talks.

3. MILF members covered by paragraph 1 above shall not be restrained or arrested, searched, seized and harassed on their persona and property in connection with their participation or involvement in the peace talks, except in cases of commission of common crimes such as crimes against persons, chastity, property, and other similar offenses.

4. The GRP and MILF Peace Panel Chairmen shall issue appropriate identification cards to MILF members covered by GRP-MILF Agreement of Safety and Security Guarantees.

## ARTICLE V: EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE

This Agreement shall take effect upon signing. Done on this 7th day of August 2001 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.

For the GRP:

**IRENE M. SANTIAGO**  
Acting Chairperson  
GRP Technical Committee

For the MILF:

**ATTY. MUSIB M. BUAT**  
Chairperson  
MILF Technical Committee

Attested by:

**ATTY. JESUS G. DUREZA**  
Chairman, GRP Peace Panel

**AL HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM**  
Chairman, MILF Peace Panel

## Joint Communiqué between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

1. The government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have agreed to the isolation and interdiction of all criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups, including so-called "lost commands" operating in Mindanao.

2. Both sides agreed that the activities of these criminal groups impede the peace process, the effective pursuit of development programs, and the efficient delivery of basic services to the poor: for this purpose, immediate and joint action is needed for the security and upliftment of the affected communities.

3. The AFP/PNP shall convey to the MILF an order of battle containing the names and identities of criminal elements as defined in the Implementing Guidelines on the security aspect of the GRP-MILF agreement on peace of 2001 suspected of hiding in MILF areas/communities.

4. The MILF and the GRP shall form an ad hoc joint action group against criminal elements. This group will operate in tandem with their Respective Coordinating committees on the cessation of hostilities (CCCH).

5. A quick coordination system will be established by the GRP-MILF ad hoc joint action group to enhance their communications and working relations for the successful apprehension or capture of criminal elements in accordance with this agreement provided, that criminals operating outside MILF areas/communities are considered beyond the purview of the peace process.

6. The MILF shall block the entry of criminals into MILF areas/communities. The MILF may request the assistance of the AFP or PNP in the conduct of operations against such criminals inside MILF areas/communities.

7. The agreement shall be enforced by the MILF and the GRP through their respective coordinating committees on the cessation of hostilities. The MILF and the GRP express sincere adherence to the implementation of this agreement, including other existing peace agreements, so that the peace negotiation of substantive issues can proceed smoothly towards a just and lasting peace in Mindanao.

Signed on this 6th day of May month 2002 at Cyberjaya.

For the GRP:  
Sec. Norberto Gonzales  
For the MILF  
Atty. Lanang Ali

Attested by:  
Sec. Eduardo Ermita  
Al Haj Murad

## Implementing guidelines on the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001

### ARTICLE I: PARTIES

The Government of the Republic Philippines (GRP), represented by the Honorable Secretary NORBERTO B. GONZALES, Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns, and The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), represented by **ATTY. MUSIB BUAT**, Chairman, MILF Technical Committee.

### ARTICLE II: TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Kuala Lumpur Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the MILF, dated March 24, 2001;  
2. GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 22, 2001; and  
3. Applicable provisions of international instruments and covenants on International Human Rights Laws (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) entered into by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

### ARTICLE III: DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. Conflict-Affected Areas - refer to places where armed conflict between the GRP forces and the MILF forces is taking place or had taken place or where there are evacuees and/or displaced families as a result of such armed conflict.  
2. Relief and Rehabilitation of evacuees - refer to the provision of appropriate services and necessary material needs to the evacuees and displaced families, their safe return to their places of origin, and their protection against loss of life, physical harm, illegal arrest or detention, fear and harassment, loss and destruction of their properties, and similar acts, to enable them to return to normal life.  
3. Rehabilitation and Development projects - refer to the projects to be implemented in the conflict-affected areas.  
4. MILF Designated Agency - refers to duly organized/registered/constituted agency or body designated by the MILF to determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas pursuant to paragraph two (2) of the Rehabilitation and Development Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 22, 2001.  
5. Government agencies - refer to the national and local agencies of the government involved in the rehabilitation and development projects in areas affected by the conflict.

### ARTICLE IV: RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAWS

1. This agreement will safeguard the observance of international humanitarian laws, respect for internationally recognized human

rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons within Mindanao. The GRP will secure to all persons within its jurisdiction or territory the highest level of recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. The GRP shall grant recognized accredited human rights agencies and organizations full access to monitor the human rights situation in conflict-affected areas.

2. In case of violation of human rights or humanitarian laws, the Joint Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) of the GRP and the MILF shall act in accordance with the provisions of Article IV of this agreement.

3. The parties will cooperate fully with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work in accordance with its mandate, ensuring full access to such persons, irrespective of their status, wherever they might be held, for visits in accordance with ICRC's standard operating procedures.

4. In conformity with international humanitarian law, each Party shall provide information, through the tracing mechanism of the ICRC, to families of all persons who are unaccounted for. The GRP and the MILF will cooperate fully in determining the identity, whereabouts, and fate of those missing persons.

5. The Parties shall cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian laws and human rights as well as violations of this agreement.

#### ARTICLE V: IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS

To pave the way for the immediate return of evacuees to their places of origin and for their relief and rehabilitation, and in the implementation of relief, rehabilitation and development projects in areas affected by the conflict, as stipulated in the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace dated June 22, 2001, the Parties are hereby committed as follows:

1. The MILF, in order to determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and development projects in the areas affected by the conflict, will establish a project implementing body, which will have the power and function to receive and disburse private and government funds. And in the case of GRP funds, it will observe pertinent Government rules and procedures, pursuant to the

provisions of paragraph B-2 of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 22, 2001.

2. The GRP and concerned government agencies, in coordination with the MILF, will continue to undertake the rehabilitation and development efforts in the conflict-affected areas.

Consistent with GRP's resolve to task the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as its primary implementing agency for development, the ARMM shall enter into contractual relations within its charter, pertaining to rehabilitation and development, with the MILF project implementing body. Likewise, with other government development agencies outside ARMM areas.

3. The Parties shall safely return evacuees to their places of origin and provide all necessary financial/material and technical assistance to those evacuees for them to start a new life. The GRP shall award reparations for the properties lost or destroyed by reasons of the conflict, upon reasonable proof thereon as mutually verified and acknowledged by both parties.

4. The Parties shall maintain an inventory or record of all relief and rehabilitation assistance or project actually extended by the GRP and other private entities to the evacuees and conflict-affected areas.

5. The MILF will submit to the GRP the name, structure and personnel of its project implementing body assigned to determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and development projects in the areas affected by the conflict as provided in the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace dated June 22, 2001.

6. The Parties will formulate work-programs, which will identify and/or define areas of cooperation and complementation for the benefit of the people affected by the conflict, which may be undertaken through agencies/bodies or other institutional arrangements that may be agreed upon by the Parties.

7. During the implementation of rehabilitation and development projects, the GRP-CCCH and MILF-CCCH shall see to it that the commitments of the Parties to peace are strictly observed in accordance with the Implementing Guidelines on

the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 22, 2001.

8. The Parties shall seek the assistance of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) as partner in the pursuit of rehabilitation and development projects.

#### ARTICLE VI: MONITORING MECHANISM

The Parties shall take steps to activate the Monitoring Team with representatives of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in order to:

1. Monitor the implementation of all rehabilitation and development projects; the observance of international humanitarian laws and internationally recognized human rights, and the protection of evacuees and displaced persons, and their safe return to their places of origin, in the areas affected by the conflict;
2. Coordinate its monitoring activities with the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) of both Parties and the project implementing agency of the MILF;
3. Formulate its internal rules and procedures to govern the conduct of its monitoring activities;
4. Serve as an advisory body to the GRP and MILF Panels in the implementation of this agreement, and other related agreements.

The GRP shall continue monitoring existing government relief, rehabilitation and development projects managed and funded by its agencies in the areas affected by the conflict, in coordination with the Monitoring Team and the MILF project-implementing agency, to avoid overlapping of activities.

#### ARTICLE VII: ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

1. The principal office of the Monitoring Team shall be in Cotabato City. However, branch offices may be established in other areas as determined by the Parties.
2. The GRP shall provide the Monitoring Team office space, equipment, vehicles, supplies, and other administrative and support requirements.

ARTICLE VIII: PUBLIC INFORMATION  
Both Parties shall conduct a continuing public information and education campaign with the aim of ensuring the

full support of all concerned persons, communities, agencies, and forces, of the relief, rehabilitation and development efforts of the Parties in the areas affected by the conflict.

**ARTICLE IX: EFFECTIVITY**

These guidelines shall take effect upon its signing.

Done this 7th day of May 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.

For the GRP:  
**HON. NORBERTO B. GONZALES**  
 Presidential Adviser  
 for Special Concerns

For the MILF:  
**ATTY. MUSIB BUAT**  
 Chairman, MILF Technical Committee

Attested by:  
**HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA**  
 Presidential Adviser  
 on the Peace Process  
**AL HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM**  
 Chairman, MILF Peace Panel

Witnessed by:  
**DR. PAROUK S. HUSSIN**  
 Regional Governor, ARMM

**GRP-MILF Joint Statement**

The Philippine Government Panel for the Exploratory Talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) met with the representatives of the MILF

Peace Panel on March 27-28, 2003 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and agreed on the following:

1. Both parties reiterate their commitment to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting political statement of the conflict in Mindanao and resolve to undertake appropriate steps to pave the way for the resumption of the formal GRP-MILF peace negotiations;
2. Both parties reaffirm to implement effectively on the ground all past and existing GRP-MILF agreements. Details of implementation shall be discussed by the Panels;
3. Both parties agree to exercise mutual restraint to minimize, if not put on end to, violence in Mindanao;
4. To normalize the situation and facilitate the early return of evacuees to their places of origin and allow rehabilitation to proceed, a new arrangement on the ground will be forged by both parties;
5. The Philippine Government takes note of the activation of the Bangsamoro Development Agency;
6. Both parties agree to direct their respective Technical Committees to work on the Implementing Guidelines of the Joint Communiqué signed on May 6, 2002 to ensure that the peace process is not adversely affected by the presence of criminal groups in Mindanao. The Technical Committees will meet within two weeks from today;
7. The parties agree to improve the

existing mechanism for monitoring of the cessation of hostilities including the composition of an observer/monitoring group as provided for in the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001;

8. The parties reaffirm the provision on the grant of Safety and Security Guarantees to MILF leaders and members who are directly and principally involved in the GRP-MILF peace talks; and

9. Both parties express their gratitude for the gracious hospitality of the Government of Malaysia in hosting and facilitating the exploratory talks and for continuing its support to the peace process.

Done in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia this 28th day of March 2003.

For the GRP:  
**PA JESUS G. DUREZA**

Members of the Delegation:  
**SEC. NORBERTO B. GONZALES**  
**SEC. CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN**  
**USEC. ANTONIO C. SANTOS**  
**EDIR. DIOSITA T. ANDOT**

For the MILF:  
**ATTY. LANANG ALI**

Members of the Delegation:  
**ATTY. MICHAEL O. MASTURA**  
**ATTY. MUSIB M. BUAT**  
**MOHAJIRIN T. ALI**

**Acronyms**

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines	MCC	Mindanao Coordinating Committee
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
BUF	Bishops-Ulama Forum	MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
CCCH	Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities	MPC	Mindanao People's Caucus
FPA	Final Peace Agreement	NPA	New People's Army
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines	OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
JCCH	Joint Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities	OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process
LMT	Local Monitoring Team	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

# Chronology

## 1999-2003

### 1999

#### October

Following twenty months of talks at the technical committees level, formal peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) open on 25 October at the Da'wah Center, Sultan Kudarat, Maguidanao.

#### November

Fighting breaks out in North Cotabato between the Philippines army (AFP) and MILF forces.

#### December

GRP and MILF peace panels meet on 17 December and agree on the rules and procedures for the conduct of formal peace talks.

### 2000

#### January

In the first week of January, President Joseph Estrada sets a deadline of 30 June for the forging of a peace agreement.

Fighting breaks out in Maguindanao between AFP and MILF forces. MILF Camp Omar Al-Farouk, recognized by the MILF-GRP Second Joint Acknowledgement of October 1999, is attacked by the AFP on 9 January.

Negotiations between the GRP and the MILF on procedural matters take place from 17-20 January.

#### February

The AFP take control of Camp Omar Al-Farouk on 21 February.

The bombing of a ferry boat in Ozamis City on 25 February is one of a series of attacks the government blames on the MILF, which the latter denies.

#### March

A land dispute in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte leads to a siege of the town hall in mid-March by alleged MILF elements. After two days of fighting AFP Marines assume

control on 19 March. On 21 March, President Estrada announces an 'all-out war' against the MILF.

On 26 March, MILF Chief Hashim Salamat calls for a United Nations-organized independence vote for Muslims in Mindanao. Abu Sayyaf take 70 hostages on Basilan island, later freeing 41.

#### April

Abu Sayyaf kidnap 21 tourists from Sabah, Malaysia on 23 April.

The Bishops-Ulama Forum issues a statement on 26 April calling for a renewed ceasefire in central Mindanao.

The GRP and MILF sign an *aide memoire* on 27 April, signalling agreement to normalize the situation in Mindanao, pursue the ongoing peace process, and resolve the situation in the Narciso Ramos Highway. The next morning, government and MILF forces fight for control of the highway. Two days later the MILF suspends peace negotiations indefinitely citing the military's disregard of the 27 April agreement.

Renewed fighting occurs towards the end of the month in Matanog, Maguindanao.

#### May

On 5 May the MILF declares a unilateral cessation of hostilities for 48 hours. The GRP continue their military operation. They demand the MILF lay down their arms and release the hostages, claiming that the MILF and Abu Sayyaf are acting in concert. Hostilities resume in Matanog and other municipalities in North Cotabato.

The GRP-MILF peace panels meet on 30-31 May in Cotabato City where the GRP panel presents a political package that includes a draft bill amending RA 6734 (ARMM Organic Act).

While the peace panels are meeting on 31 May, MILF Camp Bushra is bombed, and the Philippine flag raised in a mosque there.

#### June

On the third and final day of negotiations, 1 June, the MILF agrees to consider the government's offer of "meaningful autonomy", but no ceasefire is declared.

On 2 June the government urges displaced people to return to areas designated as zones of peace, where the government has taken effective control after fighting with the MILF.

The MILF central committee decides to withdraw from talks on 15 June.



On 15 June, the Malaysian Foreign Minister assures President Estrada that the OIC is not inviting the MILF to the forthcoming ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 29 June, but notes that it may be represented at phases of the meeting not restricted to OIC members. The MILF presents its position paper for the first time at an Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting, which ends with a resolution calling on both panels to return to the negotiating table.

## July

The government declares victory over the MILF on 9 July. President Estrada visits the MILF's main camp, Abubakar, the next day to raise the Philippine flag and to announce that all of MILF's 46 camps have been taken over by government.

Philippine newspapers report on 12 July that Hashim has declared a jihad against the Philippine government.

The Eleventh Congress starts discussions on proposed House Bills (Senate Bill 2129 and House Bill 7883) that will eventually supplant RA 6734 (ARMM Organic Act) on 24 July.

## August

Arrest warrants are issued against MILF leaders.

On 21 August, the MILF disbands its peace panel days before expected peace panel meetings.

## September

The MILF's 16th General Assembly on 22-24 September confirms their decision to withdraw from peace talks and endorses Hashim's declaration of jihad.

The government announces on 30 September that it has withdrawn criminal charges against the MILF leadership, offering amnesty and safe passage.

## October

The first of a number of corruption allegations against President Estrada emerges on 6 October.

## December

The government holds an amnesty in Cagayan de Oro, and some 800 MILF fighters allegedly exchange weapons for a pardon and \$290. The MILF claims the ceremony included no real MILF fighters, but instead local civilians.

## 2001

### January

Following the fall of Estrada on 21 January, Arroyo takes her oath of office as President of the Philippines on 21

January. During the ceremony, Arroyo also declares her "all-out peace" policy.

## February

President Arroyo appoints the members of the GRP peace panel to negotiate with the MILF.

On 7 February, both the Philippine Senate and the House of Representatives approve the two house bills (HB 7883 and SB 2129) as Republic Act 9054, the new law that will supplant RA 6734 (ARMM Organic Act).

Arroyo orders a suspension of military operations against the MILF on 20 February to encourage a resumption of peace talks, but does not agree to the MILF demand to withdraw from camps overtaken during Estrada's rule. The ceasefire is broken on 24 February as the AFP and MILF accuse each other of launching attacks.

## March

President Arroyo names MNLF chair Nur Misuari Special Envoy to the OIC on 13 March.

The MNLF and MILF meet in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MNLF is represented by the members of its Executive Council.

The government and MILF sign a *General Framework of Agreement of Intent* on 24 March in Kuala Lumpur.

A month after being approved in both houses of Congress, RA 9054 comes into force on 30 March.

## April

The MILF declares a "suspension of offensive military action" against AFP forces on 3 April, reciprocated by the government. The day before, the government had announced an all-out offensive to "annihilate" the Abu Sayyaf.

In late April, the MNLF Executive Council ousts Misuari and collectively assumes the chairmanship. Misuari remains governor of the ARMM.

## June

Peace negotiations are held in Tripoli, Libya, 19-22 June. On 22 June an *Agreement on Peace* is signed by GRP peace panel chair Jesus Dureza and MILF peace panel chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim.

## July

Beginning 24 July, a week of GRP-MILF peace negotiations are held in Port Dickson, Malaysia to flesh out the June agreements.

## August

On August 7, the MNLF Executive Council and the MILF sign an *Agreement on the General Framework for Unity* in Putrajaya, Malaysia.

On the same day the government and MILF peace panels sign a *Joint Communiqué and Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001*.

The plebiscite on an expanded ARMM is held on 14 August. One city and one province vote to join the ARMM.

## October

Peace negotiations are held in Selangor, Malaysia. The GRP and MILF sign a Manual of Instructions for Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs) on 18 October.

## November

On 19 November, Misuari is accused of rebellion after attacks on security posts in Jolo by MNLF fighters. The next day, President Arroyo issues a preventive suspension barring him from exercising his powers as ARMM governor. On 24 November, Misuari is arrested in Malaysia.

In the ARMM election of 26 November, MNLF Executive Council member Parouk Hussin is elected Governor, a post he assumes in January.

## December

The GRP and MNLF sign a *Joint Communiqué* to recognize the progress made in the implementation of the 1996 FPA and the need to sustain such progress for the good of the Muslims in southern Philippines, in Manila on 20 December.

## 2002

### January

Presidential Assistant for Mindanao Jesus Dureza takes Misuari from Subang Jaya, Royal Malaysian Air Force Base on 7 January and brings him to the detention bungalow in Sta. Rosa Laguna.

The CCCH, tasked with supervising the implementation of the ceasefire, meets for the first time on 12 January.

### February

Skirmishes resume in various parts of central Mindanao.

## March

President Arroyo suspends formal peace talks with the MILF.

## April

Geneva Call persuades the MILF to sign a deed of commitment against use of landmines after a meeting at a MILF camp in Maguindanao.

## May

The GRP and MILF sign a *Joint Communiqué* on the isolation and interdiction of all criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups operating in Mindanao, on 6 May in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The next day *Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001* are signed in Putrajaya, Kuala Lumpur.

The MNLF and MILF hold a first meeting of the Joint Coordinating Council of the Bangsamoro Solidarity Conference (BSC) on 8-9 May in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and agree to send a joint delegation to the 29th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 27 June in Sudan.

## June

The MILF's project implementing body, the Bangsamoro Development Agency, is set up to "lead, manage and determine" rehabilitation and development projects in the conflict-affected areas.

## July

President Arroyo announces on 2 July that the MILF's former headquarters Camp Abubakar will become an army base named Camp Datu Sinsuat.

From July to September, members of LMTs are appointed as per the GRP-MILF agreements in 2001, and a series of local workshops are held in various parts of central and western Mindanao. The Bangsamoro Development Agency also conducts a series of planning workshops.

## November

On 6 November Jesus Dureza denies that the USA is to list the MILF as a terrorist group, after reports to the contrary following a meeting between Philippine and US government officials.

## December

Government peace chairman Jesus Dureza and panel member Irene Santiago admit during a meeting with the members of Mindanao media on 28 December that a peace agreement is expected to be forged within the first quarter of 2003 to avoid "politicization" of the peace process.

## 2003

### February

On February 10, the government peace panel presents the draft final peace agreement with the MILF to congressional leaders.

Philippine government forces storm the Buliok Complex in the town of Pikit, in Cotabato Province on 11 February (the day of the *Eid'ul Adha*). Efforts to get the ceasefire committees to meet on 12 February fail as the MILF declines to attend the meeting before government troops move out.

President Arroyo approves a draft peace proposal for the MILF on 19 February.

### March

A bomb explodes at the waiting shed of Davao International Airport on 4 March, killing 22 people and injuring at least a hundred others. Hashim reportedly condemns the act.

Charges of multiple murder and frustrated multiple murder are filed against Hashim, Vice-Chair for military affairs Al Haj Murad Ebrahim (also MILF peace panel chair), Vice-Chair for political affairs Ghazaali Jaafar, and spokesperson Eid Kabalu.

On 27-28 March, the government and MILF peace panel representatives meet in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Jesus Dureza (GRP) and Lanang Ali (MILF) sign a *Joint Statement* on 28 March, reiterating their commitment to resume formal peace negotiations and to honour and implement past agreements.

### April

A bomb explodes at Sasa Wharf in Davao City on 2 April, killing 16 and wounding 55 others.

MILF fighters attack the town of Maigo, Lanao del Norte on 24 April, leaving 13 people dead.

### May

Twenty-two people die in a MILF bomb attack in Siocon on 4 May, prompting the Philippine government to call off the 9-11 May exploratory talks in Kuala Lumpur.

On 5 May, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) issues an open letter to both Arroyo and Hashim urging for a ceasefire and return to negotiations. Days later the Bishops Ulama Conference issues a statement offering to mediate between the MILF and the GRP.

On 9 May, GRP peace panel Chair Jesus Dureza resigns, claiming he wants to focus his efforts on development in Mindanao.

A market place in Koronadal City, South Cotabato is bombed on 10 May. Fifteen people are killed and 31 are wounded. The government blames the MILF.

On 13 May President Arroyo warns the MILF that she will recommend the USA puts them on their list of terrorist organizations if they do not end attacks on civilians by 1 June.

On 14 May, the OIC officially recognizes ARMM governor Parouk Hussin as chair of the MNLF.

Arroyo declares a war of "will and vision" against the MILF on 17 May, and orders "selective attacks" on "embedded terrorist lairs" in central and western Mindanao. In the evening of the same day, Arroyo departs for a state visit to the US, and returns a week later having secured US\$356m in defence and counter-terrorism aid.

On 28 May, the MILF announces a unilateral 10 day ceasefire beginning 2 June, welcomed by President Arroyo. The next day the MILF is involved in an attack on Carmen town, North Cotabato, in which five civilians are killed.

### June

The MILF extends its ceasefire for another 10 days on 12 June.

Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process Eduardo Ermita, named as chair of the government peace panel on 10 June, announces that the government will withdraw its offer to resume peace talks if MILF chair Salamat Hashim does not act as chief negotiator for the MILF.

On 22 June, the MILF extends its ceasefire indefinitely and requests a matching gesture from the military. Hashim issues a policy statement dated 20 June "rejecting terror as a means to resolve differences". The government welcomes the move but urges Hashim to declare a permanent ceasefire and reiterates its call for him to personally head the MILF peace panel.

The government announces on 24 June that following meetings of the peace panels GRP-MILF talks will resume in Malaysia and Hashim will lead the MILF negotiators and sign any resulting agreements.

# Further reading

**Abinales, Patricio.** *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000).

**Bertrand, J.** 'Peace and conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 peace agreement is fragile', *Pacific Affairs*, 2000 (September) Vol. 73, No. 1: 37-55.

**Case, William.** 'Mindanao and its impact on the Southern Philippines', in Bruce Vaughn, *The unraveling of Island Asia? Governmental, Communal and Regional Instability* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).

**Gaspar, Karl, CSSR, Elpidio Lapad & Ailynne Maravillas.** *Mapagpakamalinawon: A Reader for the Mindanawon Peace Advocate*, Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao and Catholic Relief Services.

**Gomez, Hilario M.** *The Moro rebellion and the search for peace: a study on Christian-Muslim relations in the Philippines* (Zamboanga City, Philippines: Silsilah Publications, 2000).

**Gutierrez, Eric et al.** *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: a reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in the Southern Philippines* (Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000).

**Hashim, Salamat.** *The Bangsa Moro People's Struggle Against Oppression and Colonialism* (Camp Abubakre As-Siddique: MILF Agency for Youth Affairs, 2001).

**Linnga, Abhoud Syed M.** 'Peace Process in Mindanao: The MILF-GRP Negotiations'. Paper presented during the Round Table Discussion on Updates on Muslims in Mindanao, sponsored by the Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines on February 7, 2002 at Romulo Hall, UP Diliman, Quezon City.  
<http://www.yonip.com/YONIP/Articles/negotiations.html>

**May, Ron J.** 'Muslim Mindanao, Four Years after the Peace Agreement' *Southeast Asian Affairs 2001*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (2001): 263-275.

**May, Ron J.** 'Beyond Ethnic Separatism: Recent Developments in the Southern Philippines', *Strategic Update 2001*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, (2001): 17-20.

**McKenna, Thomas.** *Muslim Rulers and Rebels : Everyday Politics & Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

**Mercado, Eliseo R.** *Southern Philippines question: the challenge of peace and development* (Cotobato City, Philippines: Notre Dame Press, 1999).

**Santos, Soliman M.** *The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process* (University of the Philippines Press: Manila, 2001).

**Vitug, Marites Dañguilan & Glenda M Gloria.** *Under the crescent moon: rebellion in Mindanao* (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo Center for Social Policy & Public Affairs, Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000).

**Yegar, Moshe.** *Between integration and secession. the Muslim communities of the southern Philippines, southern Thailand, and western Burma/Myanmar* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002).

## Electronic resources

**Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process**  
<http://www.opapp.gov.ph>

**Moro National Liberation Front**  
<http://mnlf.net>

**Moro Islamic Liberation Front**  
<http://www.luwaran.com>

### Information and campaigning sites:

**Just Peace**  
<http://www.justpeace.net.ph/process/index.htm>

**Kalinaw Mindanaw (Peace Mindanao)**  
<http://www.mindanao.com/kalinaw/peaceproc/process.htm>

**Mindanews**  
<http://www.mindanews.com>

**Initiatives for International Dialogue**  
<http://www.iidnet.org/adv/mda/overview.htm>

# conciliation resources

Conciliation Resources (CR) was established in 1994 to provide an international service and act as a resource in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. CR's principal objective is to support the activities of locally-based groups working at community or national levels in preventing violent conflict or seeking to transform armed conflict into opportunities for social, political and economic development based on more just relationships.

In striving to attain that objective, CR:

- assists organizations in developing innovative and sustainable solutions to short- and long-term problems related to armed conflict;
- involves previously marginalized groups in community and national peacemaking and peacebuilding processes;

- helps strengthen civic capabilities for dialogue, problem-solving and constructive action locally, nationally and regionally;
- contributes to the local and international development and dissemination of conflict transformation practice and theory.

In addition to the Accord programme, CR has worked in 2001 and 2002 with:

- civic groups in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria
- Kacoke Madit and its partners in northern Uganda
- journalists and media organizations in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda
- the Angolan non-governmental organization ADRA and its local partners

- the Citizens' Constitutional Forum in Fiji
- non-governmental organizations and officials in Georgia and Abkhazia
- community-based organizations in the South Balkans

For more information or to make a donation contact:

**Conciliation Resources**  
**173 Upper Street**  
**London N1 1RG**  
**United Kingdom**

Telephone +44 (0)20 7359 7728  
Fax +44 (0)20 7359 4081  
E-mail [conciliation@c-r.org](mailto:conciliation@c-r.org)  
Website <http://www.c-r.org>


*Charity Registration No 1055436*

**Participants at a CR workshop on election coverage in Nigeria.**



# The Accord series


*Accord: an international review of peace initiatives is published by Conciliation Resources (CR). It provides detailed narrative and analysis on specific war and peace processes in an accessible format. The series is intended to provide a practical resource for reflection for all those engaged in peacemaking activities.*



## The Liberian Peace Process 1990–1996

Issue 1 | 1996


The Liberia issue documents the lengthy and fractious Liberian peace process and provides insight into why thirteen individual peace accords collapsed in half as many years.



## Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge

Issue 5 | 1998


This publication documents issues around the signing of the 1991 Paris agreements which officially "brought to an end" Cambodia's long war and the violent collapse of the country's governing coalition in July 1997.



## Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process

Issue 2 | 1997

The signing of the peace agreement in 1996 brought an end to 36 years of civil war in Guatemala. The publication analyses issues of impunity, indigenous rights, political participation and land reform.




## Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition

Issue 6 | 1999

The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was a milestone in many ways. The publication analyses features of peacemaking in Mindanao and examines the challenges of implementation.

New in 2003: Supplement issue



## The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

Issue 3 | 1998


The Mozambique issue documents the diverse initiatives which drove the parties to a negotiated settlement of the conflict as well as illustrating the impact of changing regional and international dynamics on Mozambique.



## A question of sovereignty: the Georgia-Abkhazia peace process

Issue 7 | 1999

The publication explores the background and issues at the heart of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict and 7 provides a unique insight into a political stalemate and points towards possible avenues out of deadlock.



## Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka

Issue 4 | 1998

The Sri Lanka issue documents the cycles of ethnic/national conflict which have blighted the country since 1983. It analyses negotiations and other peace initiatives that have taken place since 1993 and outlines fundamental issues that need to be confronted in future peacemaking efforts.




## Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process

Issue 8 | 1999

Accord 8 explores the factors that led to the negotiations resulting in the Belfast Agreement, describing the complex underlying forces and the development of an environment for peace.


New in 2003: Supplement issue



**Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process**

Issue 9 | 2000

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 sought to bring an end to one of the most brutal civil wars of recent times. *Accord* 9 explores earlier attempts to bring the conflict to an end and in doing so seeks to draw valuable lessons for Sierra Leone's transition.



**Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville peace process**

Issue 12 | 2002

*Accord* 12 documents efforts leading to the Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001. The issue describes an indigenous process that drew on the strengths of Melanesian traditions, as well as innovative roles played by international third-parties.



**Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process**

Issue 10 | 2001

*Accord* 10 describes the aspirations of the parties to the conflict in Tajikistan and documents the negotiation process leading to the General Agreement of June 1997. It looks at the role of the international community, led by the UN, as well as of local civil society, in reaching a negotiated settlement.



**Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking**

Issue 13 | 2002

The first thematic publication documents mechanisms for public participation in peacemaking. It features extended studies looking at how people were enabled to participate in political processes in Guatemala, Mali and South Africa. It also contains shorter pieces from Colombia, Northern Ireland and the Philippines.



**Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda**

Issue 11 | 2002

While a meaningful peace process in Northern Uganda remains elusive, this issue documents significant peacemaking initiatives undertaken by internal and external actors and analyses their impact on the dynamics of the conflict and attempts to find peace.

---

## Future issues

### The Angolan conflict and peace process

The death of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) in February 2002 and the signing of the Luena Memorandum on 4 April 2002 brought an abrupt end to the 27-year civil war in Angola. Since then, the country has embarked on a process of transition, addressing challenges such as demobilization, development and reconciliation. The *Accord* publication will provide an overview of peacemaking efforts during the conflict and attempt to understand why they failed to halt the violence. It will also document current progress in addressing key 'post-conflict' issues, highlighting the roles played by the government, civil society, the business sector and the international community.

### The Colombian conflict and peace process

If Colombia is home to one of the oldest and most protracted armed conflicts in the world, it has also produced some of the most innovative peacemaking efforts of recent years. While some initiatives in the '20-year peace processes' led to the demobilization of a number of insurgent groups, efforts to reach substantive agreements with the two main guerrilla forces have so far failed. This issue of *Accord* will provide an overview of civic as well as formal peace initiatives, highlighting key local, regional and national processes. It will analyse the role of international actors and identify lessons for future peacemaking efforts.

# Accord: an international review of peace initiatives

## I would like to subscribe to Accord

Please tick against type of subscription requested

1 year (3 issues)	£45.00 / \$70.00
2 years (6 issues)	£88.00 / \$135.00
3 years (9 issues)	£130.00 / \$200.00

TOTAL £/\$ \_\_\_\_\_

## I would like to request a complete set/single issues

Price £200/\$304 for a complete set of back issues (1 copy each of issues 1 to 13) or £17/\$26 for a single issue – discounts available for bulk purchases

- |          |  |                          |
|----------|--|--------------------------|
| Issue 1  | The Liberian peace process 1990–1996   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 2  | Negotiating rights: the Guatemalan peace process   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 3  | The Mozambican peace process in perspective  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 4  | Demanding sacrifice: war & negotiation in Sri Lanka  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 5  | Safeguarding peace: Cambodia's constitutional challenge  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 6  | Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao in transition (including 2003 supplement)<br>Supplement only £5.00 / \$8.00       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 7  | A question of sovereignty: the Georgia–Abkhazia peace process  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 8  | Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process (including 2003 supplement)<br>Supplement only £5.00 / \$8.00 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 9  | Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 10 | Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 11 | Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda                               | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 12 | Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Issue 13 | Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Please indicate number required against issues requested

Postage & packing Please add 10% for UK, 15% for Europe and 25% and 30% for the rest of the World TOTAL £/\$ \_\_\_\_\_

## METHOD OF PAYMENT

**Cheque** made payable to 'Conciliation Resources' in pounds sterling or US dollars

**Bank transfers** (reference 'Accord') to account number 10022088, sort code 16-00-58   
Royal Bank of Scotland, London Islington Branch, 40 Islington High Street, London N1 8XJ

**Invoice** please send me an invoice for TOTAL £/\$ \_\_\_\_\_

**Credit card** Mastercard  Visa

Card number               Expiry date

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone \_\_\_\_\_ Fax \_\_\_\_\_ E-mail \_\_\_\_\_

To order, please photocopy this page and send to:

Accord Marketing, Conciliation Resources, 173 Upper Street, London N1 1RG, UK

For further information contact Accord

Telephone +44 (0)20 7359 7728 Fax +44 (0)20 7359 4081 E-mail accord@c-r.org Website www.c-r.org